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The Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union (‘CMU’) in the European 
Union (‘EU’) was launched by the European Commission in 2015. It aims to pursue a 
further development and integration of European capital markets by 2019. However, in 
the wake of the global financial crisis of 2007–09 and the Eurozone crisis, it is proven 
that appropriate governance is indispensible to underpin such integrated markets. 
Therefore, in order to establish a solid CMU, this thesis attempts to answer one crucial 
question: ‘whether investment conduct should be supervised centralisedly at the 
European level in the CMU’. 
This thesis, at first, explores the regulatory system of investment conduct in the 
EU to date, with particular emphasis given to the competence allocation between the 
EU and Member States (and between Member States). Two findings are important: first, 
even though the rules of investment conduct are harmonised to a large extent in the EU, 
supervisory issues still matter to investment intermediaries and their clients in 
cross-border transactions; and, second, the current supervisory system of investment 
conduct in the EU might bring significant costs in cross-border transactions, but this 
does not necessarily mean that the installation of a single supervisor in charge of 
investment conduct supervision is inevitable in the CMU. This thesis then examines the 
proposed single supervisor in detail, with an aim to find out the optimum institutional 
governance of investment conduct in the CMU. Based on the transaction cost approach, 
this thesis compares the proposed single supervisor and the current system from the 
perspectives of private law systems and administrative regulation respectively. From the 
perspective of private law governance, it is undeniable that many issues of private law in 
governing investment conduct are still unclear and complex in the EU, but the 
proposed single supervisor provides little help to these issues. By comparison, a 
non-mandatory pan-EU alternative dispute resolution (‘ADR’) for cross-border disputes 
of investment conduct might be a better option in reducing transaction costs in the 
CMU. From the perspective of administrative governance, the proposed single 
supervisor may also be difficult to pass the EU Treaty principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality. This is because the total transaction costs of European capital markets 
will not decrease (but even increase) after the introduction of the proposed single 
supervisor. It is further argued that, other than the establishment of the proposed single 
supervisor, policymakers have to pay more attention on how to ensure the current 
network-based system functions effectively in the CMU. In the light of this, not only a 
negative answer of the research question is concluded, but also policy recommendations 
for designing the optimum governance of investment conduct in the CMU are given in 
this thesis. 
 
Keywords: European Single Supervisor; Investment Conduct Regulation; 
Transaction Cost Approach; Capital Markets Union 
LAY SUMMARY 
Thanks to the right of establishment and the freedom to provide services, 
investment intermediaries nowadays can freely provide investment services in the 
European Union (‘EU’). Investment intermediaries can decide to do so either on the 
Internet, over the phone, or through their branches or subsidiaries in other Member 
States. Their (potential) clients in other Member States could also enjoy a wide variety of 
choices. However, due to the fact that these transactions may be considered as 
cross-border and supranational, which competent authority is appropriate to supervise 
these transactions is a complicated question. Furthermore, once disputes occur, which 
competent authority is able to handle and resolve these disputes efficiently is also hard 
to be answered. 
On the one hand, some may claim that investment intermediaries’ behaviour 
should be under the centralised supervision at the EU level. On the other hand, we may 
still have to take into account the costs of building up such a single supervisor and the 
heterogeneity of capital markets between Member States. This is the debate this thesis 
aims to examine. This thesis explores the current regulatory system in the EU and 
attempts to verify the challenges of the current system, whether there is a need for the 
establishment of the proposed single supervisor, and whether we have other alternatives 
to tackle these challenges. This provides some valuable policy recommendations for 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
‘We are interested here in what governs institutional and systemic 
performance and how we may, objectively and non-presumptively, 
analyse and understand the variables governing performance. The 
underlying motivation is two fold: first, to enable us to better know 
what is going on in the economy and the polity; and second, to 
enable us to better choose and effectuate meaningful and 
consequential institutional changes.’1 
 Research Background 1.
A single European capital market has been long dreamed by Europeanists, since 
the freedom of capital movement was enshrined in the Treaty of Rome (Title III, 
Chapter 4) in 1957.2 The Segré report,3 published in November, 1966 represents the 
first attempt to draw a comprehensive study of the problems confronting the capital 
markets of the European Economic Community (‘EEC’). As a result of the subsequent 
efforts of policymakers,4 investment intermediaries can now enjoy their freedom of 
providing investment services across Member States of the European Union (‘EU’).5 
This is the so-called ‘Single Passport’ regime. However, in the wake of the global 
																																																								
1 Alfred Allan Schmid, Property, Power, and Public Choice: An Inquiry Into Law and Economics (2nd edn, 
Praeger, 1987), at xi. 
2 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, not published in official journals. 
3 Report of a Group of Experts appointed by the EEC Commission: The Development of A European 
Capital Market, November, 1966, available at: 
<http://aei.pitt.edu/31823/1/Dev_Eur_Cap_Mkt_1966.pdf> (accessed June, 2017). 
4 See further in Section 2 of CHAPTER II (pp. 17–23). 
5 Although this thesis includes many materials before the time that the European Community (‘EC’) 
dissolved into the EU in 2009, or even before the time that the European Economic Community (‘EEC’) 
renamed as the EC in 1993, the term ‘EU’ is used generally in this thesis, if there is no clear indication, in 
order to unify the usage of terms. 
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financial crisis of 2007–09 and the Eurozone crisis, it is proven that this ‘Single Passport’ 
is not without ‘side effects’. The European Commission (‘Commission’) has pursued a 
number of initiatives to create a safer and sounder environment for the single financial 
market in the EU. A landmark reform is the planned creation of European Banking 
Union (‘EBU’).6 One important policy within the EBU is the establishment of Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (‘SSM’), which centralises prudential supervision of Eurozone 
banking system in the European Central Bank (‘ECB’).7 Although the SSM does not, at 
present, have a power to supervise non-banking sectors, even if some of them are 
deemed to be systemically significant,8 Article 127.6 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (‘TFEU’)9 has a potential to extend it to other financial 
institutions except insurance companies. 10  Therefore, the establishment of SSM 
represents an important step towards a ‘twin-peaks’11 model in the EU, with the 
macro-prudential supervision centralised in the EU level and others decentralised in the 
national level.12 Inspired by the success of the EBU, one on-going policy with a similar 
slogan is the Capital Markets Union (‘CMU’).13 It was launched by Jean-Claude Juncker, 
the current President of the Commission, in a speech before the European Parliament 
																																																								
6 For more information about the EBU, available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/finance/general-policy/banking-union/index_en.htm>  
(accessed June, 2017). 
7 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank 
concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, 2013 OJ L287/63. (‘SSM 
Regulation’) 
8 Article 1 of SSM Regulation. 
9 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2012 OJ C 326/47. 
10 Sideek Mohamed, ‘A Single Regulator for the E.C. Financial Market’ (2001) 16 Journal of International 
Banking Law 203, at 209–210; Niamh Moloney, ‘European Banking Union: Assessing its Risks and 
Resilience’ (2014) 51 Common Market Law Review 1609, at 1659. 
11 See the definition of this term in Section 4 below (pp. 8–10). 
12 Recital 28 and Article 1 of SSM Regulation; Karel Lannoo, ECB Banking Supervision and beyond (CEPS 
Task Force Reports, 2014), at 59. 
13 Nicolas Ve ́ron, ‘The Economic Consequences of Europe's Banking Union’ in Danny Busch and 
Guido Ferrarini (eds), European Banking Union (Oxford University Press, 2015), paras. 2.50 and 2.67. 
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(‘Parliament’) on 15 July, 2014.14 In that speech, he said that a further development and 
integration of capital markets should be achieved by 2019 in order to improve the 
financing of Europe’s economy and reduce the very high dependence on bank funding, 
and this would also increase the attractiveness of Europe as a place to invest.15 The 
Commission then released a Green Paper on building a CMU on 18 February, 2015,16 
followed by an Action Plan on Building a CMU on 30 September, 2015.17 According to 
the ‘Five Presidents’ Report’, the launch of the CMU, alongside the EBU, is an 
immediate step towards the ‘Financial Union’ in the EU.18 
Although relevant official documents do not explicitly mention this issue,19 it is 
logical to consider the necessity of a single supervisor within the CMU since there is a 
SSM within the EBU.20 Some argue that the CMU will need a centralised European 
																																																								
14 Jean-Claude Juncker, A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic 
Change, 15 July, 2014, available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/sites/beta-political/files/juncker-political-guidelines-speech_en_0.pdf> 
(accessed June, 2017). 
15 Ibid, at 7 and 19. 
16 European Commission, Green Paper: Building a Capital Markets Union, COM(2015) 63 final, 
February, 2015, available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/finance/consultations/2015/capital-markets-union/docs/green-paper_en.pdf> 
(accessed June, 2017). (‘Green Paper’) 
17 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Action Plan 
on Building a Capital Markets Union, COM(2015) 468 final, September, 2015, available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/finance/capital-markets-union/docs/building-cmu-action-plan_en.pdf> 
(accessed June, 2017). (‘Action Plan’) 
18 European Commission, Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary Union (reported by Juncker, J. 
C., Tusk, D., Dijsselbloem, J., Draghi, M., & Schulz, M.), June, 2015, at 4–5, 11–12, available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/sites/beta-political/files/5-presidents-report_en.pdf>  
(accessed June, 2017). (‘Five Presidents’ Report’) 
19 There is one exception. The European Commission in its Communication in September, 2016 
mentioned clearly that: ‘[t]he Five Presidents’ Report highlighted the need to strengthen the supervisory 
framework in order to ensure the solidity of all financial actors, which should lead ultimately to a single 
European capital markets supervisor. The Commission will consider, in close consultation with the 
European Parliament and the Council, the further steps in relation to the supervisory framework that are 
necessary to reap the full potential of CMU.’ See European Commission, Communication from the 
Commission: Capital Markets Union - Accelerating Reform, COM(2016) 601 final, September, 2016, at 7, 
available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/finance/capital-markets-union/docs/20160914-com-2016-601_en.pdf>  
(accessed June, 2017). 
20 Wolf-Georg Ringe, ‘Capital Markets Union for Europe: A Commitment to the Single Market of 28’ 
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supervisor,21 but the counter-argument claims that there is no need for a more 
centralised supervisor due to the fact that the current institutional framework is being 
broadly ‘fit-for-purpose’ in the CMU.22 In fact, like in the EBU, this question shall be 
examined by separating the two ‘peaks’, namely prudential supervision and conduct 
supervision of the CMU.23 The former has caught some attention already,24 while the 
latter still lacks proper care. Compared to a lot of stabilisation efforts have been put into 
the prudential supervision at the EU level, attempts to improve investor protection by 
the conduct supervision throughout the EU seem far less.25 This may be because the 
competence allocation of the conduct supervision in the EU, whether between Member 
States or between Member States and the EU, are far more sensitive. For example, if an 
investment intermediary who is located in Member State A provides investment services 
to a client who is located in Member State B, who will be the most appropriate authority 
to supervise the investment intermediary’s conduct? Does this question really matter to 
the investment intermediary and the client, once rules of investment conduct are the 
same in both Member States? If taking into account different national private law 
																																																																																																																																																													
(2015) 9 Law and Financial Markets Review 5, at 7. 
21 See, e.g., Robin Emimitt, ‘EU Finance Chief to Announce Capital Market Plan in 2015’ Reuters 
(Brussels, 6 November 2014); Jonathan Gould, ‘Draghi says need single supervisor to see off risks’ Reuters 
(Frankfurt, July 2, 2015). 
22  See, e.g., Manon Malhère, ‘Capital Markets Union: “No need for a single supervisor”’ 
EUROPOLITICS (12 November 2014); Simon Lewis, ‘Lord Hill should not fear ambition in pursuing 
capital markets union’ City AM (3 November, 2014); Huw Jones, ‘BoE paper says EU market plans don't 
need new supervisor’ Reuters (London, February 27, 2015). 
23 Nicolas Ve ́ron and Guntram B. Wolff, ‘Capital Markets Union: A Vision for the Long Term’ (2016) 2 
Journal of Financial Regulation 130, at 21–22. 
24 See, e.g., Jon Danielsson et al, Europe’s Proposed Capital Markets Union: Disruption Will Drive Investment and 
Innovation (Systemic Risk Centre, LSE, 2015), at 3; Kern Alexander, ‘Capital Markets Union from the 
Perspective of the Banking Industry and Prudential Supervision’ (2015) 9 Law and Financial Markets Review 
191, at 193–194; Viral V. Acharya and Sascha Steffen, Capital Markets Union in Europe: Why Other Unions 
Must Lead the Way (Universität StGallen WPZ Working Paper No 6, 2016), at 4–7. 
25 For example, during the post-financial crisis period (namely, 2010 to 2012), only three legislative 
proposals were relevant to investor/consumer protection. Christian Hofmann, ‘Stabilizing the Financial 
Sector: EU Financial Services 2010–2012’ (2012) 8 European Review of Contract Law 426, Part C. 
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systems between Member States A and B, how could we reconcile these two parties’ 
interests and the objective of the internal market in the EU? Will the CMU make a 
single supervisor in charge of investment conduct supervision inevitable? These 
important questions have to be answered in order to build a true single market for 
capital, and these are what this thesis seeks to explore. 
 Research Question and Objectives 2.
This thesis attempts to answer one crucial question, i.e., ‘whether investment 
conduct should be supervised centralisedly at the EU level in the CMU (or not)’? In 
order to do so, this thesis, at first, will explore the regulatory system of investment 
conduct in the EU to date, with particular emphasis given to the competence allocation 
between the EU and Member States (and between Member States). This thesis then will 
discuss the idea of a centralised European supervisor in charge of investment conduct 
supervision with an aim to find out the optimum institutional governance in the CMU. 
In the light of this two-step analysis, not only will the governance system of investment 
conduct in the EU be examined, but also policy recommendations for designing the 
optimum governance of investment conduct in the CMU will be given. 
 Research Methodology 3.
The primary methodology applied by this inter-disciplinary study is an economic 
analysis of law, which focuses on legal, policy and transaction costs considerations. 
Given the aim of reducing ‘costs’ of European capital markets is mentioned everywhere 
in the Green Paper and the Action Plan of the CMU, the major arguments presented 
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here are deprived from the findings of the Transaction Cost Economics (‘TCE’). This is 
not simply to impose a transaction cost analysis on a regulatory context, but to use its 
key notions as organising principles. Specifically, this thesis will conduct a comparative 
institutional analysis of the transaction costs between the current system and the option 
of further centralising investment conduct supervision in the EU. Only if the 
transaction costs associated with this option are comparatively lower than with the 
current system, can the centralised supervision of investment conduct be a more 
efficient and feasible option of the CMU. Otherwise, there may be other better choices. 
In fact, the transaction cost approach has been largely adopted in the study of 
regulation.26 Yannis Avgerinos might be the first applying this approach to argue in 
favour of a single regulator of the European capital markets.27 However, he did not 
distinguish the differences between prudential regulation and conduct regulation, and 
neither does he consider the role of private law systems in governing investment 
conduct. Therefore, this thesis will take both of these into account when conducting a 
																																																								
26 See, e.g., Dale B. Thompson, ‘Beyond Benefit-Cost Analysis: Institutional Transaction Costs and 
Regulation of Water Quality’ (1999) 39 Natural Resources Journal 517, at 521–538; Antonio Estache and 
David Martimort, Politics, Transaction Costs, and the Design of Regulatory Institutions (World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper No 2073, 1999), at 4–10; Laura McCann and K William Easter, ‘Estimates of 
Public Sector Transaction Costs in NRCS Programs’ (2000) 32 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 
555, at 555–564; Barak D. Richman and Christopher Boerner, ‘A Transaction Cost Economizing 
Approach to Regulation: Understanding the NIMBY Problem and Improving Regulatory Responses’ 
(2006) 23 Yale Journal on Regulation 29, at 50–65; D. Bruce Johnsen, ‘The SEC’s Mistaken Ban on Directed 
Brokerage: A Transaction Cost Analysis’ (2008) 40 Arizona State Law Journal 1241, at 1267–1282; André 
Nijsen, ‘SCM to Measure Compliance Costs’ in André Nijsen et al (eds), Business Regulation and Public Policy 
(Springer, 2009), at 61–83; Frank den Butter, Marc De Graaf and André Nijsen, The Transaction Costs 
Perspective on Costs and Benefits of Government Regulation: Extending the Standard Cost Model (Tinbergen Institute 
Discussion Paper, TI 2009-013/3, 2009), at 15–22; Pablo T. Spiller, ‘Regulation: A Transaction Cost 
Perspective’ (2010) 52 California Management Review 147, at 147–158; Pablo T. Spiller, ‘Transaction Cost 
Regulation’ (2013) 89 Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 232, at 232–242; Frank den Butter, ‘The 
Perspective of Public Sector Economics on Regulation: Transaction Costs and the Agency Model’ in 
Alberto Alemanno et al (eds), Better Business Regulation in a Risk Society (Springer, 2013), at 123–128. 
27 Yannis Avgerinos, ‘The Need and the Rationale for A European Securities Regulator’ in Mads 
Andenas and Yannis Avgerinos (eds), Financial Markets in Europe: Towards a Single Regulator? (Kluwer Law 
International, 2003), at 148–152. 
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transaction cost comparison. It is worth mentioning that, due to the fact that the United 
Kingdom (‘UK’) is the home Member State of many investment services providers in 
the EU, many research materials of this thesis are collected from the UK’s practice. 
However, the UK triggered the official Brexit process on 29th March, 2017, which is 
going to change the relationship between the UK and the EU, but not so quickly.28 
 Definitions 4.
 Before going into further analysis, some key terms of this thesis, which have no 
universally agreed-upon definition, need to be clarified. 
n Regulation and Supervision—Even there is no single agreed meaning of ‘regulation’, 
one definition is widely accepted, namely the interference/intervention of 
government/public agencies with the market mechanism. 29  This is ‘the 
promulgation of an authoritative set of rules, accompanied by some [enforcing] 
mechanisms’.30 It should be further emphasised that the criminal justice system is 
not in the sense in which the definition of ‘regulation’ is used here,31 even criminal 
liability, in a broad sense, might have its regulatory function.32 In short, this thesis 
																																																								
28 A letter from the British Prime Minister, Theresa May, notifying the United Kingdom's intention to 
leave the European Union (29th of March, 2017), available at: 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/pdf/070329_UK_letter_Tusk_Art
50_pdf/>  (accessed June, 2017). 
According to Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (‘TEU’), there might be a two-year negotiation 
between the UK and the EU after the UK notifies the European Council its intention of leaving. 
29 Roger Bowles, Law and the Economy (Martin Robertson, 1982), at 164–165; Daniel Spulber, Regulation 
and Markets (The MIT Press, 1989), at 37; Tony Prosser, Law and the Regulators (Clarendon Press, 1997), at 
5. 
30 B Robert Baldwin, Christopher Hood and Colin Scott, ‘Introduction’ in Robert Baldwin, Christopher 
Hood and Colin Scott (eds), A Reader on Regulation (Oxford University Press, 1998), at 3. 
31 For a similar usage of the definition of ‘regulation’: see Giandomenico Majone, ‘The Rise of the 
Regulatory State in Europe’ (1994) 17 West European Politics 77, at 81. 
32  See further in Law Commission, A Consultation Paper: Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts 
(Consultation Paper No 195, 2010), available at: 
<http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/cp195_Criminal_Liability_consultation.pdf
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will use the term ‘regulation’ to refer to ‘administrative regulation’ only. However, 
this confined definition does not restrict this thesis from applying an institutional 
approach to analyse the complexity of institutional arrangements, rule making and 
practical issues that are associated with regulation.33 Under this definition of 
regulation, ‘supervision’ is just part of regulation, except rule making. 34 
‘Supervision’ is further composed by four stages in implementation and 
enforcement, including: (i) licensing; (ii) monitoring; (iii) sanctioning; and (iv) crisis 
management.35 The former two stages are ex ante supervision as pre-monitoring 
compliance systems, and the latter two stages are ex post supervision as 
post-monitoring deterrence systems.36 It should be noted that ‘supervision’, stricto 
sensu, could possibly refer to the monitoring stage merely,37 but this thesis applies a 
broad sense of ‘supervision’ as the foregoing definition. 
n Conduct Regulation and Prudential Regulation—Albeit there can be no precise definition 
of these two terms. ‘Conduct regulation’ involves regulation of the process through 
which financial institutions make and perform contracts and market financial 
																																																																																																																																																													
> (accessed June, 2017). 
33 This approach is applied to establish the foundation of risk regulation regime: see Christopher Hood, 
Robert Baldwin and Henry Rothstein, The Government of Risk: Understanding Risk Regulation Regimes (Oxford 
University Press, 2001), at 8–9. 
34 According to the definition of Black’s Law Dictionary, the term ‘regulation’ is defined as ‘the act or 
process of controlling by rule or restriction’, and the term ‘supervision’ is defined as ‘the act of managing, 
directing, or overseeing persons or projects’: see Bryan A. Garner, Black's Law Dictionary (10th edn, 
Thomson West, 2014). 
35 Rosa María Lastra, Central Banking and Banking Regulation (Financial Markets Group, London School of 
Economics and Political Science, 1996), at 108, 110–122; European Union Committee of House of Lords, 
The Future of EU Financial Regulation and Supervision, HL Paper 106-I, 17 June, 2009, para. 26, 
available at: 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldeucom/106/106i.pdf>  
(accessed June, 2017). 
36 Niamh Moloney, ‘Supervision in the Wake of the Financial Crisis: Achieving Effective "Law in 
Action" — A Challenge for the EU’ in Eddy Wymeersch, Klaus J. Hopt and Guido Ferrarini (eds), 
Financial Regulation and Supervision: A Post-Crisis Analysis (Oxford University Press, 2012), paras. 4.04–4.06. 
37 See, e.g., Rosa María Lastra, Legal Foundations of International Monetary Stability (Oxford University Press, 
2006), at 87–88. 
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products to customers, and ‘prudential regulation’ focuses on the soundness and 
solvency of financial institutions. 38  Within the institutional structure of the 
so-called ‘twin-peaks’ model,39 conduct regulation (which was developed in the 
securities sector only for the objective of investor protection) is normally separated 
from prudential regulation (which was initially targeted at banks and life insurers for 
financial stability).40 There are good reasons for separating them: (i) the focus of 
former is micro, while that of later is macro; (ii) the former pays more attention on 
small participants, while main, large players and the whole market take the centre 
stage of the later; and (iii) the former can be achieved by taking individual measures, 
while consensual agreements is normally needed for the later.41 This separation is 
an ‘objective-based’ regulation,42 with a major advantage that regulators can focus 
on their own targets along with the suitable allocation of supervisory 
responsibilities.43 However, due to the imprecise definitions, there is a considerable 
																																																								
38 Gerard McMeel and John Virgo, McMeel and Virgo on Financial Advice and Financial Products (3rd edn, 
Oxford University Press, 2014), paras. 1.61–1.63. Although this topic is out of the scope of this thesis, 
prudential regulation could further be viewed from either a ‘macro’ or a ‘micro’ perspective. The objective 
of a former is to limit the risk of financial distress with significant losses to the economy as a whole, while 
the latter is to limit the risk of financial distress at individual institutions, regardless of their impact on the 
overall economy. Likewise, the macro-prudential perspective assumes that risk is in part endogenous with 
respect to the behaviour of the financial system, but the micro-prudential approach assumes that it is 
exogenous. For a comprehensive discussion of this divide: see Claudio Borio, Towards a Macroprudential 
Framework for Financial Supervision and Regulation? (BIS Working Papers No 128, 2003). 
39 The term of ‘twin-peaks’ was first used by Taylor: see M. Taylor, "Twin Peaks": A Regulatory Structure for 
the New Century (Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation, 1995). 
40 G. McMeel and J. Virgo, above note 38, paras. 1.61–1.63. 
41 Charles AE Goodhart, ‘Some Regulatory Concerns’ (1996) 132 Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics 
613, at 615–616. 
42 Four general approaches of financial regulation have been discussed and adopted in different countries: 
(i) institution-based; (ii) function-based; (iii) objective-based; and (iv) integrated approach. Giorgio Di 
Giorgio and Carmine Di Noia, ‘Financial Supervisiors: Alternative Models’ in Donato Masciandaro and 
Marc Quintyn (eds), Designing Financial Supervision Institutions: Independence, Accountability and Governance 
(Edward Elgar, 2007), at 346–354; see also G30, The Structure of Financial Supervision: Approaches and 
Challenges in a Global Marketplace (Working Group on Financial Supervision, 2008), at 23–24. See further in 
Section 3.1 of CHAPTER III (pp. 86–88). 
43 Jr. Henry M. Paulson, Robert K. Steel and David G. Nason, Blueprint for A Modernized Financial 
Regulatory Structure (The Department of The Treasury, 2008), at 142. 
 Chapter I Introduction  
 10 
overlap between these two ‘peaks’.44 For example, internal control mechanisms 
(such as, conflict-of-interest needs of intermediaries to structure and organise a way 
of providing services) may not be simply classified as either prudential regulation or 
conduct regulation.45 
n Investment Conduct Regulation—Given the aforementioned definition of ‘regulation’ 
and ‘conduct regulation’, ‘investment conduct regulation’ is defined here as the 
intervention of public agencies on ‘the way investment intermediaries provide 
investment advice, asset management, and trade matching and execution services to 
their clients, as well as the way they conduct investment promotions’.46 It is also 
called conduct-of-business regulation47, or best practice regulation,48 with an aim to 
safeguard the behaviour’s honesty, fairness, loyalty and confidentiality of 
investment intermediaries.49 Having said that, investment conduct regulation is just 
part of conduct regulation in capital markets,50 but most efforts of this thesis will 
																																																								
44 Clive Briault, The Rationale for a Single National Financial Services Regulator (FSA Occasional Paper Series 
No 2, 1999), at 24. 
45 Michel Tison, ‘Conduct of Business Rules and Their Implementation in the EU Member States’ in 
Guido Ferrarini, Klaus J. Hopt and Eddy Wymeersch (eds), Capital Markets in the Age of the Euro: 
Cross-Border Transactions, Listed Companies and Regulation (Kluwer Law International, 2002), at 72–73. See 
further in Section 3.3.5 of CHAPTER II (pp. 43–48) and Section 2.2 of CHAPTER III (pp. 80–85). 
46 Emilios Avgouleas, ‘Reforming Investor Protection Regulation: The Impact of Cognitive Biases’ in A. 
I. Ogus, Michael Faure and Frank H. Stephen (eds), Essays in the Law and Economics of Regulation: In Honour 
of Anthony Ogus (Intersentia, 2008), at 146. 
47 Tarjei Thorkildsen, ‘Conduct of Business Rules: What We Have and What We can Expect’ (1995) 16 
Company Lawyer 300, at 300. 
48 Stefan Grundmann and Falko Glasow, European Company Law: Organization, Finance and Capital Markets 
(2nd edn, Intersentia, 2012), at 529–530. 
49 Emilios Avgouleas, ‘The Harmonisation of Rules of Conduct in EU Financial Markets: Economic 
Analysis, Subsidiarity and Investor Protection’ (2000) 6 European Law Journal 72, at 74. 
50 In the EU law, conduct regulation in capital markets has three focuses: (i) investment intermediaries 
providing investment services and activities shall subject to ‘adequate organisational requirements in the 
area of internal control functions’; (ii) investment intermediaries providing investment services and 
activities have to follow ‘appropriate conduct of business rules’; and (iii) market abuse in the form of 
‘insider dealing and market manipulation’ must be prevented. See Articles 47(c)–(e) of Regulation (EU) 
No 600/2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, 2014 OJ 
L173/84. (‘MiFIR’) 
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be spent on investment conduct regulation. Specifically, investment conduct 
regulation encompasses five parts: (i) mandatory information disclosure; (ii) the 
honest and integrity of investment intermediaries; (iii) fair business practice and 
marketing; (iv) objective and high-quality advice; and (v) investment intermediaries’ 
duty of care.51 Likewise, avoiding conflicts of interest could be seen as the sixth 
part of investment conduct regulation.52  
 Thesis Outline 5.
In dealing with the aforementioned research question, the remaining part of this 
thesis is divided in six chapters. It starts with an examination with regard to the 
competence allocation of rule-making system and of the supervisory system in the EU 
separately. Chapter II: Competence Allocation of Investment Conduct Regulation in the EU—Rules 
and Rule-Making System explores the Treaty bases, the multi-level rule-making system, 
and the harmonised rules of investment conduct in the EU. Due to the fact that 
regulatory competition and the home country control may not be able to function in an 
orderly way, harmonisation of rules is necessary for European capital markets. This 
exploration also reveals institutional tension within the current system and highlights the 
limited function of the ‘Single Rulebook’, as well as the ignored role of private law 
systems. In fact, as mentioned by the Action Plan of CMU, the limited function of the 
Single Rulebook may be tackled by greater supervisory convergence, while the issue of 
																																																								
51 David T. Llewellyn, The Economic Rationale for Financial Regulation (FSA occasional paper, 1999), at 11–
12. 
52 Guido Ferrarini, ‘Contract Standards and the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID): An 
Assessment of the Lamfalussy Regulatory Architecture’ (2005) 1 European Review of Contract Law 19, at 33–
35; S. Grundmann and F. Glasow, above note 48, at 538–540. 
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private law systems in governing investment conduct may not be so easy to be resolved 
due to the limitations set in the Treaty on European Union (‘TEU’) and TFEU. 
Chapter III: Competence Allocation of Investment Conduct Regulation in the EU—Supervisory 
System analyses interactions between European agencies and national authorities, as well 
as between national authorities of home and host Member States. Conflicts between 
these relationships in cross-border transactions of investment services are significant. 
On the one hand, European agencies encounter some constitutional constraints, and, on 
the other hand, due to the divergent supervisory ‘cultures’, abilities of national 
authorities to uniformly apply harmonised rules are also restricted. Given the successful 
precedent of building the SSM within the EBU, this situation may call, at least implicitly, 
for establishing a single supervisor in charge of investment conduct supervision in the 
CMU. However, we should not blindly believe this is an absolute answer. In other 
words, what we have to ask is: whether this proposed reform could really bring a better 
outcome than the current system? 
 Before answering this question, it is necessary to build consolidated theoretical 
foundations for the institutional comparison. Chapter IV: Transaction Cost Approach of 
Investment Conduct Governance reviews the extensive literature on the transaction cost 
approach. First, the transaction cost approach provides a single criterion to analyse 
different types of investment conduct governance, which includes administrative 
regulation and private law systems. Second, from a normative perspective, the optimum 
governance (i.e., one form of governance could reduce transaction costs to the 
minimum) of investment conduct could be found by an institutional comparison, and it 
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possibly will be a hybrid of administrative regulation and private law systems here. Third, 
from a positive perspective, it is only if transaction costs could comparatively decrease 
after the introduction of reforms, otherwise, the reforms will not be possible and 
feasible in practice. 
 In the light of the transaction cost approach, the research question shall be 
answered by a two-fold institutional comparison of investment conduct governance in 
the EU: one is private law governance, and another is administrative governance. On 
the basis of a comprehensive analysis of the European private law and of the UK’s 
practice, Chapter V: Optimum Private Law Governance of Investment Conduct in the Capital 
Markets Union points out many challenges (such as, a multiplicity of jurisdictions and 
large variations of national private laws across Member States) faced by the current 
private law governance of investment conduct in the EU. All of these problems will not 
be resolved by establishing a single supervisor, which means transaction costs will not 
be decreased by this reform. Therefore, in view of the institutional comparison of the 
private law governance, there may be no argument in favour of the further centralisation 
of investment conduct supervision for reducing transaction costs in the CMU. By 
comparison, a non-mandatory pan-EU alternative dispute resolution (‘ADR’) for 
cross-border disputes of investment conduct might be a more feasible option to tackle 
these problems instead, followed by an enhancement of investors confidence in buying 
cross-border investment services in the EU. 
In accordance with the TEU and TFEU, Chapter VI: Optimum Administrative 
Governance of Investment Conduct in the Capital Markets Union conducts an institutional 
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comparison of administrative governance between the current system and the 
centralised investment conduct supervision in the EU. Two findings are significant. 
First of all, centralisation is not the sole solution for tackling cross-border issues of 
investment conduct supervision, so it might be hard to pass the ‘cannot be sufficiently 
achieved’ test within the principle of subsidiarity of Article 5.3 of the TEU. Second, the 
results of this thesis’s institutional comparison indicate that the total transaction costs of 
European capital markets will not decline (but even rise) after the further centralisation 
of investment conduct supervision in the EU. This reform, thus, is also hard to pass the 
‘better achieved’ and ‘necessary to achieve’ tests within the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality of the TEU (Articles 5.3 and 5.4). According to this, the argument in 
favour of the centralised investment conduct supervision for reducing transaction costs 
of European capital markets may not be held from the viewpoint of administrative 
governance either. 
Finally, Chapter VII: Conclusion seeks to bring together a coherent conclusion. It 
concludes with a negative answer of the research question based on the institutional 
comparison made by this thesis. Also, it reveals a ‘too much focus’ on administrative 
governance in the EU. Private law governance, by contrast, is touched far less by 
European policymakers. In order to build the optimum governance of investment 
conduct in the CMU, any forthcoming policy has to secure an optimal interplay between 
administrative regulation and private law systems. A more comprehensive viewpoint of 





COMPETENCE ALLOCATION OF 
INVESTMENT CONDUCT REGULATION 
IN THE EU—RULES AND RULE-MAKING 
SYSTEM 
‘Economists distinguish between “trade creation” and “trade 
diversion” in a customs union. Trade creation represents a shift to 
a more efficient producer as a result of the establishment of the 
customs union, while the opposite is true of trade diversion. By 
analogy, we can say that, in the field of regulatory policy-making, 
European integration has meant “rule creation”—new and 
generally better rules both at the national and supranational 
levels—rather than simply “rule diversion” from one level of 
government to another.’1 
 Introduction 1.
Generally, there are three focuses of the rules of investment conduct in the world, 
depending on the extent of intervention from regulatory authorities: first, the ‘arm’s 
length project’, with the least intervention from authorities, aims to protect the consent 
of risk takers be informed; second, the ‘fiduciary project’ puts more requirements on 
financial intermediaries to maintain their clients’ trust; and third, the ‘consumerist 
project’ pays more attention on the fairness, so the weaker parties should be protected 
more.2 Given these common focuses, rules of investment conduct were harmonised 
internationally by the International Organization of Securities Commissions (‘IOSCO’) 
																																																								
1 Giandomenico Majone, Regulating Europe (Routledge, 1996), at 59. 
2 Joanna Benjamin, Financial Law (Oxford University Press, 2007), Chs. 25–27. 
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in 1990.3 However, how does this harmonisation further happen in the EU?4 In 
particular, since there are twenty-eight Member States within the EU, how do they reach 
a balanced and efficient consensus within the complex legislative procedure? The 
answers to these questions closely link up with the competence allocation of the 
rule-making powers in relation to investment conduct regulation in the EU. This is what 
this chapter will examine. In order to highlight the complexities and challenges of the 
current rule-making system in the EU, Treaty bases, case law of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (‘CJEU’), 5  rule-making process and harmonised rules of 
investment conduct will all be explored comprehensively in this chapter. This 
exploration is crucially important for the evaluation of the optimum governance of 
investment conduct in the EU, due to the fact that investment conduct regulation falls 
into a comparatively sensitive area of the EU/Member States relationship. 
This chapter falls into four sections. Section 2 discusses the internal market of 
investment intermediaries in the EU and points out a necessity for harmonisation on 
the basis of the EU Treaties.6 Section 3 explores a multi-level rule-making system that is 
tasked with the role of harmonisation in the EU by an efficient way. Thanks to this 
rule-making system, rules of investment conduct are harmonised in the EU to a large 
																																																								
3  See International Organization of Securities Commissions (‘IOSCO’), International Conduct of 
Business Principles, July, 1990, available at: 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD8.pdf> (accessed June, 2017). 
4 For the US experience and other international comparisons of investment conduct regulation: see 
Andrew F. Tuch, ‘Conduct of Business Regulation’ in Niamh Moloney, Eilís Ferran and Jennifer Payne 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook on Financial Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2015), at Parts III–V. 
5 This thesis uses the term ‘CJEU’ to refer to either the Court of Justice of the European Communities or 
Court of Justice of the European Union generally, depending on the time of case law. The role of the 
CJEU is to ensure the interpretation and application of the Treaty on European Union (‘TEU’) and the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’). See the consolidated versions of the TEU, 
2012 OJ C 326/13, Article 19. 
6 The term ‘EU Treaties’ is deployed here to refer to the TEU and the TFEU. 
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extent, which are also analysed in detail in this section. Section 4 further examines 
relevant challenges faced by the current system and policy implications aiming at 
tackling these challenges. Section 5 brings the discussion of this chapter to conclusion. 
 Internal Market and Single Passport of Investment 2.
Intermediaries in the EU 
2.1. Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services 
When providing (or marketing) investment services in the European internal 
market, it would principally relate to the right of establishment and the freedom to 
provide services. First, in relation to the right of establishment, Articles 49 and 54 of the 
TFEU contemplate both a ‘primary’ and a ‘secondary establishment’:  
‘with a primary establishment, an individual leaves State A to set up a 
permanent establishment in State B; with a secondary establishment, an individual 
maintains an establishment in State A while setting up a second professional base 
(e.g., offices, chambers, agencies, branches or subsidiaries) in State B.’7 
These Articles expressly leave people a freedom to choose appropriate forms to 
pursue their activities.8  
Second, with regard to the freedom of service provision, Articles 56 and 57 of the 
TFEU lay down the freedom to provide services by a natural person (or legal person)9 
																																																								
7 Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: the Four Freedoms (4th edn, Oxford University Press, 
2013), at 307. 
8 CJEU, Case 270/83, Commission v France (tax credits), [1986] ECR 273, para. 22.  
9 Article 54 of the TFEU regarding ‘companies or firms’ is also applied to the freedom to provide 
services: see Article 62 of the TFEU. 
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established in one Member State to a recipient established in another Member State, and 
any restriction on this freedom shall be prohibited. However, compared to the right of 
establishment—which is a permanent right on ‘a stable and continuous basis’ 10 
involving ‘the actual pursuit of an economic activity through a fixed establishment in 
another Member State for an indefinite period’11—the freedom to provide services is 
permitted on ‘a temporary basis’12, and it only applies if the right of establishment does 
not apply.13 As to the temporary nature of the activities in question, it has to be 
‘determined in light, not only of the duration of the provision of the service, but also of 
its regularity, periodicity or continuity’.14 In addition, since the free movement of capital 
is ‘a precondition for the effective exercise of other freedoms’ (in particular, the right of 
establishment), 15  there may be a potential overlap here between Article 63 that 
abolishes any restriction on the movement of capital and the two freedoms 
aforementioned (namely, the right of establishment and the freedom to provide services) 
in the EU market. This possibility, explicitly, is recognised by Articles 65.2 and 58.2 of 
the TFEU. 
2.2. Harmonisation, Mutual Recognition and Home Country 
Control 
As discussed in the foregoing section, providing (or marketing) investment services 
																																																								
10 CJEU, Case C-55/94, Reinhard Gebhard v Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano, [1995] 
ECR I-4165, para. 25; CJEU, Case C-70/95, Sodemare SA, Anni Azzurri Holding SpA and Anni Azzurri 
Rezzato Srl v Regione Lombardia, [1997] ECR I-03395, para. 24. 
11 CJEU, Case C-221/89, The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd, [1991] ECR 
I-3905, para. 20. 
12 CJEU, Case C-55/94, above note 10, para. 26. 
13 Ibid, para. 22; CJEU, Case C-234/01, Arnoud Gerritse v Finanzamt Neukölln-Nord, [2003] ECR I-5933, 
para. 23. See also the sentence within Article 57.2 of the TFEU: ‘temporarily pursue his activity in the 
Member State where the service is provided’. 
14 CJEU, Case C-55/94, above note 10, para. 27. 
15 CJEU, Case 203/80, Criminal proceedings against Guerrino Casati, [1981] ECR 2595, para. 8.    
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in the European internal market is guaranteed by the freedoms set in the EU Treaties,16 
the next question is how to eliminate extant obstacles to these freedoms? A so-called 
‘Single Passport/European Passport’17 regime was formed for this, and is underpinned 
by three indispensible factors: (i) the legislation harmonisation set by the EU Treaties; (ii) 
the mutual recognition established by the case law of the CJEU; and (iii) the home 
country control built by the EU’s legislation.18 
Initially, the existence of a common legal framework is often viewed as a necessary 
precondition for the establishment and effective operation of integrated markets,19 but 
it has not always been possible to enact harmonised legislation. In order to tackle this, 
the CJEU set a principle of mutual recognition for facilitating the integration of the 
internal market in the leading case of Cassis de Dijo, 20  and subsequent 
judgements21—whereby goods lawfully produced in one Member State would be 
allowed to circulate freely within the pan-EU market. This principle creates a ‘new 
approach to harmonisation’,22 paving the way for internalising the European Market. 
Thanks to this principle, the freedom of movement could be ensured without the 
																																																								
16 See, e.g., Articles 49, 54, 56, 57 and 63 of the TFEU. 
17 European Commission, The Community Internal Market - 1993 Report, COM(94) 55 final, March, 
1994, paras. 162 and 176, available at: 
<http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/7b1c1007-88b4-4476-9742-2a1d7e0ea399.0006.01/DOC
_1> (accessed June, 2017). 
18 Wim Fonteyne, ‘Toward a Single Financial Market’ in Jörg Decressin, Wim Fonteyne and Hamid 
Faruqee (eds), Integrating Europe's financial markets (IMF, 2007), at 2. 
19 Article 114 of the TFEU. 
20 CJEU, Case C-120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, [1979] ECR 649, para. 
14. 
21 See CJEU, Case C-113/80, Commission v. Ireland, [1981] ECR 1625, para. 10; CJEU, Case C-261/81, Rau 
v. De Smedt, [1982] ECR 3961, para. 12. 
22  Karen J. Alter and Sophie Meunier-Aitsahalia, ‘Judicial Politics in the European Community: 
"European Integration and the Pathbreaking" Cassis de Dijon "Decision"’ (1994) 26 Comparative Political 
Studies 535, at 537. 
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systematic creation of detailed rules at the EU level.23 Thereafter, this principle was 
renamed as the ‘home country control’ of financial services in the Commission’s White 
Paper in 198524 that constituted the basis of the Single European Act (‘SEA’) 1986.25 
The home country control, as a ‘corollary’ of the principle of mutual recognition, means 
cross-border operations of financial institutions are controlled by rules and supervisory 
practices of their Member States of origin.26 On the basis of the home country control, 
the Investment Services Directive (‘ISD’),27 published in 1993, was the first piece of 
legislation allowing investment firms to conduct business across European capital 
markets with the sole approval of their home authorities.28 Thus, the foundation of the 
Single European Passport regime was laid. 
Nonetheless, the principles of mutual recognition and home country control 
cannot replace the role of legislation harmonisation entirely.29 First, the principle of 
mutual recognition within the 1992 single market programme (‘SMP’)30 raises a heated 
debate about the outcome of regulatory competition in the EU market.31 The regulatory 
																																																								
23 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament - Mutual recognition in the context of the follow-up to the Action Plan for the Single Market, 
1999 COM(1999) 299, at 3–4, June, 1999, available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/5884> (accessed June, 2017). 
24 EC Commission, Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European 
Council, 1985 COM(85) 310, June, 1985, paras. 102–103, available at: 
<http://europa.eu/documents/comm/white_papers/pdf/com1985_0310_f_en.pdf>  
(accessed June, 2017). 
25 1987 OJ L169/1. 
26 Hal S. Scott, ‘International Finance: Rule Choices for Global Financial Markets’ in Andrew T. Guzman 
and Alan O. Sykes (eds), Research Handbook in International Economic Law (Edward Elgar, 2007), at 379. 
27 Council Directive 93/22/EEC on investment services in the securities field, 1993 OJ L141/27. (‘ISD’) 
28 Article 14 of ISD. 
29 Article 53.1 of the TFEU. 
30 The 1992 SMP is the final product turned form the Commission’s White Paper 1985 with the support 
of the SEA 1986. 
31 See, e.g., David Charny, ‘Competition among Jurisdictions in Formulating Corporate Law Rules: An 
American Perspective on the Race to the Bottom in the European Communities’ (1991) 32 Harvard 
International Law Journal 423, at 423–456; Heinz Hauser and Madeleine Hösli, ‘Harmonization or 
Regulatory Competition in the EC (and the EEA)?’ (1991) 46 Aussenwirtschaft: Zeitschrift fu ̈r internationale 
Wirtschaftsbeziehungen 497, at 497–512; Norbert Reich, ‘Competition between Legal Orders: A New 
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competition can be defined as ‘a process involving the selection and de-selection of laws 
in a context where jurisdictions compete to attract and retain scarce economic 
resources’.32 Since regulation is influenced by politics, this competition also has to deal 
with the interaction between the players of the political game.33 There is no guarantee 
that this game will bring a ‘race to the bottom’ (the Delaware effect),34 or a ‘race to the 
top’ (the California effect)35 result. In cases of the former, the level of protection for 
shareholders, employees, customers and the general public has been progressively 
lowered in the course of this competition; while in cases of the latter, the competitive 
process pushes the level of regulation upwards.36 Due to this unpredictability, the range 
of regulatory competition should be limited by harmonisation to some extent: ‘the 
applicable Community legislation sets a floor, the Treaty itself sets a ceiling and the 
Member States are free to pursue an independent domestic policy between these two 
parameters’.37 This is the so-called ‘reflexive harmonisation’,38 which considers the 
																																																																																																																																																													
Paradigm of EC law?’ (1992) 29 Common Market Law Review 861, at 861–896; Simon Deakin, ‘Two Types 
of Regulatory Competition: Competitive Federalism vesus Reflexive Harmonisation. A Law and 
Economics Perspective on Centros’ (1992) 2 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 231, at 231–260; 
Jeanne-Mey Sun and Jacques Pelkmans, ‘Regulatory Competition in the Single Market’ (1995) 33 Journal of 
Common Market Studies 67, at 67–89. 
32 Catherine Barnard and Simon Deakin, ‘Market Access and Regulatory Competition’ in Catherine 
Barnard and Joanne Scott (eds), The Law of the Single European Market: Unpacking the Premises (Hart 
Publishing, 2002), at 198; Simon Deakin, ‘Is Regulatory Competition the Future for European 
Integration?’ (2006) 13 Swedish Economic Policy Review 71, at 74. 
33 Dale D. Murphy, The Structure of Regulatory Competition: Corporations and Public Policies in a Global Economy 
(Oxford University Press, 2006), at 254. 
34 William L. Cary, ‘Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware’ (1974) 83 The Yale Law 
Journal 663, at 705. 
35 David Vogel, Trading Up: Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a Global Economy (Harvard University 
Press, 1997), at 5–6. 
36 See further in Section 4.2 of CHAPTER VI (pp. 285–291). 
37 Michael Dougan, ‘Minimum Harmonization and the Internal Market’ (2000) 37 Common Market Law 
Review 853, at 855. 
38 Simon Deakin, ‘Regulatory Competition versus Harmonization in European Company Law’ in Daniel 
C. Esty and Damien Geradin (eds), Regulatory Competition and Economic Integration (Oxford University Press, 
2001), at 209–213; Simon Deakin, ‘Legal Diversity and Regulatory Competition: Which Model for 
Europe?’ (2006) 12 European Law Journal 440, at 444–445; S. Deakin, ‘Is Regulatory Competition the 
Future for European Integration?’, above note 32, at 89; Simon Deakin, ‘Regulatory Competition after 
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measures of regulatory competition and harmonisation as complementary, rather than 
substitutes,39 so they two can work together for achieving the Single Market in the EU. 
As Esty and Geradin conclude:  
‘regulatory systems should be set up with enough inter-jurisdictional 
co-operation (or harmonisation) to ensure that transboundary externalities and 
other market failures are addressed, but with a sufficient degree of regulatory 
competition to prevent the resulting governmental structure from becoming an 
untamed, overreaching, or inefficient Leviathan’.40  
Second, even the right of establishment and the freedom to provide services are 
guaranteed by the EU Treaties, 41  these freedoms are not absolute and can be 
overridden by the ‘public interest’/‘general good’/‘general interest’,42 not to mention 
the home country control. As the CJEU’s ruling in the Deposit Guarantee case shows, the 
home country control is not a Treaty principle and can be departed from for the ‘public 
interest’. 43  The list of the ‘public interest’ justifications is open-ended and wide 
ranging.44 First, in relation to investment conduct regulation, the famous Alpine case 
																																																																																																																																																													
Laval’ (2007) 10 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 581, at 609; Stelios Andreadakis, ‘Regulatory 
Competition or Harmonisation: the Dilemma, the Alternatives and the Prospect of Reflexive 
Harmonisation’ in Mads Andenas and Camilla Baasch Andersen (eds), Theory and Practice of Harmonisation 
(Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012), at 62–63. 
39 J.-M. Sun and J. Pelkmans, above note 31, at 88. 
40  Esty D. and Geradin D., ‘Introduction’ in Esty D. and Geradin D. (eds) (2001), Regulatory 
Competition and Economic Integration: Comparative Perspectives, Oxford University Press, at xxv. 
41 See Section 2.1 above (pp. 17–18). 
42 These terms are used interchangeably by the CJEU. For example, in the area of the freedom to provide 
services, ‘public interest’ in Case C-76/90, Manfred Säger v Dennemeyer & Co. Ltd., [1991] ECR I-4221, para. 
15; ‘general good’ in Case 279/80, Criminal proceedings against Alfred John Webb, [1981] ECR 3305, para. 17; 
‘general interest’ in Case C-224/97, Erich Ciola v Land Vorarlberg, [1999] ECR I-2517, para. 15. 
43 CJEU, Case C-233/94, Germany v Parliament and Council, [1997] ECR I-2405, para. 64. 
44 CJEU, Case C-288/89, Stichting Collectieve Antennevoorziening Gouda v Commissariaat voor de Media, [1991] 
ECR I-4007, para. 14; See also C. Barnard, above note 7, Ch. 13. 
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indicates that ‘the maintenance of the good reputation of the national financial sector’45 
and the protection of ‘investor confidence in the financial markets’46 of a Member State 
are eligible. Second, the imperative justifications of ‘consumer protection’/investor 
protection is also recognised by the CJEU.47 But, the protection of the revenue of 
domestic service providers,48 or the encouragement of investment in local companies49 
are not eligible ‘general good’ objectives. Given the above exceptions of the home 
country principle, it is proven again that the aim of market integration cannot be 
achieved in the absence of harmonised legislation.50 
 Harmonisation of Investment Conduct Rules in the EU 3.
3.1. Four-Level System Established by Lamfalussy Process 
In response of the indispensability of legislation harmonisation in the European 
internal market, the Financial Services Action Plan (‘FSAP’) was published in 199951—it 
consisted of a set of harmonisation measures to be implemented by 2005 which were 
intended to support the integration of EU financial markets. However, European 
																																																								
45 CJEU, Case C-384/93, Alpine Investments v Ministervan Financien, [1995] ECR 1-1141, para. 44.  
46 Ibid, paras. 49 and 56. 
47 CJEU, Case C-222/95, SCI Parodi v Banque de Bary, [1997] ECR I-3899, para. 32. Technically, the ranges 
of ‘consumer protection’ and ‘investor protection’ are not the same, although they overlap to some extent: 
see further in the footnote 128 below (p. 35). In order to simplify the issue, this thesis, however, will not 
differentiate these two terms and use them interchangeably, if there is no clear indication. This is because 
‘any attempt to draw a distinction along this line [between ‘investors’ and ‘consumers of investment 
services’] would be misconceived’: Alan C. Page and R. B. Ferguson, Investor Protection (Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1992), at 14. 
48 CJEU, Case C-288/89, Stichting Collectieve Antennevoorziening Gouda v Commissariaat voor de Media, [1991] 
ECR I-4007, para. 29. 
49 CJEU, Case C-35/98, Verkooijen, [2000] ECR I-4071, paras. 47 and 48. 
50 Emilios Avgouleas, ‘The Harmonisation of Rules of Conduct in EU Financial Markets: Economic 
Analysis, Subsidiarity and Investor Protection’ (2000) 6 European Law Journal 72, at 77–81. 
51 European Commission, Financial Services: Implementing the Framework for Financial Markets: 
Action Plan (‘FSAP’), COM(1999)232, May, 1999, available at: 
 <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/actionplan/index/action_en.pdf>  
(accessed June, 2017). 
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legislative processes52 might be too slow, too rigid, producing too much ambiguity and 
failing to distinguish between core principles and detail to do so.53 In order to tackle 
this problem, the so-called Lamfalussy report proposed a four-level system to allocate 
the competence of rule making in the EU—namely, the ‘Lamfalussy process’.54 This 
multi-level system also reflects an administrative paradigm with three characteristics in 
rule making: first, rules ‘should be defined through the application of administrative 
expertise’; second, rules ‘should be defined through a broadly participative process’; and 
third, rules ‘should be subject to a cost-benefit analysis’.55 Before starting a further 
analysis, it should be noted here that the Lamfalussy process is based on the Treaty 
establishing the European Community (‘TEC’),56 because, during that period, the 
Treaty of Lisbon57 had not yet been signed. 
At Level 1 of the Lamfalussy process, the framework legislation is proposed by the 
Commission and adopted by the Council of the European Union (‘Council’) and the 
European Parliament under the ordinary legislative procedure.58 In order to achieve the 
principles of the framework legislation, more detailed implementing measures are 
prepared by the Commission at Level 2 of the Lamfalussy process to supplement Level 
1 framework legislation.59 The European Securities Committee (‘ESC’), also called the 
																																																								
52 For the ordinary legislative procedure of the EU currently: see Article 294 of the TFEU. 
53 European Commission, Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European 
Securities Markets, February, 2001, at 14–15, available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/lamfalussy/wisemen/final-report-wise-men_en.p
df> (accessed June, 2017). (‘Lamfalussy report’) 
54 Ibid, at 6. 
55 James J. Park, ‘The Competing Paradigms of Securities Regulation’ (2007) 57 Duke Law Journal 625, at 
663. 
56 Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community, 2002 OJ C 325/33. (‘TEC’) 
57 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, 2007 OJ C 306/1. 
58 Article 251 of the TEC. See further in Lamfalussy report, above note 53, at 22–27. 
59 Article 202 of the TEC, and Council Decision 99/468/EC laying down the procedures for the exercise 
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Level 2 Committee, was set up to assist the Commission in implementing measures and 
to provide advice on policy issues in the securities field.60 However, the procedure for 
Level 2, which excludes the Parliament’s involvement, caused strong political resistance, 
so ‘sunset clauses’ had to be imposed in Level 1’s legislation to protect the Parliament’s 
participation of the rule-making process.61 As to Level 3 of the Lamfalussy process, 
three network-based committee’ forums that co-ordinate national authorities were built, 
facilitating convergent regulatory practice consistently.62 These three forums include the 
Committee of European Securities Regulators (‘CESR’),63 the Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors (‘CEBS’) 64  and the Committee of European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Supervisors (‘CEIOPS’).65 CESR was the committee in charge 
of the securities field, having advisory powers and could only issue non-binding 
																																																																																																																																																													
of implementing powers conferred on the Commission, 1999 OJ L184/23. See further in Lamfalussy 
report, above note 53, at 28–36. 
60 Commission Decision 2001/528/EC establishing the European Securities Committee, 2001 OJ 
L191/45. For historical reasons, the terms ‘securities’, ‘securities law’ and ‘securities regulation’ are 
generally employed in the USA, and in the early years of the EU, but, recently, ‘capital markets law’ and 
‘capital markets regulation’, less specifically delineated and more broadly understood terms, are applied by 
the EU law to supplant the ambit of ‘securities’. In order to prevent confusion, these two types of terms 
are used interchangeably and shall mean the same in this thesis. See further explanation about these terms: 
see Cally Jordan, International Capital Markets: Law and Institutions (Oxord University Press, 2014), footnote 
7 of page 7; Georgina Tsagas, ‘The Regulatory Powers of the European Supervisory Authorities: 
Constitutional, Political and Functional Considerations’ in Mads Andenas and Gudula Deipenbrock (eds), 
Regulating and Supervising European Financial Markets: More Risks than Achievements (Springer, 2016), footnote 
4 of page 15. 
61 Niamh Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation (3rd edn, Oxford University Press, 2014), 
at 869–872. For example, Directive 2004/39/EC on markets in financial instruments imposes a four-year 
period as a sunset clause: the Parliament and the Council have power to renew Level’2 legislation in 
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure before the end this period, otherwise Level 2’s 
legislation shall be suspended after this period: see Article 64.3 of Directive 2004/39/EC on markets in 
financial instruments, 2004 OJ L 145/1. (‘MiFID I’) 
62 This is also called ‘3L3’, which means three Level 3 Committees of the Lamfalussy process. See further 
in Lamfalussy report, above note 53, at 37–39. 
63 Commission Decision 2001/527/EC establishing the Committee of European Securities Regulators, 
2001 OJ L191/43. (‘CESR Decision’) 
64 Commission Decision 2004/10/EC establishing the European Banking Committee, 2004 OJ L3/36. 
65  Commission Decision 2004/6/EC establishing the Committee of European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Supervisors, 2004 OJ L 3/30. 
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guidelines and recommendations.66 Finally, Level 4 of the Lamfalussy process relates to 
the implementation and enforcement of enacted legislation in Member States: the 
Commission checks Member States’ implementation and takes enforcement action for 
any failure to implement, or for inconsistent implementation, with the support of Level 
3’s committees.67 In some cases that Member States fail to fulfil a Treaty obligation, the 
involvement of the CJEU might also be triggered by the Commission.68 
Essentially, the multi-level system built by the Lamfalussy process focuses on 
centralised rules making instead of centralised supervision,69 so there is no transfer of 
competencies from national to supranational supervision.70 Directive 2004/39/EC on 
markets in financial instruments (‘MiFID I’)71 is one of the most important Directives 
published during this period. Compared to the traditional legislation procedure, many 
costs of the rule-making process are comparatively reduced by this multi-level system,72 
by means of allowing ‘the European institutions to benefit from the technical and 
supervisory expertise of European securities supervisors and from better involvement 
of external stakeholders’.73 
																																																								
66 Recitals 8, 9 and Article 2 of CESR Decision. 
67 See further in Lamfalussy report, above note 53, at 40–41. 
68 Article 226 of the TEC; see also CESR, The Role of CESR at “Level 3” under the Lamfalussy Process, 
CESR/04-527b, October, 2004, at 7, available at: 
<https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/04_527b.pdf> (accessed June, 2017). 
For a comprehensive exposition of the Lamfalussy Process: see Eilís Ferran, Building an EU Securities 
Market (Cambridge University Press, 2004), at 58–111. 
69 Niamh Moloney, ‘The Lamfalussy Legislative Model: A New Era for the EC Securities and Investment 
Services Regime’ (2003) 52 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 509, at 516–517. 
70 Rosa María Lastra, Legal Foundations of International Monetary Stability (Oxford University Press, 2006), at 
331–341. 
71 Directive 2004/39/EC on markets in financial instruments, 2004 OJ L 145/1. 
72 Zdenek Kudrna, ‘Governing EU Financial Markets: Transaction Cost Approach’ (ECPR General 
Conference 2011, Reykjavík), at 26–33. 
73 European Commission, Commission Staff Working document – Instruments for a modernised single 
market policy, SEC(2007) 1518, November, 2007, at 8, available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/citizens_agenda/docs/sec_2007_1518_en.pdf> (accessed June, 2017). 
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3.2. ESMA’s Rule-Making Powers Conferred by De Larosière 
Reforms 
As discussed above, Level 3 Committees of the Lamfalussy process have only some 
soft-law powers. Theoretically, in some instances, guidelines and recommendations have 
been recognised as having legal value in court cases where they were considered good 
practice,74 so these soft-law (non-binding) tools are not devoid of de jure effect. 
However, the embryonic soft-law tools being developed within the previous Level 3 
committees was proven to be ineffective in the wake of the global financial crisis of 
2008–9: for example, an unsuccessful experiment with a soft-law approach to the 
regulation of credit rating agencies demonstrates the urge to ‘upgrade’ to a higher 
binding power remains strong;75 another example regarding failures of the soft-law 
approach can also be found in the deposit guarantee schemes.76 Due to the failure of 
these cases, the de Larosière Report, which was published in 2009 early,77 brought 
about a shift of responsibilities towards the European institutions at the expense of 
national authorities. The result was the European System of Financial Supervision 
(‘ESFS’) was established, comprising the European Systemic Risk Board (‘ESRB’), the 
																																																								
74 CJEU, Case C-322/88, Grimaldi v Fonds des maladies professionnelles, [1989] ECR 04407, para. 18.  
75 European Commission, Communication 2006/C 59/02 from the Commission on Credit Rating 
Agencies, 2006 OJ C59/2 (soft law); Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies, 2009 OJ 
L302/1 (hard law). See further at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/finance/rating-agencies/index_en.htm> (accessed June, 2017). 
76 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council concerning the review of Directive 94/19/EC on Deposit Guarantee Schemes, COM(2006) 729 
final, November, 2006 (soft law); Directive 2014/49/EU on deposit guarantee schemes, 2014 OJ 
L173/149 (hard law). See further at: <http://ec.europa.eu/finance/bank/guarantee/index_en.htm> 
(accessed June, 2017). 
77 See European Commission, Report of the High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, 
February, 2009, Ch. III, available at:  
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf>  
(accessed June, 2017). (‘de Larosière report’) 
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European Supervisory Authorities (‘ESAs’), the Joint Committee of ESAs and Member 
States’ national competent authorities (‘NCAs’).78 ESAs include three authorities: (i) the 
European Banking Authority (‘EBA’)79, (ii) the European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Authority (‘EIOPA’), 80  and (iii) the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (‘ESMA’).81 ESMA is in charge of European capital markets regulation 
replaced the advisor-only CESR on 1 January, 2011. As some scholar said, ‘minimum 
harmonised legislation is nearly abandoned’ by conferring ESMA stronger binding 
powers on rule making. 82  An important manifestation of the changes is the 
implementation of a Single Rulebook via ESMA,83 for tackling the lack of a consistent 
set of rules.84 Attributed to the de Larosière reforms, ESMA now not only undertakes 
the CESR’s old role in providing technical advice, but also has new powers to issue 
opinions,85 draft technical standards86 and publish guidelines and recommendations in 
the rule-making process.87 These matters are discussed in more detail below. 
First, ESMA has taken over the CESR’s previous role as an expert technical adviser 
																																																								
78 For a detailed institutional structure of ESFS: see Eilís Ferran, ‘Understanding the New Institutional 
Architecture of EU Financial Market Supervision’ in Eddy Wymeersch, Klaus J. Hopt and Guido 
Ferrarini (eds), Financial Regulation and Supervision: A Post-Crisis Analysis (Oxford University Press, 2012), at 
111–158. 
79 Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking 
Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC, 
2010 OJ L331/12. (‘EBA Regulation’) 
80 Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance 
and Occupational Pensions Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission 
Decision 2009/79/EC, 2010 OJ L331/48. (‘EIOPA Regulation’) 
81 Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities 
and Markets Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 
2009/77/EC, 2010 OJ L331/84. (‘ESMA Regulation’) 
82 Stuart Willey, ‘The European System of Financial Supervision’ in Michael C. Blair, George Alexander 
Walker and Stuart Willey (eds), Financial Markets and Exchanges Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press, 
2012), at 388. 
83 Recital 5 of ESMA Regulation. 
84 The de Larosière report, above note 77, paras. 99–104. 
85 Article 8.2(g) of ESMA Regulation. 
86 Articles 8.2(a) and (b) of ESMA Regulation. 
87 Articles 8.2(c) of ESMA Regulation. 
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to the Commission’s Level 2 rules,88 albeit the types and rule-making process of Level 2 
rules were changed. After the Lisbon Treaty,89 signed in 2007 and renamed the TEC as 
the TFEU, and which came into force on 1 December, 2009, Article 290 of the TFEU 
created a new category of legal act at Level 2: ‘delegated acts’. Level 1 legislation may 
delegate the Commission power to adopt non-legislative acts of general application to 
supplement or amend certain non-essential elements. The Expert Group of the ESC, as 
a consultative entity of the Internal Market and Services Directorate General (‘DG 
MARKT’) in the Commission, has a particular role in the preparation of delegated Acts 
regarding securities law.90 Moreover, Article 291 of the TFEU also strengthens the 
implementing powers of the Commission, although the Commission could neither 
amend nor supplement the legislative Act in exercising these implementing powers, 
even as to its non-essential elements.91 In case the European measures require uniform 
implementation across the EU, the Commission is authorised to adopt ‘implementing 
acts’ relating to the securities field with the assistance of the ESC.92 The new procedure 
and the Parliament’s involvement under Article 291 were also added.93 In addition to 
providing technical advice as the CESR did, ESMA, upon a request or on its own 
initiative, has a new power to provide opinions to the Parliament, the Council and the 
																																																								
88 Article 8.1(l) of ESMA Regulation. 
89 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, 2007 OJ C 306/1. 
90 See EGESC website, available at:  
<http://ec.europa.eu/finance/securities/egesc/index_en.htm> (accessed June, 2017). 
91 CJEU, Case C-65/13, Parliament v Commission, [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2289, para. 45. 
92 For example, Article 51 of MiFIR. 
93 Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the rules 
and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s 
exercise of implementing powers, 2011 OJ L55/13. 
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Commission on all issues to its area of competence.94 
Second, according to Articles 10 and 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 
(‘ESMA Regulation’), ESMA can develop regulatory technical standards (‘RTSs’) and 
implementing technical standards (‘ITSs’) by means of regulations or decisions, in 
accordance with the procedure of Articles 290 and 291 of the TFEU respectively. 
ESMA now has a new power to draft technical standards which are ‘binding’ to 
Member States.95 Essentially, ESMA’s power in drafting technical standards should be 
seen as a conferral of competence from the Commission, so, technical standards should 
be compatible with those Level 2 rules.96 Also, technical standards shall not involve 
‘strategic decisions or policy choices’.97 The adoption of technical standards is subject 
to the Commission’s endorsement, and the Parliament and the Council have veto 
powers to participate in the adoption of RTSs.98 By means of the foregoing reforms, 
Level 2 legislation with binding powers extends to two types: (i) ‘Commission-only’ acts 
with ESAs’ support: delegated acts and implementing acts; and (ii) ‘ESAs plus 
Commission’ acts: RTSs and ITSs.99 
Third, ESMA, ‘with a view to establishing consistent, efficient and supervisory 
practices and to ensuring the common, uniform and consistent application of Union 
																																																								
94 Article 34.1 of ESMA Regulation. 
95 Article 17 of ESMA Regulation. 
96 Recital 13 of Directive 2010/78/EU amending Directives 98/26/EC, 2002/87/EC, 2003/6/EC, 
2003/41/EC, 2003/71/EC, 2004/39/EC, 2004/109/EC, 2005/60/EC, 2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC and 
2009/65/EC in respect of the powers of the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking 
Authority), the European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority) and the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), 2010 
OJ L331/120. (‘Omnibus Directive’) 
97 Articles 10 and 15 of ESMA Regulation. 
98 Articles 11–14 of ESMA Regulation. 
99 Eddy Wymeersch, ‘The European Financial Supervisory Authorities or ESAs’ in Eddy Wymeersch, 
Klaus J. Hopt and Guido Ferrarini (eds), Financial Regulation and Supervision: A Post-Crisis Analysis (Oxford 
University Press, 2012), at 250–251. 
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Law’, can also issue non-binding guidelines and recommendations to NCAs, as CESR 
did, or even to market participants.100 Nevertheless, a key difference is local supervisors 
and market actors now shall ‘make every effort to comply with’ these non-binding 
guidelines and recommendations, which is supported by a novel ‘comply or explain’ 
mechanism and public disclosure of non-compliance.101 These non-binding guidelines 
and recommendations could hence be considered as secondary sources of law, having 
their ‘hard’ quality.102 Professor Möllers even coins them as the ‘hoft law’, which is a 
third type of law, beside hard law and soft law.103 Likewise, a new justification of issuing 
guidelines and recommendations is added: ESMA may adopt guidelines and 
recommendations ‘with a view to promoting the safety and soundness of markets and 
convergence of regulatory practice’.104 Although guidelines are in place everywhere to 
clarify the application of regulatory rules, it is important to note that the CJEU set down 
that guidelines shall follow the general principles of law (such as, the equal treatment 
and the protection of legitimate expectations) if the guidelines are designed to produce 
external effects.105 
On the whole, the multi-level rule-making system of investment conduct regulation 
can be understood as set out in Figure II-1 below. Indeed, some issues still exist in the 
																																																								
100 Article 16 of ESMA Regulation; compare Article 3 of CESR Decision. 
101 Article 16.3 of ESMA Regulation. See also ESMA, Frequently Asked Questions: A Guide to 
Understanding ESMA, ESMA/2011/009, January, 2011, at 5, available at: 
<https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/2011_009.pdf>  
(accessed June, 2017). 
102 N. Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation, above note 61, at 930. 
103 Thomas M. J. Möllers, ‘Sources of Law in European Securities Regulation - Effective Regulation, Soft 
Law and Legal Taxonomy from Lamfalussy to de Larosière’ (2010) 11 European Business Organization Law 
Review 379, at 400. 
104 Article 9.2 of ESMA Regulation. 
105 CJEU, Joined Cases C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P, Dansk 
Rørindustri and Others v Commission, [2005] ECR I-5425, paras. 209–211. 
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current system.106 However, the rule-making procedure added by the de Larosière 
reforms into the ‘Lamfalussy II process’ must be regarded positively with respect to the 
role of ESMA, enabling the use of its expertise and reducing the necessity of the lengthy 
European legislative procedures.107 
 
Figure II-1: Rule-Making System of Investment Conduct Regulation in the EU 
3.3. Exhaustively Harmonised Rules in MiFID Regime 
The first initiative to harmonise the rules of investment conduct in the EU may be 
traced back to the Commission Recommendation in 1977,108 followed by a list of 
general principles in Article 11 of ISD in 1993.109 Thereafter, MiFID I, together with 
																																																								
106 See further in Section 4 below (pp. 61–71). 
107 Fabian Fabian Walla, ‘Process and Strategies of Capital Markets Regulation in Europe’ in Rüdiger Veil 
(ed), European Capital Markets Law (Hart Publishing, 2013) in Rüdiger Veil (ed), European Capital Markets 
Law (Hart Publishing, 2013), at 35–36. 
108 European Commission, Commission Recommendation 77/534/EEC concerning a European code of 
conduct relating to transactions in transferable securities, 1977 OJ L212/37. 
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relative Level 2 legislation110 as ‘MiFID I Regime’, was applied by all Member States in 
2007, and the rules of investment conduct were harmonised largely in the EU.111 In 
2014, a revised MiFID112 introduced some updated ‘minimum harmonised’ 113 rules of 
investment conduct (known as ‘MiFID II’), together with a new Regulation on Markets 
in Financial Instruments (‘MiFIR’).114 Both of them are going to be implemented and 
applied by Member States from January, 2018.115  Likewise, a Regulation on key 
information documents for packaged retail and insurance-based investment products 
(‘KID Regulation’) 116  was directly applicable from 31 December, 2016, 117  as a 
complement to the measures on distribution of whole ‘MiFID II Package’.118 At the 
																																																								
110 Commission Directive 2006/73/EC implementing Directive 2004/39/EC as regards organisational 
requirements and operating conditions for investment firms and defined terms for the purposes of that 
Directive, 2006 OJ L241/36 (‘Level 2 Directive of MiFID I’); Commission Regulation (EC) No 
1287/2006 implementing Directive 2004/39/EC as regards recordkeeping obligations for investment 
firms, transaction reporting, market transparency, admission of financial instruments to trading, and 
defined terms for the purposes of that Directive, 2006 OJ L241/1. (‘Level 2 Regulation of MiFID I’) 
111 The precise level of harmonisation in MiFID I is debatable, because the only relative provision is in 
Article 4 of Level 2 Directive rather than in MiFID I: see Michel Tison, ‘Financial Market Integration in 
the Post FSAP Era. In Search of Overall Conceptual Consistency in the Regulatory Framework’ in Guido 
Ferrarini and Eddy Wymeersch (eds), Investor Protection in Europe: Corporate Law Making, The MiFID and 
Beyond (Oxford University Press, 2006), at 445–451. 
112 Directive 2014/65/EU on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and 
Directive 2011/61/EU, 2014 OJ L173/349. (‘MiFID II’) 
113 See Articles 16.11 and 24.12 of MiFID II. However, Moloney argues these provisions in MiFID II are 
regarded as de facto maximum harmonisation because Member State may only impose additional 
requirement in ‘exceptional cases’: see N. Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation, above 
note 61, at 790–791. 
114 Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation (EU) No 
648/2012, 2014 OJ L173/84. (‘MiFIR’) 
115 Originally, MiFID II and MiFIR were planned to be implemented and applied by Member States from 
January, 2017 (Article 93 of MiFID II and Article 55 of MiFIR). However, due to the complicated 
requirements of IT system update, MiFID II/MiFIR’s implementation is postponed to January, 2018. See 
Directive (EU) 2016/1034 amending Directive 2014/65/EU on markets in financial instruments, 2016 
OJ L175/8; and Regulation (EU) 2016/1033 amending Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 on markets in 
financial instruments, Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 on market abuse and Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 
on improving securities settlement in the European Union and on central securities depositories, 2016 OJ 
L175/1. 
116  Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 on key information documents for packaged retail and 
insurance-based investment products (PRIIPs), 2014 OJ L352/2. (‘KID Regulation’) 
117 Article 34 of KID Regulation. 
118 Recital 5 of KID Regulation. 
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current stage, the Commission has adopted two delegated acts of MiFID II119 and one 
of MiFIR120, along with over forty technical standards.121 Thanks to these efforts, rules 
of investment conduct now are harmonised more densely and exhaustively in the EU, 
representing a move towards the ‘Single Rulebook’ framework.122 This is a significant 
development from ‘capital markets law(s) in Europe’ to ‘European capital markets 
law’.123 However, due to the limited space, it is unable to provide comprehensive 
discussion of Level 2 and Level 3 rules of MiFID II package here. The following 
discussion will focus on the harmonised Level 1 rules of investment conduct in the EU. 
 Clients’ Classification 3.3.1.
MiFID II is a major Directive on investor protection in the EU that deals with 
‘investment firms’ and their relationship with their ‘clients’, amongst other things. 
MiFID II defines ‘investment firms’ as meaning ‘any legal person whose regular 
occupation or business is the provision of one or more investment services to third 
																																																								
119 See Commission Delegated Directive (EU) .../... supplementing Directive 2014/65/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council with regard to safeguarding of financial instruments and funds 
belonging to clients, product governance obligations and the rules applicable to the provision or reception 
of fees, commissions or any monetary or non-monetary benefits, C(2016) 2031 final, April, 2016, available 
at: <http://ec.europa.eu/finance/securities/docs/isd/mifid/160407-delegated-directive_en.pdf> 
(accessed June, 2017) (‘Delegated Directive of MiFID II’); and Commission Delegated Regulation 
(EU) .../... supplementing Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council as 
regards organisational requirements and operating conditions for investment firms and defined terms for 
the purposes of that Directive, C(2016) 2398 final, April, 2016, available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/finance/securities/docs/isd/mifid/160425-delegated-regulation_en.pdf> (accessed 
June, 2017). (‘Delegated Regulation of MiFID II’) 
120 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) .../... supplementing Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council with regard to definitions, transparency, portfolio compression 
and supervisory measures on product intervention and positions, C(2016) 2860 final, May, 2016, available 
at: <http://ec.europa.eu/finance/securities/docs/isd/mifid/160518-delegated-regulation_en.pdf>  
(accessed June, 2017). (‘Delegated Regulation of MiFIR’) 
121 The Commission provides an up-to-date overview table of these technical standards, available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/finance/securities/docs/isd/mifid/its-rts-overview-table_en.pdf> (accessed June, 
2017). 
122 Christopher Leonard, Ezra Zahabi and Chris Poon, ‘MiFID II: One Step Closer to A Common 
Rulebook?’ (2015) 34 International Financial Law Review 1, at 1. 
123 Rüdiger Veil, ‘Conclusion’ in Rüdiger Veil (ed), European Capital Markets Law (Hart Publishing, 2013), 
at 474–478. 
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parties and/or the performance of one or more investment activities on a professional 
basis’.124 In terms of ‘clients’, it means ‘any natural or legal person to whom an 
investment firm provides investment or ancillary services’125 with two types: (i) a 
‘professional client’ ‘means a client meeting the criteria laid down in Annex II’;126 and (ii) 
a ‘retail client’ ‘means a client who is not a professional client’.127 In accordance with the 
initial paragraph of Annex II of MiFID II, a retail investor is a client (may be either a 
natural or legal person) who does NOT ‘possess experience, knowledge and expertise to 
make its own investment decision and to properly assess the risks that it incurs’.128 
Under such conditions, the asymmetric information129 and principal-agent problems130 
between investment firms and retail clients are easily to become greater.131 Therefore, 
the Level 2 rules of the MiFID regime (whether MiFID I or II) provide stronger 
protection on retail investors.132 In contrast, there is no compelling reason for special 
																																																								
124 Article 4.1(1) of MiFID II. 
125 Article 4.1(9) of MiFID II. 
126 Article 4.1(10) of MiFID II with reference to Annex II, which contains detailed guidance on how to 
classify an investor as professional. 
127 Article 4.1(11) of MiFID II. 
128 In accordance with this definition, the term ‘retail investor’ is not equal to the term ‘consumer’, 
because a ‘consumer’ shall be ‘any natural person who is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, 
business or profession’ (see Article 2(b) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer 
contracts, 1993 OJ L95/29; Article 2(e) of Directive 2000/31/EC on certain legal aspects of information 
society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market, 2000 OJ L178/1; Article 2(d) 
of Directive 2002/65/EC concerning the distance marketing of consumer financial services, 2002 OJ 
L271/16), or ‘outside his craft’ (Article 2(a) of Directive 2005/29/EC concerning unfair 
business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market, 2005 OJ L149/22). Furthermore, this 
definition shall not to be given a wider interpretation in the EU law: CJEU, Joined Cases C-541/99 and 
C-542/99, Cape Snc v Idealservice Srl and Idealservice MN RE Sas v OMAI Srl, [2001] ECR I-9049, para. 16. 
129 In here, it means investment firms own more information and know more than their clients: see 
further in Section 3.1.1 of CHAPTER IV (p. 146). 
130 In brief, since an investment firm has more knowledge or power than its client, it may abuse this 
position: see further in Section 3.1.2 of CHAPTER IV (pp. 148–149). 
131 David T. Llewellyn, ‘Regulation of Retail Investment Services’ (1995) 15 Economic Affairs 12, at 14; 
Charles AE Goodhart, ‘Some Regulatory Concerns’ (1996) 132 Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics 613, 
at 618–620; Charles Goodhart et al, Financial Regulation: Why, How and Where Now? (Bank of England, 
1998), at 7–8. 
132 This can be found in the information requirements (such as, Article 48.1 and 50.1 of Delegated 
Regulation of MiFID II), the documenting and reporting requirements (such as, Article 61 of Delegated 
Regulation of MiFID II), the know your clients requirements (such as, Articles 54.3 and 56.1 of Delegated 
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protection on professional, wholesale investors, and such investors dominate markets, 
since they understand the risks.133 This distinction of retail/professional investors is 
also applied by many jurisdictions in the world, albeit this is not without critics.134 
In addition to retail/professional investors, there is a third type of clients in the 
MiFID regime: ‘eligible counterparties’.135 They can benefit from significant exemptions 
from the rules of investment conduct (such as, the quality-of-service and best execution 
requirements that will be discussed below)136 with regard to the investment services of 
‘executing orders on behalf of clients, and/or dealing on own account, and/or receiving 
and transmitting orders’.137 However, ‘in order to enhance the regulatory framework 
applicable to the provision of services irrespective of the categories of clients 
concerned’, 138  now principles to ‘act honestly, fairly and professionally’ and the 
obligation to be ‘fair, clear and not misleading’ (but the obligation to act in accordance 
with the best interest of its client is not extended) apply to the relationship with eligible 
																																																																																																																																																													
Regulation of MiFID II), the order execution requirements (such as, Article 64.1 of Delegated Regulation 
of MiFID II) and other miscellaneous requirements (such as, safekeeping clients’ assets in Article 2.3 of 
Delegated Directive of MiFID II). For a detailed analysis of this in MiFID I’s Level 2 rules: see Marc 
Kruithof, ‘A Differentiated Approach to Client Protection: The Example of MiFID’ in Stefan 
Grundmann and Yesim M. Atamer (eds), Financial Services, Financial Crisis and General European Contract Law: 
Failure and Challenges of Contracting (Kluwer Law International, 2011), at 123–147. 
133 European Commission, White Paper on Enhancing the Single Market Framework for Investment 
Funds, COM(2006)686 final, 15 November, 2006, at 13, available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/ucits/whitepaper/whitepaper_en.pdf> (accessed 
June, 2017). 
134 For example, Professor Bradley argues that the emergence of day traders invites us to reconsider the 
bases of this distinction: see Caroline Bradley, ‘Disorderly Conduct: Day Traders and the Ideology of 
"Fair and Orderly Markets"’ (2000) 26 Journal of Corporation Law 63, at 90. 
135 According to Article 30.2 of MiFID II, eligible counterparties include ‘investment firms, credit 
institutions, insurance companies, UCITS and their management companies, pension funds and their 
management companies, other financial institutions authorised or regulated under Union law or under the 
national law of a Member State, national governments and their corresponding offices including public 
bodies that deal with public debt at national level, central banks and supranational organisations.’ 
136 See Sections 3.3.6 and 3.3.7 below (pp. 48–56). 
137 Article 30.1 of MiFID II. 
138 Recital 86 of MiFID II. 
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counterparties.139 Also, ‘the financial crisis has shown limits in the ability of non-retail 
clients to appreciate the risk of their investment’,140 so some information and reporting 
requirements are now extended to apply to eligible counterparties.141 
In summary, there are three types of investors classified in the MiFID regime: 
retail investors, professional investors and eligible counterparties; and, in accordance 
with the Prospectus Directive, later two types can further be called together as ‘qualified 
investors’.142 These three types of clients enjoy different ambits of protection, reflecting 
a concern of regulatory efficiency: namely, ‘[m]easures to protect investors should be 
adapted to the particularities of each category of investors’.143 This tailored regulation 
can be regarded as ‘asymmetrically paternalistic’, bridging the gap between discipline 
through market forces and paternalistic regulatory intervention.144 
 General Requirement 3.3.2.
According to Article 24.1 of MiFID II, ‘when providing investment services 
and/or, where appropriate,145 ancillary services to clients,’146 an investment firm is 
required to ‘act honestly, fairly, and professionally in accordance with the best interest 
																																																								
139 Article 30.1 of MiFID II; see further in Article 71 of Delegated Regulation of MiFID II. 
140 Recital 104 of MiFID II. 
141 See further in Article 30.1 of MiFID II. 
142 Article 2.1(e) of Directive 2003/71/EC on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered 
to the public or admitted to trading and amending Directive 2001/34/EC, 2003 OJ L345/65; amended 
by Directive 2008/11/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2008 OJ L76/37, and 
Directive 2010/73/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2010 OJ L327/1. (‘Prospectus 
Directive’) See further in Recital 7 of Directive 2010/73/EU, 2010 OJ L327/1. 
143 Recital 86 of MiFID II. 
144  Colin Camerer et al, ‘Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for 
"Asymmetric Paternalism"’ (2003) 151 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1211, at 1236–1237. See also 
Section 3.1.4 of CHAPTER IV (pp. 151–153). 
145 Without any further clarification, some concern the wording ‘where appropriate’ may leave some 
discretion to Member States in determining whether the general duty should apply to particular ancillary 
services; see Rob Price, ‘Conduct of Business Standards – Fair Dealing for Clients’ in Matthew Elderfield 
(ed), A Practitioner's Guide to MiFID: The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (1st edn, Sweet & Maxwell 
Ltd, 2007), at 148–149. 
146 Even when a firm is not providing any services, another similar obligation based on a different legal 
basis may still be applied: see Article 24 of MiFIR. 
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of its client’, as a fundamental fiduciary-style obligation.147 This general requirement, as 
an improvement on the static test, has ‘an operational focus and sets an on-going 
standard of conduct expected of a license holder’. 148  The importance of this 
requirement is two-fold. First, it imposes positive obligations on investment firms,149 
and provides an ex post mechanism for reviewing the behaviour of investment firms.150 
Second, given the opacity of the concepts used (notably ‘fairness’), it provides flexibility 
with respect to risks not expressly addressed.151 
 Marketing Requirement 3.3.3.
A core marketing obligation is found in Article 24.3 of MiFID II, requiring that all 
information (including ‘marketing communications’) provided by an investment firm to 
(potential) clients must be ‘fair, clear and not misleading’. Although there is no clear 
definition of the term ‘marketing communications’,152 the absence of such a definition 
is likely to be less significant in practice, since the information requirement that will be 
discussed in the next section can cover the term sufficiently. 153  ‘Marketing 
																																																								
147 Jean-Pierre Casey and Karel Lannoo, The MiFID Revolution (Cambridge University Press, 2009), at 46. 
For further discussion about the fiduciary duties: see Section 4.2.3 of CHAPTER V (pp. 230–234). 
148 Paul Latimer and Philipp Maume, Promoting Information in the Marketplace for Financial Services: Financial 
Market Regulation and International Standards (Springer Publishing, 2015), at 129. 
149 Alastair Hudson, The Law of Finance (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2013), para. 10-16. 
150 N. Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation, above note 61, at 800. 
151 Niamh Moloney, How to Protect Investors: Lessons from the EC and the UK (Cambridge University Press, 
2010), at 218; Christel M. Grundmann-van de Krol, ‘The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive and 
Asset Management’ in Danny Busch and Deborah A. DeMott (eds), Liability of Asset Managers (Oxford 
University Press, 2012), at 45–46.  
152 The only relevant clarification of this term is given in Article 36.2 of Delegated Regulation of MiFID 
II. It defines an investment recommendation should be treated as a marketing communication once this 
recommendation does not meet the conditions of investment research. 
153 Rob R. Price, ‘Conduct of Business Standards – Information Requirements’ in Elderfield M (ed), A 
Practitioner's Guide to MiFID: The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (1st edn, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd 
2007), at 223. See also ESMA, MiFID – Conduct of Business, fair, clear and not misleading information: 
Peer Review Report, ESMA/2014/1485, December, 2014, paras. 14 and 15, available at: 
<https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/2014-1485_peer_review_report_-_m
ifid_-_conduct_of_business_fair_clear_and_not_misleading_information.pdf> 
(accessed June, 2017). 
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communications’ typically represent the initial stage in the investment process, which 
may have a ‘material effect’ on the investment decision than other stages of the sales 
process.154 Thus, in order to prevent an undue impact on the commercial activities of 
investment firms, this requirement should be applied in an appropriate and 
proportionate way.  
However, given the evidence of vulnerability of investors on marketing with 
respect to the over-confidence bias,155 the marketing requirement become more and 
more stringent. For instance, MiFID II requires a match between financial instruments 
that investment firms manufacture (or offer/recommend) and their ‘identified target 
market’.156 This is a product governance procedure required for product distributors, 
imposing an overarching obligation on investment firms to consider clients’ interests 
when distributing products through any channel.157 Furthermore, the KID Regulation is 
in place with an aim to help retail investors understand and compare the key features 
and risks of the packaged retail and insurance-based investment products (‘PRIIPs’).158 
Marketing communications of PRIIPs ‘shall not include any statement that contradicts 
the information contained in the key information document or diminishes the 
significance of the key information document’.159 
  
																																																								
154 CESR, Technical Advice on Possible Implementing Measures of Directive 2004/39/EC: 1st Set of 
Mandates, CESR/05-024c, January, 2005, at 45, available at: 
<https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/05_024c.pdf> 
(accessed June, 2017). 
155 Gregory La Blanc and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, ‘In Praise of Investor Irrationality’ in Francesco Parisi and 
Vernon L. Smith (eds), The Law and Economics of Irrational Behavior (Stanford University Press, 2005), at 558. 
156 Articles 24.2 and 24.4(b) of MiFID II. See also Articles 9 and 10 of Delegated Directive of MiFID II. 
157 N. Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation, above note 61, at 800. 
158 Article 1 of KID Regulation. 
159 Article 9 of KID Regulation. 
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 Information Requirement 3.3.4.
In addition to the shared provision with the marketing requirement to require 
information be ‘fair, clear and not misleading’,160 the core disclosure provision of 
MiFID II requires an investment firm to provide appropriate information in ‘good time’ 
to clients and potential clients about the investment firm and services provided, the 
financial instruments involved, the proposed investment strategies (including risk 
warnings and execution venues), and related costs and associated charges.161 For 
determination of the ‘good time’, ‘the investment firm should take into account, having 
regard to the urgency of the situation, the client’s need for sufficient time to read and 
understand it before taking an investment decision’.162 In addition, the information 
requirement on costs and charges requires the investment firm not only to inform 
clients about all costs and charges related to both the investment/ancillary services and 
the financial instruments, but also to aggregate them in order to let clients understand 
the ‘overall costs, as well as the cumulative effect on return of the investment’.163 
Likewise, a cross-selling provision for tackling issues of packaged products and bundle 
of services is newly introduced in MiFID II:164 due to the complexity, investment firms 
shall inform their clients whether it is possible to buy the different components 
separately with comparable costs and risks.165 However, the wide range of information 
places a concern regarding an investor’s capacity to understand sophisticated financial 
																																																								
160 Article 24.3 of MiFID II. See detailed requirements in Article 44 of Delegated Regulation of MiFID 
II. 
161 Article 24.4 of MiFID II. See further details in Articles 46–50 of Delegated Regulation of MiFID II. 
162 Recital 83 of MiFID II. 
163 Article 24.4 of MiFID II. 
164 Recital 81 of MiFID II. 
165 Article 24.11 of MiFID II. 
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information and may simply generate confusion. 166  Therefore, MiFID II further 
requires the information should be ‘in a comprehensible form’ that clients or potential 
clients are ‘reasonably able to understand the nature and risks’ for taking investment 
decisions on an informed basis. 167  Some may claim this wording recognises the 
investor’s limited cognition, opening up ‘a leeway to design the EU securities regulation 
right from the start in a behavioural way’.168 This is very different to the traditional 
disclosure requirement. 
Furthermore, due to the fact that retail investors may not be able to understand 
structured products, appropriate information regarding the characteristics of each 
product should be disclosed to retail investors.169 The KID Regulation, thus, introduces 
simpler and standardised product information of PRIIPs, with an aim to build ‘the trust 
of retail investors in the financial markets’.170 A KID is a stand-alone document, 
separating from marketing material and any other disclosures required under other 
regimes which continue to exist in parallel. 171  It constitutes key pre-contractual 
information that should be ‘accurate, fair, clear, not misleading’ and ‘consistent with’ all 
other information about PRIIPs.172 KIDs, normally,173 are required to be provided to 
																																																								
166 Niamh Moloney, ‘Large-Scale Reform of Investor Protection Regulation: The European Union 
Experience’ (2007) 4 Macquarie Journal of Business Law 147, at 171–172. 
167 Article 24.5 of MiFID II. 
168 Kai Purnhagen, ‘Why Do We Need Responsive Regulation and Behavioural Research in EU Internal 
Market Law?’ in Klaus Mathis (ed), European Perspectives on Behavioural Law and Economics (Springer, 2015), at 
65. 
169 ESMA, Economic Report: Retailisation in the EU, No1 2013, ESMA/2013/326, July, 2013, at 6, 
available at: 
<https://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files_force/library/2015/11/2013-326_economic_report_-_retail
isation_in_the_eu_0.pdf?download=1> (accessed June, 2017). 
170 Recital 5 of KID Regulation. 
171 Article 6.2 of KID Regulation. 
172 Article 6.1 of KID Regulation. 
173 See two exceptions of the providing time in Articles 13.3 and 13.4 of KID Regulation. 
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retail investors or their behalves with written authority before concluding a sale.174 
Furthermore, KIDs shall be free of charge and may be provided either on paper, 
durable mediums or websites. 175  Overall, information requirements in the KID 
Regulation, which establish uniform rules on transparency, are complementary to the 
measures of MiFID II,176 aiming to enhance investor protection at the EU level.177 
However, the scope and relative importance of KIDs is open to debate.178 First, 
given the limitations of disclosure highlighted by behavioural economics research, the 
reforms regarding key or simplified information may have limited effectiveness.179 A 
further concern as to the ineffectiveness of information requirements is the time delay 
for information disclosure between the emergence of the ‘evil’ in the market and the 
enactment of the law to correct the ‘evil’.180 Inasmuch as the simple information rules 
are only ever going to be partially effective, or even fail,181 clients shall be protected by 
an enhanced risk disclosure obligation.182 Given the aforementioned suspicion that the 
information requirement may not always function orderly, some behavioural economics 
																																																								
174 Articles 13.1 and 13.2 of KID Regulation. 
175 Article 14 of KID Regulation. 
176 Recital 5 of KID Regulation. 
177 Recital 4 of KID Regulation. 
178 Godwin and Ramsay conduct a comparative analysis of six jurisdictions, showing that rules of 
short-form disclosure documents are significantly varied: see Andrew Godwin and Ian Ramsay, ‘Financial 
Products and Short-Form Disclosure Documents: A Comparative Analysis of Six Jurisdictions’ (2015) 10 
Capital Markets Law Journal 212, at 212–238. 
179 Specifically, some scholars conducted an experiment finding that summary prospectuses on mutual 
funds did not lead to different purchasing decisions than much more detailed (and complex) statutory 
prospectuses for the same products: see John Beshears et al, ‘How Does Simplified Disclosure Affect 
Individuals' Mutual Fund Choices?’ in David A. Wise (ed), Explorations in the Economics of Aging (University 
of Chicago Press, 2011), at 76–96. 
180 John J. A. Burke, ‘Re-Examining Investor Protection in Europe and the US’ (2009) 16 eLaw Journal 1, 
at 17–18. 
181 See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider, More Than You Wanted to Know: The Failure of 
Mandated Disclosure (Princeton University Press, 2014), Part II. 
182  Donald C. Langevoort, ‘Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from Behavioral 
Economics about Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers’ (1996) 84 California Law Review 627, at 692–
695. 
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scholars call for an enhancement of the point-of-sale (‘POS’) regulation, focusing on the 
quality of services and the mitigation of conflicts of interest instead.183 
 Conflict-of-Interest Requirement 3.3.5.
Although the obligation to avoid prejudicial conflicts of interest between 
investment firms and their clients might be considered as being implied in the general 
requirement aforementioned, the conflict-of-interest requirements are expressly 
addressed by many self-standing provisions of MiFID II (such as, Articles 9.3, 16.3 and 
23). This is because, even the general requirement under Article 24.1 concerning acting 
in the client’s ‘best interests’ is closely related to (or even partially overlapping with) the 
conflict-of-interest requirement,184 these two regimes operate independently: a breach 
of the conflict-of-interest requirement does not automatically lead to a breach of the 
general requirement and vice versa.185 For example, an investment firm may provide its 
investment advice in accordance with the best interest of one client, but the 
recommended financial instrument is linked to the personal interest of the investment 
firm’s managers. 
Essentially, the conflict-of-interest requirement is not only an organisational 
requirement but also a conduct requirement.186 On the one hand, in Article 9.3 of 
MiFID II, as an organisational requirement, interests of clients and conflict-of-interest 
management are placed at the heart of the management body’s responsibilities. 
																																																								
183 Rainer Baisch and Rolf H. Weber, ‘Investment Suitability Requirements in the Light of Behavioural 
Findings: Challenges for a Legal Framework Coping with Ambiguous Risk Perceptions’ in Klaus Mathis 
(ed), European Perspectives on Behavioural Law and Economics (Springer, 2015), at 171–174. 
184 This overlap is noted by Article 24.9 of MiFID II. 
185 R. Price, ‘Conduct of Business Standards – Fair Dealing for Clients’, above note 145, at 150 
186 Guido Ferrarini, ‘Contract Standards and the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID): An 
Assessment of the Lamfalussy Regulatory Architecture’ (2005) 1 European Review of Contract Law 19, at 33–
35. 
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According to Article 16.3 of MiFID II, ‘firms must maintain and operate organisational 
and administrative arrangement with a view to taking all reasonable steps187 to prevent 
conflicts of interest from adversely affecting client interests’. In some cases that 
organisational and administrative arrangements are not sufficient ‘with reasonable 
confidence’ that risks of damage to client interests will be prevented, the investment 
firm shall clearly disclose this in a durable medium and in detail to the client before 
undertaking business.188 However, this disclosure is a ‘last resort’, which is not a 
substitute for the conflict-of-interest identification and management.189 Furthermore, 
investment firms shall take ‘all appropriate steps to identify’ conflicts of interest required 
by Article 23.1 of MiFID II.190 Compared to the standard of ‘reasonable steps’ to 
‘prevent’ conflicts of interest, the standard of ‘appropriate steps’ to ‘identify’ conflicts of 
interest is higher because of its objective assessment.191 This difference may be caused 
by the different degrees of difficulty between identifying and preventing conflicts of 
interest. The former is easier than the latter. Therefore, in practice, investment firms 
need to set up different processes and control systems in different stages, in order to 
fulfil these two different standards.192 
On the other hand, the conflict-of-interest requirement is diffused into the conduct 
																																																								
187 The ‘reasonable steps’ implies that investment firms may take into account the nature of the relevant 
business, but are not expected to go to disproportionate lengths to manage conflicts: see Michael Raffan, 
‘Conduct of Business Standards – Organisational Requirements’ in Matthew Elderfield (ed), A 
Practitioner's Guide to MiFID: The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (1st edn, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, 
2007), at 125. 
188 Articles 23.2 and 23.3 of MiFID II. 
189 C. M. G.-v. d. Krol, above note 151, at 39. 
190 For detailed requirements of ‘appropriate steps’: see Article 33 of Delegated Regulation of MiFID II. 
191 N. Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation, above note 61, at 373. 
192 For the detailed differences of these two standard: see further in Article 34 of Delegated Regulation of 
MiFID II regarding ‘conflicts of interest policy’. 
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requirement in Article 24 of MiFID II. 193  This could not only prove that the 
conflict-of-interest requirement is part of the investment conduct rules, rather than a 
pure organisational requirement, but also prevent a wrongful over-reliance on 
organisational arrangements to tackle conflict-of-interest issues. 194  One important 
change here is that ‘independent advice’ is now clearly distinguished from 
‘non-independent advice’.195 The distinction between these two is whether investment 
firms ‘accept and retain fees, commissions or any monetary and non-monetary benefits 
from third parties’.196 Once an investment firm informs the client that investment 
advice is provided on an ‘independent basis’, the investment firm shall assess a 
‘sufficient diverse range’ of financial instruments available on the market, which must 
not be limited to financial instruments issued or provided by the investment firm or by 
entities that have relationships with the investment firm.197 However, some paradoxical 
results show such a disclosure-based division of investment advice can have perverse 
effects: first, clients generally underestimate the influence of the disclosed conflicts of 
interest;198 second, disclosure can even exaggerate the problem caused by conflicts of 
																																																								
193 Articles 24.7, 24.8, and 24.10 of MiFID II. 
194 Luca Enriques, ‘Conflicts of Interest in Investment Services: The Price and Uncertain Impact of 
MiFID's Regulatory Framework’ in Guido Ferrarini and Eddy Wymeersch (eds), Investor Protection in Europe: 
Corporate Law Making, The MiFID and Beyond (Oxford University Press, 2006), at 331–334. 
195 Article 24.4(a) of MiFID II and Article 52 of Delegated Regulation of MiFID II. 
196 Recital 74 of MiFID II. 
197 Recital 73 and Article 24.7 (a) of MiFID II; see further in Article 53 of Delegated Regulation of 
MiFID II. 
198 Daylian M. Cain, George Loewenstein and Don A. Moore, ‘The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse 
Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest’ (2005) 34 The Journal of Legal Studies 1, at 5–7 and 22; Marc 
Kruithof, ‘Conflicts of Interest in Institutional Asset Management: Is the EU Regulatory Approach 
Adequate?’ in Luc Thévenoz and Rashid Bahar (eds), Conflicts of Interest: Corporate Governance and Financial 
Markets (Kluwer Law International, 2007), at 326–327; Christoph Kumpan and Patrick C. Leyens, 
‘Conflicts of Interest of Financial Intermediaries: Towards a Global Common Core in Conflicts of 
Interest Regulation’ (2008) 5 European Company and Financial Law Review 72, at 89.  
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interest, because the advisors feel themselves are conferred with a ‘moral license’.199  
In addition to the foregoing disclosure requirement, MiFID II further requires that 
when providing investment advice on an independent basis,200 or providing services of 
portfolio management 201 , investment firms shall ‘not accept and retain fees, 
commissions or any monetary or non-monetary benefits paid or provided by any third 
party or a person acting on behalf of a third party in relation to the provision of the 
service to clients’.202 This aims to prevent misaligned incentives of compensation 
structures between investment firms and their clients that will aggravate the 
principle-agent problem.203 By means of the strict avoidance of conflicts of interest, this 
might be ‘better suited to balance the behavioural anomalies than a mere disclosure’.204 
Overall, MiFID II establishes a disclosure-based division in combination with 
appropriate prevention, providing an ‘efficient deterrent’ to opportunistic behaviour of 
advisors.205 
Yet, the foregoing mandatory separation of the independent advice from the 
non-independent advice in MiFID II might still be questioned. Because (i) not all clients 
will want to opt into the independent advice; and (ii) many clients would need to find a 
																																																								
199 Daylian M. Cain, George Loewenstein and Don A. Moore, above note 198, at 7 and 22; George 
Loewenstein, Daylian M. Cain and Sunita Sah, ‘The Limits of Transparency: Pitfalls and Potential of 
Disclosing Conflicts of Interest’ (2011) 101 The American Economic Review 423, at 423–424. 
200 Article 24.7 (b) of MiFID II. 
201 Article 24.8 of MiFID II 
202 See also Recital 75 of MiFID II and Article 12 of Delegated Directive of MiFID II. 
203 Professor Jackson refers this issue as the ‘trilateral dilemma’ in the field of investment services: see 
Howell E. Jackson, ‘The Trilateral Dilemma in Financial Regulation’ in Annamaria Lusardi (ed), Overcoming 
the Saving Slump: How to Increase the Effectiveness of Financial Education and Saving Programs (University of 
Chicago Press, 2008), at 82–83 and 91–97. 
204 Gerald Spindler, ‘Behavioural Finance and Investor Protection Regulations’ (2011) 34 Journal of 
Consumer Policy 315, at 329–330. 
205  Bryan K. Church and Xi  Kuang, ‘Conflicts of Interest, Disclosure, and (Costly) Sanctions: 
Experimental Evidence’ (2009) 38 The Journal of Legal Studies 505, at 509 and 527. 
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new advisor since their current advisors may not allow to offer two types of advice to 
them, there is a risk that the separation of independent/non-independent advice may 
result in less advice for the people who need it most.206 In order to access by-products 
of some useful products and services, it might be impossible to eliminate all of this 
‘ethical pollution’ arising from conflicts of interest.207 As some argue, commissions are 
an important instrument that steers demand to the most efficient products, but the 
mandatory disclosure and bans/caps on commissions would stifle this function.208 In 
practice, a perhaps more effective mechanism is to ensure that the remuneration 
schemes of the front-office sales staff are either (i) ‘blind to the amount of commission 
revenue’ linking to specific products in question; or (ii) ‘neutral to sales volumes’ of 
specific products.209 Also, changing the system of commissions from the ‘upfront type’ 
into the ‘trail type’ (i.e., from the short-term into the long-term consideration) might 
also be another choice to dilute conflicts of interest.210 In this sense, even in the 
absence of the separation between independent and non-independent services, Article 
24.10 of MiFID II, along with an appropriate inducements regulation in Article 24.9, 
might be enough to prevent misconduct of investment firms already: namely, when 
providing investment services (no matter on an independent basis or not), an 
investment firms shall ensure that it do not remunerate or assess the performance of 
																																																								
206 Andreas Hackethal and Andreas Hackethal, ‘Financial Advice’ in Ester Faia et al (eds), Financial 
Regulation: A Transatlantic Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2015), at 257–258. 
207 James Angel and Douglas McCabe, ‘Ethical Standards for Stockbrokers: Fiduciary or Suitability?’ 
(2013) 115 Journal of Business Ethics 183, at 191. 
208 Roman Inderst and Marco Ottaviani, ‘Competition through Commissions and Kickbacks’ (2013) 102 
The American Economic Review 780, at 780–809. 
209 J.-P. Casey and K. Lannoo, above note 147, at 138. 
210 Roman Inderst and Marco Ottaviani, ‘Regulating Financial Advice’ (2012) 13 European Business 
Organization Law Review 237, at 243–244. 
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their staff in a way that ‘conflicts with its duty to act in the best interests of its clients’.211 
 Quality-of-Service Requirement 3.3.6.
Since quality of investment services depends mostly on the natural person who 
providing services, an eligibility obligation in Article 25.1 of MiFID II requires 
investment firms shall ensure and demonstrate that ‘natural persons giving investment 
advice or information about financial instruments, investment services or ancillary 
services to clients on behalf of the investment firm posses necessary knowledge and 
competence to fulfil their obligations’ under Articles 24 and 25 of MiFID II. 
Once the service is guaranteed to be provided by qualified people, the quality of 
service is further assessed under MiFID II in two ways: (i) the assessment of 
‘suitability’,212 and (ii) the assessment of ‘appropriateness’.213 These two assessments, 
which will be discussed in detail in the following paragraphs, have different scopes, 
functions and characteristics, depending on the degree of clients’ reliance on the 
investment firm for investor choices.214 Packaged products and bundle of services are 
also subject to the ‘suitability’ and ‘appropriateness’ tests. 215  Only execution-only 
services in ‘non-complex products’ provided at the initiative of the client, together with 
a prescribed warning and compliance with the conflict-of-interest regime, are not 
subject to the above assessments.216 However, the range of ‘non-complex products’ 
																																																								
211 Article 24.10 of MiFID II; see further in Article 27 of Delegated Regulation of MiFID II regarding 
remuneration policies and practices, together with Article 11 of Delegated Directive of MiFID II.  
212 Article 25.2 of MiFID II. 
213 Article 25.3 of MiFID II. 
214 CESR, A Consumer’s Guide to MiFID: Investing in Financial Products, CESR/08-003, March, 2008, 
at 6, available at: 
<https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/08-003.pdf> (accessed June, 2017). 
215 Articles 25.2(2) and 25.3(1) of MiFID II. 
216 Article 25.4 of MiFID II. 
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exceptions is getting narrower. Article 25.4(a) of MiFID II, in comparison with Article 
19.6(2) of MiFID I, narrows the list of non-complex products, 217  in particular 
structured Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (‘UCITS’) 
will no longer be able to be sold on an execution-only basis.218 Structured deposits, 
which are newly brought into MiFID II,219 are also no longer allowed to be sold on an 
execution-only basis if it is difficult for the client to understand the risk of return or the 
cost of exiting before term.220 
According to Article 25.2 of MiFID II, where a firm provides ‘investment advice or 
portfolio management services’, a suitability/know-your-client (‘KYC’) check is required, 
which is calibrated to the nature of the investor, the service and the investment: the 
investment firm shall obtain ‘the necessary information regarding the client’s or 
potential client’s knowledge and experience in the investment field relevant to the 
specific type of product or service, that person’s financial situation including his ability 
to bear losses, and his investment objectives including his risk tolerance’,221 so as to 
enable the investment firm to recommend whether the investment services and financial 
instruments are suitable for that client or potential client. This detailed requirement of 
the requested information can be considered as ‘a positive step towards an increased 
																																																								
217 In short, according to Article 25.4(a) of MiFID II, although there are more detailed exceptions, 
‘non-complex products’ include (i) ‘shares admitted to trading on a regulated market or on an equivalent 
third-country market or on a MTF’; (ii) ‘bonds or other forms of securitised debt admitted to trading on a 
regulated market or on an equivalent third country market or on a MTF’; (iii) ‘money-market instruments’; 
(iv) ‘shares or units in UCITS’; (v) ‘structured deposits’; and (vi) other non-complex financial instruments. 
For the criteria with respect to what other non-complex financial instruments are: see Article 57 of 
Delegated Regulation of MiFID II. 
218 This raises another issue about this criterion: whether the ‘structured’ UCITS can be considered as 
‘complex’ product equally: see Jürgen Vandenbroucke, ‘(Non-)Complexity through the Eyes of MiFID’ 
(2014) 37 European Journal of Law and Economics 477, at 477–488. 
219 Recital 39 and Article 1.4 of MiFID II.  
220 Article 25.4(a) of MiFID II. 
221 For detailed requirements: see Article 54 of Delegated Regulation of MiFID II. 
Chapter II Competence Allocation of Investment Conduct Regulation 
in the EU—Rules and Rule-Making System 
50 
individualisation of the provided investment services and reducing the risk of 
investment services with negative consequences’. 222  Also, MiFID II requires a 
comprehensive statement on ‘suitability’ to specify ‘the advice given and how that 
advice meets the preferences, objectives and other characteristics of the retail client’,223 
which ‘ensures that the client does not incur a loss out as a result of the report 
presenting in an inaccurate or unfair manner the personal recommendation’224 made by 
the investment firms to the client. However, it should be noted that this assessment 
does not appear to be a requirement to find the ‘most suitable’ transaction, so it may 
still be possible for a firm to comply with the requirement of this Article, even if there 
are other transactions that would have been more suitable.225 
The ‘appropriateness’ test is under Article 25.3 of MiFID II: where non-advisory 
services are provided, and include, in particular, execution-only transactions in complex 
products, investment firms shall ask the client to provide information regarding the 
client’s ‘knowledge and experience in the investment field relevant to the specific type 
of product or service offered or demanded so as to enable the investment firm to assess 
whether the investment service or product envisaged is appropriate for the client’.226 In 
contrast with the ‘suitability’ test, the client’s financial situation and investment 
objectives are not required to be assessed within the ‘appropriateness’ test.227 In case 
that ‘the product or service is not appropriate to the client or potential client’ based on 
																																																								
222 Martin Hobza, ‘Investment Services and Protection of the Retail Client’ (2015) 1 The Lawyer Quarterly 
51, at 55. 
223 Article 25.6.2 of MiFID II. 
224 Recital 82 of MiFID II. 
225 R. Price, ‘Conduct of Business Standards – Fair Dealing for Clients’, above note 145, at 167–168. 
226 See further in Article 56 of Delegated Regulation of MiFID II. 
227 Compare Article 25.2 with Article 25.3 of MiFID II. 
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the information provided, or even the information is not provided by the client, 
investment firms have a risk warning obligation that may be provided in a standardised 
format.228 However, unlike the suitability regime, the firm is still able to proceed with a 
transaction after this warning. 229  In addition, in order to keep evidence of the 
aforementioned suitability and appropriateness assessments,230 MiFID II requires the 
keeping documentary records, 231  along with an additional provision on keeping 
recordings of telephone conversations and electronic communications. 232  It also 
requires investment firms to establish a documentary record of the firm/investor 
relationship with the on-going disclosure.233  
However, boundaries of the aforementioned quality-of-service requirement are 
revealed by the behavioural economics research. First, the information required by the 
‘suitability’ and ‘appropriateness’ tests is impossible to be collected from the clients 
without fault and bias.234 Second, overconfident clients could still possibly appear: (i) 
they may use execution-only services in non-complex products to bypass the ‘suitability’ 
and ‘appropriateness’ tests; and (ii) they may submit unsolicited orders to investment 
firms and do not provide enough information for the ‘appropriateness’ test, and, as a 
result, firms, in this case, can just issue a warning which is of little value.235 Given the 
																																																								
228 Articles 25.3.2 and 25.3.3 of MiFID II. 
229 R. Price, ‘Conduct of Business Standards – Fair Dealing for Clients’, above note 145, at 177. 
230 Recitals 57 and 144 of MiFID II. 
231 Articles 16.6 and 25.5 of MiFID II; see further in Articles 72–75 of Delegated Regulation of MiFID 
II. 
232 Articles 16.7 and 25.6.3 of MiFID II; see further in Article 76 of Delegated Regulation of MiFID II. 
233 Article 25.6.1 of MiFID II. 
234 Andreas Oehler and Daniel Kohlert, ‘Financial Advice Giving and Taking—Where are the Market’s 
Self-healing Powers and a Functioning Legal Framework When We Need Them?’ (2009) 32 Journal of 
Consumer Policy 91, at 99–102. 
235 Lars Klöhn, ‘Preventing Excessive Retail Investor Trading under MiFID: A Behavioural Law & 
Economics Perspective’ (2009) 10 European Business Organization Law Review 437, at 445–447. 
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foregoing imperfection of the quality-of-service requirement, other tools are 
complementarily needed. 
 Best Execution Requirement 3.3.7.
Although the ‘best-execution’ regime is initially designed to uphold ‘integrity’ and 
‘efficiency’ in the new competitive order-execution market,236 it is now critical for 
investor protection when investment firms provide services for executing orders to their 
clients. Therefore, where firms owe contractual or agency obligations to their clients, the 
investment firms shall ‘execute client orders on terms that are most favourable to the 
client’.237 Although the best execution requirement focuses on investment services 
regarding execution of orders, Level 2 rules of MiFID II extend it to portfolio 
management as well as reception and transmission of orders, on the basis of the general 
requirement concerning acting in the client’s ‘best interests’.238 In short, the relationship 
between the best execution, the quality-of-service and the general requirements could be 
explained as following Table II-1 shows. 
  
																																																								
236 Recital 13 of MiFID II. However, whether these aims could be achieved is questioned by scholars. See, 
e.g., Guido Ferrarini and Niamh Moloney, ‘Reshaping Order Execution in the EU and the Role of 
Interest Groups: From MiFID I to MiFID II’ (2012) 13 European Business Organization Law Review 557, at 
579–580; David C Donald, ‘Bridging Finance Without Fragmentation: A Comparative Look at Market 
Connectivity in the US, Europe and Asia’ (2015) 16 European Business Organization Law Review 173, at 182–
189. 
237 Recital 91 of MiFID II. 
238 Article 65 of Delegated Regulation of MiFID II. 
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Table II-1: Requirements of Investment Services 
 
The best-execution regime seeks to address the information deficits between firms 
and their clients as to price formation and aims to ensure that an investor’s trade is 
executed on the most favourable terms. 239  It imposes ‘positive obligations on 
investment firms regardless of the terms of their contracts’ with their clients.240 
Investment firms must take all ‘sufficient steps’ when executing orders to obtain the 
‘best possible result’ for their clients, taking into account ‘price, costs, speed, likelihood 
of execution and settlement, size, nature or any other considerations’.241 The ‘sufficient 
steps’ is a standard higher than the ‘reasonable steps’ but lower than the ‘appropriate 
steps’.242  
In terms of the ‘best execution’, it has no precise legal definition in order to 
embrace ‘a multitude of concerns relating to the nature of market participants’.243 For a 
retail client, the best possible result shall be determined in terms of the total 
																																																								
239 N. Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation, above note 61, at 583–584. 
240 A. Hudson, above note 149, para. 10-43. 
241 Article 27.1 of MiFID II. For detailed criteria of the best execution: see Article 64 of Delegated 
Regulation of MiFID II. 
242 Dick Frase, ‘Best Execution under MiFID II’ in Jonathan Herbst (ed), A Practitioner's Guide to MiFID 
II (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2015), at 171; N. Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation, 
above note 61, at 521. For a further explanation: see ESMA, Questions and Answers on MiFID II and 
MiFIR investor protection topics, ESMA35-43-349, April, 2017, at 12–13, available at: 
<https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/esma35-43-349_mifid_ii_qas_on_investor_pro
tection_topics.pdf> (accessed June, 2017). 
243 Jonathan R. Macey and Maureen O'Hara, ‘The Law and Economics of Best Execution’ (1997) 6 
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consideration: that is, account must be taken of not only the execution price, but also 
the associated costs.244 Where there is more than one competing venue to execute an 
order, the firm’s commissions and the costs for executing of each eligible execution 
venues shall also be taken into account. 245 Conflict-of-interest and inducement rules 
are also required between investment firms and trading venues.246 A firm’s commissions 
shall not differentiate unfairly between execution venues by imposing different charges 
for different venues that do not reflect actual differences in execution costs to the 
firm.247 
The above flexible concept of ‘best execution’ may make competition between 
trading venues248 easier, but it would also encounter some difficulties in practice.249 
Therefore, in support of this obligation, investment firms must establish and implement 
‘effective arrangements’, including an order execution policy, to allow them to obtain 
the ‘best possible’ result.250 Although these policies must consider different venues for 
the execution of such transactions and the factors affecting the choice of execution 
venues,251 an investment firm’s own commission or fees charged to the client must not 
be used for determining what execution venues should be included in the firm’s 
execution policy.252 Likewise, investment firms are required to provide information 
																																																								
244 Recital 93 and Article 27.1 of MiFID II. 
245 Article 27.1 of MiFID II. 
246 Articles 27.2 of MiFID II referring to Articles 16.3, 23 and 24 of MiFID II. 
247 Recital 95 of MiFID II. 
248 According to Article 2.1(24) of MiFID II, a trading venue means a regulated market, a multilateral 
trading facility (‘MTF’) or an organised trading facility (‘OTF’). As to the definitions of MTFs and OTFs, 
please see Articles 2.1(22) and 2.1(23) of MiFID II. 
249 For example, it is not so easy to compare the price data with those concerning speed the execution 
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about these policies to clients in sufficient detail and in clear, easily understandable 
language253 (including whether or not execution may involve execution outside a 
regulated market or multilateral trading facility)254, in order to obtain the prior consent 
of clients to the execution policy.255 Firms then have to monitor the effectiveness of 
their execution policies, in order to identify and correct any deficiencies.256 Clients may 
even request a firm to demonstrate that orders have been executed in accordance with 
the firm’s execution policy.257 On top of the disclosure of execution policies, a broader 
information requirement about the best execution are further inserted by MiFID II: (i) 
in order to allow the public and investment firms to assess standard statistics on 
execution quality, execution venues shall publish periodic reports of data relating the 
quality of execution of transactions;258 (ii) similarly, in order to enable clients to assess 
the execution quality obtained and challenge the results obtained, investment firms will 
need to summarise and disclose to the public annually about the details of the main five 
execution venues for each of the main categories of financial instruments they provide 
services in relation to.259 
In addition, pursuant to Article 28 of MiFID II, investment firms are required to 
ensure that orders executed on behalf of clients are conducted by reference to 
‘procedures and arrangements’ which ‘provide for the prompt, fair and expeditious 
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execution of client orders’,260 and they have to follow a time-priority rule to execute 
otherwise comparable client orders in accordance with the time of their reception.261 
This provision particularly aims at tackling conflicts that can arise between the interests 
of several clients using the same investment services from the investment firm, because, 
in some cases, the best interest of one client may be at the expense of other clients’ best 
interests—‘a duty of loyalty now is transformed into a duty of equal treatment’.262 To 
some extent, this article, together with the foregoing best-execution requirement, forms 
a wider order-execution regime. 
 Product Requirement 3.3.8.
In the past, financial products were regulated principally on the basis of the 
identity of the issuer, rather than the nature of the product, so there is a lack of basic 
safety rules on financial products when consumers are using them.263 Despite the 
successful experience of the UCITS Directive,264 the product-oriented rules265 had been 
ignored for some time.266 However, in the wake of behavioural economics, the rules of 
investment conduct are changing track from the ‘line of rational expectations investor 
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model’ to the ‘line of trusting investor model’.267 This means investors are not as 
sophisticated as expected, and more interventionist rules might be better to protect 
investors’ trust on the system.268 This is a legitimate and important reason calling for 
stronger paternalism.269 The introduction of product requirements into MiFID II 
represents the most powerful and interventionist form of retail market regulation to 
compensate the shortcomings of the aforementioned other requirements.270 
Specifically, the product-oriented rules have three focuses: (i) pre-contractual and 
marketing information obligations, (ii) ex ante product governance arrangements; and (iii) 
ex post product intervention. 271  Relevant rules tackling these three focuses are 
introduced in the MiFID II package. The first focus has been discussed above.272 In 
terms of the second focus, the product governance arrangement is introduced in MiFID 
II. As one of the responsibilities of the management body, it shall define, approve and 
oversee a policy as to such products in accordance with ‘the risk tolerance of the firm’ 
and ‘the characteristics and needs of their clients’. 273  Investment firms which 
manufacture financial instruments for sale to clients will be required to maintain a 
product approval process that must identify the target market for each product and 
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ensure that ‘all relevant risks to such identified market are assessed and that the intended 
distribution strategy is consistent with the identified target market’.274 The target market 
and performance of products should be subject to regular reviews.275 Investment firms 
which offer or recommend financial instruments must ensure that they understand the 
features of those products, including the ‘identified target market’.276 Given this, 
product manufacturers and distributors all should know their products. This regulatory 
policy is away from the POS regulation and concentrates much more on product design 
and distribution, as ‘a sensible response to the risks posed by financial innovation’.277 
NCAs are empowered to ‘suspend the marketing or sale of financial instruments or 
structured deposits’ where the firm does not meet the above requirements.278 It should 
be noted that these provisions do not define duties on the part of investment firms 
clearly, so practical difficulties may emerge in the near future.279 
With regard to the third focus of the product-oriented rules, the power of product 
intervention is embedded in MiFIR and the KID Regulation, as a rudimentary shift to 
‘post market control’.280 According to Articles 40–42 of MiFIR, ESMA, EBA and 
NCAs are given powers to impose temporary, or (in the case of NCAs) permanent, 
prohibitions or restrictions, on the marketing, distribution or sale of (in the case of 
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ESMA and NCAs) certain financial instruments, or on financial activities or (in the case 
of EBA and NCAs) certain structured deposits where there is ‘a significant investor 
protection concern’ or a ‘threat to the orderly functioning and integrity of the financial 
or commodity markets’, or ‘the stability of the whole or part of the financial system’.281 
These powers will be available on a precautionary basis even before the financial 
instrument has been marketed to clients,282 but the prohibition or restrictions made by 
NCAs must be removed when the conditions no longer apply.283 When powers are 
exercised by NCAs, they are required to notify ESAs and other relative NCAs in 
advance.284 In exceptional cases where urgent action is necessary, NCAs can ‘take 
action on a provisional basis with no less than 24 hours’ written notice’.285 When 
complementary powers are exercised by ESMA or EBA, more restrictive elements shall 
be met286 with a notice before taking any action.287 The KID Regulation also gives 
EIOPA and NCAs similar product intervention powers to impose a ban or restriction 
on ‘the marketing, distribution or sale’ of particular insurance-based investment 
products, or on ‘financial activity or practice’ of an insurance or reinsurance 
undertaking.288 In practice, this extends the product intervention powers in MiFIR to 
any PRIIPs that would not otherwise fall under the ambit of MiFIR. All of these 
provisions of product intervention become a potentially powerful tool available to ESAs 
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and NCAs, showing a trend towards ‘hard paternalism’289 or ‘consumerisation’290. 
Having said that, the introduction of product requirements is not without concerns. 
The first question is whether the product-oriented rules could fit conceptually into the 
current regulatory system which is, obviously, non-product-oriented.291 In particular, it 
sometimes can be difficult to distinguish issues relating to the quality of investment 
services from those relating to the quality of financial products.292 It may need more 
cases in practice to clarify this. Second, underlying these tighter controls is the premise 
that financial innovation may introduce new forms of risk into the financial system,293 
but such bans would also stifle the advantages of competition and innovation in 
financial markets.294 For example, automation in investment advice enables clients to 
enjoy services in a potentially beneficial way in terms of costs, access, and quality of 
service, because automated tools are faster, more consistent, accessible, up-to-date, 
wide-ranging, and need less human resources.295 Third, product requirements may 
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further raise some concerns about second-guessing weakness of supervisors, the 
risk-taking of retail investors and the elusion of governing concepts.296 There is also a 
risk that supervisors might be very ‘passive’ once they have only little experience in this 
area.297 In the light of these concerns, bans on products shall be the ‘last resort’ and 
need strong justification. 
 Challenges of Current System 4.
4.1. Institutional Tension between EU Institutions, ESMA and 
Member States 
Although the multi-level rule-making system established by the Lamfalussy process 
and the de Larosière reforms enhances the efficiency of harmonisation of investment 
conduct rules in the EU,298 it also causes some institutional tension between European 
institutions, ESMA and Member States, particularly in relation to the process of making 
Level 2 legislation. 
In terms of ‘Commission-only’ Level 2 acts with ESAs’ support, the divide of 
delegated acts and implementing acts might be contestable.299 Because the CJEU simply 
explains that ‘the concept of an implementing act within the meaning of Article 291 
TFEU must be assessed in relation to the concept of a delegated act, as derived from 
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Article 290 TFEU’ 300  and leaves as much flexibility as possible to the political 
institutions,301 Member States may always claim that the EU’s legislators pick a wrong 
type of Level 2 rules, as a strategy to fight their own sovereignty. In order to end this 
annoying fight, the CJEU further confirms that legislature should enjoy full discretion in 
choosing between these two types of acts once it could fulfill the conditions set by the 
Treaty articles,302 so the line is set down by ‘the intention of the EU legislature’.303 
However, this clarification may no be able to end the political fight within the EU 
legislative system with regard to the choice between delegated acts and implementing 
acts.304 
Moreover, given that ESMA only plays an advisory and non-binding role in the 
rule-making process of delegated and implementing acts, the Commission might choose 
to assert itself regardless of ESMA’s advice. As pointed out by some scholars, in the 
early days of the Lamfalussy process, the Commission redrafted CESR’s initial advice on 
Level 2 measures many times.305 There might be a conflict between technical concerns 
of ESMA and political considerations of the Commission. To an extreme extent, the 
Commission may consider ESMA as a rival to its rule-making powers, causing a fight 
that renders the rule-making process slow, ineffective and inefficient.306 
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In the matter of Level 2 technical standards made by ‘ESAs plus the Commission’, 
institutional tension might be even greater. This is because the constitutionality of 
ESMA’s powers in making technical standards might still be challengeable. 307 
Specifically, ESMA enjoys the sole power to initiate drafting of technical standards, 
because only ESMA, subject to prior public consultations and cost-benefit analysis 
requirements, could submit a draft to the Commission.308 Once	 the draft is submitted, 
the Commission only could decide not to endorse it, or endorse it in part, or with 
amendments.309 Only if it was incompatible with EU law and Treaty principles,310 the 
Commission could send back the draft to ESMA and explain the reasons for doing 
so.311 If ESMA then does not submit an amended draft within a six-week period, or 
submit one that is not amended in line with the Commission’s proposed amendments, 
the Commission then can adopt the technical standard with the amendments it wants.312 
Obviously, the Commission is severely restricted in its constitutional powers to 
participate the rule-making process of Level 2 technical standards. There is a risk that 
the Commission would simply be a ‘rubber stamp’ to ESMA.313 Furthermore, the line 
between pure technical standards and those involving policy choices will not be 
clear-cut in practice.314 The separation between RTSs and ITSs is not easy to make in 
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practice either.315 ESMA is very likely to become a pre-decision-making agency with de 
facto decision-making powers on policy choices.316 Technical standards, thus, give rise to 
the question regarding democratic legitimacy of this type of executive legislation by the 
independent ESMA.317 
Furthermore, since (i) the Parliament and the Council may object to RTSs adopted 
by the Commission,318 and (ii) they may invite the responsible Commissioner, together 
with the chairperson of ESMA, to present and explain their differences in the event that 
the Commission does not endorse an RTS or amends it,319 ESMA might become an 
‘institutional battleground’ of European institutions, leading to fraught rule making.320 
For example, some part of the drafted technical standards of MiFID II were rejected by 
the Parliament in March, 2016, and the Commission sent letters to ESMA requiring 
appropriate amendments, but ESMA wondered how to react to such letters and start 
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the required amendments.321 In this sense, in order to find a fine balance within this 
multi-level rule-making system, how to divide tasks between ESMA and the 
Commission will be of crucial importance in the future practice.322 
4.2. Limited Function of A Single Rulebook 
As discussed above,323 rules of investment conduct are harmonised to a large 
extent with an aim to establish a Single Rulebook in the EU. The establishment of this 
Single Rulebook could be achieved by two ways. First, by means of enacting more 
‘rule-based’ legislation at Level 1, Member States will have little space to implement it. 
For example, on the basis of an examination of divergences and weaknesses of national 
sanctioning regimes conducted by the Commission after the financial crisis,324 more 
‘rule-based’ legislation regarding administrative powers of NCAs was introduced in 
MiFID II. 325  Article 70 of MiFID II ensures NCAs may be able to impose 
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‘administrative sanctions’ and measures applicable to all infringements of MiFID II and 
MiFIR and relative legislation, and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they 
are implemented. This Article further lists substantive provisions that relate to 
investment conduct, including those on the management and internal policies of firms 
(Article 9.3),326 the governance of the product development process (Articles 16.2, 16.3 
and 16.5)327 as well as the provisions to ensure investor protection (Section 2).328 Then 
this Article specifies the kinds of administrative remedies to be made available to NCAs, 
ranging from the naming and shaming of violators (Article 70.6(a)), the imposition of 
cease and desist orders (Article 70.6(b)), the withdrawal of authorisation and banning 
individuals from performing management functions (Articles 70.6(c)–(e)), to the 
significant administrative fines for both institutions and individuals (Articles 70.6(f)–
(h))329. This reform not only reveals the essentially administrative nature of MiFID II, 
but also ensures consistency in relation to the application of sanctions across the EU.330 
By listing administrative tools and sanctioning powers in detail at Level 1 legislation, a 
common minimum set is established to pave the way towards an equivalent intensity of 
enforcement across the integrated financial market. 331  Second, even extremely 
‘rule-based’ legislation might not be in place at Level 1 entirely, a similar effect could be 
attained at Level 2 rules. In the current ‘hub-and-spoke’332 rule-making system: the ‘hub’ 
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(ESMA) would elaborate detailed rules and recommendations to the ‘spokes’ (NCAs). 
Ideally, the rules issued by the ‘hub’ could also narrow the permissible scope for the 
addition of supplementary local rules that are more stringent and squeeze local 
discretion of ‘spokes’.333 
However, while MiFID II specifies a minimum set of powers that NCAs should 
have, these powers are still exercised by NCAs within the national laws.334 NCAs still 
have choices to ‘gold-plate’ them, so the harmonisation has its limits for achieving 
uniformity to European capital markets law.335 Also, even a Level 2 function of the 
Lamfalussy process has significantly contributed to the development of a flexible, 
efficient and inclusive decision-making process in harmonising European rules, if the 
implementation and enforcement of these rules are left to Member States, they still 
would be ‘likely to reflect national demands, which could vary across Member States’.336 
Even the rule-making system is getting more ‘Europeanised’, national divergences in 
implementation, interpretation and application of the EU law must remain.337 This is an 
intrinsic limit of the Single Rulebook. As admitted by the de Larosière report338 and the 
																																																																																																																																																													
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-10-434_en.pdf> (accessed June, 2017). 
333 E. Ferran, ‘Understanding the New Institutional Architecture of EU Financial Market Supervision’, 
above note 78, at 140–141. 
334 Recital 138 of MiFD II. 
335 Luca Enriques and Matteo Gatti, ‘Is There a Uniform EU Securities Law after the Financial Services 
Action Plan’ (2008) 14 Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance 43, at 78–80. 
336 Iris H.-Y. Chiu, ‘Three Challenges Ahead for the New EU Securities Regulation Directives’ (2006) 17 
European Business Law Review 121, at 129. 
337 Jan Smits, ‘A Principled Approach to European Contract Law?’ (2000) 7 Maastricht Journal of European 
and Comparative Law 221, at 221–223; Stephen Weatherill, ‘Pre-emption, Harmonisation and the 
Distribution of Competence to Regulate the Internal Market’ in Catherine Barnard and Joanne Scott (eds), 
The Law of the Single European Market: Unpacking the Premises (Hart publishing, 2002), at 68–69; D. Vitkova, 
‘Level 3 of the Lamfalussy Process: An Effective Tool for Achieving Pan-European Regulatory 
Consistency?’ (2008) 2 Law and Financial Markets Review 158, at 170. 
338 The de Larosière report, above note 77, para. 160. 
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Lamfalussy review,339 the Single Rulebook might be of little help in strengthening the 
supervisory co-operation and convergence between NCAs. Both the Green Paper340 
and the Action Plan of CMU341 recognise the limited function of the Single Rulebook, 
and further admit that fostering great supervisory convergence might be a better way to 
tackle this issue.342 
4.3. Unclear Influence on Private Law 
The MiFID regime, at the first glance, only recognises that investment services are 
provided on a contractual basis by requiring an investment firm to establish a 
documentary record regarding the contractual terms,343 and does not mandate any 
specific contents of such a contract. This is because many private law duties now are 
coined as administrative standards (such as, the ‘conflict-of-interest’344 and ‘suitability’345 
requirements) checked by NCAs and their staff, rather than courts.346 However, albeit 
these rules applicable to investment firms are regulatory rules now, their relevance to 
																																																								
339 See European Commission, Communication from the Commission- Review of the Lamfalussy 
Process: Strengthening Supervisory Convergence, COM(2007) 727 final, November, 2007, at 6–13, 
available at: 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52007DC0727&from=EN> 
(accessed June, 2017). 
340 European Commission, Green Paper: Building a Capital Markets Union, COM(2015) 63 final, 
February, 2015, at 22, available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/finance/consultations/2015/capital-markets-union/docs/green-paper_en.pdf> 
(accessed June, 2017). (‘Green Paper of CMU’) 
341 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Action Plan 
on Building a Capital Markets Union, COM(2015) 468 final, September, 2015, at 24, available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/finance/capital-markets-union/docs/building-cmu-action-plan_en.pdf> (accessed 
June, 2017). (‘Action Plan of CMU’) 
342 European Commission, Green Paper of CMU, above note 340, at 22; European Commission, Action 
Plan of CMU, ibid, at 26. See further discussion regarding divergent supervisory cultures in Section 4.3 of 
CHAPTER III (pp. 121–128). 
343 Article 25.5 of MiFID II. 
344 See further in Section 3.3.5 above (pp. 43–48). 
345 See further in Section 3.3.6 above (pp. 48–50). 
346 Stefan Grundmann, ‘EC Financial Services–Developments 2002–2005’ (2005) 1 European Review of 
Contract Law 482, at 490–491; see also Articles 67.2 and 70 of MiFID II. 
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private law still remains.347 One distinctive characteristic of the rules of investment 
conduct is they ‘usually create both regulatory (public law) and contractual-tortious 
(private law) obligations’.348 Given this characteristic, investment conduct rules within 
the MiFID regime intrinsically determines the contents of the legal relationship between 
the client and the investment firm to a large degree, causing a partial ‘eclipse’ of normal 
contract law.349 Even if the ‘eclipse’ is an overstatement, the provisions of the MiFID 
Regime indeed bring significant influence on private law systems. First, agreements 
made between investors and investment firms must set out the ‘rights and obligation 
between the parties’, complying with the general requirement applicable in the MiFID 
regime.350 Although there is no further guidance regarding what ‘rights and obligations 
of the firm and the client’ in agreements are, the essential terms of retail agreements 
typically are required to cover all the requirements mentioned above in Section 3.3.351 
Second, decisions of the ‘suitability’352 and ‘appropriateness’353 requirements are based 
on information required by relative terms of contract. Given NCAs are vested with 
powers to examine these decisions,354 contractual terms, inevitably, would be influenced 
by the attitudes of NCAs. Finally, such obligations in the MiFID regime are considered 
																																																								
347 Michel Tison, ‘Conduct of Business Rules and Their Implementation in the EU Member States’ in 
Guido Ferrarini, Klaus J. Hopt and Eddy Wymeersch (eds), Capital Markets in the Age of the Euro: 
Cross-Border Transactions, Listed Companies and Regulation (Kluwer Law International, 2002), at 76. 
348 E. Avgouleas, above note 50, at 74. 
349 Peter O. Mülbert, ‘The Eclipse of Contract Law in the Investment Firm-Client-Relationship: The 
Impact of the MiFID on the Law of Contract from a German Perspective’ in Guido Ferrarini and E. 
Wymeersch (eds), Investor Protection in Europe: Corporate Law Making, the MiFID and Beyond (Oxford 
University Press, 2006), at 316–320. 
350 Article 25.5 of MiFID II.  
351 Philip R. Wood, Regulation of International Finance (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2007), para. 14-010. 
352 See further in Section 3.3.6 above (pp. 48–50). 
353 See further in Section 3.3.6 above (pp. 50–51). 
354 Articles 69 and 70 of MiFID II. 
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by courts in defining the investment firms’ duties under private law.355 Member States 
shall also ensure that specific bodies may be able to, ‘in the interests of consumers and 
in accordance with national law’, take action before courts to ensure that MiFIR and 
MiFID II are applied in Member States.356 
However, the MiFID regime provides no harmonised civil liability system 
regarding these obligations, and leaves Member States at liberty to make their own 
arrangements. The KID Regulation might be the only legislation tackling this issue 
explicitly: in order to protect retail investors from misleading, inaccurate or inconsistent 
with the relevant parts of the contractual documents of PRIIPs, KID Regulation 
harmonises rules regarding the civil liability of PRIIPs manufacturers.357 In the absence 
of a similar provision within MiFID II/MiFIR, the interaction between regulatory rules 
of investment conduct and national private laws is still open to debate. This method 
could be unsatisfactory and disparate, causing the MiFID regime to become a ‘lex 
imperfecta’.358 Furthermore, the situation might be even more complicated if you take 
into account the role of ESMA. For instance, what effect ESMA’s technical standards 
will have on the enforcement under private law,359 and what impact of ESMA’s 
non-binding guidelines and recommendations will have on market participants in 
individual private cases. 360 In fact, the Action Plan of CMU acknowledges such 
																																																								
355 G. Ferrarini, above note 186, at 22. 
356 Article 74.2 of MiFID II. 
357 Recital 22 and Article 11 of KID Regulation. 
358 L. Enriques and M. Gatti, above note 335, at 76–77; Ünal Tekinalp, ‘Investor Protection and 
Investment Firms' Duty of Care and Loyalty to Clients’ in Stefan Grundmann and Yesim M. Atamer (eds), 
Financial Services, Financial Crisis and General European Contract Law: Failure and Challenges of Contracting 
(Kluwer Law International, 2011), at 171–172 and 177; Vassilios Tountopoulos, ‘Investor Protection 
under MiFID: A Survey of Greek Case Law’ (2016) 27 European Business Law Review 513, at 533. 
359 F. Walla, ‘Capital Markets Supervision in Europe’, above note 317, at 121. 
360 Federico Della Negra, ‘The Effects of the ESMA’s Powers on Domestic Contract Law’ in Mads 
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different national measures in private law could not be addressed by the tools of either 
the Single Rulebook or supervisory convergence.361 The Green Paper of CMU also 
admits that securities law still differs across Member States since it touches on national 
private law and private international law.362 Within these areas, due to the principles of 
subsidiarity363 and proportionality364, the EU may only be able to apply comparatively 
softer policies (such as, setting up a network of Member States and engaging in bilateral 
discussions).365  
 Concluding Remarks 5.
This chapter has explored the extant rule-making system and harmonised rules of 
investment conduct in the EU. It started with the internal market and the Single 
Passport regime in relation to investment intermediaries in the EU. Due to the fact that 
regulatory competition and the home country control may not be able to function 
orderly, harmonisation of rules is necessary in the EU. This chapter then graduated into 
a concise discussion of the multi-level ruling-making system established by the 
Lamfalussy process and the de Larosière reforms. It delineated that this ruling-making 
system, which shows a massive shift of the rule-making role to ESMA from NCAs, has 
significantly contributed to the development of a flexible, efficient and inclusive 
decision-making process in harmonising European rules. Also, given the example of the 
																																																																																																																																																													
Andenas and G. Diepenbrock (eds), Regulating and Supervising European Financial Markets: More Risks than 
Achievements (Springer, 2016), at 156–159. 
361 European Commission, Action Plan of CMU, above note 341, at 24. 
362 European Commission, Green Paper of CMU, above note 340, at 23. 
363 Article 5.3 of the TEU. 
364 Article 5.4 of the TEU. 
365 See further discussion in Section 2.2 (pp. 197–199) and Section 3.4 (pp. 211–212) of CHAPTER V. 
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densely and exhaustively harmonised rules of investment conduct in the MiFID II 
package, a movement towards an overarching harmonised Single Rulebook framework 
is on the way to lay down a ‘level playing field’ of Member States in the European 
capital markets. 
However, the competence allocation of the current system may face some 
challenges. First, the multi-level rule-making process causes some institutional tension 
between European institutions, ESMA and Member States, particularly in making Level 
2 legislation. Second, the Single Rulebook has its limits. It is impossible to write down 
everything in detail. Implementation, interpretation, application and enforcement of the 
Single Rulebook play an equally important role in practice. Therefore, in cross-border 
transactions, even though the rules of investment conduct are harmonised to a large 
extent in the EU, supervisory issues still matter to investment firms and their clients. 
Last but not least, the relationship between such harmonised rules of investment 
conduct and private law systems remains unclear at the current stage, but it is 
undeniable that the MiFID regime affects private relationships between investment 
firms and their clients to some extent. In the light of this, the plan of CMU provides a 
valuable policy implication: it not only highlights the importance of private law systems 





COMPETENCE ALLOCATION OF 
INVESTMENT CONDUCT REGULATION 
IN THE EU—SUPERVISORY SYSTEM 
‘Cross-border economic integration and national political 
sovereignty have increasingly come into conflict, leading to a 
growing mismatch between the economic and political structures 
of the world. The effective domains of economic markets have 
come to coincide less and less with national governmental 
jurisdictions.’1 
 Introduction 1.
As summarised in the last chapter, even though the rules of investment conduct are 
harmonised to a large extent in the EU, supervisory issues of investment conduct 
regulation still matter to investment firms and their clients in relation to cross-border 
transactions. This chapter, thus, is going to examine the competence allocation of 
supervision of investment conduct in the EU. Initially, the home country control, as one 
of the indispensible factors of the Single Passport regime,2 played the major role in 
supervising investment conduct in the EU. However, in the wake of the global financial 
crisis of 2007–09, the Economic and Financial Committee (‘EFC’), which is a 
committee of the European Union set up under Article 134 of the TFEU to promote 
policy co-ordination among the Member States, found that the allocation of supervisory 
competence between home Member States and host Member States was not so clear 
																																																								
1 R. Herring and R.E. Litan, Financial Regulation in the Global Economy (Brookings Institution, 1995), at xxi. 
2 See further in Section 2.2 of CHAPTER II (pp. 19–20). 
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and inconsistencies between Member States’ supervisory powers are significant. 3 
Therefore, the de Larosière Report suggested an establishment of ESAs with stronger 
powers to replace the old 3L3 committees.4 Since 1 January, 2011, ESMA has been in 
place to take on some of the responsibilities of capital markets supervision in the EU.5 
Due to the coexistence of the home country control and ESMA, the competence 
allocation of investment conduct supervision is now multi-level and complicated. How 
the current system works and what challenges it might face are two important questions. 
In order to answer these two questions, this chapter will explore the incomplete home 
country control and the supervisory powers of ESMA, with particular emphasis on 
investment conduct supervision in cross-border transactions. A further aim of this 
exploration is to build a connection between the challenges faced by the current system 
of investment conduct supervision and the emergence of the idea of a single supervisor. 
The text below is in four sections. Section 2 examines the practice of the home 
country control of investment conduct supervision in the European internal market, 
pointing out the tension between home and host Member States in the EU. Section 3 
explores the supranational supervisory system in the EU. It highlights that investment 
conduct supervision in the EU not only relates to the relationship between NCAs, but 
also concerns the interaction between ESMA and NCAs. Challenges of the current 
																																																								
3 EFC, High Level Working Group on Cross-Border Financial Supervision Arrangements, Lessons from 
the Crisis for European Financial Stability Arrangements (2009), at 10–14. 
4 European Commission, Report of the High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, February, 
2009, rec. 22, available at:  
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf>  
(accessed June, 2017). (‘de Larosière report’) 
See further in Section 3.2 of CHAPTER II (pp. 27–28). 
5 Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities 
and Markets Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 
2009/77/EC, 2010 OJ L331/84. (‘ESMA Regulation’) 
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system are then analysed in Section 4, along with relevant CMU’s policies purposing to 
deal with these challenges. Finally, Section 5 draws conclusion based on the findings of 
the present discussion. 
 Incomplete Home Country Control of Investment 2.
Conduct Supervision in the EU 
2.1. Role of Home/Host Member States in Different Business 
Models 
Before going into any further analysis, it is important to emphasise that the home 
country control does not apply to every type of transnational investment services in the 
EU. In practice, transnational investment services could be provided by three methods 
in a supranational market: (i) cross-border services, (ii) subsidiaries and (iii) branches.6 
An investment firm may consider many factors (such as, the regulatory environment, 
tax rates, and degrees of penetration in a foreign market) to decide a most suitable 
method.7 Depending on different methods, home Member States8 and host Member 
States9 also have different roles in supervising investment services. First, investment 
																																																								
6 Sydney J. Key and Hal S. Scott, International Trade in Banking Services: A Conceptual Framework (Group of 
Thirty: Occasional papers 35, 1991), at 4–5. 
7 For relevant analyses in banking sector: see, e.g., Eugenio Cerutti, Giovanni Dell’Ariccia and Maria 
Soledad Martínez Pería, ‘How Banks Go Abroad: Branches or Subsidiaries?’ (2007) 31 Journal of Banking 
& Finance 1669, at 1669–1692; Jonathan Fiechter et al, Subsidiaries or Branches: Does One Size Fit All? (IMF 
Staff Discussion Note SDN/11/04, 2011), at 11–12; Tobias H. Tröger, ‘Organizational Choices of Banks 
and the Effective Supervision of Transnational Financial Institutions’ (2013) 48 Texas International Law 
Journal 177, Sec. III.  
8 According to Article 4.1(55) of MiFID II, the home State Member of investment firms means: ‘(i) if the 
investment firm is a natural person, the Member State in which its head office is situated’; ‘(ii) if the 
investment firm is a legal person, the Member State in which its registered office is situated’;  and ‘(iii) if 
the investment firm has, under its national law, no registered office, the Member State in which its head 
office is situated’. 
9 According to Article 4.1(56) of MiFID II, the host State Member of investment firms means: ‘the 
Member State, other than the home Member State, in which an investment firm has a branch or provides 
investment services and/or activities’. 
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services might be offered cross-borderly by an investment firm located in one Member 
State to clients in other countries without establishing any office in the clients’ 
countries.10 Due to technological improvement, especially the Internet, these kinds of 
services have become more prevalent. Home Member States are getting more and more 
supervisory tasks in supervising this type of investment conduct.11 Second, investment 
firms could set up an office in another Member State via a subsidiary for the physical 
promotion of their business. Subsidiaries are separately incorporated in other Member 
States, having their own capital similar to domestic investment firms.12 They are 
independent legal entities requiring separate authorisation and under supervision of their 
own home Member States.13 Therefore, the home country control and the Single 
Passport regime are not applicable directly when investment services are provided by 
subsidiaries. These subsidiaries need to apply their own licences, so that they could 
enjoy the benefits of the Single Passport. Third, the establishment of branches that are 
an integral part of an investment firm14 is another choice of investment firms for 
physical promotion of their business in other Member States. Having said that, where 
investment services are provided by branches, the home country control might be 
‘imperfect’15 and ‘not entirely clear’.16 Specifically, in the MiFID regime (whether 
																																																								
10 S. J. Key and H. S. Scott, above note 6, at 16. 
11 Article 34 of MiFID II. 
12 Article 4.1(33) of MiFID II, and Seventh Council Directive 83/349/EEC on consolidated accounts, 
1983 OJ L193. 
13 European Commission, Supervision of Branches under MiFID, MARKT/G/3/MV D(2007) 2386, 
June, 2007, para. 5, available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/isd/mifid-branches_en.pdf>  
(accessed June, 2017). 
14 Article 4.1(30) of MiFID II.  
15 Gérard Hertig, ‘Imperfect Mutual Recognition for EC Financial Services’ (1994) 14 International Review 
of Law and Economics 177, at 180–185. 
16 Eva Lomnicka, ‘The Home Country Control Principle in the Financial Services Directives and the 
Case Law’ (2000) 11 European Business Law Review 324, at 330. 
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MiFID I17 or MiFID II18), prudential supervision, as well as the using of the Single 
Passport, and the monitoring of compliance with the investor protection provisions, are 
granted to home Member States, 19  but host Member States retain their role in 
monitoring compliance with the investor protection provisions in the case of branches, 
provided that the services were offered by the branch within their territories.20 Also, 
host Member States have powers to require branches of firms to provide necessary 
information.21 This clearly rests upon closer co-operation between home and host 
Member States, with some confusion about the transaction reporting requirements in 
practice.22 If a branch infringes the obligations within MiFID II, host Member States 
may further take relative precautionary measures.23 By and large, the aforementioned 
‘host’ powers prove that the nature of contractual obligations between investment firms 
and their clients will always provide a role for host Member States.24 It is sometimes 
appropriate for NCAs of host Member States to ‘assume responsibility for enforcing 
obligations’ ‘in relation to business conducted through a branch within the territory 
																																																								
17 Directive 2004/39/EC on markets in financial instruments, 2004 OJ L 145/1. (‘MiFID I’) 
18 Directive 2014/65/EU on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and 
Directive 2011/61/EU, 2014 OJ L173/349. (‘MiFID II’) 
19 Article 34 of MiFID II. 
20 Article 35.8 of MiFID II. 
21 Article 85.2 of MiFID II. 
22 For example, if a transaction conducted by a branch, should this branch either reports this transaction 
to the NCA of its home Member State directly or the NCA of the host Member State would convey such 
information that has been reported by the branch to the NCA of the branch’s home Member State? 
Nathalie Aubry and Michael McKee, ‘MiFID: Where Did It Come From, Where Is It Taking Us?’ (2007) 
22 Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 177, at 184. In terms of this issue, it was highlighted in 
the discussion paper of MiFID II/MiFIR (see ESMA, Discussion Paper: MiFID II/MiFIR, 
ESMA/2014/548, May, 2014, para. 128), but it is now resolved by a regulatory technical standard of 
MiFIR. Investment firms only need to report the transaction once: see Commission Delegated Regulation 
(EU) …/… with regard to regulatory technical standards for the reporting of transactions to competent 
authorities, in particular Article 14, available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/finance/securities/docs/isd/mifid/rts/160728-rts-22_en.pdf>  
(accessed June, 2017). 
23 Article 86 of MiFID II. 
24 Emilios Avgouleas, ‘The New EC Financial Markets Legislation and the Emerging Regime for Capital 
Markets’ (2004) 23 Yearbook of European Law 321, at 353. 
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where the branch is located’, since the NCAs are ‘closest to the branch’ and are ‘better 
placed to detect and intervene in respect of infringements of rules governing the 
operations of the branch’.25 
Furthermore, in practice, the home/host divide of investment conduct supervision 
in case of branches is not so clear-cut. The wording of Article 35.8 of MiFID II (the 
same as Article 32.7 of MiFID I), ‘by the branch within its territory’, reveals a ‘grey 
area’26 with various possible interpretations. Although some argue the most satisfactory 
and policy-matching interpretation is that all services provided from a branch are 
engaged in within the relevant Member State,27 CESR28 and the Commission settled a 
complicated way to give clarity of the wording of Article 35.8 of MiFID II/Article 32.7 
of MiFID I: 
(i) ‘[w]hen both the branch through which the service is provided and the client 
are in the host Member State, responsibility for supervising the obligations 
[…] should be allocated to the host competent authority’; 
(ii) ‘[w]hen the client is in the home Member State of the head office, (i.e. the 
home Member State), the competent authority responsible for supervising 
these same obligations should be that of the home Member State’; 
(iii) ‘[…] where the client is not either in the Member State of the branch or in the 
																																																								
25 Recital 90 of MiFID II. 
26 European Commission, Supervision of Branches under MiFID, above note 13, para. 8. 
27 Etay Katz, ‘MiFID - Practical Issues for Implementation’ (2007) 1 Law and Financial Markets Review 401, 
at 403; Bob Penn, ‘Markets in Financial Instruments Directive ('MiFID'): Conduct of Business’ (2007) 22 
Journal of International Banking and Financial Law 20, at 21. 
28 CESR, The Passport under MiFID: Recommendations for the Implementation of the Directive 
2004/39/EC, CESR/07-337b, May, 2007, at 7, available at: 
<https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/07_337.pdf>  
(accessed June, 2017). 
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Member State of the head office[,]’ the allocation of supervisory responsibility 
has to be decided on a case by case basis.29 
Thus, when in the case of situation (iii), where there is an area that results in ‘dual 
supervision’, there should be an effective shared and common supervision of the 
branches between the NCAs of home and host Member States;30 and NCAs of home 
and host Member States have a legal obligation to co-operate, with a precautionary 
power of host Member States in limited circumstances;31 NCAs should establish a 
Memoranda of Understanding (‘MoU’) to determine the practical arrangements for their 
co-operation in the supervision of branches.32 Given this, a Protocol for building a 
multilateral MoU for supervision of branches was issued.33 
In summary, the competence divide of home/host Member States is complex in 
the MiFID regime, depending upon different methods of providing transnational 
investment services as shown in Table III-1 below. The most unclear area is the middle 
column, where investment services are provided by branches in host Member States. As 
Professor Moloney describes:  
‘[the current system of] branch control might be regarded as displaying the 
advantages of home-Member-State control with respect to market integration, in 
that it avoids the application of multiple regimes, and of host-Member-State 
																																																								
29 European Commission, Supervision of Branches under MiFID, above note 13, para. 8. 
30 European Commission, Supervision of Branches under MiFID, ibid, para. 9. 
31 Recital 153 and Articles 79–87 of MiFID II. 
32 European Commission, Supervision of Branches under MiFID, above note 13, para. 10. 
33 CESR, Protocol on the Supervision of Branches under MiFID, CESR/07-672b, October, 2007, 
available at: <https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/07_672b_update.pdf>  
(accessed June, 2017). 
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control, in that it reflects the proximity of the branch regime to the 
investor/branch relationship and the investor’s familiarity with the regulatory 
regime.’34  
Moreover, this issue may be even more troublesome, because whether the service is 
provided within the territory of the host Member States is indeterminable due to the 
development of e-commerce.35 There is no uniform standard, like private international 
law, to resolve this issue between NCAs.36 Therefore, this fragmentation of powers and 
responsibilities between home and host Member States severely constrains NCAs’ 
abilities to supervise their markets and cross-border firms active in their jurisdictions.37 
Table III-1: Home Country Control of  
Investment Conduct Supervision in MiFID II 
  Services are provided by 
 
Services are received by 
Head Office 
in 
Home State (A) 
Branches 
in 
Host State (B) 
Subsidiaries 
in 
Host State (B) 
Clients 
in 


















Other State (C) 
Home-State 
Supervisor (A) 





2.2. Overlaps of ‘Two Peaks’ within Home/Host Country Divide 
Besides the foregoing complex allocation of competence between the home and 
																																																								
34 Niamh Moloney, ‘The Regulation of Investment Services in the Single Market: The Emergence of a 
New Regulatory Landscape’ (2002) 3 European Business Organization Law Review 293, at 333–334. 
35 Simon Crown, ‘Scope, Authorisation and Passporting’ in Jonathan Herbst (ed), A Practitioner's Guide to 
MiFID II (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2015), at 54. 
36 For more discussion about this in private international law: see Section 4.3 of CHAPTER V (pp. 240–
250). 
37 Lucia Quaglia, ‘Financial Regulation and Supervision in the European Union After the Crisis’ (2013) 16 
Journal of Economic Policy Reform 17, at 26. See further in Section 4.3 below (pp. 121–128). 
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host Member States, if investment services are offered by a branch within a host 
Member States’ territories, another tension will emerge due to the overlap between 
prudential supervision and conduct supervision. This is because the borderline between 
these ‘two peaks’ is not always clear.38 For example, according to Article 35.8 of MiFID 
II, only the obligations laid down in Articles 24, 25, 27 and 2839 are supervised by 
NCAs of host Member States. However, the general conflict-of-interest requirement 
under Article 23 is not listed in Article 35.8 of MiFID II, and Article 16.3.1, regarding 
the organisational requirement to prevent conflicts of interest, is a home Member States’ 
duty. 40  Given the fact that some of the supervision of the conflict-of-interest 
requirement are host Member States’ duty but others are home Member States’, both 
home and host Member States may sanction for infringements of the conflict-of-interest 
requirement.41 Furthermore, in order ‘to detect and investigate potential cases of market 
abuse, to monitor the fair and orderly functioning of markets, as well as the activities of 
investment firms’, 42  host Member States are still empowered to enforce the 
record-keeping obligation 43  and to supervise transaction reporting of investment 
																																																								
38 Guido Ferrarini, ‘Towards a European Law of Investment Services and Institutions’ (1994) 31 Common 
Market Law Review 1283, at 1305; Eddy Wymeersch, The European Banking Union, a First Analysis (Financial 
Law Institute Working Paper Series WP 2012-07 2012), at 5; Eilís Ferran, ‘European Banking Union: 
Imperfect, But It Can Work’ in Danny Busch and Guido Ferrarini (eds), European Banking Union (Oxford 
University Press, 2015), para. 3.14; Niamh Moloney, ‘Banking Union and the Implications for Financial 
Market Governance in the EU: Convergence or Divergence?’ in Danny Busch and Guido Ferrarini (eds), 
European Banking Union (Oxford University Press, 2015), para. 16.71. 
39 These are the general requirement, the marketing requirement, the information requirement, part of 
the conflict-of-interest requirement, the quality-of-service requirement and part of the best execution 
requirement. See all of these in Sections 3.3.2 to 3.3.7 of CHAPTER II (pp. 37–56). 
40 Article 16.1 of MiFID II. See further in Section 3.3.5 of CHAPTER II (pp. 43–48). 
41 Article 70.3(a) of MiFID II. 
42 Recital 32 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending 
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, 2014 OJ L173/84. (‘MiFIR’) 
43 Article 16.11 of MiFID II. 
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firms.44 This, inevitably, would cause an ambiguity of supervision between host and 
home Member States in the conflict-of-interest regime.45 Host Member States may 
draw up rules of investment conduct to avoid conflicts of interest, or to ensure fair 
treatment in case that such conflicts cannot be avoided, but, at the same time, home 
Member States are vested with the power to require a certain structure and organisation 
of investment firms so that the risk of conflicts of interest is minimised. In a worst 
instance, home Member States’ organisational rules for personal transactions by the 
firm’s employees may conflict with host Member States’ conduct rules on conflicts of 
interest. There is another similar example of the overlapping duty between the home 
and host Member States in relation to the product governance policy between Article 
16.3 and Article 24.2 of MiFID II.46 This might be the reason why Article 16.3.7 of 
MiFID II has to set out that the requirements of Article 16.3 ‘shall be without prejudice 
to all other requirements’. In addition, the new compliance requirement of Article 25.1, 
with regard to the assessment of knowledge and competence of investment firms’ staff, 
may also overlap with the organisational requirement of Article 16.2 in MiFID II. The 
former is supervised by NCAs of host Member States, while the latter is by home 
Member States.47 On the whole, tension between home and host Member States caused 
by the overlap of ‘two peaks’ in MiFID II can be summarised in Table III-2 below. The 
																																																								
44 Articles 24–26 of MiFIR, together with Article 35.8 of MiFID II. 
45 Yannis V. Avgerinos, ‘Problems with Home Control and Investment Services’ in Mads Andenas and 
Yannis Avgerinos (eds), Financial Markets in Europe: Towards a Single Regulator? (Kluwer Law International, 
2003), at 100–101. 
46 For further discussion regarding the product governance, please see Section 3.3.3 and Section 3.3.8 of 
CHAPTER II (p. 39 and pp. 57–58). 
47 See Articles 35.8 and 16.1 of MiFID II.  
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predecessor of the MiFID I, ISD,48 had tried to mitigate them by giving priority to 
conduct supervision.49 In the absence of a similar provision within MiFID II, the only 
solution in the current system is the co-operation obligation between NCAs.50 However, 
there is often no plain answer to the question that either the management model of 
Article 16,51 or the supervision model of other rules is more effective or corrective. 
How to mediate this tension between home and host Member States is a difficult job 
for the EU. 
Table III-2: Tension of Two Peaks in MiFID II 








Articles 24.7–24.10 Host State 
Compliance 
Policy 
Article 16.2 Home State 
Articles 79–87? 




Articles 16.3.2–16.3.6 Home State 
Article 16.3.7? 
Article 24.2 Host State 
																																																								
48 Council Directive 93/22/EEC on investment services in the securities field, 1993 OJ L141/27. (‘ISD’) 
49 5th indent of Article 10 of ISD. 
50 Articles 79–87 of MiFID II. See further in a regulatory technical standard: Commission Delegated 
Regulation (EU) .../... with regard to regulatory technical standards for the exchange of information 
between competent authorities when cooperating in supervisory activities, on-the-spot verifications and 
investigations, C(2016) 4415 final, June, 2016, available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/finance/securities/docs/isd/mifid/rts/160714-rts-coop-btw-authorities_en.pdf> 
(accessed June, 2017) 
See also a relevant guideline: ESMA, Guidelines on cooperation arrangements and information exchange: 
between competent authorities and between competent authorities and ESMA, ESMA/2014/298, March, 
2014, available at: 
<https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/2014-298_guidelines_on_cooperatio
n_arrangements_and_information_exchange_0.pdf> (accessed June, 2017). 
51 For a comprehensive analysis of the organisational requirement introduced by MiFID II: see Rik 
Mellenbergh, ‘MiFID II: New Governance Rules in Relation to Investment Firms’ (2014) 11 European 
Company Law 172, at 172–177. 
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In fact, due to the ambiguous ambits of the ‘two peaks’, the KID Regulation52 and 
MiFIR53 also create similar tension. For instance, the KID Regulation requires that 
NCAs of the Member State where the PRIIP is marketed should be responsible for the 
supervision of marketing of that PRIIP.54 But home Member States are in charge of 
supervision of the KIDs, and host Member States may only require the ex ante 
notification for PRIIPs marketed within their territories.55 Also, the product-oriented 
rules introduce another tension between the market monitoring and product 
intervention. According to Article 39.3 of MiFIR and Article 15.2 of the KID 
Regulation, where products ‘are marketed, distributed or sold in or from their Member 
State’, NCAs in where then shall have power to monitor, or to impose a sanction for 
infringements.56 Same provisions also exist in the field of product intervention.57 In 
this sense, a product may be monitored and supervised by more than one Member State, 
and this duplication will inevitably cause serious tension, particularly in case of 
cross-border services. Moreover, the viability of a distinction between the product and 
its marketing can be questioned in practice.58 The place of the market might be unclear 
due to the technology.59 For example, if a client visits the website of an investment firm 
																																																								
52  Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 on key information documents for packaged retail and 
insurance-based investment products (PRIIPs), 2014 OJ L352/2. (‘KID Regulation’) 
53 Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation (EU) No 
648/2012, 2014 OJ L173/84. (‘MiFIR’) 
54 Recital 24 of Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 on key information documents for packaged retail and 
insurance-based investment products (PRIIPs), 2014 OJ L352/2. (‘KID Regulation’) 
55 Article 5.2 of KID Regulation. 
56 Articles 70 and 72 of MiFID II and Article 22 of KID Regulation. 
57 Article 42.1 of MiFIR and Article 17.1 of KID Regulation. 
58 Jukha Snell and Mads Andenas, ‘Exploring the Outer Limits - Restrictions on the Free Movement of 
Goods and Services’ (1999) 10 European Business Law Review 252, at 265. 
59 William Blair and David Quest, ‘Jurisdiction, Conflict of Law and the Internet’ in Guido Ferrarini, 
Klaus J. Hopt and Eddy Wymeersch (eds), Capital Markets in the Age of the Euro: Cross-Border Transactions, 
Listed Companies and Regulation (Kluwer Law International, 2002), at 161–164. 
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and purchases financial products in such a way, where is the place of the market? One 
may argue that the client ‘virtually’ visited the home Member State of the investment 
firm; on the contrary, others may argue that the investment services are advertised and 
provided through a way of Internet into the host Member State’s market, having no 
difference with other channels for distribution.60 Therefore, without coherence and 
consistency of supervisory approaches in Member States, creating the EU-wide product 
governance and intervention regime may raise major difficulties.61 
In brief, although the home/host divide of supervision has been described as the 
‘most significant building block’ of the integrated financial market in the EU,62 it is hard 
to clarify and optimise home-host responsibilities without a specific mechanism to 
resolve relevant issues.63 As the Commission recognises, the fragmented supervision 
undermining the single market indeed ‘imposes extra costs for financial institutions and 
increases the likelihood of failures of financial institutions with potentially additional 
costs’ for European citizens.64 This calls for an enhancement of supervisory powers of 
ESAs in some areas. 
  
																																																								
60 Philip Woolfson, ‘Electronic Commerce and the Single Market in Financial Services in Europe: What 
Chances for Success?’ (1997) 5 Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance 306, at 312–313. For a same 
discussion regarding private international law in the EU law: see Section 4.3.1 of CHAPTER V (pp. 241–
244).  
61 O. Cherednychenko Olha, ‘Freedom of Contract in the Post-Crisis Era: Quo Vadis?’ (2014) 10 
European Review of Contract Law 390, at 419–421. 
62 The home/host model has been described as the ‘most significant building block’ of the integrated 
financial market. European Parliament, European Parliament resolution on financial services policy 
(2005-2010), P6-TA(2007)0338, para. 61. 
63 European Commission, White Paper on Financial Services Policy (2005-2010), May, 2005, part 3.2, 
available at: 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52005DC0629&from=EN> 
(accessed June, 2017). 
64 European Commission, Financial Supervision Package - Frequently Asked Questions, MEMO/10/434, 
September, 2010, Question 2, available at: 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-10-434_en.pdf> (accessed June, 2017). 
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 Supranational System of Investment Conduct 3.
Supervision in the EU 
3.1. Sector-Based Supervision of ESFS 
Given the above incompleteness of the home country control, a supranational 
system to ‘link’ national supervision, more or less, is needed in the EU, but how to 
organise this is an open question. According to traditional patterns, the main business 
line of a financial institution determines its classification and authorisation, which results 
in a supervisory structure based on sectors: namely, banking, insurance and securities 
supervision.65 In order to prevent intervention from other sectors, supervisors in each 
sector develop their own approaches, techniques and practices—the so-called 
‘sectoral’/‘institutional’, or ‘three-pillar’, approach of supervision.66 However, attributed 
to market integration and financial innovation, ‘many large financial institutions are 
involved in a cross-section of products and services’, and ‘they tend to operate along 
business lines without regard to the legal status of the entities in which the activity is 
technically situated, or recorded for supervisory purposes’.67 This causes significant 
supervisory gaps of hybrid products, followed by competitive inequality caused by the 
fact that similar products and operations executed by institutions in different sectors 
may apply disparate provisions.68 In order to tackle the competitive inequality problem, 
																																																								
65  Eddy Wymeersch, ‘The Structure of Financial Supervision in Europe: About Single Financial 
Supervisors, Twin Peaks and Multiple Financial Supervisors’ (2007) 8 European Business Organization Law 
Review 237, at 251–252. 
66 Ibid, at 252–253. 
67 G30, The Structure of Financial Supervision: Approaches and Challenges in a Global Marketplace (Working 
Group on Financial Supervision, 2008), at 34. 
68 Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, ‘Financial Supervision - Inside or Outside Central banks?’ in Dirk 
Shoenmaker, Jeroen J.M. Kremers and Peter J. Wierts (eds), Financial Supervision in Europe (Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2003), at 162. 
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a ‘functional’ consideration is added into the supervisory structure. Under the 
‘functional approach’, supervisory divide is ‘determined by the business that is being 
transacted by the entity, without regard to its legal status’,69 but a similar challenge is 
that it could be extremely difficult to distinguish which activity comes within the 
jurisdiction of a particular supervisor, especially in the case of complex products and 
multi-sector activities.70 The same problems and supervisory gaps, still exist. Therefore, 
if the institutional or functional approach is operable, an extensive consolidation and a 
clear allocation of responsibilities are needed.71 
Due to the fact that no approach to supervision has been proven to be superior to 
others, 72  sector-based supervision plus a co-ordination platform—the so-called 
ESFS—is the structure chosen by the EU due to the historical roots.73 ESAs were built 
to replace Level 3’s Committees set in the Lamfalussy process,74 and many Directives 
were then amended due to these institutional changes.75 In addition, for tackling gaps 
between NCAs in supervising European financial conglomerates, the Joint Committee76 
																																																								
69 G30, above note 67, at 24. See also E. Wymeersch, ‘The Structure of Financial Supervision in Europe: 
About Single Financial Supervisors, Twin Peaks and Multiple Financial Supervisors’, above note 65, at 
257–259. 
70 G30, ibid, at 35. 
71 T. Padoa-Schioppa, above note 68, at 164; Eric J. Pan, ‘Four Challenges to Financial Regulatory 
Reform’ (2010) 55 Villanova Law Review 743, at 758. 
72 Eilís Ferran, ‘Institutional Design: The Choices for National Systems’ in Niam Moloney, Eilís Ferran 
and Jennifer Payne (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2015), at 
100–102. 
73 For a comprehensive history and critical evaluation of this sector-based model: see Veerle Colaert, 
‘European Banking, Securities, and Insurance Law: Cutting through Sectoral Lines?’ (2015) 52 Common 
Market Law Review 1579, at 1579–1616. 
74 For more details of the Lamfalussy process: see Section 3.1 of CHAPTER II (pp. 23–27). 
75  Directive 2010/78/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 
98/26/EC, 2002/87/EC, 2003/6/EC, 2003/41/EC, 2003/71/EC, 2004/39/EC, 2004/109/EC, 
2005/60/EC, 2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC and 2009/65/EC in respect of the powers of the European 
Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), the European Supervisory Authority (European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) and the European Supervisory Authority (European 
Securities and Markets Authority), 2010 OJ L331/120. (‘Omnibus Directive’) 
76 CHARTER IV of EBA Regulation, ESMA Regulation and EIOPA Regulation. 
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plays an important role for providing a forum for co-operation between ESAs and 
NCAs.77 For tackling another challenge, that no supervisor has sufficient information 
and authority to address systemic risk,78 the ESRB was also established.79 On the whole, 
the supervisory system of ESFS could be viewed as Table III-3 below,80 but the grey 
area with respect to European capital markets supervision (in particular, investment 
conduct supervision) is the focus of this thesis. 
Table III-3: Structure of ESFS81 
 
3.2. De Larosière Reforms Conferring ESMA More Supervisory 
Powers 
As highlighted by the de Larosière report, CESR was considered as having a lack 
																																																								
77 European Commission, Revision of the Financial Conglomerates Directive - Frequently Asked 
Questions, Memo/10/376, August, 2010, question 7, available at: 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-10-376_en.pdf> (accessed June, 2017). 
78 G30, above note 67, at 35–36. 
79 Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council on European Union 
macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board, 
2010 OJ L331/1. (‘ESRB Regulation’) 
80 After the SSM entered into operation in November 2014, the supervisory structure of banking sector 
in the EU was changed hugely. See further in Section 2.2 of CHAPTER VI (pp. 267–271).  
81 With regard to the difference between the macro-prudential, micro-prudential and conduct supervision, 
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of resources (or insufficient resources) and no means to deal with tension between 
NCAs.82 Therefore, ESMA is established as an independent EU agency,83 having legal 
personality, 84  with the aim ‘to upgrade the quality and consistency of national 
supervision, strengthening oversight of cross-border groups’.85 ESMA not only inherits 
similar powers from CESR, but also gets more ‘hard’ supervisory powers that CESR did 
not have.86 However, it is important to note that ESMA still operates as a ‘European 
Network Plus’,87 so, as some commentators have said, the de Larosière reforms ‘did not 
substantially change the allocation of powers and responsibilities amongst authorities, 
but enhanced coordination mechanisms’ in the EU.88 
 Enhanced Soft Powers 3.2.1.
First of all, ESMA continues to play a general co-ordination role, as CESR did.89 It 
shall ‘facilitate the exchange of information’,90 and function as a centralised information 
point.91 In addition, ESMA has a new power to request information from NCAs in 
order to carry out its duties assigned.92 If the information is not available (or not made 
available in a timely fashion) from the NCAs, ESMA can request it from the relevant 
																																																								
82 The de Larosière report, above note 4, paras. 161–166. 
83 Article 1.5.4 of ESMA Regulation. 
84 Article 5.1 of ESMA Regulation. 
85 Recital 5 of ESMA Regulation. 
86 Articles 8.2(d)–(f) and (h)–(j) of ESMA Regulation. See details in Sections 3.2.1, 3.2.2 and 3.3 below 
(pp. 89–105). 
87 Saskia Lavrijssen-Heijmans and Leigh Hancher, ‘European Regulators in the Network Sectors: 
Revolution or Evolution?’ in G. Arts, W. Dicke and L. Hancher (eds), New Perspectives on Investment in 
Infrastructures (Amsterdam University Press, 2008), at 138–141. 
88 Guido Ferrarini and Luigi Chiarella, Common Banking Supervision in the Eurozone: Strengths and Weaknesses 
(ECGI Law Working Paper No 223/2013, 2013), at 38. 
89 Article 31 of ESMA Regulation. 
90 Articles 31(a) of ESMA Regulation. 
91 Articles 31(b) and (f) of ESMA Regulation. 
92 Article 35.1 of ESMA Regulation. 
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financial market participants directly. 93  On the counterbalance, ESMA shall also 
provide ‘a centrally accessible database of registered financial market participants’.94 
Second, given that ESFS is still based on a decentralised network, and NCAs 
would continue to carry out day-to-day supervision,95 building a common supervisory 
culture is still needed for a consistent network in the EU. To this end, ESMA inherits 
peer review powers that CESR had for strengthening consistency in supervisory 
outcomes.96 Although the effect of ‘soft’ peer reviews remains unclear, it seems to be 
effective in the promotion of communication and information flows at least.97 From 
the viewpoint of this, the outcomes of peer reviews are multiple: first, peer reviews may 
contribute to ‘a better understanding of the differences’ between supervisory systems in 
Member States; second, peer reviews may ‘give rise to initiatives in terms of regulation 
or recommendations’; and third, peer reviews may ‘constitute a monitoring device’ of 
Member States.98 Furthermore, best practices may be identified and made public by 
peer reviews, as the fourth function.99 This re-engineered and strengthened function of 
																																																								
93 Article 35.6 of ESMA Regulation. 
94 Article 8.2(j) of ESMA Regulation. 
95 The de Larosière report, above note 4, rec. 18; Recital 9 of ESMA Regulation. 
96 Article 30 of ESMA Regulation. Relative legislation also grants ESMA a peer review function in 
practice: see, e.g., Article 38 of Directive 2011/61/EU on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and 
amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 
1095/2010, 2011 OJ L174/1 (‘AIFMD’); Article 21 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 on OTC derivatives, 
central counterparties and trade repositories, 2012 OJ L201/1 (‘EMIR’); Article 24 of Regulation (EU) 
No 909/2014 on improving securities settlement in the European Union and on central securities 
depositories and amending Directives 98/26/EC and 2014/65/EU and Regulation (EU) No 236/2012, 
2014 OJ L257/1. (‘CSDR’) 
97  Martino Maggetti and Fabrizio Gilardi, ‘The Policy-Making Structure of European Regulatory 
Networks and the Domestic Adoption of Standards’ (2011) 18 Journal of European Public Policy 830, at 836–
844. 
98 Eddy Wymeersch, ‘The European Financial Supervisory Authorities or ESAs’ in Eddy Wymeersch, 
Klaus J. Hopt and Guido Ferrarini (eds), Financial Regulation and Supervision: A Post-Crisis Analysis (Oxford 
University Press, 2012), para. 9.179. 
99 Recital 41 and Article 30.4 of ESMA Regulation. 
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peer reviews is considered as a future way to achieving supervisory convergence.100 In 
addition, compared to CESR, ESMA Regulation opens a wider window on various 
forms of building a common supervisory culture between NCAs: ESMA may provide 
opinions to NCAs; promote an effective bilateral and multilateral exchange of 
information between NCAs; develop supervisory standards, especially on reporting; 
review the application of technical standards, guidelines and recommendations; establish 
training programmes; or even develop new practical instruments and convergence 
tools. 101 This leaves plenty of room for ESMA regarding further innovation on 
supervisory tools. For example, in accordance with ESMA’s Supervisory Convergence 
Work Programme for 2017, besides guidelines, Q&A and peer reviews, ‘application 
workshops’ and ‘training workshops’ are also applicable tools for the sound, efficient 
and consistent implementation and supervision of MiFID II package.102 
 New Hard Powers 3.2.2.
In addition to the enhanced soft powers indicated above, ESMA, compared to 
CESR, has been granted four new ‘hard powers’. First, ESMA now plays an important 
role in monitoring how EU law (including technical standards) is enforced by NCAs, 
and ensures the consistent application of EU law.103 Subject to a prior investigation into 
the alleged breach or non-application of EU law, ESMA may address recommendations 
																																																								
100 International Monetary Fund (‘IMF, European Union: Publication of Financial Sector Assessment Program 
Documentation—Technical Note on European Securities and Markets Authority (IMF Country Report No 13/69, 
2013), para. 84, available at: <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr1369.pdf>  
(accessed June, 2017). 
101 Article 29 of ESMA Regulation. 
102 ESMA, Supervisory Convergence Work Programme 2017, ESMA42-397158525-448 
, February, 2017, paras. 86–87 and Annexes I & II, available at: 
<https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/esma42-397158525-448_supervisory_converge
nce_work_programme_2017_0.pdf> (accessed June, 2017). 
103 Article 17 of ESMA Regulation. 
Chapter III Competence Allocation of Investment Conduct Regulation 
in the EU—Supervisory System 
 92 
to the NCAs for setting out the action that they should take.104 If the NCAs do not 
correct their action after receiving the recommendations, the European Commission 
(‘Commission’) shall take into account these recommendations to issue a formal opinion 
to the NCAs for further procedures.105 In this sense, the recommendations within this 
article (namely, Article 17 of ESMA Regulation) have de facto binding powers to NCAs. 
Moreover, if the NCAs do not comply the opinion issued by the Commission, ESMA 
may take a direct decision against to financial market participants in order to ‘maintain 
or restore neutral conditions of competition in the market or ensure the orderly 
functioning and integrity of the financial system’.106 Unanswered questions then remain 
about what steps ESMA could take if a financial institution was failed to comply with 
the direct decision made by ESMA, although this may not happen in reality since that 
NCAs would seldom persist in holding out against the combined views of the 
Commission and ESMA.107 
Second, in an emergency case of ‘adverse market developments that may seriously 
jeopardise the orderly functioning and integrity of financial market or the stability of the 
whole or part of the financial system’,108 ESMA shall either issue a confidential 
recommendation to the Council of the European Union (‘Council’) for requiring a 
meeting,109 or even take individual decisions to instruct NCAs.110 If the NCAs do not 
																																																								
104 Article 17.3 of ESMA Regulation. 
105 Article 17.4 of ESMA Regulation. 
106 Article 17.6 of ESMA Regulation. 
107 Eilís Ferran, ‘Understanding the New Institutional Architecture of EU Financial Market Supervision’ 
in Eddy Wymeersch, Klaus J. Hopt and Guido Ferrarini (eds), Financial Regulation and Supervision: A 
Post-Crisis Analysis (Oxford University Press, 2012), para. 5.68. 
108 Article 18.1 of ESMA Regulation. 
109 Article 18.2(2) of ESMA Regulation. 
110 Article 18.3 of ESMA Regulation. 
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comply with the decision issued by ESMA, ESMA may further take an individual 
decision to financial market participants directly.111 However, ESMA’s action taking in 
emergency cases are too onerous, especially this article (namely, Article 18 of ESMA 
Regulation) is subject to a fiscal safeguard set out in Article 38 of ESMA Regulation in 
order to ensure that no decision ‘impinges in any way on the fiscal responsibilities of 
Member States’.112 The decision of ESMA may be suspended by the notification from a 
Member State up to ten working days, plus eight weeks re-examination from the 
Council.113 This is an incredibly long period in emergency cases.114 In addition, given 
that ESMA has a task to monitor and assess market developments,115 ESMA shall also 
develop common methodologies for assessment and common approaches to 
communication, all of which will be applied by NCAs.116 
Third, although ESMA still could carry out non-binding mediation as CESR did,117 
it now has the possibility of settling binding disagreements between NCAs, in particular, 
in areas that require co-operation, co-ordination or joint decision-making by NCAs 
from more than one Member State. 118  After assisting NCAs in resolving their 
disputes,119 ESMA could resolve the dispute unilaterally by ‘binding’ decisions to 
instruct the NCAs to take (or refrain from) an action if the NCAs fail to reach an 
																																																								
111 Article 18.4 of ESMA Regulation. 
112 Article 38.1 of ESMA Regulation. 
113 Articles 38.3 and 38.4 of ESMA Regulation. 
114 E. Ferran, ‘Understanding the New Institutional Architecture of EU Financial Market Supervision’, 
above note 107, at 147; Nicolette Kost de Sevres and Lorenzo Sasso, ‘The New European Financial 
Markets Legal Framework: A Real Improvement? An Analysis of Financial Law and Governance in 
European Capital Markets from A Micro- and Macro-Economic Perspective’ (2012) 7 Capital Markets Law 
Journal 30, at 49–50. 
115 Article 8.1(f) of ESMA Regulation. 
116 Article 32 of ESMA Regulation. 
117 Article 31(c) of ESMA Regulation. 
118 Article 19 of ESMA Regulation. 
119 Articles 19.1 and 19.2 of ESMA Regulation. 
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agreement.120 However, the fiscal safeguard of Article 38 of ESMA Regulation is 
applied to ESMA’s power of settling disagreements in cross-border situations. 121 
ESMA’s decision may be suspended by the notification from a Member State up to 
three months.122 Some argue this long period might hinder efficient cross-border 
supervision.123 Thus, in order to find a fine balance of this fiscal safeguard, Recital 50 of 
ESMA Regulation clarifies that ‘this safeguard mechanism should not be abused’, in 
particular in relation to a decision taken by ESMA which ‘does not have a significant or 
material fiscal impact’.124 In this case, the fiscal safeguard set in Article 38 provides a 
well-balanced function reconciling the responsibilities between ESMA and NCAs.125  
Finally, ESMA has a new task to monitor new and existing financial activities.126 
ESMA could issue warnings on risky financial activities.127 In case that these activities 
‘threaten the orderly functioning and integrity of financial market or the stability of the 
whole or part of the financial system’, ESMA could even temporarily prohibit or restrict 
certain activities.128 It should be further noted that this banning power is subject to 
either the condition laid down in Article 18 in case of an emergency situation or the 
conditions laid down in other specific legislation.129 On the whole, the new legally 
																																																								
120 Article 19.3 of ESMA Regulation. 
121 Article 38.2 of ESMA Regulation. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Wim Fonteyne et al, Crisis Management and Resolution for a European Banking System (IMF Working Paper 
WP/10/70, 2010), at 7–8. 
124 See also Article 38.5 of ESMA Regulation. 
125 Pierre Schammo, ‘EU Day-to-Day Supervision or Intervention-Based Supervision: Which Way 
Forward for the European System of Financial Supervision?’ (2012) 32 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 771, 
at 793–794. 
126 Article 9.2 of ESMA Regulation. 
127 Article 9.3 of ESMA Regulation. 
128 Article 9.5 of ESMA Regulation. See further in Section 3.3.2 below (pp. 100–105).  
129 Ibid. For further details of the conditions laid down in other specific legislation: see Section 3.3.1 
below (pp. 96–99). 
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binding powers of ESMA are the most important features of the de Larosière 
reforms.130 In contrast to CESR, ESMA is meant to have ‘real teeth’.131 ESMA now 
works as a ‘supervisor of supervisors’ and a ‘system supervisor’, hovering ‘above’ and 
‘beside’ NCAs.132  
3.3. Increasing Direct Supervisory Powers of ESMA 
Since the task of ESMA is to ensure ‘the integrity, transparency, efficiency and 
orderly functioning’ of the highly integrated securities markets in the EU,133 the current 
level granted to ESMA might be insufficient134— truly pan-European supervisory 
powers are needed.135 As anticipated by CESR’s ‘Himalaya Report’, a certain number of 
fields might be suitable for centralised supervision at the EU level in the near future: (i) 
EU-wide public offerings of highly standardised products; (ii) public offering of 
standardised UCITS; (iii) application of accounting standards for listed companies; and 
(iv) certain trans-European market infrastructures.136 Therefore, ESMA is getting more 
and more direct supervisory powers, and its role is changing from ‘a supervisor of 
																																																								
130 E. Wymeersch, ‘The European Financial Supervisory Authorities or ESAs’, above note 98, at 249–
276. 
131 Pierre Schammo, ‘The European Securities and Markets Authority: Lifting the Veil on the Allocation 
of Powers’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 1879, at 1880. 
132 Niamh Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation (3rd edn, Oxford University Press, 2014), 
at 973. 
133 Article 1.5(b) of ESMA Regulation. 
134 Sony Kapoor, Emergent Global Challenges: What Europe Needs to Do to Tackle the Triple Crises of Tax, Finance 
and Climate (European Parliament's Special Committee on the Financial, Economic and Social Crisis 
(CRIS) Research Paper, 2010), at 16, available at: 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2010/433452/IPOL-JOIN_NT(2010)433
452_EN.pdf> (accessed June, 2017). 
135 Deutsche Bank Research, Financial Supervision in the EU, August, 2011, at 15, available at: 
<https://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD/PROD0000000000276501/Fin
ancial+supervision+in+the+EU%3A+Incremental+progr.PDF> (accessed June, 2017). 
136 CESR, Preliminary Progress Report: Which Supervisory Tools for the EU Securities Markets? An 
Analytical Paper By CESR, CESR Ref:04~333f, October, 2004, at 17, available at: 
<https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/04_333f.pdf>  
(accessed June, 2017). 
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supervisors’ to a direct supervisor step by step. This represents a radical shift from the 
model ‘which hitherto has been based on the allocation of supervisory jurisdiction 
between home and host supervisors’, towards centralised supervision at the EU level.137 
 Direct Powers conferred by Sectoral Legislation 3.3.1.
There are three cases that new direct supervisory powers are conferred to ESMA 
by independent and sectoral legislation. Credit rating agencies (‘CRAs’) are the first case 
to be placed under the direct supervision of ESMA.138 ESMA now has an exclusive 
power on the registration of CRAs in the EU.139 The Commission only has limited 
powers on registration and supervisory fees.140 In order to fulfil its supervisory role on 
CRAs,141 ESMA is empowered to request for information142 and to conduct general 
investigations 143  and on-site inspections. 144  In case the CRAs infringe the 
conflict-of-interest, organisational or operational requirements 145  and disclosure 
requirements146 mentioned in Annex III of CRA Regulation, ESMA may, by ‘taking 
into account the nature and seriousness of the infringement’,147 either withdraw the 
CRAs’ registration, temporarily ban the CRAs from issuing credit ratings, suspend the 
use of credit ratings issued by the CRAs, require the CRAs to end their infringements, 
																																																								
137 Niamh Moloney, ‘Reform or Revolution? The Financial Crisis, EU Financial Markets Law and the 
European Securities and Markets Authority’ (2011) 60 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 521, at 
528. 
138 Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies amended by Regulation (EU) No 513/2011, 
2011 OJ L145/30. (‘CRA Regulation’) 
139 Articles 14–19 of CRA Regulation. 
140 Article 19.2 of CRA Regulation; see also Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 272/2012 
supplementing Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 with regard to fees charged by the European Securities 
and Markets Authority to credit rating agencies, 2012 OJ L90/6. 
141 Article 21 of CRA Regulation. 
142 Article 23b of CRA Regulation. 
143 Article 23c of CRA Regulation. 
144 Article 23d of CRA Regulation. 
145 Part I of Annex III of CRA Regulation. 
146 Part II of Annex III of CRA Regulation. 
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or issue public notices.148 If the CRAs, intentionally or negligently, commit these 
infringements, ESMA shall also impose fines on them.149 ESMA could even impose 
periodic penalty payments to compel the CRAs put an end to their infringements.150 
Although the Commission is empowered to adopt rules of procedure for the exercise of 
the power to impose fines,151 the files submitted by independent investigating officers 
who are within ESMA are the basis of ESMA’s decision in taking any supervisory 
measure.152 In addition, credit ratings that are related to entities established, or financial 
instruments issued in third countries, and that are issued by a CRA established in a third 
country, might apply for certification from ESMA, in order to be used in the EU 
without an endorsement of EU-based CRAs.153 This procedure requires (i) a previous 
equivalence decision made by the Commission regarding the third-country regulatory 
and supervisory regime on CRAs154, and (ii) the establishment of a co-operation 
arrangement between ESMA and the relevant third-country authorities.155 
The second case relates to trade repositories (‘TRs’),156 which is similar to the 
supervisory regime of CRAs. Under EMIR, ESMA now has direct responsibilities 
regarding the registration, supervision and recognition of TRs.157 EU-based TRs need 
																																																								
148 Article 24.1 of CRA Regulation. 
149 Article 36a of CRA Regulation. 
150 Article 36b.1(a) of CRA Regulation. 
151 Article 23e.7 of CRA Regulation; see also Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 946/2012 
supplementing Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 with regard to rules of procedure on fines imposed to 
credit rating agencies by the European Securities and Markets Authority, including rules on the right of 
defence and temporal provisions, 2012 OJ L282/33. 
152 Article 23e of CRA Regulation. 
153 Article 5 of CRA Regulation. 
154 Article 5.1(b) of CRA Regulation.  
155 Article 5.1(c) of CRA Regulation. 
156 ‘Trade repository’ means ‘a legal person that centrally collects and maintains the records of derivatives’: 
see Article 2(2) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade 
repositories, 2012 OJ L201/1. (‘EMIR’) 
157 TITLE VI of EMIR. 
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to be authorised by ESMA.158 ESMA could adopt a registration decision, or a decision 
refusing or withdrawing registration with its discretion, and the only need is to 
communicate the decisions made to the Commission.159 The same as the supervisory 
powers on CRAs, ESMA could make a request for information160 and conduct general 
investigations161 and on-site inspections.162 The Commission only has limited powers 
on supervisory fees.163 Also, if TRs committed infringements relating to organisational 
(conflicts of interest) requirements, operational requirements, transparency and the 
availability of information, or obstacles to the supervisory activities listed in Annex I of 
EMIR, ESMA, by taking into account the nature and seriousness of the infringement, 
could require the TRs end their infringements, impose fines, issue public notices or even 
withdraw their registration.164 ESMA could further compel the TRs put an end to their 
infringements by imposing periodic penalty payments.165 Before ESMA takes the 
decision, it needs to appoint independent investigating officers conducting investigation 
and follow the detailed rules of procedure published by the Commission. 166 
Furthermore, third-country (non-EU) based TRs that are doing business in the EU need 
to be recognised by ESMA.167 A precondition of this recognition is the Commission 
																																																								
158 Articles 55–59 of EMIR. 
159 Article 59.2 of EMIR. 
160 Article 61 of EMIR. 
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has assessed third countries having equivalent and enforceable regulatory and 
supervisory frameworks by adopting implementing acts.168 Furthermore, in Article 25 
of EMIR Regulation, ESMA is empowered with a power of recognising third-country 
central counterparties (‘CCPs’)169 based on the Commission’s Level 2 rules. 
The third case relates to the registration of third-country investment firms within 
MiFIR: a third-country firm may provide investment services to eligible counterparties 
and per se professional clients170 on a cross-border basis without the establishment of a 
branch, where such firm is registered with ESMA.171 Although the major task of 
monitoring this firm is left to the third country, ESMA has a power to withdrawal the 
registration of the firm.172 The Commission’s equivalence decision, with regard to 
whether ‘the prudential and business conduct framework of a third country can be 
considered to have equivalent effect’,173 is a prior requirement of ESMA’s decision 
taking, so the decisions of registration of third-country firms made by ESMA are still 
subject to the Commission. 174  In case that ESMA would like to withdraw this 
registration, ESMA shall also inform the Commission to assess whether the conditions 
(namely, the prudential and business conduct framework of a third country can be 
considered to have equivalent effect) under the equivalence decision still persist.175 
																																																								
168 Article 77.2(a) conferring Article 75.1 of EMIR. 
169 ‘Central counterparties’ means ‘a legal person that interposes itself between the counterparties to the 
contracts traded on one or more financial markets, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to 
every buyer’: see Article 2(1) of EMIR. 
170 For further discussion about the client classification of the MiFID regime: see Section 3.3.1 of 
CHAPTER II (pp. 34–37). 
171 Article 46.1 of MiFIR. If a third country firm would like to provide investment services to retail clients 
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States in accordance with Article 39 of MiFID II.  
172 Article 49 of MiFIR. 
173 Article 47.1 of MiFIR. 
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 Direct Powers based on Article 9.5 of ESMA Regulation 3.3.2.
Besides above three cases, Article 9.5 of ESMA Regulation provides another legal 
basis for conferring direct supervisory powers to ESMA. This article opens up the 
possibility of a much more centralised form of control over financial innovation and 
provides a reserve power to set the relationship between ESMA and the European 
capital markets.176 Even if in the absence of emergency cases, the power of Article 9.5 
of ESMA Regulation could still be conferred by sectoral legislation. Three examples can 
be found in the EU law. 
First, Article 47 of AIFMD177 confers on ESMA a ‘look-like’ direct supervisory 
power. Although this article is also based on Article 9 of ESMA Regulation, it confers 
on ESMA a power to request NCAs to prohibit or restrict certain non-EU alternative 
investment fund managers (‘AIFMs’),178 if (i) a ‘substantial threat exists’ to ‘the orderly 
functioning and integrity of the financial market or to the stability of the whole or a part 
of the financial system’ in the EU, and ‘there are cross border implications’; and (ii) no 
NCA ‘has taken measures to address the threat’, or ‘one or more’ of the NCAs ‘have 
taken measures that do not adequately address the threat’.179 The measures requested by 
ESMA shall: (i) ‘effectively address the threat’, (ii) ‘not create a risk of regulatory 
arbitrage’, and (iii) ‘not have a detrimental effect on the efficiency of the financial 
markets’.180 The power of this Article, strictly speaking, is not a direct supervisory 
																																																								
176 Iain G. MacNeil, An Introduction to the Law on Financial Investment (2nd edn, Hart Publishing, 2012), at 65. 
See further in pages 94–95 above. 
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179 Article 47.5 of AIFMD. 
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power on market participants, but an ‘indirect’ supervisory power on NCAs. However, 
four years after the deadline for transposition of AIFMD, around July, 2017,181 the 
Commission should commence a review of the application and the scope of this 
Directive, and it may entrust ESMA with further supervisory responsibilities in the field 
of authorisation and supervision of non-EU AIFMs.182 Given the other two examples 
below, it is highly likely that ESMA will be granted a direct supervisory power of 
non-EU AIFMs then. 
Second, according to Article 28 of Short Selling Regulation,183 ESMA has direct 
intervention powers in exceptional circumstances to restrict short selling, credit default 
swaps and other transactions with a temporary nature. However, ESMA could take this 
decision only if: (i) there is ‘a threat to the orderly functioning and integrity of financial 
markets or to the stability of the whole or part of the financial system’ in the EU and 
‘there are cross-border implications’; and (ii) no NCA ‘has taken measures to address 
the threat’ or ‘one or more’ of NCAs ‘have taken measures that do not adequately 
address the threat’.184 The Commission is empowered to adopt Level 2 rules in 
determining what is a threat.185 ESMA shall also consider whether the measures taken: 
(i) could ‘significantly address the threat’; (ii) ‘do not create a risk of regulatory arbitrage’; 
and (iii) ‘do not have a detrimental effect on the efficiency of financial markets’.186 
Furthermore, this power should be exercised ‘only for such period and to the extent 
																																																								
181 Article 66 of AIFMD. 
182 Recital 91 of AIFMD. 
183 Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on short selling and 
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necessary to deal with the specific threat’.187  
Third, MiFIR introduces two articles conferring direct supervisory powers to 
ESMA.188 According to Article 40 of MiFIR, ESMA will have temporary product 
intervention powers on the marketing, distribution or sale of certain financial 
instruments, or on a type of financial activity or practice, if: (i) ‘the proposed action 
addresses a significant investor protection concern or a threat to the orderly functioning 
and integrity of financial markets or commodity markets or to the stability of the whole 
or part of the financial system’ in the EU; (ii) ‘regulatory requirements under EU law do 
not address the threat’; and (iii) NCAs ‘have not taken action to address the threat or 
the actions that have been taken do not adequately address the threat’. 189  The 
Commission shall adopt Level 2 rules in determining the first of foregoing conditions 
concerning investor protection, market integrity or financial stability.190 ESMA shall 
ensure the supervisory actions takes: (i) ‘do not have a detrimental effect on the 
efficiency of financial markets or on investors’; (ii) ‘do not create a risk of regulatory 
arbitrage’; and (iii) have ‘been taken after consulting with relevant authorities, where the 
measures relates to agricultural commodities derivatives’.191 This new power mainly 
deals with overall financial stability and orderly functioning of markets, and does ‘not 
imply any requirement to introduce or apply a product approval or licensing’.192 
Furthermore, in order to address ‘excessive commodity price volatility’,193 Article 45 of 
																																																								
187 Recital 36 of Short Selling Regulation. 
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MiFIR also provides ESMA with position management powers, allowing it to: (i) 
‘request all relevant information from any person regarding the size and purpose of a 
position or exposure entered into via a derivative’;194 (ii) ‘require such people to reduce 
the size of or to eliminate their position or exposure, having analysed this 
information’;195 or (iii) ‘as a last resort, limit the ability of a person from entering into a 
commodity derivative’.196 The above measures could only be taken if: (i) they could 
‘address a threat to the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets’; and (ii) 
NCAs ‘have not taken measures to address the threat or the measures taken do not 
sufficiently address the threat’. 197  ESMA shall ensure the measures it takes: (i) 
‘significantly addresses the threat’; (ii) ‘does not create a risk of regulatory arbitrage’; and 
(iii) ‘does not have any of the following detrimental effects on the efficiency of financial 
markets’.198 The Commission shall further adopt Level 2 rules to specify: (i) ‘the 
existence of a threat’; (ii) ‘the appropriate reduction of a position or exposure entered 
into via a derivative’; and (iii) ‘the situations where a risk of regulatory arbitrage could 
arise’.199 
Overall, all of the current direct supervisory powers of ESMA could be 
summarised as following Table III-4 shows. On the one hand, ESMA’s direct powers 
are subject to many constraints. They normally require detailed pre-requests, conditions 
and limited choices of actions that ESMA may take, so that ESMA will not abuse these 
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powers. On the other hand, it appears that ESMA are not merely an agency now, as it 
has some ‘independent’ supervisory powers.200 ESMA is now operating as a unique 
‘quasi-regulator’ within a complex, formal, institutional structure created by the EU 
Treaties.201 In the light of these examples, it could be reasonably anticipated that direct 
supervisory powers might extend to the cases of market abuse and money laundering, 
since these direct powers of ESMA can further harmonise supervisory powers across 
the EU.202 The recent review of ESAs also provides similar recommendations towards a 
stronger role for ESMA on market function supervision.203 It is suggested that the 
coverage of ESMA’s supervision should be enlarged to include the Shareholders Rights 
Directive, 204  Takeover Directive, 205  shadow banking, 206  the enforcement of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (‘IFRS’)),207 and to confer on ESMA more 
direct powers in relation to the highly integrated market infrastructure.208 
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L184/17. 
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(accessed June, 2017). 
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Table III-4: Increasing Direct Supervisory Powers of ESMA 
Types Legislation & Time Initiatives 
Supervision of EU-based CRAs 
and Non-EU CRAs 




Supervision of EU-based TRs and 
Non-EU TRs, Non-EU CCPs 
EMIR, 2012 
Supervision of Non-EU 
Investment Firms 
MiFIR, 2014 
Supervision of Short Selling Short Selling Regulation, 2012 
Based on 
Article 9.5 of 
ESMA 
Regulation 
Product Intervention & Position 
Management Powers 
MiFIR, 2014 
Supervision of Non-EU AIFMs AIFMD, 2017 (expected) 
 Challenges of Current System 4.
4.1. Constitutionality of ESMA 
Increasing the direct powers of ESMA shows that a trend of centralising 
supervision to the EU level is underway. However, whether this transfer is desirable or 
not, it always needs to be done with sensitivity in order to ‘avoid upsetting the present 
constitutional balance’.209 As admitted by ESMA, any further grant of direct supervisory 
powers to ESMA shall occur ‘in very limited circumstances where the entity is 
pan-European and where there is a clear added value to the EU-level supervision’.210 
																																																																																																																																																													
European Supervisory Authorities, March, 2017, at 17–18, available at: 
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/2017-esas-operations-consultation-document_en.pdf> 
(accessed June, 2017). (‘ESA Consultation Paper’) 
209 Alan Dashwood, ‘States in the European Union’ (1998) 23 European Law Review 201, at 213. 
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Therefore, a debate about the constitutionality of ESMA emerges. 
In fact, although many agencies have worked for a long time in the EU, primary 
legislation was completely silent on the existence of agencies until the Treaty of 
Lisbon.211 In the Treaty of Lisbon, many provisions mention these kinds of entities. 
First, Article 263 of the TFEU provides a legal basis for the CJEU to review the legality 
of ‘acts of bodies, offices or agencies of the Union’. Second, Article 265 of the TFEU 
also clarifies that the rules governing actions for failure to act are applicable to ‘bodies, 
offices and agencies of the Union which fail to act’. Third, Article 267(b) of the TFEU 
further confirms that courts and tribunals of Member States may refer questions 
concerning the validity and interpretation of ‘acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or 
agencies of the Union’ to the CJEU. Fourth, such acts may also be the subject of a plea 
of illegality, pursuant to Article 277 of the TFEU, so ‘any party may, in proceedings in 
which an act of general application adopted by an institution, body, office or agency of 
the Union is at issue’. Although these provisions might be seen as the Treaty bases of 
EU agencies, these Treaty fixes do not bring about a constitutional revolution in the 
sense that judicial review of acts of agencies had already been confirmed in the practice 
of the General Court (the Court of First Instance prior to 2009) within the CJEU.212 In 
this sense, the Treaty of Lisbon, as it stands, does not foresee the possibility of 
establishing an agency or conferring powers on it, but does foresee legal redress against 
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the acts of such agencies.213 There is still a need for clarifying the constitutionality in 
relation to the establishment of EU agencies. 
 Meroni  and Romano  Cases 4.1.1.
Meroni v High Authority (the ‘Meroni case’)214 is a long-standing CJEU case law that 
raises a heated debate regarding ESMA’s constitutionality.215 The Meroni case ruled that 
an EU agency cannot be given a discretionary power which may make possible the 
execution of economic policy, but only purely executive powers can be delegated.216 
Thus, the Commission’s Communication states that ‘[a]gencies cannot be given the 
power to adopt general regulatory measures. They are limited to taking individual 
decisions in specific areas where a defined technical expertise is required, under clearly 
and precisely defined conditions and without genuine discretionary power’.217 Although 
some commentators have challenged the restrictive interpretation of the Meroni case,218 
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Meets Reality’ (2009) 15 European Law Journal 482, at 501; Merijn Chamon, ‘EU Agencies between Meroni 
and Romano or the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 1055, Sec. 4. 
214 CJEU, Case 9/56, Meroni v High Authority, [1957–1958] ECR 133. 
215 See, e.g., Niamh Moloney, ‘EU Financial Market Regulation after the Global Financial Crisis: "More 
Europe" or More Risks?’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 1317, at 1347, 1352; Hans Van Meerten 
and A.T. Ottow, ‘The Proposals for the European Supervisory Authorities: The Right (Legal) Way 
Forward?’ (2010) 1 Tijdschrift voor Financieel Recht 5, at 11–14; P. Schammo, above note 131, Sec. 3.2 and 4.3; 
Niamh Moloney, ‘The European Securities and Markets Authority and Institutional Design for the EU 
Financial Market – A Tale of Two Competences: Part (2) Rules in Action’ (2011) 12 European Business 
Organization Law Review 177, Sec. 3.2.2; Pierre Schammo, EU Prospectus Law: New Perspectives on Regulatory 
Competition in Securities Markets (Cambridge University Press, 2011), at 30–36; E. Wymeersch, ‘The 
European Financial Supervisory Authorities or ESAs’, above note 98, at 241, 245 and 255; Stuart Willey, 
‘The European System of Financial Supervision’ in Michael C. Blair, George Alexander Walker and Stuart 
Willey (eds), Financial Markets and Exchanges Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press, 2012), at 255.  
216 CJEU, Case 9/56, above note 214, at 151–152. 
217 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council: European agencies – The way forward, COM(2008) 135 final, March, 2008, at 5, available at: 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0135:FIN:EN:PDF> 
(accessed June, 2017). 
218 See, e.g., Edoardo Chiti, ‘An Important Part of the EU’s Institutional Machinery: Features, Problems 
and Perspectives of European Agencies’ (2009) 46 Common Market Law Review 1395, at 1422–1424; Saskia 
Lavrijssen and Leigh Hancher, ‘Networks on Track: From European Regulatory Networks to European 
Regulatory ‘Network Agencies’’ (2009) 36 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 23, at 23–55; Robert Schütze, 
‘'Delegated' Legislation in the (new) European Union: A Constitutional Analysis’ (2011) 74 Modern Law 
Review 661, at 674. 
Chapter III Competence Allocation of Investment Conduct Regulation 
in the EU—Supervisory System 
 108 
simply examining EU agencies by the Meroni doctrine would result in the conclusion 
that the current ‘agencification’—the increased delegation of regulatory powers from the 
classical state’s powers to specialised agencies219—is, de facto, in breach with this doctrine, 
as some have claimed.220  
Given EU agencies are widely used now,221 it is worth reviewing the Meroni 
doctrine here. As one commentator argues, EU ‘agencies could be delegated 
discretionary powers provided that this is accompanied by reinforcement or 
re-balancing of the existing institutions’.222 First, in accordance with the true meaning of 
the principle of institutional balance, the protective aspect in the Meroni doctrine seems 
to ‘have been gradually lost’ as other means of protection (such as, judicial review) 
appeared.223 The purpose of the Meroni case could be preserved by ‘a less rigid set of 
criteria’ once the steering and control mechanisms are well established.224 Second, the 
factual and legal contexts in which the agencies in the Meroni case and the current EU 
agencies operate are fundamentally different in nature: the former were bodies 
established under private law, whereas the latter are public bodies under the EU law.225 
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In fact, differing from the view of legal literature on the nature of discretion, political 
science literature provides a comparatively helpful way of viewing it—‘the zone of 
discretion’ consists of: (i) ‘the sum of delegated powers (policy discretion) granted by 
the principal to the agent, minus’ (ii) ‘the sum of control instruments, available for use 
by the principal to shape (constrain) or annul (reverse) policy outcomes that emerge as a 
result of the agent’s performance of set tasks’.226 Therefore, the Meroni case ruling can 
be understood as ‘the zone of discretion’ shall be zero, regardless whether by means of 
(i) increasing the sum of control instruments, or (ii) decreasing the sum of delegated 
powers, or (iii) both. 
Besides the Meroni case, another relevant case is Romano v Institut national d'assurance 
maladie-invalidité (‘Romano case’),227 in which the CJEU held that the Council of the 
European Economic Community (‘EEC’) could not delegate the power to adopt acts 
‘having the force of law’ to agencies, 228 implying most likely the prohibition of 
delegation of legislative-like type of powers, rather than of powers to take 
legally-binding decisions in individual cases. Two points shall be noted: (i) the Romano 
case was a ruling under the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community 
(‘the EEC Treaty’);229 and (ii) the delegatee in the Romano case was a body established 
under secondary EU law and not a body established by private law.230 However, in the 
Romano case, the principle of institutional balance, which was considered in the Meroni 
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case, was not relied by the CJEU as a support, and the CJEU formed its reasons of 
judgment by the range of the Commission’s missions. 231  In the light of the 
aforementioned case-law limitations on the establishment of EU agencies, the legal 
grounds of ESMA’s powers might be shaky and challengeable. 
 United Kingdom v European Parl iament  (‘Case C-270/12’) 4.1.2.
On 22 January, 2014, an important constitutional judgement was made by the 
CJEU.232 This case dealt with the legal limits of the proliferation of agencies within the 
EU and their powers imposed by the EU Treaties, and, in particular, with the Meroni and 
the Romano doctrines, as well as the new constitutional structure created with the Treaty 
of Lisbon with respect to delegated and implementing powers. It was held that 
implementing rights, including discretionary powers, may be conferred to EU agencies 
on the legal basis of Article 114 of the TFEU, but these have to be clear and precise, 
and delineated in conformity with the principle of institutional balance that are set by 
the ‘updated’ Meroni doctrine.233 This ruling provides a clear instruction to EU agencies 
with discretionary powers (namely, ESMA here) after the Treaty of Lisbon. 
In this case, the UK challenged the legality of Article 28 of the Short Selling 
Regulation,234 which gives ESMA powers to prohibit or impose conditions on the entry 
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into short sales or similar transactions, and to require such persons to notify or publicise 
net short positions in conformity with Article 9.5 of ESMA Regulation.235 The Court 
rejected all pleas of the UK, and dismissed the action of the UK, based on following 
reasons. 
First of all, the CJEU observed that the bodies in question in the Meroni case were 
entities governed by private law, whereas ESMA is a EU entity created by EU law.236 
ESMA’s discretion is limited by various conditions and criteria, and is required to 
examine a significant number of factors, so ESMA can take only certain types of 
measures and has duties to consult and notify various bodies.237 The powers of 
intervention available to ESMA are also precisely delineated and amenable to judicial 
review.238 The Meroni doctrine, thus, is satisfied here. In this sense, the Meroni case is not 
overruled, but ‘restyled’.239 
Second, the delegation of powers is not of a quasi-legislative nature, but rather fell 
within the ambit of the criteria of the Meroni judgment.240 Even in strictly circumscribed 
circumstances, ESMA adopting measures of general application (which may include 
rules affecting any natural or legal person) is not at odds with the Romano doctrine, 
because this is envisaged and permitted by Articles 263 and 277 of the TFEU.241 
Third, the delegation of powers to ESMA is valid even though it does not 
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correspond to any of the situations defined in Articles 290 and 291 of the TFEU.242 
These two Articles of the TFEU do not represent a closed system of delegation. While 
the EU Treaties do not contain any provision to the effect that powers may be 
conferred on a EU body, office or agency, a number of provisions in the TFEU, none 
the less, presuppose that such a possibility exists, such as, Articles 263, 265, 267 and 
277.243 Therefore, ESMA’s powers conferred by the Short Selling Regulation cannot be 
regarded as undermining the rules governing the delegation of powers laid down in 
Articles 290 and 291 of the TFEU.244 
Fourth, Article 114 of the TFEU is an appropriate legal basis of Article 28 of the 
Short Selling Regulation. This is based on a two-step examination. In the first step, due 
to the reasons that: (i) the range of ‘measures for the approximation’ of Article 114 
‘depends on the general context and the specific circumstances’ (especially in fields with 
‘complex technical features’) of the matter to be harmonised;245 and (ii) the expression 
‘measures for the approximation’ in Article 114 allows the legislature to establish a ‘body 
responsible for the implementation of harmonisation’ in particular,246 if it requires 
‘specific professional and technical expertise’, or ‘the ability of such a body to respond 
swiftly and appropriately’,247 the CJEU confirmed that the system of intervention 
established by Article 28 of the Short Selling Regulation falls within the scope of Article 
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114 of the TFEU.248 In the second step, given Article 28 of the Short Selling Regulation 
is in fact to improve the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal 
market in the financial field, 249  this harmonisation measure adopted by the EU 
legislature indeed is in line with the object of the internal market.250 
Based on the ruling in this case, a liberal reading might suggest that the ESMA’s 
constitutional basis is stabilised, and the Meroni doctrine is limited to finding a balance 
between the principle of institutional balance and the principle of internal market.251 
However, it might also be read more restrictively, namely, that operating powers of 
ESMA, as an EU agency, shall be restrained by the Commission with some 
conditions.252 In fact, the ‘Meroni-light doctrine’,253 established by this case, does not 
end the debate, rather it adds a twist to what kind of discretion EU agencies have and 
should enjoy, in accordance with the principle of institutional balance.254 As one 
commentator observed, the CJEU’s silence on the issue of the institutional balance 
amounts to ‘foolish judicial disregard for the vital need to ensure continuing financial 
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stability within Europe.’255 Given this, the political sensitivities still remain after the 
decision of this case, and ESMA is likely to tread carefully when exercising its 
supervisory powers. In this sense, whether we adopt the liberal or the restrictive reading 
of this case, a more important issue is: how can we tackle the ambiguous competence 
and the institutional weaknesses of ESMA? 
 Ambiguous Competence of Investment Conduct Supervision  4.1.3.
Given the sensitive place of ESMA, we have to ask whether the EU possesses 
powers of investment conduct supervision, so that the EU could delegate them to its 
agencies? In particular, the protection of local markets at the EU level is criticised by 
reason that NCAs are better placed to assess the risks to consumers posed by the 
relevant financial activities and to determine the best course of action.256 Hardened and 
direct intervention powers at the EU level in the field of investment conduct 
supervision might represent a potential of inefficient centralisation and an establishment 
of a ‘too distant interlocutor’.257 The answer of this question, thus, should be examined 
carefully in the context of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality within the 
EU Treaties (namely, TEU and TFEU).258  
Furthermore, even though the competence of investment conduct supervision at 
the EU level could be justified, whether Article 114 of the TFEU that provides a treaty 
foundation of ESMA can be a legal basis for setting an agency in charge of the pan-EU 
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investment conduct supervision remains unclear in CJEU’s case law.259 Especially, in 
that case that a measure does not contribute to harmonisation, other possible articles 
(such as, Article 352) might be a preferable legal basis, because Article 114 is for a 
harmonisation measure only. Therefore, when establishing a EU agency in charge of 
pan-EU investment conduct supervision (or conferring this task to ESMA), the choice 
of a correct legal basis (the internal market clause of Article 114 or the flexibility clause 
of Article 352 of the TFEU) is likely to remain as a sensitive topic post-Lisbon in the 
context of agency governance.260 In order to answer this question, we need to ask 
whether this centralisation of investment conduct supervision is really a measure of 
harmonisation?261 
ESMA’s tasks relevant to investment conduct supervision now include (i) ‘ensuring’ 
the taking of investment and other risks are appropriately supervised,262 and (ii) 
‘enhancing’ consumer protection.263 According to Article 9 of the ESMA Regulation, 
entitled ‘Tasks related to consumer protection and financial activities’, ESMA could 
issue warnings in the context of consumer protection,264 and could prohibit or restrict 
certain financial activities for overall financial stability and orderly functioning of 
markets.265 However, to some extent, the banning power of Article 9.5 of the ESMA 
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Regulation lacks clarity, because it has two lines of reasoning: investor protection and 
financial stability.266 The later from the ‘macro’ perspective would be in higher priority 
than the former from the ‘micro’ perspective, once they two have some conflicts in one 
case.267 Articles 40.8 and 40.2(a) of MiFIR also mentions a possibility of ‘significant 
investor protection concern’ as the leeway for ESMA to directly prohibit or restrict 
investment conduct.268 ESMA itself thereby confirmed this banning power as a last 
resort to ‘ensuring’ the interest of investors rather than overall financial stability and 
orderly functioning of markets.269 This may be, implicitly, considered as ESMA’s 
entering into the competence of investment conduct supervision. But, given the 
sensitivity and ambiguity of competence, it is critical that this power is exercised 
cautiously with a clear and transparent protocol.270  
The issue of ambiguous competence is noted in the official documents of CMU. 
Within the Green Paper of CMU, the newly introduced ESMA’s direct powers on 
‘investor protection’ in MiFID II are confirmed, and it moves on to mention that 
ESMA’s mandates in the area of consumer/investor protection ‘could be clarified and 
enhanced where necessary’,271 followed by an important question that ‘how can the 
																																																								
266 Eddy Wymeersch, ‘Europe's New Financial Regulatory Bodies’ (2011) 11 Journal of Corporate Law 
Studies 443, at 461; E. Wymeersch, ‘The European Financial Supervisory Authorities or ESAs’, above note 
98, at 275. 
267 Jeroen JM Kremers and Dirk Schoenmaker, Twin Peaks: Experiences in the Netherlands (LSE Financial 
Markets Group Paper Series Special Paper 196, 2010), at 4–5. 
268 See also Recital 46 of MiFIR. For more details regarding the product intervention powers: see Section 
3.3.2 above (pp. 102–103) and Section 3.3.8 of CHAPTER II (pp. 58–59). 
269 ESMA, ESMA Annual Report 2014, at 16–17, available at: 
<https://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files_force/library/2015-934_annual_report_2014.pdf> 
(accessed June, 2017). 
See also European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on the operation of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the European System of 
Financial Supervision (ESFS), above note 203, at 8. 
270 IMF, above note 100, para. 92. 
271 European Commission, Green Paper: Building a Capital Markets Union, COM(2015) 63 final, 
Chapter III Competence Allocation of Investment Conduct Regulation 
in the EU—Supervisory System 
 117 
ESAs [ESMA] further contribute to ensuring consumer and investor protection?’.272 
From the context of this, although the Commission intends to carefully increase 
ESMA’s direct powers in the future, the Commission admits that ESMA’s competence 
of direct supervisory powers on investor protection is still unclear and controversial. 
Officially, there is no EU agency in charge of investment conduct supervision to date. 
NCAs still take centre stage of investment conduct supervision, and ESMA, for now, 
plays a merely supporting role.273  
4.2. Institutional Weaknesses of ESMA 
Even though ESMA’s competence in supervising investment conduct could be 
found in the Treaties, the extant decision-making structure of ESMA might still be 
ill-suited to function as a competent supervisor. Two loopholes of ESMA’s 
decision-making structure are noteworthy here: i.e., independence and accountability.274 
First, in the absence of enough independence, the enforcement of an agency’s 
powers may be, potentially, cumbersome, inefficient and likely to exacerbate tension 
between the EU institutions and ESMA. 275  As mentioned above, 276  ESMA’s 
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supervisory powers are largely controlled by the Commission, whose traditional role in 
financial markets is to initiate policies, propose legislation and adopt delegated rules, and, 
thus, has no enough experience with the operational business of supervision.277 The 
involvement of the Commission would particularly undermine the effectiveness and 
independence of ESMA’s tasks of supervision.278 Moreover, the Council and the 
Parliament also have a limited role in relation to emergency situations. 279  The 
cumbersome interaction between EU institutions and agencies may cause an uncertainty 
in the functioning of ESMA.280 There is, as a result, a need to ‘de-politicise’ ESMA’s 
policy making,281 and to focus on making the system work to achieve its real goals. 
Second, ESMA is ‘not directly democratically accountable’,282 but, for the well 
function of European agencies, the accountability is urgently needed.283 Increasing the 
direct powers of ESMA should be balanced by appropriate accountability requirements, 
because it is a shift of supervisory powers from Member States to the EU.284 Given that 
accountability and independence can and do co-exist,285 it is possible to enhance 
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ESMA’s accountability and independence at the same time. The CJEU provides a good 
explanation:  
‘[t]hat principle [of democracy] […] requires that the administration be 
subject to the instructions of the government which is accountable to its 
parliament.286 […] That principle [of democracy] does not preclude the existence 
of public authorities outside the classic hierarchical administration and more or less 
independent of the government.287 […] In view of the foregoing, conferring a 
status independent of the general administration on the supervisory authorities 
responsible […] does not in itself deprive those authorities of their democratic 
legitimacy.’288 
Since that (i) democracy is a founding principle of EU law289 and (ii) the 
democratic legitimation is an underpinning of the Meroni doctrine,290 it remains to be 
seen to what extent the Meroni-light principles established by Case C-270/12 will need to 
accommodate democratic legitimacy concerns.291 
																																																																																																																																																													
Masters: Independence and Accountability in Theory’ in Donato Masciandaro and Marc Quintyn (eds), 
Designing Financial Supervision Institutions: Independence, Accountability and Governance (Edward Elgar, 2007), at 
14–20; Madalina Busuioc, ‘Accountability, Control and Independence: The Case of European Agencies’ 
(2009) 15 European Law Journal 599, at 614; Miroslava Scholten, ‘‘Independent, Hence Unaccountable’? 
The Need for a Broader Debate on Accountability of the Executive’ (2011) 4 Review of European 
Administrative Law 5, at 42–43.  For a comprehensive analysis of independence and accountability: see 
Madalina Busuioc and Martijn Groenleer, ‘The Theory and Practice of EU Agency Autonomy and 
Accountability: Early Day Expectations, Today's Realities and Future Perspectives’ in Michelle Everson, 
Cosimo Monda and Ellen Vos (eds), EU Agencies in between Institutions and Member States (Kluwer Law 
International, 2014), at 201–228. 
286 CJEU, Case C-518/07, Commission v Germany, [2010] ECR I-1885, para. 40. 
287 Ibid, para. 42. 
288 Ibid, para. 46. 
289 Article 10 of the TEU. 
290 Jens-Peter  Schneider, ‘A Common Framework for Decentralized EU Agencies and the Meroni 
Doctrine’ (2009) 61 Administrative Law Review 29, at 37–40. 
291 Heikki Marjosola, ‘Bridging the Constitutional Gap in EU Executive Rule-Making: The Court of 
Justice Approves Legislative Conferral of Intervention Powers to European Securities Markets Authority’ 
(2014) 10 European Constitutional Law Review 500, at 516; Miroslava Scholten and Marloes van Rijsbergen, 
Chapter III Competence Allocation of Investment Conduct Regulation 
in the EU—Supervisory System 
 120 
In the light of the foregoing discussion, in order to pay the price of 
constitutionality, ESMA has significant institutional weaknesses if in relation to its 
supervisory powers. Due to the acknowledgement of this, the Commission, on 21st 
March, 2017, published a consultation paper to review (i) the tasks and powers, (ii) the 
governance, (iii) the supervisory structure and (iv) funding of ESAs.292 In terms of the 
independence issue, it is undeniable that a reform for keeping an arm’s length between 
ESMA’s operation and the EU institutions might offer two advantages: (i) increasing the 
transparency of the decision-making system; and (ii) reducing the risk of undue political 
interference on technical decisions.293 Yet, it is not yet certain how the independence of 
ESMA could be achieved in balance with the constitutionality issue of EU agencies. 
Further clarification from the CJEU is needed for any further significant reform of 
ESMA’s institutional arrangements. With regard to the accountability issue, some argue 
the democratic legitimacy issue might be resolved by enhanced political accountability 
within the decision-making structure of ESMA,294 but a particular difficulty of political 
accountability in here is: there are different representations of interests at the EU level 
in the political triangle, so accountability mechanisms must be designed complexly to 
link oversights by the Commission, the Parliament and the Council.295 Designing such a 
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balanced political accountability system is difficult too. Therefore, the judicial 
accountability might be a good focus of further reforms on ESMA. A feasible option, 
from the perspective of the judicial accountability, is to design a sound judicial guarantee 
of its decision-making procedures (for example, the judicial review of ESMA’s 
decision-making process),296 given the fact that the judicial review of ESMA’s decisions 
has been established,297  
4.3. Divergent Supervisory ‘Cultures’ of NCAs 
Officially, the role of ESMA is just to improve a sound, effective and consistent 
level of supervision in the EU,298 so NCAs continue to play a major role in supervising 
investment conduct. Under such circumstances, ‘cultures’ of supervision, which 
encompass a wider range of factors, are always divergent in Member States.299 This is 
due to the reasons that (i) NCAs’ powers retained by governments are different; (ii) 
ways of using powers by NCAs are contrasting; and (iii) the nature of state-society 
relations and the aims of governments are dissimilar.300 In 2009, CESR first published a 
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report about the supervision of MiFID I,301 pointing out the inconsistent supervision of 
investment conduct among Member States.302 In December, 2014, ESMA published a 
peer review report, including updated information of how NCAs implement MiFID I’s 
investment conduct rules on providing ‘fair, clear and not misleading information’ to 
clients.303 Albeit this report does not include some information requirements (such as, 
on-going reporting, post-sales communications and execution of orders) and does not 
cover the provision of personalised advice including portfolio management,304 it proves 
that the tension of the home/host Member State divide still exists after the introduction 
of ESMA. Another peer review, on ‘best execution’ was published in February, 2015,305 
reveals that the level of implementation of the best execution provisions, as well the 
level of convergence in NCAs, are still relatively low.306 Furthermore, the peer review 
on ‘suitability’ requirements, published in April, 2016, also shows varied methods that 
NCAs use to supervise the firms in their jurisdictions.307 As Steven Maijoor, the Chair 
of ESMA, admits, the objective of supervisory convergence in the EU might be hard to 
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succeed entirely by the current network-based system, according to the effort made after 
the financial crisis. 308  Divergences of supervisory cultures, on top of different 
supervisory structures and conflicting supervisory biases, explain the real constraints on 
achieving this objective.309 
 Different Supervisory Structures 4.3.1.
Although ESFS is built on a sector-based model, 310  NCAs have different 
supervisory structures. There are several sectoral schemes in Member States, with 
substantial differences in the powers granted to national supervisors: some Member 
States have an integrated single supervisor model (such as, Germany, Denmark and 
Austria); several Member States maintain a ‘two-pillars’ (such as, Croatia, Bulgaria and 
Luxembourg) or ‘three-pillars’ model (such as, Italy, Spain and Greece) following the 
institutional basis; and other Member States embrace the ‘twin-peaks’ model (such as, 
the UK, France and Netherlands).311 More specifically, a specific unit or task force has 
been established in some Member States (for instance, in Bulgaria, Greece and Poland), 
while in most Member States (for instance, in the UK, France, Netherlands, Germany, 
Italy and Spain) more than one unit is involved in supervision of MiFID’s provisions.312 
Obviously, supervisory powers of NCAs on investment conduct are not the same in 
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different units in different Member States. These different arrangements, to a certain 
extent, are seem to reflect the different dimensions of the local markets,313 but it is 
inevitable that inter-NCAs co-ordination issues could arise from the existence of a 
polarised field of supervisory architectures.314 
In fact, despite the possibility that two NCAs are under the same sectoral scheme, 
they still differ greatly in terms of standards, procedures or even quality of supervisory 
practice. For example, even if the UK and Germany had similar single-supervisor-model 
NCAs (namely, FSA315 and BaFin) during the period of 2002–04, empirical research still 
reveals large differences in the frequency and severity of administrative sanctions 
between the UK and Germany.316 This is, particularly, the case in the practice of 
investment conduct supervision in the EU: first, there are divergent practices in relation 
to how NCAs take enforcement actions (whether pecuniary or non-pecuniary);317 
second, the type and frequency of periodic reporting by investment firms, the 
parameters triggering alerts to identify the risks and prioritise actions, the frequency and 
scope of on-site inspections and thematic reviews are significantly different between 
NCAs;318 and, third, the different use of audit reports are detected, in particular certain 
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NCAs use their supervision reports prepared by external auditors.319 In the light of the 
different supervisory structures between Member States, it may be nearly impossible to 
require NCAs to have the same reaction and take the same measures when facing the 
same situation.  
 Conflicting Supervisory Biases 4.3.2.
In extreme cases, even if the supervisory structures of NCAs are identical, there is 
no guarantee that NCAs’ behaviour will be exactly the same. This is because NCAs, 
which are operated by human beings, having their own ‘preferences’ or even ‘biases’. 
Specifically, three typical biases have been identified in the internal market in the wake 
of financial crisis: namely, (i) the national bias, (ii) the home Member State’s bias, and (iii) 
the host Member State’s bias. 
First, due to the national bias, pan-EU risks are not considered sufficiently by 
NCAs. Negative externalities will not be taken into account sufficiently if NCAs are 
accountable only to their own jurisdiction in the EU’s cross-border market.320 This is 
because ‘national views rather than the EU-wide interests’ dominate the decision 
making process of NCAs.321 Overlapping and even conflicting lines between the 
national accountability and the ‘European accountability’ exist as an intrinsic handicap 
of NCAs in dealing with cross-border issues. 322  From this viewpoint, ESMA’s 
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independence requirement on the Board of Supervisors requiring a sole consideration of 
the EU’s interests323 may be seem at odds with the role of NCAs: it is almost 
impossible to require the Members of the Board of Supervisors (i.e. NCAs who are first 
and only accountable at the national level) to act in the European interests when making 
co-decision in ESMA.324 Under such a condition, ESMA’s capability may also be 
limited by the national biases, because ESMA’s information and part of its funding are 
obtained from NCAs.325 Indeed, the national bias might be serious in cross-border 
transactions. However, what we have to ask is the definition of ‘public interest’326 of the 
EU, which is an obscure and controversial question. There is no guarantee that 
European public interests could be judged by ESMA easily either.327 Therefore, an 
option that may be considered is either: (i) to establish a rotation system of the Board of 
Supervisors, or (ii) to compose it with independent members that are not affiliated to 
Member States.328 
Second, NCAs of home Member States, because of the home Member State’s bias, 
seldom take account of host Member States’ interests. Since they do not bear the costs 
of a crisis in other countries, NCAs of home Member State have few incentives to fully 
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internalise host Member States’ stability risks. 329  Therefore, a country-by-country 
system will create a series of supervisory gaps in the European cross-border 
market—namely, ‘scarce supervisory resources are expended in a discriminatory way, 
with disproportionately less being devoted to extraterritorial supervision’.330 This is a 
reasonable outcome that can be expected, given the political accountability and technical 
difficulties of home Member States’ supervisors in the current system. 
Third, even though the NCAs of home Member States are willing to supervise 
cross-border transactions, co-operation between home and host Member States may still 
be constrained by the host Member State’s bias. This is because NCAs of host Member 
States, more or less, have to respond to national interests in their countries, and this 
might induce them to adopt a protectionist stance.331 Provided that the NCAs of host 
Member States do not have the ultimate responsibility of supervising these cross-border 
firms, they might be reluctant to provide assistance that home Member States need.332 
One even worse possibility is: the NCAs of host Member States may have incentives to 
misreport information in order to obtain a preferable outcome during the crisis.333 
Given the co-existence of the conflicting supervisory biases between Member States, it 
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is again proved the unattainable goal of the comprehensive supervisory convergence. 
4.4. Inevitability of A Single Investment Conduct Supervisor? 
Given the aforementioned challenges, the current supervisory system in the EU is 
often condemned by big participants (cross-border investment firms) as a cause of 
considerable costs and inefficiency, followed by a plea for building a single supervisor 
with real powers at the EU level in order to harmonise different national supervisory 
practices.334 This voice, in fact, gets even louder after the launch of CMU.335 However, 
as the Commission admitted:  
‘[s]ome of these divergences [of national approaches and practices] are 
warranted to accommodate national specificities, while others are rather due to 
different interpretations of the underlying principles, leading to situations where 
rules overlap or contain inconsistent legal requirements.’336  
Not all Member States appreciate EU agencies in the same manner, so more 
competences transferred to the EU level might even disturb the network and balance of 
powers between the EU and Member States.337 Here, imposing a uniform conduct 
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supervisory strategy at the EU level may seriously jeopardise the regulatory objective 
(namely, ensuring a high level of investor protection) pursued by the MiFID regime.338 
Divergences of national supervisory practices do not necessarily mean that the current 
network-based system of investment conduct supervision in the EU is either bad or 
good.339 
Indeed, any big European fix in the CMU might be contentious.340 For example, 
the issue about different levels of investor protection caused by divergent national 
supervisory cultures is considered by the Green Paper of CMU.341 A relevant question, 
‘Do you think that the powers of the ESAs [ESMA] to ensure consistent supervision are 
sufficient? What additional measures relating to EU level supervision would materially 
contribute to developing a capital markets union?’,342 is then asked. In response, most 
governments and industry associations consider ESMA’s current powers as sufficient,343 
so ESMA, in the early stages of CMU, will need to fully use its current tools with a 
strategy to strengthen supervisory convergence and consistent implementation of the 
EU law.344 On the contrary, in the Commission’s CMU communication, it admits that, 
in some areas where it can bring benefits in the CMU, further reforms to reinforce ‘the 
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European dimension of supervision’ will be needed.345 The European Investment Bank 
(‘EIB’) and the ECB both suggest that a single capital markets supervisor should be 
established in the long term.346 The five Presidents’ Report also indicates that the CMU 
should ultimately lead to a single European capital markets supervisor.347 In this sense, 
the plan of CMU perhaps is a first political step towards the establishment of a single 
supervisor in the European capital markets, after the successful precedent of building 
the SSM within the EBU.348 However, what we have to ask is whether the CMU will 
really make a single supervisor in charge of investment conduct inevitable, as the SSM 
within the EBU? 
 Concluding Remarks 5.
This chapter has engaged in a deep analysis of the extant EU supervisory system 
and relative issues of investment conduct supervision. Given the tension caused by the 
home/host divide of supervisory competence between NCAs in cross-border 
transactions, ESMA was set up as a supervisor of supervisors and empowered with 
some hard powers and direct supervisory powers. It is also important to emphasise that 
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more and more direct supervisory powers are conferred to ESMA, whether by sectoral 
legislation and ESMA Regulation. Nevertheless, as an EU agency, ESMA’s powers are 
restricted by the EU Treaties, not to mention the intrinsic institutional weaknesses of 
ESMA. To date, officially, the competence of investment conduct supervision in the 
EU is still left to NCAs, and the divergent supervisory cultures cause inconsistent and 
different practice among Member States. ‘Big’ firms often condemn that the divergent 
supervisory cultures bring significant costs in cross-border transactions, followed by a 
plea for building a single supervisor in charge of investment conduct supervision in the 
CMU. 
However, we should not blindly believe there is a standard path towards the 
European Single Market, i.e., starting from the establishment of a Single Passport, 
bypassing the setting up of a Single Rulebook and reaching the installation of a single 
supervisor at the end. Although the Single Passport and the Single Rulebook are in place 
in the European investment conduct regulation,349 there is no model answer after such 
development. The single supervisor is not an inevitable next step in the CMU. In other 
words, what we have to ask is whether a planned reform, in this case the installation of a 
single supervisor in charge of investment conduct supervision in the CMU, will really 
bring a better outcome than the current system? The EU should consider carefully 
about the options between building up a centralised single supervisor and upgrading the 
current system to meet the expanded needs of a true CMU.350 
																																																								
349 See further in Sections 2 and 3 of CHAPTER II (pp. 17–61). 
350 As the Commission said, financial integration will need to be accompanied by (1) increased focus on 
achieving supervisory convergence, or (2) necessary adjustments to strengthen the supervisory powers at 
the EU level. See European Commission, Public Consultation on The Capital Markets Union Mid-Term 
Review, January, 2017), at 18, available at: 
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TRANSACTION COST APPROACH OF  
INVESTMENT CONDUCT GOVERNANCE  
‘Economists studying business and industrial organization have 
long recognised the inadequacy of the neoclassical view of the 
firm and have developed richer paradigms and models based on 
the concepts of various kinds of transaction costs. Policy analysis 
also stands to benefit from such an approach, opening the black 
box and examining the actual workings of the mechanism inside.’1 
 Introduction 1.
In order to examine whether the installation of a single supervisor in charge of 
investment conduct supervision in the CMU will really bring a better outcome than the 
current network-based system, it is necessary to build consolidated theoretical 
foundations for the institutional comparison. Given this, a ‘transaction cost’ approach 
to investment conduct governance derived from the findings of the TCE, will be 
explored in detail in this chapter. In essence, the TCE has two major propositions: (i) 
institutional governance matters in relation to the economic structure; and (ii) the 
determinants of institutional governance can be explained and understood by the tools 
of economic theory.2 By incorporating a broader sense of institutional governance 
within the TCE, market discipline, administrative regulation and private law systems all 
																																																								
1 Avinash K. Dixit, The Making of Economic Policy: A Transaction-Cost Politics Perspective (The MIT Press, 
1996), at 9. 
2 R. C. O. Matthews, ‘The Economics of Institutions and the Sources of Growth’ (1986) 96 Economic 
Journal 903, at 903. 
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become one type of ‘investment conduct governance’. 3  Also, based on the 
organisational failures framework set by the TCE, no type of investment conduct 
governance is flawless, namely, the impossibility of a zero-transaction-cost world.4 The 
purpose of this chapter, thus, is threefold: first, to highlight the strengths and 
shortcomings of the different types of investment conduct governance; second, to 
establish a model for selecting optimum investment conduct governance; and, third, to 
explain how investment conduct governance changes and persists. In the light of this, 
the research question could be answered by an institutional comparison on the basis of 
the transaction cost approach. 
The remainder of this chapter is in five sections. Section 2 provides a 
comprehensive literature review of the transaction cost approach of governance, in 
respect of its history, framework, methodology and the limits and implications of this 
approach. Section 3 moves on to apply the transaction cost approach to examining 
three major types of investment conduct governance (i.e., market discipline, 
administrative regulation and private law systems). The theoretic frameworks of 
institutional selection and of institutional change in investment conduct governance are 
then established in Sections 4 and 5 respectively. The final section, Section 6, 
summarises the findings of this chapter which will be applied to the institutional 
comparison in the following chapters. 
  
																																																								
3 See further in Section 2.3 below (pp. 142–144). 
4 See further in Section 2.2 below (pp. 137–142). 
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 Transaction Cost Approach of Governance 2.
2.1. Emergence of Transaction Cost Economics 
Ronald Coase, who was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1991, argues 
that the operation of a market to allocate resources costs ‘something’, and certain costs 
of markets are saved by forming an organisation and allowing some authorities to direct 
the resources5—in particular, some transactions are better managed via a hierarchy 
within a firm, rather than by a market, because the firm could reduce the costs of using 
the price mechanism of the market greatly.6 However, since the costs of organising 
additional transactions within the firm may be higher than the costs of the market 
mechanism, a balanced point must be reached where the costs of organising an extra 
transaction within the firm becomes equal to the costs of carrying out the same 
transaction by means of an exchange on the open market, or the costs of organising in 
another firm.7 Due to this landmark framework, the term ‘transaction cost’ is frequently 
thought to have been coined by Coase,8 who indicates that transaction costs are the 
sole barrier to economic efficiency.9 The TCE then becomes most widely known as one 
important theory of the New Institutional Economics (‘NIE’),10 and is systematised by 
																																																								
5 Ronald H. Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937) 4 Economica 386, at 392. 
6 Ibid, at 390–391. 
7 Ibid, at 396–397. 
8 Ibid, at 390: ‘there is a cost of using the price mechanism’; Ronald H. Coase, ‘The Problem of Social 
Cost’ (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1, at 15: ‘[i]n order to carry out a market transaction it is 
necessary to discover who it is that one deals with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what 
terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up a contract, to undertake the inspection 
needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, and soon.’ 
9 Ronald H. Coase, The Firm, The Market, and The Law (University of Chicago Press, 1988), at 157–158, 
174–179.   
10 The term ‘NIE’ was coined by Oliver Williamson in 1975. Professor Williamson defines that NIE has 
two common consensuses: (i) the current ‘micro-theory [in economics] […] operates at too high a level of 
abstraction to permit many microeconomic phenomena to be addressed in an uncontrived way’; and (ii) 
‘the study of “transactions” […] is a core matter and deserves renewed attention’. See Oliver E. 
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Oliver Williamson (a Nobel Prize laureate in Economics in 2009).11 
In the TCE, transactions are the basic and ultimate unit of analysis,12 where a 
transaction is said to occur ‘when a good or service is transferred across a 
technologically separable interface’.13 Then, what are transaction costs? Since there is no 
precise answer of this question, the ‘bad name’ of ‘transaction costs’ is criticised as a 
theoretical device that ‘almost anything can be rationalised by invoking suitably specified 
transaction costs’.14 Williamson also admits that the broad, elastic and plausible concept 
of transaction costs is a ‘grave problem’.15 However, there is a strong response to this 
critique: although a clear definition of transaction costs does not exist, neither are the 
‘costs of production’ in the Neoclassical Economics well defined.16 Kenneth Arrow, the 
youngest laureate of the Nobel Prize in Economics, defines ‘transaction costs’ as ‘costs 
of running the economic system’.17 This definition includes the costs ‘establishing’ and 
‘maintaining’ property rights which are the ability to freely exercise a choice over a good 
or service.18 ‘Anything that impedes the specification, monitoring, or enforcement of an 
economic transaction is a transaction cost’.19 Generally, scholars of the NIE apply a 
																																																																																																																																																													
Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (Free Press, 1975), footnote 1 of page 
1. 
11 See Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (Free Press, 1985).  
12 John Rogers Commons, Institutional Economics: Its Place in Political Economy (The Macmillan Company, 
1934), at 4. 
13 Oliver E. Williamson, ‘The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach’ (1981) 87 
American Journal of Sociology 548, at 552. 
14 Stanley Fischer, ‘Long-Term Contracting, Sticky Prices, and Monetary Policy: A Comment’ (1977) 3 
Journal of Monetary Economics 317, footnote 5 of page 322. 
15 Oliver E. Williamson, ‘Hierarchies, Markets and Power in the Economy: An Economic Perspective’ 
(1995) 4 Industrial and Corporate Change 21, at 33. 
16 Eggertsson Thráinn, Economic Behavior and Institutions (Cambridge University Press, 1990), at 14. 
17 Kenneth J. Arrow, ‘The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market 
versus Nonmarket Allocation’ in Joint Economic Committee (ed), The Analysis and Evaluation of Public 
Expenditure: the PPB System, vol 1 (US Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1969), at 48. 
18 Douglas W. Allen, ‘What are Transaction Costs?’ (1991) 14 Research in Law and Economics 1, at 1–18. 
19 A. K. Dixit, above note 1, at 38. 
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comprehensive definition of transaction costs. For example, Barzel defines ‘transaction 
costs’ as ‘the costs associated with the transfer, capture and protection of rights’.20 
Furubotn and Richter mention that ‘transaction costs include the costs of resources 
utilised for the creation, maintenance, use, change, and so on of institutions and 
organisations.’ 21 This is because simply analysing the costs involved with market 
transactions will underestimate the total transaction costs, in particular government (or 
even legal systems) is also involved in definition or reallocation of property rights that 
enables private trade.22 Therefore, transaction costs have a broad nature and this nature 
would depend on the institutions of a country—the legal system (property rights and 
their enforcement), the political system, the educational system, and the culture.23 Albeit 
this broad definition may make it difficult to measure transaction costs precisely, it is 
still possible to measure them by a qualitative way if we know what would cause 
transaction costs. 
2.2. From Market Failures, Government Failures to Organisational 
Failures 
Traditionally, in case of ‘market failures’, where Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’24 
does not work, the government should intervene in the market as the ‘helping hand’ for 
																																																								
20 Yoram Barzel, Economic Analysis of Property Rights (2nd edn, Combridge University Press, 1997), at 4. 
21 Eirik Grundtvig Furubotn and Rudolf Richter, Institutions and Economic Theory: the Contribution of the New 
Institutional Economics (2nd edn, University of Michigan Press, 2005), at 48. 
22 Laura McCann et al, ‘Transaction Cost Measurement for Evaluating Environmental Policies’ (2005) 52 
Ecological Economics 527, at 530 
23 Ronald H. Coase, ‘The Task of the Society’ (1999) 2 ISNIE Newsletter 1, at 4. 
24 This term was coined by Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations (originally published in 1776), at 293. 
According to Smith, markets work automatically, as it directed by an invisible hand, to promote economic 
efficiency and maximise individual welfare of participants in a market economy: see Adam Smith, An 
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of The Wealth of Nations (Harriman House, 2007), at xiv–xvi. 
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‘public interest’.25 The normative theories of regulation are principally based on the 
welfare economics of Pigou.26 Although regulation can never satisfy the Pareto test27 
(which ‘is a “no-one-is-harmed” situation where all parties benefit, or none are harmed, 
by a reallocation of resources, goods, assets, or a change in the law’28), there is a good 
chance that there will be the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency,29 as a ‘second best’30 solution—a 
new state under regulation is better than the current state without regulation, if those 
who gain from the new state gain enough to compensate those who lose.31 It is 
important to note the normative view on regulation has two important assumptions: (i) 
there are significant market failures, and (ii) the government has incentives and 
capabilities to ameliorate these market failures.32 However, these two assumptions are 
strongly debatable. 
First, if transaction costs go to zero, resource allocation will approach efficiency 
automatically.33 Therefore, as Arrow observed, ‘market failure is not absolute; it is 
better to consider a broader category, that of transaction costs, which in general impede 
																																																								
25 Andrei Shleifer, ‘Understanding Regulation’ (2005) 11 European Financial Management 439, at 440. 
26 See generally Arthur C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (4th edn, London: Macmillan, 1932). 
27 See further in James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of 
Constitutional Democracy (University of Michigan Press, 1965), paras. 3.7.12–3.7.19; 3.12.2–3.12.6. 
28 Francesco Parisi, The Language of Law and Economics: A Dictionary (Cambridge University Press, 2013), at 
215. 
29 Kaldor Nicholas, ‘Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility’ (1939) 
49 The Economic Journal 549, at 549–552; J. R. Hicks, ‘The Foundations of Welfare Economics’ (1939) 49 
The Economic Journal 696, at 696–712. 
30 R. G. Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster, ‘The General Theory of Second Best’ (1956) 24 The Review of 
Economic Studies 11, at 11–17. 
31 Herbert Hovenkamp, ‘Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice’ (1990) 57 The University of Chicago 
Law Review 63, at 64–67. 
32 Roger G. Noll, ‘Economic Perspectives on the Politics of Regulation’ in Richard Schmalensee and 
Robert D. Willig (eds), Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol 2 (North-Holland, 1989), at 1255–1262. Dr. 
Hantke-Domas provides a very clear diagram to clarify the normative theories of regulation: see Michael 
Hantke-Domas, ‘The Public Interest Theory of Regulation: Non-Existence or Misinterpretation?’ 15 
European Journal of Law and Economics 165, at 189.  
33 George Joseph Stigler, The Theory of Price (4th edn, Macmillan, 1987), at 117–120. 
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and in particular cases completely block the formation of markets’.34 Market failures 
should be seen as ‘failures only in a limited sense that they involve transaction costs’ and 
‘can be attenuated by substituting organisations for market exchange’,35 where ‘the 
existence of the market is no longer worthwhile’.36 In this sense, every ‘market failure’ 
just provides a profit opportunity to choose a governance mechanism that minimises 
transaction costs.37 Second, principal-agent problems also exist between regulators and 
taxpayers,38 while the normative theories seldom consider this issue.39 The positive 
theories of regulation strongly challenge the assumption that public agencies are 
benevolent and have incentives and capabilities to cure market failures.40 As Coase 
mentioned, ‘we find a category “market failure” but no category “government failure”’,41 
which represents ‘a concept referring to substantial imperfection in government 
performance’.42 Government is the same as a market—it may fail (and often does).43 
 Given this, the TCE applies a new framework to understand the causes of 
																																																								
34 K. J. Arrow, above note 17, at 48. 
35 Oliver E. Williamson, ‘The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations’ (1971) 
61 The American Economic Review 112, at 114. 
36 K. J. Arrow, above note 17, at 70. 
37 D. Bruce Johnsen, Transaction Cost-Benefit Analysis, with Applications to Financial Regulation (George Mason 
University School of Law Working Papers, 2013), at 4. 
38 R. G. Noll, above note 32, at 1277–1281. 
39 Richard J. Herring and Reinhard H. Schmidt, ‘The Economic Rationale for Financial Regulation 
Reconsidered: An Essay in Honour of David Llewellyn’ in Christopher J. Green, Eric J. Pentecost and 
Thomas G. Weyman-Jones (eds), The Financial Crisis and the Regulation of Finance (Edward Elgar, 2011), at 
70. 
40 See further in Section 3.2.2 below (pp. 155–157). For general information with regard to the debate 
between the normative and positive views of regulation: see Anthony Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and 
Economic Theory (Hart Publishing 2004), part II; W. Kip Viscusi, Joseph Emmett Harrington and John M. 
Vernon, Economics of Regulation and Antitrust (4th edn, The MIT Press, 2005), at 378–379; Cento 
Veljanovski, ‘Economic Approaches to Regulation’ in Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and Martin Lodge 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2010), at 17–19. 
41 Ronald H. Coase, ‘The Regulated Industries—Discussion’ (1964) 54 The American Economic Review 192, 
at 195. 
42 Barak Orbach, ‘What Is Government Failure?’ (2012) 30 Yale Journal on Regulation Online 44, at 56. 
43 Professor Schuck gives a comprehensive analysis to explain why ‘government failure’ is so often: see 
Peter H. Schuck, Why Government Fails So Often: And How It Can Do Better (Princeton University Press 
2014), Part 2. 
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transaction costs, namely, ‘organisational failures’.44 Since organisations include political 
bodies (political parties, regulatory agencies, etc.), economic bodies (firms, trade unions, 
etc.), social bodies (churches, associations, etc.), educational bodies (schools, universities, 
etc.),45 organisational failures are not peculiar to market, firms, regulatory agencies or 
government. As shown by Figure IV-1 below, the organisational failures occur when 
environmental factors and human factors interact, corresponding to the objective and 
subjective dimensions of costs respectively.46 
 
Figure IV-1: Organisational Failures Framework47 
‘Uncertainty/complexity’ and ‘small numbers’ are two environmental factors of the 
organisational failures framework. A situation with uncertainty/complexity is very costly, 
perhaps impossible, to describe the complete decision tree.48 A famous issue in the 
																																																								
44 O. E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, above note 10, Ch. 2. 
45 Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge University Press, 
1990), at 5. 
46 James M. Buchanan, Cost and Choice: An Inquiry in Economic Theory (Markham Publishing, 1969), at 47–
50. 
47 O. E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, above note 10, at 40. 
48 Ibid, at 23. There is a slight difference between uncertainty and complexity: in an uncertain condition, 
people would make final decision on the basis of limited information, while people would try to acquire 
more acknowledge before a final decision is made in a complex condition. See further in Sushil 
Bikhchandani, Jack Hirshleifer and John G. Riley, The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information (2nd edn, 
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Neoclassical Economics, information asymmetries, focuses on this factor.49 In terms of 
the small-number issue, it is ‘fundamentally transferred’50 from the degree of asset 
specificity in an exchange relationship (or the degree to which assets are specifically 
designed or located for a particular use or user), since the higher degree would decrease 
the number of potential trading partners.51 Essentially, the small-number issue relates 
closely to the research of monopoly/oligopoly in the Neoclassical Economics. 52 
Moreover, one extremely important point highlighted by Williamson is that ‘unless 
joined by the human factors, such environmental conditions need not impede market 
exchange’.53 Therefore, market failures based on the Neoclassical Economics only see 
problems partially. Much more attention should be paid to other two human factors 
within the organisational failures framework, namely, ‘opportunism’ and ‘bounded 
rationality’. The former is defined as ‘self-interest seeking with guile’,54 as the ‘human 
nature as we know’.55 The latter is, in a sense, that ‘human behaviour is intendedly 
rational, but only boundedly so’.56 The rationality of human behaviour may be limited 
by motivational causes.57 On the whole, this framework could not only be used to 
explain and examine the causes of transaction costs, but also offer potential for 
extending the traditional market failures’ framework to encompass a broader 
																																																								
49 O. E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, above note 10, at 31–33. 
50 O. E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, above note 11, at 61–63. 
51 Ibid, at 52–56. 
52 O. E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, above note 10, at 28–29. 
53 Ibid, at 9. 
54 Oliver E. Williamson, ‘Opportunism and its Critics’ (1993) 14 Managerial and Decision Economics 97, at 
97. 
55 Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (Houghton Mifflin Co., 1921), at 271. 
56 Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior (4th edn, Free Press, 1997), at 88. 
57 Reinhard Selten, ‘Bounded Rationality’ (1990) 146 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 649, at 
651–653. 
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institutional analysis of public policies.58 The ‘black box’ of organisations is now 
opened.59 
2.3. Comparative Institutional Analysis of Governance Structures 
On the basis of its deeper analysis of organisations, the TCE further matches 
different types of transactions with alternative governance structures,60 with an aim to 
explore within what kinds of governance a transaction will be secured at least cost.61 
However, given transaction costs are often difficult to be quantified, transaction costs 
are always assessed in a ‘comparative institutional way’, a qualitative way.62 In other 
words, instead of measuring a precise quantity, the transaction cost approach is a 
comparative institutional analysis to examine ‘comparative [transaction] costs of 
planning, adapting, and monitoring tasks completion under alternative governance 
structures’.63  
Governance structures are defined by Williamson as ‘the institutional matrix within 
which transactions are negotiated and executed’.64 Governance structures aim to: (i) 
‘regulate the multi-person relationship over time’, (ii) ‘determine adjustment to factors 
arising in the course of the relationship’, and (iii) ‘promote orderliness and cooperation 
																																																								
58 John M. Bryson, ‘The Policy Process and Organizational Form’ (1984) 12 Policy Studies Journal 445, at 
459–460. 
59 Claude Ménard, ‘Inside the Black Box: The Variety of Hierarchical Forms’ in John Groenewegen (ed), 
Transaction Cost Economics and Beyond (Kluwer, 1996), at 149–170. 
60 Martin Currie, and Marcello Messori, ‘New Institutional and New Keynesian Economics’ in Richard 
Arena and Christian Longhi (eds), Markets and Organization (Springer, 1998), at 175. 
61 Stephan Voight and Hella Engerer, ‘Institutions and Transition – Possible Policy Implications of the 
New Institutional Economics’ in Klaus F. Zimmermann (ed), Frontiers in Economics (Springer, 2002), at 
128–129. 
62 O. E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, above note 11, at 22; Michael Dietrich, 
Transaction Cost Economics and Beyond: Towards A New Economics of the Firm (Routledge, 1994), at 20. 
63 Oliver E. Williamson, ‘The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes’ (1981) 19 Journal of 
Economic Literature 1537, at 1544. 
64 Oliver E. Williamson, ‘Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations’ (1979) 
22 Journal of Law and Economics 233, at 239. 
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in the on-going relationships’.65 Therefore, ‘administered contracts’, which involve 
intervention from public agencies to provide long-term administrative supports, could 
be regarded as one kind of governance to tackle the hazards inherently unable to be 
remedied by most private alternatives.66 Government, like ‘a super-firm’, is ‘able to 
influence the use of factors of production by administrative decisions’,67 which may 
reduce transaction costs from the price mechanism greatly.68 Also, ‘regulation, in some 
form, is immanent from those in which market modes can be made to work relatively 
well’,69 so regulation, in this case, emerges as a governance structure for tackling 
contracting problems in the market.70 Based on this understanding, regulation, together 
with government or other public institutions, arise as transaction-cost-minimising 
responses to govern certain economic activities.71 
However, as mentioned by the organisational failures’ framework, the 
administrative machine is not costless, and even, on occasions, is extremely costly.72 
Therefore, Dixit incorporates the organisational failures framework to analyse 
transaction costs of political organisations.73 Williamson also extends the institutional 
spectrum of the TCE to encompass the role of public bureaucracy, admitting the costs 
																																																								
65 Barry H. Spicer and Van Ballew, ‘Management Accounting Systems and the Economics of Internal 
Organization’ (1983) 8 Accounting, Organizations and Society 73, at 75. 
66 Victor P. Goldberg, ‘Regulation and Administered Contracts’ (1976) 7 The Bell Journal of Economics 426, 
at 427–430. 
67 R. H. Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, above note 8, at 17. 
68 Ibid, at 17. 
69 Oliver E. Williamson, ‘Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies-in General and with Respect to 
CATV’ (1976) 7 The Bell Journal of Economics 73, at 73. 
70 Brian Levy and Pablo T. Spiller, ‘The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A 
Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation’ (1994) 10 Journal of Law, Economics & 
Organization 201, at 202. 
71 Oliver E. Williamson, ‘Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective’ 
(1999) 15 Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 306, at 334–336. 
72 R. H. Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, above note 8, at 18. 
73 A. K. Dixit, above note 1, at 45–47, 51–56. 
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caused and saved by it.74 Administrative regulation is just one of the ‘candidate modes’ 
of suitable governance,75 so there is no guarantee that it would always be a better choice 
than others. There should be an enquiry into the effects of a whole range of governance 
structures, and the main question would be which governance will actually work in 
practice.76 
2.4. Limits and Implications of Transaction Cost Approach 
Thanks to the above efforts, the notions and methodology of the TCE now are 
increasingly being applied outside the business-related fields,77 and have foundational 
contributions to the study of ‘non-market strategy’.78 Having said that, the TCE itself is 
not without critics, which are almost as large as the TCE literature,79 and obviously 
beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, it is better to point out some weaknesses of an 
efficiency-based analysis for deciding institutional arrangements in government, such as, 
difficulties of comparison and making a choice in political reality. 
First, since public agencies often have multiple or vague objectives and the output 
of government is complex and controversial, some argue that it is difficult to decide 
what is the ‘efficiency/best’ when accommodating considerations of equity and 
																																																								
74 Oliver E. Williamson, ‘Transaction Cost Economics: How it Works: Where it is Headed’ (1998) 146 De 
Economist 23, at 45–47. 
75 O. E. Williamson, ‘Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective’, 
above note 71, at 307. 
76 R. H. Coase, ‘The Regulated Industries—Discussion’, above note 41, at 194–195. 
77 Jeffrey T. Macher and Barak D. Richman, ‘Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of Empirical 
Research in the Social Sciences’ (2008) 10 Business & Politics 1, at 31–38. 
78 Jr Rui J. P. de Figueiredo, ‘Institutions, Politics, and Non-Market Strategy’ (2010) 52 California 
Management Review 123, at 124. 
79 For a brief and comprehensive overview of this: see Nicolai J. Foss and Peter G. Klein, ‘Critiques of 
Transaction Cost Economic: An Overview’ in Peter G. Klein and Michael E. Sykuta (eds), The Elgar 
Companion to Transaction Cost Economics (Edward Elgar, 2010), at 263–272; Geoffrey M. Hodgson, ‘Limits 
of Transaction Cost Analysis’ in Peter G. Klein and Michael E. Sykuta (eds), The Elgar Companion to 
Transaction Cost Economics (Edward Elgar, 2010), at 297–305. 
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accountability into the transaction cost approach.80 In order to respond to this concern, 
Williamson clarifies a ‘remediableness criterion’ of the transaction cost approach: ‘an 
extant mode of organisation for which no superior feasible alternative can be described 
and implemented with expected net gains is presumed to be efficient’.81 Therefore, 
from the normative perspective of the TCE, there is an implication that the current 
system of investment conduct regulation in the EU is ‘presumed to be better’ unless 
benefits of the planned institutional reform can be proven. 
Second, it is argued that the transaction cost approach will ‘have to be modified in 
essential ways’ to deal effectively with public considerations because of the fundamental 
differences between economic and political organisations.82 However, since this is a 
standard challenge to the premises of economic theories, it is not to downplay the 
transaction cost approach, but to highlight this approach should be fitted into other 
areas cautiously.83 In this sense, we should not preclude the application of this fruitful 
economic approach in allocating competences in the EU.84 The outcome of an 
institutional comparison based on the TCE may not be the sole consideration in 
deciding whether investment conduct supervision should be centralised in the CMU, 
but it provides a useful indication. The next section, thus, is going to apply the 
organisational failures framework within the TCE to examining different types of 
																																																								
80 James Q Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies do and Why They Do It (Basic Books, 1989), at 
347–348, 359. 
81 O. E. Williamson, ‘Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective’, 
above note 71, at 316. 
82 Terry M. Moe, ‘The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward A Theory of Public Bureaucracy’ in Oliver E. 
Williamson (ed), Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond (Oxford University Press, 
1990), at 119–127. 
83 Terry M. Moe, ‘The Positive Theory of Public Bureaucracy’ in Dennis C. Mueller (ed), Perspectives on 
Public Choice (Cambridge University Press, 1996), at 476–477. 
84 Andreas Føllesdal, ‘Subsidiarity’ (1998) 6 Journal of Political Philosophy 190, at 206–207. 
Chapter IV Transaction Cost Approach of Investment Conduct Governance 
 146 
investment conduct governance. 
 Application of Transaction Cost Approach to Investment 3.
Conduct Governance 
3.1. Organisational Failures of Market Discipline in Governing 
Investment Conduct  
 Environmental Factors 3.1.1.
The uncertainty/complexity issues between investment firms and their clients are 
significant. This is because investors lack experience and have lower abilities to monitor 
investment firms: they are unable to compare and make a choice about intangible 
financial instruments, not to mention the content of investment services.85 Investment 
services, which are generally described as ‘credence goods’ in economics that buyers can 
never be certain of the quality of the ‘goods’ they have purchased based on ex post 
observations, with the consequence that experts who provide the ‘goods’ have strong 
incentives to cheat buyers.86 In this sense, investment services, as ‘credence goods’, are 
incomparable to many people. Also, this pattern makes it much easier for the general 
public to assess the performance of the whole investment services industry, rather than 
to assess the quality of an individual investment firm.87 
Given the incomparability of investment services, the human-asset specificity of 
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investment firms can be ‘fundamentally transferred’ to the issue of small numbers,88 
causing an incentive between parties to enter a long-term relationship.89 In addition, 
investment firms, intrinsically, have fewer competitors due to the entry/exit 
requirement.90 In combination of the incomparability of investment services and the 
entry/exit requirement of investment firms, this could possibly lead to market powers 
of investment firms.91 Investment firms may abuse their market powers to charge prices 
higher than the level under perfect competition.92 Apparently, the above environmental 
factors (i.e. the uncertainty/complexity and small numbers issues of investment services) 
are unable to cause organisational failures without the interaction of human factors. The 
environmental factors’ influence has been subsumed by the human factors, namely, 
opportunism and bounded rationality.93 The traditional disclosure regime, in this case, 
might not be enough to tackle the problems in this relationship, since it merely focuses 
on environmental factors. 94  A considerably difficult question is how to assure 
investment firms are genuine and are providing advice to their clients, free of conflicts 
and influences,95 so the human factors is the real issue. 
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 Human Factor: Opportunism 3.1.2.
Caused by opportunism, investment firms may exploit their informational 
advantages and other sources of relative powers in investment services markets to affect 
the benefits, risks and costs of the relationship between themselves and their clients.96 
Generally, when an investment firm has more knowledge or power than its client, there 
is a potential for the agent ‘shirking’,97 or even ‘abusing’, its position—principal-agent 
problems happen here98 and cause transaction costs.99 These problems generally could 
be classified into two types: (i) hidden knowledge/adverse selection, which relates to 
difficulties in ascertaining objectively the quality of investment services purchased; and 
(ii) hidden action/moral hazard, which refers to the possibility of investment firms, 
during the contractual relationship, altering certain characteristics of investment services, 
in its own favour and to the detriment of their clients.100 Opportunism may induce 
investment firms to ‘mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or confuse’ information.101 
Furthermore, if misaligning incentives of compensation structures between 
investment firms and their clients, the opportunism issue becomes even worse.102 For 
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example, three types of ‘mis-selling’ are recognised in the wake of the global financial 
crisis of 2008–09: namely, investment firms may (i) misrepresent information; (ii) design 
or promote complex financial products; or (iii) provide non-customised advice, in order 
to gain more commissions or other benefits.103 Inappropriate ‘kick-back’ system, thus, 
may undermine the principal obligation of investment firms to their clients, which is 
unable to be corrected simply by market forces.104 There is an appreciable need for 
regulators’ intervention to prevent abuse of the superior position in this relationship,105 
in particular investors neither expect market participants to defraud them nor have the 
resources or inclination to monitor these participants.106 
 Human Factor: Bounded Rationality 3.1.3.
Based on the behavioural economics, five behavioural factors influence retail 
investors’ choices have been identified in the European capital markets:  
[(i)] cognitive limitations—consumers [retail investors] struggle with even very 
simple investment choices, especially if older or less educated; [(ii)] trust in 
advice—advice is ubiquitous […] and consumers [retail investors] are usually, 
sometimes naively, trusting of advice they receive; [(iii)] attitudes to risk and 
ambiguity—investment choices are strongly influenced by perceived risk in 
investment returns or product complexity; [(iv)] framing effects— 
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cognitively-limited consumers [retail investors] make worse decisions when 
financial instruments are framed in harder-to-understand ways; [and (v)] familiarity 
and other heuristics—in the absence of advice, consumers [retail investors] may 
fall back on other (inappropriate) heuristics when making a choice.’107  
Therefore, the rational assumption of investors may not be held. Furthermore, 
even professional investment firms are also affected by many irrational effects: (i) 
‘endowment effects’, which ‘signify that due to loss aversion people value what they 
own more than what they do not own, in the sense that they demand more money to 
give up an object than they would be prepared to pay to acquire it’; 108  (ii) 
‘procrastination’, which ‘refers to the delay of taking an action, in spite of being aware 
that prompt action would be better’;109 (iii) ‘complex risk assessment’, which indicates 
‘the inability of professional intermediaries to realise’ everything, such as, systemic 
risks;110 (iv) ‘overconfidence’, which proves investment firms ‘tend to be confident in 
their own judgement and rating assessment, even if they did not entirely understand the 
design of financial products’;111 (v) ‘herding’, which is ‘a natural tendency of individuals 
to simplify complex decision taking processes that leads them to just copy decisions of 
others’.112 These biases, to some extent, can guide further reforms on regulatory policies 
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and intervention,113 conferring a ‘debiasing’ job of regulatory intervention in governing 
investment conduct.114 
 Emergence of Administrative Regulation 3.1.4.
As shown by the organisational failures, high performance ambiguity and goal 
incongruence between investment firms and their clients, are very likely to lead an 
‘impersonal hierarchy/public bureaucratic relation’ for reducing transaction costs.115 
Therefore, administrative regulation emerges as a ‘comparatively efficient’ form to 
govern investment conduct.116 First, information costs can be reduced by standard 
disclosure rules;117 second, agency costs between investment firms and their clients can 
be comparatively reduced by centralising monitoring and sanctioning activities in the 
hands of public entities;118 and third, contracting costs can also be reduced by uniform 
provisions of providing services.119 
However, the control mechanisms of administrative regulation may not be the 
most efficient, because all kinds of governance, to a greater or lesser degree, are ‘in a 
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state of at least partial failure’.120 For example, it is generally questioned whether the 
disclosure regime is effective in overcoming the issue of bounded rationality—sunlight 
can be blinding.121 The role of administrative regulation in mitigating the issue of 
bounded rationality also raises a heated debate, since it should not incautiously support 
a constraint on individual choices. 122  On account of the bounded rationality of 
regulators, a deeper analysis of ‘anti-antipaternalism’ is necessary.123 Some are in favour 
of ‘asymmetrical paternalism’, in a form of intervention that ‘creates large benefits for 
those people who are boundedly rational […] while imposing little or no harm on those 
who are fully rational’.124 It is also possible to imagine ‘libertarian paternalism’, ‘an 
approach that preserves freedom of choice but authorises both private and public 
institutions to steer people in directions that will promote their welfare’.125 One further 
possible approach is to consider the role of law as ‘debiasing’ people.126 Although the 
discussion of this question is complicated, all of these approaches are sort a form of 
‘weak’ (soft) paternalism,127 implying a significant fear of errors of administrative 
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regulation. 128  In particular, ‘control imperfections’ could be easily found in 
administrative regulation.129 
3.2. Organisational Failures of Administrative Regulation in 
Governing Investment Conduct 
 Environmental Factors 3.2.1.
No less than the market discipline, administrative regulation also faces the issue of 
uncertainty and/or complexity in governing investment conduct. First of all, 
information, from the institutional viewpoint, is not only an important input into the 
regulatory process (the instrumental role), but also one kind of regulatory policy (the 
constitutive role).130 However, significant information asymmetries between regulators 
and regulatees will increase regulatory ‘decision costs’ in the administrative process.131 
Even if standing aside these information asymmetries, ‘knowledge problems’, which are 
caused by the frontier of scientific and technical knowledge, are also embedded in the 
abilities of regulators.132 Furthermore, the issue of uncertainty/complexity might be 
even more serious since there are more limits of regulatory resources (such as, staff, 
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budget, administrative powers) in practice.133 For example, regulation encounters some 
‘geographic interface’ problems in an international market.134 In cases where investment 
services are provided by an investment firm that does not have a physical presence 
within the regulators’ borders, the regulators may have to consider (i) the characteristics 
of the investor, (ii) the nature of the access, (iii) the type of the financial products traded 
and/or (iv) the regulation of the firm’s home country, to decide how to regulate it.135 
Even in other cases, where cross-border investment firms have a physical presence, 
obstacles to the co-operation between regulators could still be found, so that regulators 
need to evaluate (i) the nature of these entities, (ii) how their operations are conducted 
across borders, and (iii) the degree to which information that the supervisor requires 
domestically is available for entities with operations abroad. 136  Overall, in a 
comprehensive globalised and digitised capital market, organisational structures of 
regulators, as well as their information and knowledge, become more important in 
tackling cross-border issues increasingly.137 In this sense, the growth of administrative 
regulation at the EU level, to some extent, owes much to the ‘mismatch between 
existing institutional capacities and the growing complexity of policy problems’.138 
In addition, the issues of small numbers are also relevant in the capital market 
regulation since administrative regulation is always considered as ‘monopolistic’ 
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governance within its own territory.139 Here we must examine the geographic and 
product scopes of the monopoly enjoyed by the regulators, in order to prevent an 
excessive monopoly and find the optimum level and scope at which to regulate140—this 
examination, inevitably, links to the principle of subsidiarity and the regulatory 
competition.141 
 Human Factor: Opportunism 3.2.2.
Many scholars, as discussed in this section, have been asking whether regulators 
are opportunistic, due to the interests of regulators and the lobbying efforts of 
interested parties. First, the Chicago theory of regulation 142  strongly argues that 
regulators are incompetent, corrupt, and ‘captured’ by interest groups.143 Regulation, 
thus, is a product allocated on the basis of demand by industry groups’ pressure, which 
would make things even worse than no regulation.144 The Virginia School of Public 
Choice further explains regulation as an outcome of ‘rent-seeking’,145 which means 
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‘spending scarce resources on political action by individuals and groups to obtain 
monopoly rights or other favours’ granted by regulation.146 Regulators may decide a 
policy that is beneficial to specific groups or themselves in a costly way.147 Although it 
is criticised on the overestimation of assumed losses of welfare in regulation,148 the 
Public Choice theory indeed provides a different perspective to evaluate waste and 
inefficiency of administrative regulation in the allocation of scarce resources.149 The 
Public Choice theory considers financial regulators, such as, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission in the USA (‘US SEC’), have no difference to highly politicised 
organisations150 that are ‘intent on preserving their own bureaucratic turf despite the 
mounting evidence of their own obsolescence and irrelevance’.151 Thus, like ‘the 
counterpart of “market failure” is “regulatory failure”[,] the counterpart of “market 
abuse” is “regulatory opportunism”.’152 
In brief, institutionalists view the efficiency of administrative regulation as jointly 
influenced by ‘governmental opportunism’ and ‘third party opportunism’: the former 
‘consists of the ability of [regulators] to change the rules of the game via the standard 
																																																								
146 J. d. Hertog, above note 142, at 243–244. 
147 Oliver James, ‘Regulation inside Government: Public Interest Justifications and Regulatory Failures’ 
(2000) 78 Public Administration 327, at 333–338. 
148 Hal R. Varian, ‘Measuring the Deadweight Costs of Dup and Rent Seeking Activies’ (1989) 1 Economics 
& Politics 81, at 92. 
149 Nicholas Mercuro and Steven G. Medema, Economics and the Law: From Posner to Post-Modernism and 
Beyond (2nd edn, Princeton University Press, 2006), at 201–204, 230–231. 
150 Donald C. Langevoort, ‘The SEC as a Bureaucracy: Public Choice, Institutional Rhetoric, and the 
Process of Policy Formulation’ (1990) 47 Washington and Lee Law Review 527, at 527–540. 
151 Jonathan R. Macey, ‘Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A Case 
Study of the SEC at Sixty’ (1994) 15 Cardozo Law Review 909, at 948. However, some claim this is an 
unrealistic overstatement in response to Professor Macey’s argument: see David L. Ratner, ‘The SEC at 
Sixty: A Reply to Professor Macey’ (1995) 16 Cardozo Law Review 1765, at 1769–1779. 
152 Frank Bickenbach, Lars Kumkar and Rüdiger Soltwedel, ‘Antitrust and Regulation—The View of 
New Institutional Economics’ in Klaus F. Zimmermann (ed), Frontiers in Economics (Springer, 2002), at 
193. 
Chapter IV Transaction Cost Approach of Investment Conduct Governance 
 157 
use of [regulatory] powers to extract the quasi-rents’;153 and the latter could be seen as 
challenges given by interested third parties, interest groups, public, or even other 
regulators to the regulators.154 As described by Professor Langevoort, capital market 
regulators ‘operate in a complex political ecology, making law in response to a multitude 
of shifting incentives, both external and internal.’155 Causes of these two types of 
opportunism are closely associated with the arrangement of governance, so the solution 
to them should also be based on the nature of regulatory institutions, the operation of 
regulation and the performance of the whole mechanism.156 This calls for a deeper 
analysis of the inefficiency of regulatory contracts and of the regulatory outcomes within 
a proper institutional comparison.157 
 Human Factor: Bounded Rationality 3.2.3.
Organisations may evolve and adapt to minimise the impact of bounded rationality 
on individuals to some extent.158 Nevertheless, given a belief that psychological errors 
are understood to be endogenous, there are good reasons to consider whether society is 
better off if error correction is supplied by individuals in markets, or by individuals in 
government.159  In particular, exports and regulators are subject to cognitive and 
motivational problems that could inhibit good decision-making.160 The global financial 
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crisis of 2008–09, for example, is a confirmation that regulators face rationality 
constraints too. 161  For now, the existence of many regulatory biases have been 
confirmed: (i) ‘flawed heuristics and myopia’, which lead regulators estimate 
probabilities irrationally and then overreaction; (ii) ‘status quo biases’, which cause 
regulatory inertia and path dependency; and (iii) ‘confirmation biases’, which result in 
resistance to change a regulatory course, even in face of contrary evidence.162 The 
forgoing regulatory biases are even considered as ‘pathologies’ of the US SEC,163 
providing a strong argument questioning the corrective role of regulators.164 
Given the regulators’ behaviour is not rational as the Public Choice theory165 
assumed, the above behavioural research, to some extent, complement and enrich the 
rational actor assumptions of the Public Choice theory. In return, the corrective 
mechanisms of bounded rationality might also be found in the Public Choice theory: 
namely, appropriate institutional arrangements of governance. By two means of 
reforming institutional arrangements of governance, bounded rationality may be cured: 
one is ‘insulation’ by eliminating (or making more difficult to choose) poor alternatives; 
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and another is ‘de-biasing’ by other review functions or institutions.166 The latter 
solution significantly highlights the complementary role of other governance outside 
administrative regulation, such as, judicial review and political oversight,167 regulatory 
competition of the regulators’ market, 168 or even ‘monitored experimentalism’ of 
regulators. 169  In this sense, investment conduct is not merely governed by 
administrative regulation, but also controlled by other types of governance (e.g., private 
law). We should pay equal attention to these types of governance that we always 
ignored. 
 Imperfect but Necessary Administrative Regulation 3.2.4.
The story told by opportunism and bounded rationality indicates the ‘regulatory 
failures’ of administrative regulation in governing investment conduct.170 Blindly relying 
on administrative regulation is a mistake, because this diminishes the market’s ability to 
overcome some issues. However, it should still be recognised there is a need for public 
intervention, since there is strong empirical evidence supporting the view that regulation 
is advantageous to the development of financial markets.171 In fact, the need for 
administrative regulation has arisen very recently due to two significant changes of 
markets. First, technological advances have created new methods of trading, 
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accompanied with a need to replace the traditional governance.172 It becomes difficult 
to control these ‘anonymous, digitalised and globalised’ contemporary marketplaces by 
private law alone.173 Second, in the higher linked markets, a private and individual risk 
of some rather wealthy groups may become a risk of the whole society, rendering an 
innovation of administrative regulation.174 In particular, ‘financial markets have become 
the most important institution of modern societies’,175 whose operation affects the 
livelihoods of large parts of the population. ‘Case-to-case’ private law, thus, may not be 
able to take problems of the whole society. 
Specifically, since (i) private-law standards might be too broad and too vague to let 
a client of the investment firm feels (un)confident that misconduct will be found by the 
court; and (ii) an individual client’s claim will often be too small to make it worthwhile 
to sue the investment firm,176 there is a high risk of the ‘rational apathy’ phenomenon 
on investment firms’ clients in traditional private law systems. 177  Administrative 
regulation, thus, may be seen as a response to ‘a regulatory failure of [traditional] private 
law […] in response to new policy objectives’,178 with the aim to complete the 
‘incomplete’ private law systems.179 As some commentators claim, given the existence 
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of the MiFID regime in the EU180: 
 ‘[i]nvestment services is probably the most important example for the 
phenomenon that contract law in the area of financial services is partly superseded 
by (market) supervision rules.’181  
It should be noted that private law is just ‘partly superseded’ by administrative 
regulation, so an equal appreciation should still be given to the ‘responsive function’182 
of private law systems that complemented the weaknesses of administrative regulation 
in the financial crisis.183 
3.3. Private Law Systems as Alternatives in Governing Investment 
Conduct 
 Old Position of Private Law Systems 3.3.1.
The traditional approach sees private law systems and administrative regulatory 
systems as ‘born enemies’, and this tension may trace back to the divide between private 
law and public law in the Roman model of civil law.184 The Roman model of civil law 
conceives of law as being a series of relationships existing between person and person, 
the person and the thing, and the person to the State: the first relationship gave rise to 
an action in personam (against a person), and the second to an action in rem (against a 
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thing);185 these two were then amalgamated under the general heading ‘Private Law’ and 
distinguished from the third relationship ‘Public Law’.186 ‘Public law’ might be defined 
as laws relating to ‘the constitution, and the maintenance and regulation of 
governmental authority’, 187 which is steeped in politics and collective interests. 188 
‘Private law’, it may further be argued focuses on the individual’s right to ‘corrective 
justice’, which ‘treats the wrong, and the transfer of resources that undoes it’.189 It is 
worthy to note that, in contrast to the civil law system, emergence of the private/public 
divide is comparatively late in the common law system.190 Until the nineteenth century, 
the idea of ‘markets’ brought the divide of private/public law into the common law 
system,191 followed by some critics on the utility192 and the clarity193 of this dichotomy. 
Indeed, the line between public and private law is not uniform and clear,194 in 
particular with the significant differences between the common law and civil law 
systems.195 Some even argue that ‘the’ public/private distinction is ‘one of the longest 
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lies’, due to the fact that many distinctions between public and private laws are almost 
never doctrinally dispositive.196 The divide of private/public law, thus, might better be 
re-classified as ‘facilitative’/‘interventionist’ law based on the extent of the impacts on 
parties: the former are used for mutually desired outcomes, generating winners and few 
or no losers; while the latter is designed to protect defined interests and/or supersede 
voluntary transactions, impacting significantly on losers as well as winners.197 In the 
light of this new proposed divide, private law systems have a new life—namely, a 
regulatory context of private law systems. 
 New Life of Private Law Systems 3.3.2.
Essentially, private law and public law are based on similar concepts of 
‘responsibility’,198 so there are ‘common underlying values in public and private law’.199 
From the economics viewpoint, both of them are necessary for the well functioning of a 
free market.200 Therefore, post-classical private law is characterised by ‘its linkages with 
regulatory and distributive policies and its opening to social values and human rights’.201 
Private law incorporates public policies and has its regulatory role.202 Although some 
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may fear this is some sort of instrumentalisation to downgrade the role of private law,203 
the fact is this is an upgrade of private law by admitting its broader role in the regulatory 
context. 
Many practical cases in the contemporary legal system can prove this. First, 
consumer law is conceptualised as governance of consumer markets and as a ‘toolbox’ 
of public, private and self-regulatory techniques by most scholars.204 It, thus, may be 
regarded as part of private law and part of public law.205 Second, company law provides 
another good example: on the one hand, it is an enabling law helps the efficient use of 
party autonomy and, on the other hand, it is a regulatory regime aiming to protect the 
interests of third parties or the weaker parties.206 In this sense, company law may be 
either private or public. Third, there is a newly regulatory context of financial contract 
law, which is the so-called ‘contract governance’207 or  ‘regulatory contract law’.208 
Contract law’s function has extended from ‘governance of contracts’ (an element of the 
institutional framework for private transactions) to ‘governance by means of contract 
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law’ (an instrument for steering behaviour and in order to achieve regulatory goals).209 
Inspired by this change, many new areas of European financial law (such as, MiFID210 
and Consumer Credit Directive211) have been developed within contract law which are 
regulatory in substance.212 
 Long-Standing Distinction between Private Law and Public Law 3.3.3.
Even though the ‘dichotomy/divide’ of private/public law is theoretically 
unconvincing and disappearing, this does not render the ‘distinction’ meaningless.213 
Rather, various public/private distinctions provide different, but equally valuable, 
indications in deciding what to do in different, or even opposite, cases.214 This 
‘multi-functional and context-dependent’ approach could be valuable to justify and 
rationalise certain choices (such as, the applicability of certain legal procedures and the 
adoption of certain substantive principles) in various legal systems.215 It should be 
emphasised that, although various distinctions exist, ‘there is an unavoidable and 
fundamental division of authorities over law-making and prosecution among various 
institutional types, characterised most basically by their public or private nature’.216 
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Courts and administrative authorities are very unlike.217 The idea of ‘path dependence’ 
in the NIE could further explain why this private/public distinction based on different 
natures of authorities has astonishing longevity.218 
Given this long-standing distinction, private law systems and administrative 
regulation have their own strengths. Compared to administrative regulation, private law 
systems have a number of advantages: (i) private law systems are more reliable and 
predictable than administrative regulation, because private law decisions are subject to 
the doctrine of precedent or other formal jurisprudence;219 (ii) private law systems have 
comparatively less costs of monitoring, in some situations, because administrative 
authorities lack resources for specific cases, and, thus, have to pay more detection 
costs;220 (iii) individuals have an incentive and personal motivation to be active on their 
own cases in private law systems;221 and (iv) private law systems are lack of chances to 
be ‘captured’ (influenced) either by the industry or by the political system.222 In contrast, 
administrative regulation still owns some inherent advantages over private law systems: 
(i) unlike judges, regulators can be experts and motivated to pursue social objectives in 
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specific technical areas;223  (ii) administrative regulation can act pre-emptively and 
proactively;224 and (iii) administrative regulation is less likely to be subverted by large 
firms.225 
 Flawed but Indispensable Private Law Systems  3.3.4.
In fact, neither a belief in the benevolence of courts nor in the omniscience of 
judges is right.226 The issues of opportunism and bounded rationality are not confined 
to administrative regulation. Some empirical evidence supports the view that courts 
around the world could also be highly inefficient, politically motivated, slow, unfamiliar 
with the economic issues, and even corrupt.227 Nevertheless, empirical evidence also 
indicates that, in contrast to the modest role of administrative regulation (except 
disclosure requirements), there is a strong correlation between the well functioning of 
private law systems and the development of capital markets.228 Private law systems are 
equally important to capital markets. 
From the institutional viewpoint, ‘[p]rivate law is not only a system of norms but 
also a set of institutional arrangements for creating and sustaining norms, and a set of 
social practices around those norms and institutions’.229 Therefore, private law systems, 
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as one type of governance, have two indispensable tasks in capital markets. First, private 
law and private litigation now become almost a last resort to those seeking protection in 
the cases of regulatory failures.230 Since private law touches financial matters in nature 
(such as, contracts, promissory notes, bills of exchange, derivatives and bonds),231 
private law systems possess some considerable efficiency and reflexivity (for example, 
contractual parties could negotiate the terms of contract) over administrative 
regulation.232 Second, private law also has a ‘deterrent effect’ and a ‘protective effect’ 
through the threat of civil damages, which has the regulatory context on the behaviour 
of parties for the benefit of all of the parties, third parties, and society at large.233 
In sum, given the equal importance of private law systems and administrative 
regulation in capital markets, as Professor Richard Posner said: 
‘[t]he choice is rarely between a free market and public regulation. Ordinarily 
the choice is between two methods of public control, the common law system of 
privately enforced rights and the administrative system of direct public control. 
The choice between them should depend upon a weighting of their strengths and 
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weaknesses in particular contexts.’234 
In other words, from the perspective of the TCE, an institutional comparison of 
investment conduct governance not only has to compare different arrangements of 
administrative regulation, but also has to find out whether court enforcement or 
administration by regulatory agencies is a more effective mean of governing those 
relations.235 
 Institutional Selection of Investment Conduct 4.
Governance 
4.1. Basic Framework of Institutional Selection 
According to the New Comparative Economics, which is a new formalisation of 
the NIE by studying what constitutes appropriate governance for different societies, 
there are four distinct strategies of institutional design depending on ‘the degree of 
public control’: market discipline, private law, administrative regulation, and state 
ownership.236 These four general types of governance are possible institutional solutions 
arrayed along the convex of ‘institutional possibilities frontier’ (‘IPF’).237 In terms of the 
optimum institutional governance, it will be presumed at the point that minimises social 
losses on the IPF.238 Since IPFs are determined by social, cultural, and other factors, 
different societies, even a same country in different times, have different IPFs and 
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optimum points.239 Although some criticise its ambiguous divide and the over simple 
equilibrium assumption,240 the idea of the IPF is valuable, by a single criterion, in 
judging the performance of an economic system and in choosing the optimum 
institutional governance.241 Given the above, this thesis incorporates the idea of IPF 
into the institutional comparison of the TCE, and the basic framework can be viewed as 
following Figure IV-2 reveals. 
 
Figure IV-2: Basic Framework of Institutional Selection 
Figure IV-2 depicts the IPF for the TCE analysis applied by this thesis. Market 
discipline and state ownership are two polar modes of governance alternatives, and 
private law systems and administrative regulation can be seen as two models between 
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them.242 Since every type of governance has its own organisational failures,243 each of 
them may face transaction costs to different degrees. In order to show this difference, 
the horizontal and vertical axes of Figure IV-2 are set as transaction costs of hierarchies 
and of markets respectively. The TCE further appeals to the efficient alignment 
hypothesis to predict which transactions go—a ‘transaction cost economising 
outcome’.244 Therefore, the IPF is assumed to be convex to the origin, otherwise there 
would never be an optimum choice. The downward sloping 45 degree line in Figure 
IV-2 holds the minimum total transaction costs of markets and hierarchies, whose 
tangent with the IPF is the most efficient/optimum institutional choice. In this sense, 
the role of institutional selection is to make the best choice (i.e. the lowest total 
transaction costs) among these ‘imperfect alternatives’.245 
In order to illustrate this framework, we could suppose a society has four basic 
institutional strategies for governing investment conduct. First, the market discipline 
solution (Point A of Figure IV-2) relies on the demand/supply relationship between 
investment firms and their clients. However, as discussed above,246 market discipline 
faces organisational failures that cause significant transaction costs, followed by a need 
for administrative regulation. The society can designate a regulatory authority, which 
mandates the way investment conduct is undertaken and penalises investment firms 
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further in Section 2.2 above (pp. 137–142). 
244 Oliver E. Williamson, ‘Transaction Cost Economics: The Natural Progression’ (2010) 100 The 
American Economic Review 673, at 681. 
245 Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public Policy (University 
of Chicago Press, 1996), at 3–6. 
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who break the rules. But, administrative regulation (Point C of Figure IV-2) itself also 
encounters organisational failures leading to transaction costs.247 Therefore, the society 
still relies on private suits by clients who feel that they have been cheated by investment 
firms under the general doctrines of private law systems (Point B of Figure IV-2), as 
explored above.248 The society, in this case, needs courts and judges and has to pay 
relative transaction costs for running them. In extreme cases, the society can even 
nationalise investment firms, and everything is under the control of the state (Point D 
of Figure IV-2). It should be emphasised that, as competition and regulation often 
operate in the same market, this classification does not mean these strategies are 
mutually exclusive, and an efficient institutional choice might be in the middle of 
them. 249  Therefore, from the normative perspective, the optimum institutional 
governance of investment conduct might be a combination of private law systems and 
administrative regulation,250 namely, a point in somewhere between Point B and Point 
C of Figure IV-2. However, it might be difficult to find where this point exactly is. 
4.2. Differences between Administrative Regulation and Private Law 
Systems 
Given the long-standing distinction between public/private law,251 it is irrefutable 
that administrative regulation and private law systems give rise to different rights, and 
are enforced by different authorities in governing investment conduct, as a ‘two-tier 
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legal framework’.252 This framework is underpinned by an institutional implication, that 
is: administrative regulation presupposes a leading and centralised role of administrative 
authorities in determining the legal position of a private person with regard to the whole 
society and to other private persons, whereas the heart of private law systems is to build 
a decentralised system with a aim of enabling private parties to order their relationships 
themselves.253 
Differences can be found between these two tiers. First, compared to 
administrative authorities, courts are primarily concerned with settling disputes in 
individual cases triggered by private investors, rather than with the long-term social 
implications of their decisions on the whole market.254 Given this case-by-case basis, 
the impact of private law systems is ‘interstitial’ instead of comprehensive.255 Second, 
administrative regulation imposes positive obligations on authorised firms, which means 
the authorised firms are required to take action to discharge their obligations; while 
private law is normally reluctant to do so, unless the parties agree to these positive 
obligations by contracts.256 The best execution requirement is an explicit example of 
such positive obligations imposed by regulatory rules.257 Third, investment conduct 
regulation is applied ex ante, whereas general private law is largely applied ex post to 
																																																								
252 O. O. Cherednychenko, above note 230, at 418–419. 
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establish whether the violation of the standard of care by the investment firm has taken 
place in the circumstances of the individual case.258 Administrative regulation, therefore, 
is to provide more clarity of investment firms concerning their obligations towards the 
client beforehand. 
4.3. Complementarities between Administrative Regulation and 
Private Law Systems 
Notwithstanding the above differences, administrative regulation and private law 
systems can still be mutually complementary in governing investment conduct. On the 
one hand, the ambit of private law duties is shaped by administrative regulation.259 
Administrative regulation imposes many duties on parties who are in privity with each 
other, which penetrate into private law systems and affect courts’ decisions in 
cases260—the so-called ‘osmosis’,261 ‘external effect’262 or ‘radiating effect’.263 First, 
administrative authorities may impose some mandatory provisions on contracts, causing 
a direct influence on contractual transactions and turning these private contracts into 
‘legal products’ of regulation.264 Second, since some general contractual duties are 
controlled by regulatory standards, private parties no longer need to bear various risks 
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of litigating their cases in courts.265 Even if there is no specific provision inside the 
contract, a common standard is given by this codification of administrative regulation in 
prescriptive detail;266 even if there is an opt-out, via exclusion clauses within contracts, 
it is also restricted by administrative regulation.267 However, it is still important to note 
that such radiating effect of administrative regulation, although it provides significant 
‘help’ to private law systems, relies, nevertheless, on the gap-filling function of private 
law systems.268 
Private law systems, on the other hand, also affect administrative regulation—as a 
‘two-way traffic’.269 In practice, some discretionary decisions made by administrative 
authorities need the database of private law in order to decide the appropriate amount 
of fines, especially where such decisions depend on the amount of loss. 270 
Principle-based regulatory standards can only be workable via more precedents in 
private law systems.271 Many codes of administrative regulation in governing investment 
conduct are coming from major principles that private law systems have established:272 
fiduciary duties are a good example;273 and ‘undue influence’ and ‘integrity’ also 
stimulate the development of administrative regulation.274 In this sense, private law can 
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function as ‘the avant-garde in a risk society’ due to its autonomy and flexibility, further 
leading to the metamorphosis of private law solutions into administrative regulation.275  
On the whole, what we can see is a process of mutual learning and complementing 
occurring between private law systems and administrative regulation in governing 
investment conduct, as ‘productive cherry-picking’, 276  or ‘mutual assisting legal 
orders’277—‘different legal spaces superimposed, interpenetrated and mixed in our 
minds, as much as in our actions, either on occasions of qualitative leaps or sweeping 
crises in our life trajectories, or in the dull routine of eventless everyday life.’278 This 
‘mutual permeation’ is a good thing, because ‘people who are in the same situation, 
irrespective of the legal area involved, receive equal treatment in the field of legal 
protection’.279 
4.4. Difficult Choice in Transnational EU Markets 
Given the differences and complementarities between these two types of 
governance, it is clear that the issue is not whether either one should have a role to play, 
but rather how, in effect, to reach a balance between private law systems and 
administrative regulation in governing investment conduct, and to create effective 
mechanisms for co-ordinating the roles of them. 280  This ‘meta-legal’ usage of 
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administrative regulation and private law systems could be seen as a combination of two 
strategies for controlling misconduct in capital markets.281 In relation to designing an 
optimal structure of intervention, the state has to decide the timing, the form and the 
initiation of intervention.282 Some countries prefer to allocate the job to administrative 
authorities, whilst others to courts.283 However, this decision might be much more 
difficult to be made in transnational markets (such as, the European capital markets). 
This is because, through the lens of governance, the control of global conduct cannot 
be adequately depicted as either national or transnational, public or private.284 
On the one hand, as some describe, ‘[i]t could be very difficult to convince public 
officials or local bureaucrats to devote time and resources to complaints concerning 
foreign interests or values.’ 285  The use of domestic administrative regulation for 
transnational markets is hampered by a lack of foreign vision and domestic interests 
embedded in regulatory processes.286 Given this, the combination of domestic private 
law and private international law may provide better tools of governance than 
administrative regulation287—the so-called ‘transnational private law’288 emerges as a 
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better tool of transnational governance.289 In fact, by means of distinguishing questions 
about jurisdiction and choices of law, private international law highlights an impressive 
tolerance and conditional cosmopolitan hospitality in the face of plural normative 
orders, with an emphasis on the role of contractual choices made by parties.290 
Transnational private law provides a softer function to a harmonisation of substantive 
law in the application of transnational markets.291 
On the other hand, transnational private law has its limits too. This is because ‘real 
conflicts’ in transnational private law across jurisdictions expand significantly.292 These 
‘real conflicts’ are caused by different interests with individual, social and institutional 
concerns in transnational private law. Specifically, domestic private law may encounter 
significant obstacles to be transplanted and harmonised since it is more closely 
connected with traditional legal cultures.293 Therefore, not only effective and credible 
operation of private law systems is necessary to administrative regulation,294 but also 
transnational private law is underpinned by solid transnational administrative 
regulation.295 In the practice of transnational governance, the relationship between 
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administrative regulation and private law systems is being transformed in a hybrid way 
(such as, trade associations now involve in enforcing and using powers delegated by 
legislative bodies).296 This mix seeks to minimise transactions costs associated in 
transnational governance. 297  Yet, as Professor Cafaggi highlights, transnational 
governance of the pan-EU market is a much more complicated case: (i) there is a 
‘horizontal complementarity’, when administrative regulation and private law systems 
operate at the same level, whether it is the EU level or the national level; and (ii) there is 
a ‘vertical complementarity’, where administrative regulation at the EU level and private 
law systems at the national level or vice versa; and these two types of complementarities 
then interact.298 It is very difficult to make an optimal choice between administrative 
regulation and private law systems in governing investment conduct in the European 
capital markets.299 
 Institutional Change of Investment Conduct Governance 5.
5.1. Basic Framework of Institutional Change 
After the normative analysis of the institutional selection, the following question, 
from the positive viewpoint, is: how the society changes its governance if the current 
status is not optimum? As the TCE admits, institutional change is very likely to happen, 
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since the status quo is only ‘presumed to be efficient’ to transactions.300 The existence of 
governance ‘tends’ to economise transaction costs,301 but there is no guarantee that the 
current system is the best, or always the best. However, institutional change was not the 
major focus of the TCE initially, so many critiques arose from this ignorance.302 
In fact, institutional change represents the birth of a new type of governance, so 
the reasons for institutional change strongly relates to the reasons for the emergence of 
governance. Based on the divide of spontaneous/made orders used by Friedrich A. 
Hayek,303 Professor Williamson argues that forms of governance could be either 
spontaneous or intentional: markets and hierarchies are polar examples of each, but 
there is always a mix in reality.304 Thus, there are two polarised explanations of 
institutional change: on the one hand, institutional change may emerge from the 
unco-ordinated choices of many individuals, as a routine of natural evolution of 
institutions;305 and, on the other hand, it may be argued that institutional change is 
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made deliberately by a centralised and collective-choice process.306 These two polarised 
explanations of institutional change can further be used to discuss the reforms of 
financial regulation are either considered accidental or deterministic. 307  However, 
although each explanation could be fitted in some cases of institutional change, no 
explanation perfectly suits to all cases.308 In the real world, the process of institutional 
change is generally a combination of ‘artificial selection’ and ‘natural selection’.309 
Given the institutional selection of investment conduct governance is a mix of (i) 
(market-oriented) private law systems, and (ii) (hierarchy-oriented) administrative 
regulation,310 a broad framework of institutional change that integrates both of the 
above explanations is needed—that is, the equilibrium-of-game view of institutions.311 
This ‘equilibrium view’, based on the game theory312, characterises institutions as the 
equilibrium of many ‘games’ in the society, no matter how this equilibrium is formed 
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spontaneously or intentionally.313 In these games, each player is constrained both by 
exogenous constraints that underlie games and by endogenous ‘rules of the game’ that 
reflect the strategies of the other players. Equilibrium is not static, which is influenced 
by not only exogenous causes (such as, technology improvements), but also endogenous 
causes (such as, learning effects).314 This is the ‘exogenous–endogenous duality’ of 
institutions.315 Institutional change, in this sense, could be seen as a path of seeking the 
dynamic equilibrium in the society. However, it is important to note that equilibrium is 
not necessarily efficient,316 so there is no guarantee that the reformed governance of 
investment conduct is the most efficient one. 
5.2. Types of Institutional Change and Path Dependence  
Depending on the degree of changes, the types of institutional change can be 
classified into three categories: (i) persistence, which refers to an institutional system 
only accumulation of pressure for change; (ii) adaptation, which is to adjust the current 
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institutional system in order to respond the pressure for change; and (iii) transformation, 
which is to create a new institutional system for the great pressure for change.317 
‘Surprises’ are major exogenous causes of transformation.318 An explicit example of this 
is the significant changes of financial regulation stimulated by the financial crisis of 
2007–08. However, institutional change, in practice, is seldom reconstructive or 
deconstructive totally, and, normally, is ‘overwhelmingly incremental’.319 Persistence or 
adaptation happens in most cases, as history shows.320 In the development of financial 
regulatory architecture, transformation seldom happens.321 
In fact, no matter by which type of institutional change, institutional change 
represents a movement to reach dynamic equilibrium. In such a movement, endogenous 
causes of institutional change cannot be ignored. Previous institutional structures and 
past experience play an important role in reaching the equilibrium in novel situations.322 
Professor North provides a good description of this phenomenon:  
‘[w]hen economists talk about their discipline as a theory of choice and about 
the menu of choices being determined by opportunities and preferences, they 
																																																								
317 Carl Folke et al, ‘Resilience Thinking: Integrating Resilience, Adaptability and Transformability’ (2010) 
15 Ecology and Society 20, at 26; Elke Herrfahrdt-Pa ̈hle and Claudia Pahl-Wostl, ‘Continuity and Change in 
Social-ecological Systems: the Role of Institutional Resilience’ (2012) 17 Ecology and Society 8, at 8–11. 
318 Marco A. Janssen, ‘A Future of Surprises’ in Lance H. Gunderson and C. S. Holling (eds), Panarchy: 
Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural Systems (Island Press, 2002), at 250–251. 
319 D. C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, above note 45, at 89. 
320 For example, Frier and Kehoe illustrate the outcome of path dependence by three cases of the ancient 
economy in the agrarian history of the Roman empire: see Bruce W. Frier and Dennis P. Kehoe, ‘Law and 
Economic Institutions’ in Bruce W. Frier and Dennis P. Kehoe (eds), The Cambridge Economic History of the 
Greco-Roman World (Cambridge University Press, 2007), at 137–142. 
321 For example, Andreas and Donato conduct an empirical analysis, indicating that the relationship 
between the central bank’s independence and the unification of financial supervisors’ powers is largely 
limited by each country’s former economic and institutional structures: see Andreas Freytag and Donato 
Masciandaro, ‘Financial Supervision Architecture and Central Bank Independence’ in Donato 
Masciandaro and Marc Quintyn (eds), Designing Financial Supervision Institutions: Independence, Accountability 
and Governance (Edward Elgar, 2007), at 211–261. 
322 Robert Sugden, ‘Spontaneous Order’ (1989) 3 The Journal of Economic Perspectives 85, at 88–90; A. Greif 
and D. D. Laitin, above note 314, at 636–638. 
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simply left out that it is the institutional framework which constraints people’s 
choice sets.’323 
Simply because ‘history matters’,324 ‘institutions lock in and reinforce historical 
outcome through endogenous institutional mechanisms’.325 This is the so-called ‘path 
dependence’,326 or ‘lock-in’,327 effect of policy legacies. However, it is noteworthy that 
this path dependence ‘is not “inertia,” rather it is the constraints on the choice set in the 
present that are derived from historical experiences of the past’.328 Path dependence, 
thus, does not always imply inefficiency.329 
5.3. Self-Reinforcing of Investment Conduct Governance 
Whilst some argue that path dependence is much less significant outside the 
market mechanism, 330  public policies and formal institutions are also 
‘change-resistant’.331 Therefore, in the absence of significant exogenous causes like the 
financial crisis, the current system of investment conduct governance may easily persist. 
Any significant institutional change may face strong resistance if benefits of the change 
																																																								
323 D. C. North, Structure and Change in Economic History, above note 306, at 201. 
324 D. C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, above note 45, at 100; Sheri 
Berman, ‘Path Dependency and Political Action: Reexamining Responses to the Depression’ (1998) 30 
Comparative Politics 379, at 380. 
325 Tine Hanrieder, International Organization in Time: Fragmentation and Reform (Oxford University Press, 
2015), at 29. 
326 Professor David is the first one to use this term in analysing economic development in 1985: see Paul 
A. David, ‘Clio and the Economics of QWERTY’ (1985) 75 The American Economic Review 332, at 332–337. 
327 This term was coined by Professor Arthur in 1989: see W. Brian Arthur, ‘Competing Technologies, 
Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events’ (1989) 99 The Economic Journal 116, at 116–131. 
328 Douglass C. North, Understanding the Process of Economic Change (Princeton University Press, 2005), at 52. 
329 S. J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, ‘Path Dependence, Lock-in, and History’ (1995) 11 Journal of 
Law, Economics, & Organization 205, at 206–208. 
330 Stan J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, ‘Path Dependence’ in Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De 
Geest (eds), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, vol I: The History and Methodology of Law and Economics 
(Edward Elgar, 2000), at 994–995 
331 Paul Pierson, ‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics’ (2000) 94 The American 
Political Science Review 251, at 257–262. 
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cannot be significantly proven. 
First, large fixed costs of units are falling, and the learning effects are lowering 
costs within the current system over time,332 so policymakers enjoy these benefits and 
lack motivation to change. Even if such decreasing effects are insignificant, 
policymakers may have status quo biases so that the current system of investment 
conduct governance could regularly produce one kind of outcome in favour of the 
extant winners.333 Also, the losers lack incentives to change the current system, since 
they realise their small contribution has no perceptible impact. 334  This robust 
equilibrium between winners and losers insulates the current system of investment 
conduct governance from dissatisfaction and provides it with a measure of stability.335  
Second, since the knowledge about institutional choices is incomplete, this 
uncertainty makes risk-averse policymakers stick to the current system of investment 
conduct governance, even when a better choice exists somewhere else.336 It is also very 
difficult to ignore the effect of ‘sunk costs’ on policymakers’ decision making.337 Unlike 
fixed costs, sunk costs are retrospective costs that cannot be recovered (for example, 
specific skills or competences that can only be used in the current institutions), but 
people normally are motivated by them to adhere to their prior decisions.338 These 
																																																								
332 W. Brian Arthur, Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy (University of Michigan Press, 
1994), at 112. 
333 William H. Riker, ‘Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions’ 
(1980) 74 The American Political Science Review 432, at 443; Vernon W. Ruttan, ‘Social Science Knowledge 
and Induced Institutional Innovation: An Institutional Design Perspective’ (2006) 2 Journal of Institutional 
Economics 249, at 257. See further in Section 3.2.3 above (pp. 157–159). 
334 E. Thráinn, above note 16, at 64–67. 
335 Kenneth A. Shepsle, ‘Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach’ (1989) 
1 Journal of Theoretical Politics 131, at 142. 
336 Philipp Genschel, ‘The Dynamics of Inertia: Institutional Persistence and Change in 
Telecommunications and Health Care’ (1997) 10 Governance 43, at 48.  
337 Ibid, at 47. 
338 See further examples in a well-known paper: Hal R. Arkes and Catherine Blumer, ‘ The Psychology of 
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‘emotions’ limit policymakers’ willingness to change the current system of investment 
conduct governance. 
5.4. Three Possibilities of Centralised Investment Conduct 
Supervision in the EU 
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, a reform aiming to centralise investment 
conduct supervision means Member States have to transfer powers that they possess to 
the EU, which is a significant institutional change (namely, a transformation, or a big 
adaptation at least). On the one hand, incentives of centralising investment conduct 
supervision might be lowered since it is politically costly in terms of sovereignty loss or 
national champions’ promotion, especially weakening the status of national 
supervisors.339 If the benefits of this centralisation cannot be demonstrated, this change 
would face strong resistance caused by path dependence.340 On the other hand, there is 
no guarantee that the current network-based system is the most efficient type of 
investment conduct governance either. In particular, many challenges to the current 
system have been recognised (such as, the institutional tension and weaknesses of 
ESMA).341 In the light of these two sides, an institutional comparative analysis is useful 
and necessary to make sure that either the current network-based system or the 
centralised system of investment conduct supervision is more efficient than the other. 
Likewise, this comparison could provide a clear indication about the position of the 
																																																																																																																																																													
Sunk Cost’ (1985) 35 Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Process 124, at 124–140. 
339 A similar concern emerged during the consultation of establishing SSM in the EBU: see Gerard Hertig, 
Ruben Lee and Joseph A. McCahery, ‘Empowering the ECB to Supervise Banks: A Choice-Based 
Approach’ (2010) 7 European Company & Financial Law Review 171, at 184. 
340 See further in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 above (pp. 182–186). 
341 See further in Section 4 of CHAPTER II (pp. 61–71) and CHAPTER III (pp. 105–128). 
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current system, so that responding reforms towards the optimum investment conduct 
governance could be designed. Based on the transaction cost approach established 
above, the result of this comparison has three possibilities, as shown in the following 
Figures. 
 
Figure IV-3: Possibility 1 of Centralised Investment Conduct Supervision  
in the EU 
First of all, assume that the optimum governance of investment conduct in the EU 
is a point ( ) somewhere between private law systems (Points B) and administrative 
regulation (Point C) on the IPF. And the current network-based system of investment 
conduct governance in the EU is at a point ( ). In terms of the reform aiming to 
centralise investment conduct supervision, it is an institutional change towards a higher 
extent of administrative regulation (→). Based on this assumption, if the current 
system is the most efficient one in accordance with the TCE, the two points (namely, 
 and ) will match at the same place. In this possibility, the reform of centralisation 
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shows. The path dependence resisting the change, thus, secures the efficient outcome. 
But, it is highly impossible that the current system is as perfect as this, given the 
challenges we examined.342 In reality, the point of the current system could be possibily 
either on the right side or on the left side of the optimum point, as the following 
possibilities 2 and 3. 
 
Figure IV-4: Possibility 2 of Centralised Investment Conduct Supervision  
in the EU 
If the point of the current system ( ) is on the right side of the optimum point 
( ), the relationship between the current system and the reform of centralisation could 
be viewed as the above Figure IV-4 shows. Similar to the line L1, the reform of 
centralisation (→) moves to the wrong direction, followed by an increase of total 
transaction costs. If the point of the current system ( ) is on the left side of the 
optimum point ( ), the centralisation of investment conduct supervision (→) might 
bring three possible sub-outcomes, as Figure IV-5 reveals below.  
																																																								



































































Figure IV-5: Possibility 3 of Centralised Investment Conduct Supervision  
in the EU 
In these cases, the direction of institutional change is correct, since that all changes 
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makes the point of the current system close to the optimum point, leading to a 
significant reduction of total transaction costs. However, an institutional change may 
move ‘too much’ and over the optimum point. As showed by lines L3.2 and L3.3 
respectively, an over movement would increase the total transaction costs again and 
even exceed the previous number of total transaction costs. 
Given these possibilities, an institutional comparison between the current system 
and the reform of centralisation is useful to confirm the relative positions of them and, 
most importantly, to find out the optimum point. Due to the fact that the above 
possibilities are on the interval of IPF between private law systems and administrative 
regulation, this institutional comparision shall include both the transaction costs of these 
two types of governance. Based on the outcome of this comparison, if the total 
transaction costs decrease after the reform of centralised supervision, the positions of 
them may look like lines L3.1 or L3.2; and, on the contrary, they may be more like the 
lines L2 or L3.3 if the total transaction costs increase. Technically, there is another 
possible outcome of the institutional comparison: namely, the sum of total transaction 
costs remains the same. In this situation, the optimum point is in the middle of the 
current system and the reformed system. However, given the difficulty of quantifying 
transaction costs, it is extremely difficult to obtain such an outcome by the institutional 
comparison. Moreover, from the positive viewpoint, path dependence resists 
institutional changes no matter in which case,343 so, without a significant reduction of 
the total transaction costs as lines L3.1 or L3.2 show, the reform to centralising 
																																																								
343 See further in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 above (pp. 182–186). 
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investment conduct is unnecessary and unfeasible to the CMU. In other words, if there 
is no significant decrease of the total transaction costs based on the outcome of an 
institutional comparison, the answer of the research question is negative otherwise. 
 Concluding Remarks 6.
This chapter has established the theoretical foundations of the transaction cost 
approach. The rationales and forms of investment conduct governance have also been 
identified. Based on this approach, market discipline, administrative regulation and 
private law systems all are types of investment conduct governance for reducing 
transaction costs. However, all of them face the issues of organisational failures, causing 
transaction costs to different extents. Therefore, no type of investment conduct 
governance is perfect, as transaction costs cannot be eliminated entirely, and there is no 
guarantee that either the current status or any proposed reform is the optimum one. 
What we can do is try to find a comparatively ‘better’ arrangement among the different 
types of investment conduct governance, in order to minimise the total transaction 
costs. 
In order to find an institutional solution to minimise the total transaction costs, the 
framework of institutional selection has also been established in this chapter. This 
framework not only summarises four basic forms of governance (i.e., market discipline, 
private law systems, administrative regulation and state ownership), but also opens a 
broad set of institutional solutions for investment conduct governance. By following the 
clear indication of choosing the optimum investment conduct governance provided by 
the IPF, private law systems and administrative regulation are taken into account 
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simultaneously. Furthermore, due to the fact that the current status of investment 
conduct governance is very unlikely to be optimum, the framework of institutional 
change is useful to explain the causes and process of any institutional reform in the real 
world. This framework highlights an important inequality between ‘efficient’ and 
‘equilibrium’, and ‘path dependence’ might be the major resistance of any big reform. 
On the whole, the transaction cost approach not only establishes a standard for the 
institutional selection and comparison, but also provides an indication of institutional 
change based on the results of the institutional comparison. By the sound of this, the 
research question—whether investment conduct should be supervised centralisedly at 
the EU level in the CMU—could be answered by a comprehensive institutional 




OPTIMUM PRIVATE LAW GOVERNANCE 
OF INVESTMENT CONDUCT  
IN THE CAPITAL MARKETS UNION 
‘The “Internal Market” (the EU multilevel system, the Economic 
and Political European Constitution), that I have in mind would 
be a co-ordination system of different visible hands [including 
European private law and national private legal orders] which 
combines aspects of efficiency with those of material justice and 
which does not only distribute competences between the European 
Community, the Member States (and private actors), but delimit 
them.’1 
 Introduction 1.
Based on the transaction cost approach set out in the last chapter, this chapter is 
going to examine the private law governance of investment conduct in the EU. As one 
commentator claims: ‘[i]n contrast to nominal separation, the CMU announces an 
in-principle public-private symbiosis of financial markets regulation, with public and 
private regulators inviting each other to articulate a co-governance space’.2 The CMU’s 
policy implication indeed reveals an important role for private law systems in the 
European capital markets integration.3 According to the model of ‘Eurolegalism’, it is 
																																																								
1 Hans-W Micklitz, ‘The Visible Hand of European Regulatory Private Law—The Transformation of 
European Private Law from Autonomy to Functionalism in Competition and Regulation’ (2009) 28 
Yearbook of European Law 3, at 59. 
2 Nicholas Dorn, ‘Capital Cohabitation: EU Capital Markets Union as Public and Private Co-Regulation’ 
(2016) 11 Capital Markets Law Journal 84, at 85. 
3 Fabrizio Cafaggi, ‘A Coordinated Approach to Regulation and Civil Liability in European Law: 
Rethinking Institutional Complementarities’ in Fabrizio Cafaggi (ed), The Institutional Framework of European 
Private Law (Oxford University Press, 2006), at 195–199. See further in Section 4.3 of CHAPTER II (pp. 
68–71). 
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also argued that the EU regime for investment services is developing towards regulation 
by ‘litigation’,4 which would bring the EU closer to an adversarial, judicialised approach 
with an increasing emphasis on its private law system.5 Therefore, when considering 
whether the CMU needs a centralised administrative authority in charge of investment 
conduct supervision, it is inevitable to compare transaction costs, from the perspective 
of private law systems, before and after this proposed reform. If transaction costs will 
not be reduced after the introduction of a single supervisor in charge of investment 
conduct supervision, this may provide an argument against further centralisation. 
However, private law systems in governing investment conduct in the EU are very 
complex, so this comparison shall be based on a comprehensive analysis of MiFID’s 
influence on national private law, the role of national private law and the function of the 
intra-European private international law. 
In order to do so, the remainder of this chapter falls into five sections. The first of 
these, Section 2, discusses the development of European private law and Treaty 
limitations on it. Section 3 examines the private law nature of the MiFID regime. The 
interaction between MiFID’s rules (as European private law) and national private law is 
further discussed in Section 4, on the basis of the UK position (and, in particular, 
English law, given London currently is still a leading financial centre in the EU). This 
discussion indicates some unresolved issues of the current private law systems in 
governing investment conduct in the EU. In Section 5, a number of critical thoughts for 
tackling such issues in the CMU are analysed, which includes ideas on the further 
																																																								
4 R. Daniel Kelemen, Eurolegalism: The Transformation of Law and Regulation in the European Union (Harvard 
University Press, 2011), at 115, 138–142. 
5 Ibid, at 96–97. 
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centralising of investment conduct supervision and establishing a pan-EU extra-judicial 
mechanism. In the final section, Section 6, conclusions of this chapter are drawn. 
 European Private Law and European Integration  2.
2.1. Late Development of European Private Law 
Originally, the Treaty of Rome in 1957, signed by six European nations, was 
‘exclusively public in inspiration and scope’.6 This is because the primary focus of the 
internal market, at that moment, was the abolition of tariffs and custom duties, which 
could be achieved without reference to the civil codes. Given a similar reason that the 
first purpose of capital markets legislation in the EU is not to deal with relations among 
investors, the development of instrumentalised private law in the investment firm/client 
relationship was comparatively late at the EU level.7 However, the ‘de-couplings’ of the 
European regulatory system from national private law systems ‘produces ever more 
disintegrative side-effect’ on the internal market policy.8 This segregation, thus, begins 
to buckle under heavy pressure from functionalists. The rationale behind this pressure is 
that EU law shall be applied and implemented in a uniform manner throughout the 
internal market, irrespective of how Member States conceive of the concepts of 
regulation, or of the public/private law divide.9 This pressure is becoming more and 
																																																								
6 Daniela Caruso, ‘The Missing View of the Cathedral: The Private Law Paradigm of European Legal 
Integration’ (1997) 3 European Law Journal 3, at 9. 
7 Eddy Wymeersch, ‘Private Law Remedies Relating to Obligations Flowing From EU Directives on 
Securities’ in Matti Rudanko and Pekka Timonen (eds), European Financial Area (Institute of International 
Economic Law (KATTI), 1996), at 203. 
8 Christian Joerges, ‘On the Legitimacy of Europeanising Private Law: Considerations on a Law of 
Justi(ce)-fication (Justum Facere) for the EU Multi-Level System’ in Arthur Hartknamp et al (eds), Towards 
a European Civil Code (3rd edn, Kluwer Law International, 2004), at 172. 
9 Constanze Semmelmann, The Public-Private Divide in European Union Law or an Overkill of Functionalism 
(Maastricht European Private Law Institute Working Paper No 2012/12, 2012), at 13–14. See further in 
Article 288 of TFEU and Section 3.1 below (pp. 200–201). 
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more strong under the trend of internationalisation and globalisation.10 Therefore, 
European legislation starts to ‘instrumentalise’ rules of private law.11  This is the 
so-called ‘goal-oriented private law’,12 or ‘regulatory private law’.13 Private law now has 
a prominent ‘state-making’ role in the EU.14 
Given this on-going change, it can be very difficult to assign any given provision of 
the EU law to either private law or administrative regulation in the current state of 
development.15 Primary and secondary laws in the EU now are organised along the 
lines of the overall objective of market integration as reflected in the different subject 
matters, functionally.16 The split between public law and private law is abandoned by 
EU legislation.17 For example, it is not unusual that specific duties of investment firms, 
whether contractual or non-contractual, are imposed simultaneously by general private 
																																																								
10 Inger-Johanne Sand, ‘Globalization and the Transcendence of the Public/Private Divide—What is 
Public Law under Conditions of Globalization?’ in Cormac Mac Amhlaigh, Claudio Michelon and Neil 
Walker (eds), After Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2013), at 208–210. 
11 Christian Joerges, ‘The Challenges of Europeanization in the Realm of Private Law: A Plea for a New 
Legal Discipline’ (2004) 14 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 149, at 183. 
12 Fabrizio Cafaggi and Horatia Muir Watt, The Making of European Private Law: Regulation and Governance 
Design (European Governance Papers No N-07-02, 2007), at 12. 
13 H.-W. Micklitz, above note 1, at 6–7. For a detailed comparison between European private law and 
national private law: see Ralf Michaels, ‘Of Islands and the Ocean: The Two Rationalities of European 
Private Law’ in Roger Brownsword et al (eds), The Foundations of European Private Law (Hart Publishing, 
2011), at 144–149. 
14 Daniela Caruso, ‘Private Law and State-Making in the Age of Globalization’ (2006) 39 New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics 1, at 24–26 and 31–33. 
15 Michael Dougan, ‘Who Exactly Benefits From The Treaties? The Murky Interaction Between Union 
And National Competence Over The Capacity To Enforce EU Law’ (2010) 12 Cambridge Yearbook of 
European Legal Studies 73, at 77; Hugh Collins, ‘The Hybrid Quality of European Private Law’ in Roger 
Brownsword et al (eds), The Foundations of European Private Law (Hart Publishing, 2011), at 453; Michel 
Rosenfeld, ‘Rethinking the Boundaries between Public Law and Private Law for the Twenty First Century: 
An Introduction’ (2013) 11 International Journal of Constitutional Law 125, at 126;  
16 For an analysis of the EU’s primary law: see Okeoghene Odudu, ‘The Public/Private Distinction in 
EU Internal Market Law’ (2010) 46 Revue trimestrielle de droit europeen 826, at 826–841; for an analysis of the 
EU’s secondary law: see Norbert Reich, ‘The Public/Private Divide in European law’ in Hans-W. Micklitz 
and Fabrizio Cafaggi (eds), European Private Law after the Common Frame of Reference (Edward Elgar, 2010), at 
56–89.  
17 Fabrizio Cafaggi and Horatia Muir Watt, ‘Introduction’ in Fabrizio Cafaggi and Horatia Muir Watt 
(eds), The Regulatory Function of European Private Law (Edward Elgar, 2009), at xi. For a similar discussion 
from the international viewpoint: see Mahmood Bagheri and Chizu Nakajima, ‘International Securities 
Markets, the Diversity of National Regulations and the Relevance of the Public/Private Law Dichotomy’ 
(2001) 3 International and Comparative Corporate Law Journal 49, at 49–75. 
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law, and by rules of administrative regulation in different jurisdictions in the EU.18 The 
blurring between private law systems and administrative regulation (and even 
combinations of both) does not present serious problems, but complementarities in the 
EU.19 This also proves that the European law is essentially a ‘law of governance’ and 
European private law is just one form of this governance, according to the transaction 
cost approach established in the last chapter.20 
2.2. Treaty Limitations on Harmonisation of European Private Law  
Despite some commentators claiming that the harmonisation of private law in 
international capital markets is more likely to happen than administrative regulation,21 
this may not be the case in the European private law. Unlike Article 83.2 of the TFEU 
that provides a legitimate competence for the EU to impose harmonisation policy of 
criminal law, there is no clear provision in the EU Treaties for harmonising private law 
in the EU.22 European private law, thus, is formed by a decentralised mode and the EU 
only has limited powers in this field. To some extent, this decentralised system is 
designed to find a dynamic balance between: (i) the wills of Member States to defend 
their sovereign justice, and (ii) their need to find institutional answers to transnational 
																																																								
18 Apostolos Gkoutzinis, ‘Free Movement of Services in the EC Treaty and the Law of Contractual 
Obligations relating to Banking and Financial Services’ (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 119, at 167. 
19 Wolfgang Kerber, ‘European System of Private Laws: An Economic Perspective’ in Fabrizio Cafaggi 
and Horatia Muir-Watt (eds), Making European Private Law: Governance Design (Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2010), at 70. See further in Section 4.3 of CHAPTER IV (pp. 174–176). 
20 See further in Section 4.4 of CHAPTER IV (pp. 176–179). 
21 See, e.g., M. Bagheri and C. Nakajima, above note 17, at 64–65. 
22 There is no article like Article 83.2 of the TFEU that provides for the EU’s competence to impose 
harmonisation policy of criminal law. For further discussion regarding this issue: see Jacobien W. Rutgers, 
‘European Competence and a European Civil Code, a Common Frame of Reference or an Optional 
Intrument’ in Arthur S. Hartkamp et al (eds), Towards a European Civil Code (4th edn, Kluwer Law 
International, 2011), at 313–328. 
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litigation within the process of EU integration.23 In accordance with Article 81 of the 
TFEU,24 it requires the EU to develop judicial ‘cooperation’ in civil matters having 
cross-border implications ‘particularly when necessary for the proper functioning of the 
internal market’.25 However, in many cases, it is hard to assess the impact of the 
absence of such uniform system of private law on intra-European trade,26 but, in the 
presence of highly harmonised private law systems, the possibility of undermining the 
domestic law of Member States might be easily proven.27 Likewise, even though the 
term ‘cooperation’ may include ‘measures for the approximation’,28 Article 81, unlike 
the breadth of Article 114, lists the measures that can be adopted exhaustively.29 
Therefore, in the absence of a treaty amendment, private law systems will continue 
to represent a major sensitivity for Member State/EU separation of powers.30 The core 
																																																								
23 Mattia Magrassi, ‘Reconsidering the Principle of Separation of Powers: Judicial Networking and 
Institutional Balance in the Process of European Integration’ (2011) 3 Contemporary Readings in Law and 
Social Justice 159, at 175–176. 
24 It should be noted that not all Member States are bound by this Article. Denmark, the UK and Ireland 
can decide to opt in (or out) of relative policies based on this Article: see Protocol (No 21) on the 
position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the area of freedom, security and justice, 2008 
OJ C115/295; and Protocol (No 22) on the position of Denmark, 2008 OJ C115/299. 
25 Article 81.2 of the TFEU. 
26 Martin Boodman, ‘The Myth of Harmonization of Laws’ (1991) 39 The American Journal of Comparative 
Law 699, at 715–716; Gerhard Wagner, ‘The Economics of Harmonization: the Case of Contract Law’ 
(2002) 39 Common Market Law Review 995, at 1006–1018. 
27 HM Government, Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the 
European Union: Civil Judicial Cooperation, February, 2014, para. 2.13, available at: 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/279228/civil-judicial
-cooperation-report-review-of-balance-of-competences.pdf> (accessed June, 2016). 
28 Article 81.1 of the TFEU. 
29 Article 81.2 lists eight measures exhaustively: ‘(a) the mutual recognition and enforcement between 
Member States of judgments and of decisions in extrajudicial cases; (b) the cross-border service of judicial 
and extrajudicial documents; (c) the compatibility of the rules applicable in the Member States concerning 
conflict of laws and of jurisdiction; (d) cooperation in the taking of evidence; (e) effective access to justice; 
(f) the elimination of obstacles to the proper functioning of civil proceedings, if necessary by promoting 
the compatibility of the rules on civil procedure applicable in the Member States; (g) the development of 
alternative methods of dispute settlement;(h) support for the training of the judiciary and judicial staff.’ 
30 Niamh Moloney, ‘Effective Policy Design for the Retail Investment Services Market: Challenges and 
Choices Post FSAP’ in Guido Ferrarini and E. Wymeersch (eds), Investor Protection in Europe: Corporate Law 
Making, the MiFID and Beyond (Oxford University Press, 2006), at 425; Christian Twigg-Flesner, 
‘Introduction: Key Features of European Union Private Law’ in Christian Twigg-Flesner (ed), The 
Cambridge Companion to European Union Private Law (Cambridge University Press, 2010), at 14–18. 
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of private law systems in Member States has to remain in the hands of national 
institutions with autonomy—as ‘a sort of antidote to the dilution of regional identities’.31 
In order to find a compromise of various legal cultures in private law in Member 
States,32 soft methods or harmonisation of non-core and commonly agreed elements 
might be more feasible in the practice of the European private law.33 Compared to 
regulatory rules, there may not be a high level of harmonisation of private law systems 
regarding financial services in the EU.34 This also explains why the Lamfalussy process 
is much determined by way of regulatory rules and leaves a free forum to national 
private law.35 
 MiFID Functioning as European Private Law  3.
3.1. MiFID’s Influence on National Private Law 
When considering private law systems in governing investment conduct in the EU, 
the first question is whether MiFID’s rules have influence on national private law. 
Indeed, on the basis of the Lamfalussy structure, MiFID’s rules are predominantly 
																																																								
31 D. Caruso, ‘The Missing View of the Cathedral: The Private Law Paradigm of European Legal 
Integration’, above note 6, at 4. 
32 Lorenz Kähler, ‘Conflict and Compromise in the Harmonization of European Law’ in Thomas 
Wilhelmsson, Elina Paunio and Annika Pohjolainen (eds), Private Law and the Many Cultures of Europe 
(Kluwer Law International, 2007), at 135–139. 
33 Peter Rott, ‘Effective Enforcement and Different Enforcement Cultures in Europe’ in Thomas 
Wilhelmsson, Elina Paunio and Annika Pohjolainen (eds), Private Law and the Many Cultures of Europe 
(Kluwer Law International, 2007), at 312–315, 318–321. For example, some plan a similar policy of the 
Principles of European Law for Financial Service Contracts (‘PELFSC’), but in a softer way of the 
Common Frame of Reference (‘CFR’): see Olha O. Cherednychenko and Chris E.C. Jansen, ‘Principles of 
European Law on Financial Service Contracts?’ (2008) 16 European Review of Private Law 443, at 443–468. 
Some suggest that an EU Investment Law Acquis Database should be established: see Niamh Moloney, 
‘Liability of Asset Managers: A Comment’ (2012) 7 Capital Markets Law Journal 414, at 422. 
34 Olha O. Cherednychenko, ‘Full Harmonization of Retail Financial Services Contract Law in Europe: A 
Success or a Failure?’ in Stefan Grundmann and Yesim M. Atamer (eds), Financial Services, Financial Crisis 
and General European Contract Law: Failure and Challenges of Contracting (Kluwer Law International, 2011), at 
226–227. 
35 Hans-W. Micklitz, ‘Regulatory Strategies on Services Contracts in EC Law’ in Fabrizio Cafaggi and 
Horatia Muir Watt (eds), The Regulatory Function of European Private Law (Edward Elgar, 2009), at 27–29. See 
further in Section 3.1 of CHAPTER II (pp. 23–27). 
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designed to harmonise rules of administrative regulation in Member States.36 But, the 
MiFID regime does not prohibit Member States from considering the private law nature 
of its rules, even though it may not have the intention to do so.37 Theoretically, the 
MiFID regime has three possible ways to affect private cases as follows. 
First, MiFID’s investment conduct rules could be transposed into national private 
law systems. According to Article 288.3 of the TFEU, ‘[a] Directive shall be binding, as 
to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall 
leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods.’ In the absence of any 
clear provision, Member States could freely use different ways (whether by 
administrative rules or private law) to transpose MiFID’s rules into their national legal 
systems, provided that they could ensure that infringements are penalised in an 
‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’ way.38 However, it is needed to remind two 
limits on this transposition if Member States decide to transpose MiFID’s investment 
conduct rules into their national private laws: (i) this transposition is subject to the 
principles of equivalence and effectiveness, namely, the national remedies and 
procedures ‘are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions’ and 
they do not make the exercise of rights conferred by the EU legal order ‘practically 
impossible or excessively difficult’;39 and (ii) this transposition shall not endanger the 
																																																								
36 See further in Section 3.3 of CHAPTER II (pp. 32–61). 
37 See further in Section 4.3 of CHAPTER II (pp. 68–71). 
38 CJEU, Case 68/88, Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic, [1989] ECR 2965, para. 24; 
CJEU, Case C-326/88, Anklagemyndigheden v Hansen & Soen I/S, [1990] ECR I-2911, para. 17. 
39 See, e.g., CJEU, Joined cases C-397/98 and C-410/98, Metallgesellschaft and Others, [2001] ECR 
I-1727, para. 85; C-147/01, Weber's Wine World and Others, [2003] ECR I-11365, para. 103; C-291/03, 
MyTravel, [2005] ECR I-8477, para. 17; Case C-591/10, Littlewoods Retail and Others, [2012] 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:478, para. 27. For a comprehensive discussion of the principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness: see Michael Dougan, ‘The Vicissitudes of Life at the Coalface: Remedies and Procedures 
for Enforcing Union Law before the National Courts’ in Paul P. Craig and Gráinne De Búrca (eds), The 
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effective judicial protection of Member States required by Article 19.1 of the TEU and 
Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.40 
Second, MiFID’s investment conduct rules may have some influence on the 
client/investment firm relationships, regardless of the fact that these rules are 
transposed into national regulatory rules or private law. In accordance with the settled 
CJEU case law, Directives are addressed exclusively to Member States and do not have 
a ‘horizontal direct effect’ on individuals, i.e., a Directive ‘cannot of itself impose 
obligations on an individual and cannot therefore be relied on as such against an 
individual’.41 Nevertheless, according to Article 4.3 of the TEU, Member States ‘shall 
take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the 
obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the 
Union’. This obligation is also binding on national courts of Member States, so national 
courts are required to interpret national law ‘in the light of the wording and purpose’ of 
EU Directives in order to ensure the full effectiveness of EU law.42 This is the so-called 
‘horizontal indirect effect’.43 By means of this, ‘effective’ MiFID’s rules could have an 
																																																																																																																																																													
Evolution of EU Law (Oxofrd University Press, 2011), at 407–438. 
40 For critical analyses of the relationship between the principle of effectiveness and the effective judicial 
protection: see Sacha Prechal and Rob Widdershoven, ‘Redefining the Relationship between 
‘Rewe-effectiveness’ and Effective Judicial Protection’ (2011) 4 Review of European Administrative Law 31, at 
38–49; Marek Safjan and Dominik Düsterhaus, ‘A Union of Effective Judicial Protection: Addressing a 
Multi-level Challenge through the Lens of Article 47 CFREU’ (2014) 33 Yearbook of European Law 3, at 9–
26. 
41 CJEU, Case 152/48, Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority, [1986] ECR 
723, para. 48; Case C-91/92, Faccini Dori v Recreb, [1994] ECR I-3325, para. 20; Case C-192/94, El Corte 
Inglés v Blázquez Rivero, [1996] ECR I-1281, para 15; Case C-201/02, Wells v Secretary of State for Transport, 
Local Government and the Regions, [2004] ECR I-23, para. 56; Joined Cases C-397/01 to C-403/01, Pfeiffer et al 
v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz et al, [2004] ECR I-8835, para. 108; and Case C-555/07, Ku ̈cu ̈k- deveci v Swedex GmbH 
& Co. KG, [2010] ECR I-00365, para. 46. 
42 CJEU, Case 14/83, Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, [1984] ECR 1891, para. 26; Case 
C-106/89, Marleasing v Comercial Internacional de Alimentación, [1990] ECR I-4135, para. 8; Case C-334/92, 
Wagner Miret v Fondo de garantía salarial, [1993] ECR I-6911, para. 20; Case C-131/97, Carbonari and Others, 
[1999] ECR I-1103, para. 48; Case C-62/00, Marks & Spencer, [2002] ECR I-6348, para. 24 
43 In fact, there is a debate about the difference between the terminologies of ‘horizontal direct/indirect 
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influence on the courts’ interpretation of national law at least, or even lead to similar 
results which would be achieved if the Directives were capable of producing a 
horizontal effect in the case law system.44 Having said that, this effect is not without 
restrictions: (i) such an interpretation cannot determine nor aggravate the criminal 
liabilities of persons who act in contravention of that Directive’s provisions;45 and (ii) 
national courts have to consider national law as a whole (namely, ‘on the basis of all 
provisions of national law’) in order to assess to what extent it may be applied, so as not 
to produce a result contrary to that sought by the Directive.46  
Third, national regulatory rules transposing MiFID’s investment conduct rules 
could influence judgements in private law cases. For example, by taking into account of 
the aim of investor protection, many scholars suggest that the burden of proof should 
be reversed in serious violations of the investment services providers’ obligations under 
the MiFID regime.47 However, there is no consistent approach between national courts 
																																																																																																																																																													
effect’ and ‘direct/indirect horizontal effect’. However, this is outside the scope of this study, and does 
not affect the analysis below; this study applies the former since it is the usual one in the EU law. For 
further information regarding this debate: see Arthur Hartkamp, ‘The Effect of the EC Treaty in Private 
Law: On Direct and Indirect Horizontal Effects of Primary Community Law’ (2010) 18 European Review of 
Private Law 527, at 527–548; and Christiaan Timmermans, ‘Horizontal Direct/Indirect Effect or 
Direct/Indirect Horizontal Effect: What’s in a Name?’ (2016) 24 European Review of Private Law 673, at 
673–685. 
44 Takis Tridimas, ‘Black, White, and Shades of Grey: Horizontality of Directives Revisited’ (2001) 21 
Yearbook of European Law 327, at 347–348; Paul Craig, ‘The Legal Effect of Directives: Policy, Rules and 
Exceptions’ (2009) 34 European Law Review 349, at 359. 
45 CJEU, Case C-168/95, Arcaro, [1996] ECR I-4730, para. 42; Case C-457/02, Niselli, [2004] ECR 
I-10853, para. 29; C-60/02, X, [2004] ECR I-651 para. 61; Joined Cases C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, 
C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P, Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission, [2005] ECR I-5425, 
para. 221. 
46 CJEU, Case C-131/97, Carbonari and Others, [1999] ECR I-1103, para. 50; Joined Cases C-397/01 to 
C-403/01, Pfeiffer and Others, [2004] ECR I-8916, para. 115. 
47 Norbert Reich, ‘The Interrelation between Rights and Duties in EU Law: Reflections on the State of 
Liability Law in the Multilevel Governance System of the Union: Is There a Need for a More Coherent 
Approach in European Private Law?’ (2010) 29 Yearbook of European Law 112, at 158–159; Hans-Wolfgang 
Micklitz, ‘The Paradox of Access to Financial Services for Consumers’ (2010) 1 Revue europe ́enne de droit de 
la consommation/European Consumer Law Journal 7, at 26; Gerald Spindler, ‘Behavioural Finance and Investor 
Protection Regulations’ (2011) 34 Journal of Consumer Policy 315, at 328; Martin Hobza, ‘Investment 
Services and Protection of the Retail Client’ (2015) 1 The Lawyer Quarterly 51, at 58. 
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on this issue. In Austria, some courts are reluctant to consider regulatory rules, and 
rather concern themselves with fundamental issues of contract law and consumer law.48 
The Dutch Supreme Court has argued that some regulatory rules ‘influence’ private law 
duties, but do not ‘determine’. 49  Italian and Spanish courts establish particular 
mechanisms to alleviate the burden of proof in liability claims and even waive the need 
to prove the amount of damages, if an infringement of regulatory rules is proven.50 The 
German Civil Law Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) also gives its opinion of this issue: (i) 
since the court traditionally has assumed an implied agency contract between investment 
firms and their clients, relative contents of regulatory rules (such as the suitability and 
appropriateness requirements) are seen as contractual standards; but (ii) the court has 
not assumed that organisational duties, namely the internal control and 
conflict-of-interest requirements, are owed to the clients, nor does the court assume this 
for documentation duties.51 In Greece, the prevailing opinion is that regulatory rules 
affect private law relation ‘reflexively’, through the general principles of private law (i.e., 
contract rules, consumer protection rules and tort provisions). 52  More different 
applications and implementations of MiFID’s rule in private law cases can be found on 
asset managers’ civil liabilities in different national courts.53 
																																																								
48 Susanne Kalss, ‘Civil Law Protection of Investors in Austria – A Situation Report from Amidst a Wave 
of Investor Lawsuits’ (2012) 13 European Business Organization Law Review 211, at 215. 
49  Olha O. Cherednychenko, ‘European Securities Regulation, Private Law and the Investment 
Firm-Client Relationship’ (2009) 5 European Review of Private Law 925, at 941–942. 
50 Federico Della Negra, ‘The Private Enforcement of the MiFID Conduct of Business Rules. An 
Overview of the Italian and Spanish Experiences’ (2014) 10 European Review of Contract Law 571, at 579–
586. 
51 Stefan Grundmann and Christian Hofmann, ‘EC Financial Services and Contract Law – Developments 
2007–2010’ (2010) 6 European Review of Contract Law 467, at 482–483. 
52 Vassilios Tountopoulos, ‘Investor Protection under MiFID: A Survey of Greek Case Law’ (2016) 27 
European Business Law Review 513, 517–531. 
53 Danny Busch, ‘Why MiFID Matters to Private Law—the Example of MiFID’s Impact on An Asset 
Manager’s Civil Liability’ (2012) 7 Capital Markets Law Journal 386, at 386–413. For a comprehensive 
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3.2. Bankinter  and Bani f  Plus Bank  Cases 
Given the chaos of MiFID’s influence on private law systems, the Spanish court 
asked for clarification from the CJEU in the Genil 48 and Comercial Hostelera de Grandes 
Vinos case (‘Bankinter case’) on the basis of Article 267 of the TFEU.54 In this case from 
Spain, as MiFID’s ‘suitability’55 and ‘appropriateness’56 requirements are transposed 
into administrative rules only in Spanish law, a relevant question arose: whether an 
interest-rate swap agreement to cover the risk of variations of interest rates would be 
‘void ab initio’ if the ‘suitability’ and ‘appropriateness’ tests under MiFID are not meet?57 
The CJEU confirmed that the MiFID regime, albeit it rules the imposition of 
administrative measures or sanctions against infringements, does not state either 
Member States must provide for ‘contractual consequences’ in the event of contracts 
being concluded which do not comply with the obligations under national legal 
provisions transposing MiFID’s investment conduct rules, or what those consequences 
might be.58 In the absence of any clear provision, for the internal legal order of each 
Member State, Member States could determine ‘contractual consequences’ where an 
investment firm offering investment services fails to comply with these requirements, 
subject to observance of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.59 The answer 
to this case is examined again by the CJEU in the Banif Plus Bank Zrt. v Márton Lantos, 
																																																																																																																																																													
analysis of private-law divergences in Member States regarding the liability of asset managers: see Danny 
Busch and Deborah A. DeMott (eds), Liability of Asset Managers (Oxford University Press 2012), Parts III–
V. 
54 CJEU, Case C-604/11, Genil 48 SL and Comercial Hostelera de Grandes Vinos SL v Bankinter SA and Banco 
Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA, [2013] EU:C:2013:344. 
55 Article 19.4 of MiFID I; see further in Section 3.3.6 of CHAPTER II (pp. 48–50). 
56 Article 19.5 of MiFID I; see further in Section 3.3.6 of CHAPTER II (pp. 50–51). 
57 CJEU, Case C-604/11, above note 54, para. 22. 
58 Ibid, para. 57. 
59 Ibid, para. 58. 
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Mártonné Lantos case (Banif Plus Bank case).60 In this case, the CJEU confirmed that 
national courts could rule on the classification of the terms within a foreign currency 
denominated consumer credit agreement once they could follow the standard 
established by the Bankinter case.61 However, according to the CJEU’s opinion given by 
these two cases, there are two possibly extended and polarised arguments. On the one 
hand, some may argue these two case laws can be interpreted as: (i) characterising 
MiFID I’s duties as contractual or other private law rules that ‘gives individual claims’ to 
clients, and (ii) leaving ‘the freedom to national law to determine the private law 
remedies’.62 This understanding imposes on Member States an ‘obligation’ to transpose 
MiFID’s rules into their private law systems, albeit they enjoy the freedom of how to do 
so. On the other hand, it is also possible to treat the CJEU’s opinion in these two cases 
as a clear emphasis on the administrative nature of MiFID’s rules.63 In this reading, the 
CJEU just repeats a ‘right’ of Member States to transpose MiFID’s rules into their 
private laws within its well-established case law, and the only condition of this 
transposition is to follow the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. Therefore, it is 
still unclear whether these two case laws impose Member States an ‘obligation’ to 
transpose MiFID’s investment conduct rules into their private laws. 
By considering the wording of the MiFID regime and its legislative history, the 
latter reading above might be more convincing here than the first reading. There are two 
																																																								
60  CJEU, Case C-312/14, Banif Plus Bank Zrt. v Márton Lantos, Mártonné Lantos, [2015] 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:794. 
61 Ibid, para. 79. 
62 Stefan Grundmann, ‘The Bankinter Case on MIFID Regulation and Contract Law’ (2013) 9 European 
Review of Contract Law 267, at 278; F. D. Negra, above note 50, at 578–579. 
63 Olha O. Cherednychenko, ‘Public and Private Enforcement of European Private Law in the Financial 
Services Sector’ (2015) 24 European Review of Private Law 621, at 635–636. 
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reasons for this. First, if the EU law wants to impose such an obligation on Member 
States, it must be written in provisions unequivocally. For example, in Article 6.2 of the 
Prospective Directive,64 it clearly states that ‘Member States shall ensure that their laws, 
regulation and administrative provisions on civil liability apply to those persons 
responsible for the information given in a prospectus.’ Also, Article 11.1 of the KID 
Regulation65 explicitly requires that ‘the PRIIP manufacturer shall not incur civil liability 
solely on the basis of the key information document, including any translation thereof, 
unless it is misleading, inaccurate or inconsistent with the relevant parts of legally 
binding pre-contractual and contractual documents or with the requirements laid down 
in Article 8.’ In contrast, Article 69 of MiFID II (which is entitled ‘supervisory powers’) 
only mentions ‘Member States shall ensure that mechanisms are in place to ensure that 
compensation may be paid or other remedial action be taken in accordance with 
national law for any financial loss or damage suffered as a result of an infringement of 
this Directive [MiFID II] or of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 [MiFIR]’. Recital 7 of 
MiFID II also expressly states: ‘[t]he form of a Directive is appropriate in order to 
enable the implementing provisions in the areas covered by this Directive, when 
necessary, to be adjusted to any existing specificities of the particular market and legal 
system in each Member State.’ Since the mechanisms might be formed by either 
administrative measures or civil liabilities, there is no place to restrict the Treaty ‘right’ 
of Member States by turning it into an ‘obligation’.66 There is no clear provision to 
																																																								
64 Directive 2003/71/EC on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or 
admitted to trading and amending Directive 2001/34/EC, 2003 OJ L345/31. 
65  Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 on key information documents for packaged retail and 
insurance-based investment products (PRIIPs), 2014 OJ L352/2. 
66 For a similar argument relating to the Market Abuse Directive: see Vassilios Tountopoulos, ‘Market 
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impose Member States an ‘obligation’ to transpose MiFID’s investment conduct rules 
into their private laws. 
Second, there have been many efforts to try to harmonise the civil liability of 
MiFID’s investment conduct rules, but these have failed. For example, the Commission 
was aware of this issue since the drafting of MiFID I,67 and the Parliament also 
attempted to make clear that MiFID I supersedes traditional pre-existing civil 
liabilities.68 But, all of these voices disappeared in the final context of MiFID I. During 
the period of consultation on MiFID II, the Commission again proposed to build a 
principle of civil liabilities with regard to relevant obligations of investment conduct,69 
but MiFID II did not address this issue eventually. These precedents not only prove the 
Treaty difficulties of introducing harmonised rules in private law, but also indicate that, 
compared to private law, a consensus on harmonising administrative legislation is much 
easier to be reached among European policymakers.70  
Indeed, in order to build up a common capital market law in the EU, some may 
																																																																																																																																																													
Abuse and Private Enforcement’ (2014) 11 European Company & Financial Law Review 297, at 302–304. 
67 ‘Consequently, retail investors may derive benefit and confidence from the possibility of seeking 
redress within their own jurisdiction’: see Commission of the European Communities, Communication 
from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Upgrading the Investment Services 
Directive (93/22/EEC), COM (2000) 729 Final, November, 2000, at 10, available at: 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52000DC0729&from=EN> 
(accessed June, 2017). 
68 European Parliament, Report on the proposal for a European Parliament and Council directive on 
Investment services and regulated market, and amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC, Council 
Directive 93/6/EEC and European Parliament and Council 2000/12/EC (COM(2002) 625 – 
C5-0586/2002 – 2002/0269(COD)), A5-0287/2003, September, 2013, Amendment 23, available at: 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A5-2003
-0287+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN> (accessed June, 2017). 
69 European Commission, Public Consultation: Review of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
(MiFID), December, 2010, para. 7.2.6, available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/mifid/consultation_paper_en.pdf> 
(accessed June, 2017). 
70 Takis Tridimas, ‘EU Financial Regulation: Federalization, Crisis Management, and Law Reform’ in 
Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford University Press, 2011), at 793–
794. 
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keep arguing for a necessary harmonisation of MiFID’s civil liabilities by further 
legislation.71 However, the Treaty limitations may not easily allow the EU to do so.72 
The CJEU is unable to create an obligation on Member States to transpose MiFID’s 
rules into their private laws. As a sign of the CJEU’s disability of adopting a uniform 
approach towards this sensitive issue, Member States should retain the freedom to 
transpose MiFID’s rules, whether into their administrative rules or private law. This 
would leave different models reflecting elements of the current practices in a variety of 
jurisdictions.73 
3.3. Irreplaceable but Divergent Practices of National Private Law 
In fact, whether there is an obligation on Member States to transpose MiFID’s 
rules into their national private law systems, the important role of national private law 
could never be replaced. For example, even if MiFID’s rules are transposed into 
Member States’ national private law systems,74 civil liability of these rules are still relied 
on domestic private law and courts in order to maintain the internal order of each 
Member State, because there is no harmonised rule regarding the MiFID’s civil liability. 
Furthermore, even if MiFID’s rules are transposed into Member States’ regulatory rules 
only, MiFID’s horizontal indirect effect and these regulatory rules’ influence on private 
law cases,75 both depends largely on the application of national private law by national 
																																																								
71 Thomas M. J. Möllers, ‘European Legislative Practice 2.0: Dynamic Harmonisation of Capital Markets 
Law - MiFID II and PRIIP’ (2015) 31 Banking & Finance Law Review 141, at 168 and 170–171. 
72 See Section 2.2 above (pp. 197–199). 
73 Cherednychenko further classified four possible models of the relationship between MiFID’s rules and 
national private law system: (i) substitution, (ii) separation, (iii) complementarity and (iv) integration. See 
Olha O. Cherednychenko, ‘Contract Governance in the EU: Conceptualising the Relationship between 
Investor Protection Regulation and Private Law’ (2015) 21 European Law Journal 500, at 504–518. 
74 See further in Section 3.1 above (pp. 200–201). 
75 See further in Section 3.1 above (pp. 201–203). 
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courts. Also, if there is an issue not covered by MiFID’s rules or national regulatory 
rules, national private law has the potential to address problems encountered by 
individual investors in relation to investment firms.76 For example, a large number of 
decisions that relied on various private law techniques were made by English courts to 
address unregulated problems of the over-the-counter (‘OTC’) markets during the 
financial crisis.77 In any case, national private law systems underpin the well-functioning 
of European capital markets law.78 By taking into account of this role of national 
private law systems, national courts might be considered as another type of authorities 
in governing investment conduct,79 as ‘quasi-agencies’ (quasi-regulators).80 
Without doubt, these quasi-agencies/national courts would recognise the 
supremacy of a European measure in accordance with the established constitutional 
structure.81 Nevertheless, the CJEU, unlike ESMA, only has power to co-ordinate 
national private law systems in accordance with Article 267 of the TFEU. As clarified by 
the Freiburger Kommunalbauten case, the CJEU is not a court of last instance to rule on the 
application of a particular term that must be considered in the light of the particular 
																																																								
76 O. O. Cherednychenko, ‘European Securities Regulation, Private Law and the Investment Firm-Client 
Relationship’, above note 49, at 945. 
77 See, e.g., Pioneer Freight Futures Co Ltd (in liquidation) v TMT Asia Ltd [2011] EWHC 778 (Comm); [2011] 
2 Lloyd’s Rep. 96; Standard Chartered Bank v Ceylon Petroleum Corporation [2011] EWHC 1785 (Comm). For 
comprehensive statistical data: see Joanne P. Braithwaite, ‘OTC Derivatives, the Courts and Regulatory 
Reform’ (2012) 7 Capital Markets Law Journal 364, at 365–371. 
78 Rüdiger Veil, ‘Enforcement of Capital Markets Law in Europe - Observations from a Civil Law 
Country’ (2010) 11 European Business Organization Law Review 409, at 421; Athanasios G. Panagopoulos, 
Thomas Chatzigagios and Ioannis Dokas, ‘The Main Effects of MiFID on European Capital Markets and 
European Integration’ (2015) 6 International Journal of Business Administration 52, at 58. 
79 Steve Hedley, ‘Courts as Public Authorities, Private Law as Instrument of Government’ in Kit Barker 
and Darryn Jensen (eds), Private Law: Key Encounters with Public Law (Cambridge University Press, 2013), at 
89–90. 
80 Hans-W. Micklitz, ‘The Transformation of Enforcement in European Private Law: Preliminary 
Considerations’ (2015) 23 European Review of Private Law 491, at 509. 
81 See, e.g., CJEU, Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v 
Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, [1963] ECR 1, at 12; Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze 
dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA, [1978] ECR 629, para. 22. 
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circumstances of the case in question by national courts, so the CJEU has only a very 
limited opportunity to interpret the general criteria of relevant EU provisions.82 On the 
one hand, each Member State’s court systems could easily develop their own 
interpretation and understanding of the EU’s law of governance in the absence of a 
hierarchical judicial system (such as, the federal court in the USA).83 On the other hand, 
national courts need this flexibility of interpretation in each case. This is because judges 
in private law systems cannot withdraw from their offices when new cases occur.84 
National courts have to fill the ‘regulatory voids’ of the EU legislation by relevant civil 
law principles.85  
This decentralised model inevitably and necessarily would cause different 
interpretations and applications of European private law. For example, a British court 
can interpret the meaning of ‘good faith’ in Article 3 of Council Directive 93/13/EEC 
on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts (‘UCTD’)86 within the traditional common 
law notions, and it is unnecessary either to refer the matter to the CJEU or to consider 
other potential meanings in continental system.87 In contrast, Germany has developed 
																																																								
82 CJEU, Case C-237/02, Freiburger Kommunalbauten GmbH Baugesellschaft & Co. KG v Ludger Hofstetter and 
Ulrike Hofstetter, [2004] ECR I-3403, para. 22. For critiques of this restrictive explanation of the CJEU’s 
role: see Peter Rott, ‘What is the Role of the ECJ in EC Private Law?’ (2005) 1 Hanse Law Review 6, at 9–
17; Christoph U. Schmid, ‘Judicial governance in the European Union: The ECJ as a constitutional and a 
private law court’ in Erik Oddvar Eriksen, Christian Joerges and Florian Ro ̈dl (eds), Law, Democracy and 
Solidarity in a Post-national Union: The Unsettled Political Order of Europe (Routledge, 2008), at 92. 
83 Hugh Collins, ‘Governance Implications for the European Union of the Changing Character of Private 
Law’ in Fabrizio Cafaggi and Horatia Muir Watt (eds), Making European Private Law: Governance Design 
(Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010), at 271–272. 
84 Jürgen Basedow, ‘Codification of Private Law in the European Union: the Making of a Hybrid’ (2001) 
9 European Review of Private Law 35, at 42–43. 
85 Heikki Marjosola, ‘What Role for Courts in Protecting Investors in Europe – A View from Finland’ 
(2014) 10 European Review of Contract Law 545, at 562. 
86 Council Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts, 1993 OJ L95/29. (‘UCTD’) 
87 Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank Plc [2001] UKHL 52; [2002] 1 A.C. 481, para. 25. 
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Treu und Glauben which is different to the British concept of good faith.88 Similar 
situations could possibly happen in the explanation of terms of ‘honestly’, ‘fairly’ and so 
on in many MiFID’s rules. In this sense, the effort of harmonisation of the legal order 
in the EU is an ‘irritant’ of new divergences because of different legal cultures in 
Member States (such as, different traditions, structures and understandings of values).89 
Indeterminacy and unforeseeability will always happen at the national level after the 
introduction of EU law—the so-called ‘Jack-in-the-Box effects’90— Member States will 
always use the most appropriate way to transpose, apply and explain these EU rules.   
3.4. Is EJN-Civil Enough? 
Given the aforementioned divergences of private law systems between Member 
States (particularly between the civil law and common law systems), a European Judicial 
Network in civil and commercial matters (‘EJN-civil’) was established in 200191 and 
later enhanced in 2009.92 By means of establishing a network at the EU level to 
facilitate co-operation93 and integrate the legal professions in different Member States,94 
it improves effective judicial co-operation between Member States and effective access 
																																																								
88 Gunther Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New 
Divergencies’ (1998) 61 Modern Law Review 11, at 18–22. 
89 Ibid, at 11–17. For a similar phenomenon in European consumer law: see Christian Twigg-Flesner, 
‘Time to Do the Job Properly-The Case for a New Approach to EU Consumer Legislation’ (2010) 33 
Journal of Consumer Policy 355, at 357–359. 
90 Thomas Wilhelmsson, ‘Jack-in-the-Box Theory of European Community Law’ in Ludwig Krämer, 
Hans-W. Micklitz and Klaus Tonner Nomos (eds), Law and Diffuse Interests in the European Legal Order 
(Nomos, 1997), at 188–191; Thomas Wilhelmsson, ‘Private Law in the EU: Harmonised or Fragmented 
Europeanisation?’ (2002) 10 European Review of Private Law 77, at 79–82. 
91 Council Decision 2001/470/EC establishing a European Judicial Network in civil and commercial 
matters, 2001 OJ L174/25 (‘EJN-civil Decision’). The UK opted into this network: see Recital 18 of 
EJN-civil Decision. 
92 Decision No 568/2009/EC of The European Parliament and of The Council amending Council 
Decision 2001/470/EC establishing a European Judicial Network in civil and commercial matters, 2009 
OJ L168/35. (‘New EJN-civil Decision’) The UK also opted in this new decision: see Recital 20 of New 
EJN-civil Decision. 
93 Recital 10 of EJN-civil Decision. 
94 Recital 5 of New EJN-civil Decision. 
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to justice for people engaging in cross-border litigation.95 It should be noted that the 
function of the EJN-civil focuses on information exchange,96 so it has no binding 
power in relation to national courts. This network, at most, plays a supporting role in 
European private law. This again shows the Treaty limitations on harmonisation of 
European private law.97 In the field of the private law governance of investment 
conduct, the EU can only have little competence. 
On the whole, in view of the lack of ability to the private law’s governance role in 
the EU, it is not entirely clear to what extent investors will really benefit from the 
private enforcement of MiFID’s investment conduct rules, and to what extent MiFID’s 
rules will be able to ensure a high level of investor protection in private cases currently.98 
Is the EJC-civil enough to tackle the cross-border private law issues of MiFID regime in 
the EU? In order to clarify this, the interaction between MiFID’s rules and the UK’s 
private law is going to be examined in the next section.   
 MiFID and National Private Law: UK’s Practice 4.
4.1. MiFID and UK’s National Private Law 
In order to examine MiFID’s influence on national private law systems in practice, 
the following section will explore the implementation of MiFID’s rules in private law 
cases in the UK.99 This is because the UK’s legal system includes all possibilities to 
																																																								
95 Recital 9 of EJN-civil Decision and Recitals 14 of New EJN-civil Decision. 
96 Article 3.1 of EJN-civil Decision. 
97 See Section 2.2 above (pp. 197–199). 
98 Olha O. Cherednychenko, ‘The Legal Matrix for Retail Investment Services in the EU: Where is An 
Individual Investor?’ in James Devenney and Mel Kenny (eds), Consumer Credit, Debt and Investment in 
Europe (Cambridge University Press, 2012), at 277. 
99 Since there are different legal systems in England and Wales, in Scotland and in Northern Ireland 
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realise MiFID’s private law influence: first, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
(‘FSMA’) provides a civilly actionable right to claim remedies from infringements of 
FCA’s rules;100 second, the UK’s case law system, by means of horizontal indirect effect, 
provides a possibility for de facto horizontal direct effect of MiFID’s rules;101 and, third, 
MiFID’s rules are totally transposed into FCA Handbook as regulatory rules.102 It 
should be noted again that, although the UK triggered the official Brexit process on 
29th March, 2017,103 and this eventually will change the relationship between the UK 
law and the EU law, the analysis below is still based on the current status given the fact 
that this change may not happen before 2019 and the FCA is going to implement 
MiFID II in the UK.104 
 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 4.1.1.
A statute in the UK may provide a right of action caused by a breach of the 
																																																																																																																																																													
respectively, this section will mainly focus on the cases in England if there is no specific emphasis. 
100 Section 138D of FSMA. See further in Section 4.1.1 below (pp. 213–216). 
101 See further in Section 4.1.2 below (pp. 216–218). 
102 See further in Section 4.1.3 below (pp. 219–221). According to FSA’s Consultation Paper, the MiFID 
legislation is incorporated by ‘intelligent copy-out’ of the text (that is, our rules will generally be based on 
copied-out directive text to avoid placing any unintended additional obligations on firms): see FSA, 
Reforming Conduct of Business Regulation (Consultation Paper CP06/19, 2006), para. 2.11, available at: 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp06_19.pdf> (accessed June, 2017). 
For a comprehensive discussion about the introduction of MiFID’s rules into the FCA Handbook: see 
Paul Nelson, Capital Markets Law and Compliance: The Implications of MiFID (Cambridge University Press, 
2008), Part IV. 
103 A letter from the British Prime Minister, Theresa May, notifying the United Kingdom's intention to 
leave the European Union (29th of March, 2017), available at: 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/pdf/070329_UK_letter_Tusk_Art
50_pdf/>  (accessed June, 2017). 
104 FCA, Statement on European Union referendum result, 24 June 2016, available at:  
<https://www.fca.org.uk/news/statements/statement-european-union-referendum-result>  
(accessed June, 2017).  
On 30 March, 2017, the UK Government promised to transpose the EU law into national/domestic law 
after the official Brexit process for maintaining the legal certainty. See further in UK Government, 
Legislating for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union, March, 2017, available at: 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/604516/Great_repe
al_bill_white_paper_accessible.pdf> (accessed June, 2017). (‘The Great Repeal Bill: White Paper’) 
 
 Chapter V Optimum Private Law Governance of Investment Conduct in the CMU   
 214 
statutory duty for injury thereby imposed, which is not relegated to other civil 
remedies,105 or the provisions for the administrative imposition.106 Such liability can be 
based on a ‘breach of statutory duty simpliciter’,107 provided that the provisions and 
structure of the statute intend to create a statutory right which is distinct from common 
law duties.108 Given this, Section 138D (formerly Section 150 as originally enacted) of 
FSMA states that ‘a contravention by an authorised person of a rule made by the FCA is 
actionable at the suit of a private person who suffers loss as a result of the 
contravention, subject to the defences and other incidents applying to actions for breach 
of statutory duty.’ FCA’s Conduct of Business Sourcebook (‘COBS’) Sch 5.4G further 
explains the application of this statutory claim in detail.109 Thanks to the legal basis of 
FSMA, civilly actionable claims for breaches of such regulatory rules transposed from 
the MiFID regime are grounded in the UK’s legal system. This statutory claim often 
results in a more easily established liability,110 so it is now routinely pleaded along with 
the usual common law claims by ‘private persons’.111 However, it should be noted that 
MiFID’s investment conduct rules, in the UK, are transposed into FCA’s COBS rather 
than FSMA, so, precisely, this civilly actionable statutory claim for breaches of COBS is 
not a main product, but a by-product of transposition of MiFID’s rules. As Lord Hodge 
																																																								
105 Groves v Lord Wimborne [1898] 2 Q.B. 402, at 416–417. 
106 Ibid, at 409. 
107 X (Minors) v Bedfordshire CC [1995] 2 A.C. 633, at 730. 
108 Gorringe v Calderdale MBC [2004] UKHL 15; [2004] 1 W.L.R. 1057, para. 3. 
109 In COBS Sch 5.4G, it differentiates COBS rules: some may not be actionable for ‘private persons’. 
110 Roger Stewart and John L. Powell, Jackson & Powell on Professional Liability (7th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 
2012), para. 14-072. 
111 See, e.g., Redmayne Bentley Stockbrokers v Isaacs [2010] EWHC 1504 (Comm), (breach of contract, duty of 
care and formerly FSMA ss. 71 & 150); Wilson v MF Global UK Ltd [2011] EWHC 138 (QB), (breach of 
contract and formerly FSMA s. 150); Bank Leumi (UK) plc v Wachner [2011] EWHC 656 (Comm); [2011] 1 
C.L.C. 454, (misrepresentation, duty of care and formerly FSMA s. 150); John Green and Paul Rowley v The 
Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2013] EWCA Civ 1197; [2014] Bus. L.R. 168, (duty of care and formerly FSMA s. 
150). 
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clarified in Grant Estates Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (a Scottish case):  
‘MiFID does not require a member state to provide protection to a customer 
by means of a direct right of action against the authorised person. Nor did the 
United Kingdom choose to confer such a right when it implemented MiFID […].	
[Section 138D of FSMA]	were a response to a perceived mischief which antedated 
MiFID.’112  
Furthermore, this statutory right is extremely limited as it has many preliminary 
conditions. First, a ‘private person’ is defined in a restrictive way: the claimant, generally, 
must be an individual, and corporate persons may use this provision only if they were 
not ‘conducting business of any kind’.113 The definition of ‘conducting business’, which 
is given by Titan Steel Wheels Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland plc,114 further limits the 
possibility of corporate persons to apply this statutory claim. Second, the FCA must not 
have removed the availability of a right of action for the rule in question.115 It is 
noteworthy that three important rules of FCA Handbook are excluded: (i) the PRIN 
rules, in particular PRIN 2.1.1R with respect to fiduciary principles of business;116 (ii) 
SYSC 10, in terms of senior management arrangements, systems and controls regarding 
																																																								
112 Grant Estates Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland Plc [2012] CSOH 133; 2012 G.W.D. 29-588, para. 48. 
113 Article 3 of Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Rights of Action) Regulations 2001, SI 
2001/2256. It should be noted here that the regulatory definition of ‘retail client’ and ‘private person’ are 
not co-extensive. For the definition of ‘retail client’: see Section 3.3.1 of CHAPTER II (p. 35). 
114 [2010] EWHC 211 (Comm); [2010] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 92, para. 65: ‘there are three types of trade carried 
out by a business which may be in the course of that business: i) A one-off trade with a view to profit. 
Such a case, regardless of how sporadic, would be in the course of the business. ii) A sporadic series of 
trades which were not part of the normal practice of the business nor an integral part of the business. 
This would not be “in the course of the business”. iii) A regular trade which was part of the normal 
practice of the business in question.’ See also Camerata Property Inc v Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Ltd [2012] 
EWHC 7 (Comm); [2012] 1 C.L.C. 234, paras. 94–98. 
115 Section 138D(3) FSMA. 
116 FCA Handbook, PRIN 3.4.4R. 
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conflicts of interest;117 and (iii) the ‘fair, clear and not misleading’ rule, under COBS 
4.2.1R if, in relation to a particular communication or financial promotion, a firm takes 
reasonable steps to ensure it complies with the ‘fair, clear and not misleading’ rule.118 
Third, the claimant is still required to show not only a breach of relevant rules, but also 
many elements, such as, a causal nexus between the breach and the loss.119 But, the 
approach in contract and/or tort to causation, foreseeability and remoteness here will be 
‘guided by the focus and purpose of the statutory provisions’,120 which means they may 
operate in different ways in such statutory claims.121 Finally, the defendant of this 
statutory claim is limited to the ‘authorised person’, as defined by Section 138D of 
FSMA. To those unauthorised people, they are not eligible to be claimed by this article, 
but they might be governed by other common law duties instead.122 On the whole, this 
statutory claim, based on FSMA and FCA Handbook, is significantly different and 
independent from other claims in private cases, but its function still largely depends on 
explanations of courts in private law cases. 
 MiFID’s Horizontal Indirect Effect in Private Cases 4.1.2.
In terms of the horizontal effect of MiFID’s rules, two relevant cases deserves to 
be mentioned. In Nextia Properties Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland,123 the claimant, which is a	
company in the property development business, entered into an interest rate swap 
																																																								
117 FCA Handbook, SYSC 1 Annex 1.2.19R. 
118 FCA Handbook, COBS 4.2.6R. 
119 Iain G. MacNeil, ‘FSA 1986: Does S.62 Provide An Effective Remedy for Breaches of Conduct of 
Business Rules?’ (1994) 15 Company Lawyer 172, at 175–176. 
120 Rubenstein v HSBC Bank plc [2012] EWCA Civ 1184; [2013] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 915, para. 46. 
121 Ibid, para. 45. 
122 Robert H. Sitkoff, ‘The Fiduciary Obligations of Financial Advisers under the Law of Agency’ (2014) 
27 Journal of Financial Planning 42, at 45–48. See further in Section 4.2 below (pp. 221–239). 
123 Nextia Properties Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland [2013] EWHC 3167 (QB). 
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agreement with the defendants. The claimant originally contended that the defendants 
breached the duties of fair and accurate communication, costs disclosure and conflicts 
of interest disclosure in FCA Handbook and MiFID’s rules simultaneously, followed by 
a claim of damage for breaches of statutory duties, but, the claimant later accepted that 
neither MiFID, nor its implementing Directives, give rise to a direct right of action, so it 
was only necessary to consider whether English domestic law, namely the FSMA and 
FCA Handbook in this case, gave a right of action.124 The same, in Grant Estates Ltd v 
Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (a Scottish case with similar facts as the above Nextia case),125 
the pursuer also accepted there was no direct claim that could be made against the 
defenders under MiFID, so the real issue is the correct interpretation of the UK 
legislation and regulatory rules having regard to the results which MiFID sought to 
achieve.126 In these cases, although the courts did not reject the horizontal direct effect 
of MiFID explicitly, the courts correctly followed the consistent EU case law implicitly. 
That is, a Directive, like MiFID here, could have horizontal indirect effect on the 
client/investment firm relationships at the most.127 
As to the horizontal indirect effect of MiFID’s rules, the decision of the Supreme 
Court in the well-known case of Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe),128 provides a 
clear indication. This case related to a ‘statutory trust’ in the FCA’s Client Assets 
Sourcebook (‘CASS’).129 According to CASS 7.7.2R, a firm receives and holds client 
																																																								
124 Ibid, para. 100. 
125 Grant Estates Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland Plc [2012] CSOH 133; 2012 G.W.D. 29-588. 
126 Ibid, para. 32. 
127 See further in Section 3.1 above (pp. 201–202). 
128 CRC Credit Fund Ltd v GLG Investments Plc Sub-Fund: European Equity Fund Lehman Brothers International 
(Europe) (In Administration) v CRC Credit Fund Ltd [2012] UKSC 6; [2012] 3 All E.R. 1. 
129 Although it is not the focus of this study, for a comprehensive analysis of this case: see Panagiotis K. 
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money as trustee: (i) for the purposes of the client money rules and the client money 
(MiFID business) distribution rules, and (ii) for the clients for whom that money is held 
according to their respective interests in it, with certain immaterial exceptions. However, 
the issues of this regulatory rule are: ‘when does the statutory trust arise? Does it arise 
only when the money has been placed in a segregated client account, or is the money 
subject to the trust as soon as it is in the firm’s hands irrespective of where it puts the 
money?’130 In order to answer these questions, Lord Dyson incorporated MiFID I (and 
its implementing Directive) in his explanation: he first confirmed that the purpose of 
the MiFID regime includes providing a high level of protection for clients and 
safeguarding their rights to funds in the event of the insolvency,131 and then agreed that 
a trust of client money received by a firm arises upon receipt, rather than only upon 
segregation by reference to the purpose of MiFID’s regime.132 Although this case is not 
directly relevant to the COBS or MiFID’s investment conduct rules, the court directly 
applied MiFID’s rules in explaining (or even de facto creating) a trust relationship 
between clients and investment firms. This can strongly prove a possibility for MiFID’s 
investment conduct rules to influence private law by the horizontal indirect effect. 
Having said that, as Lord Dyson highlighted, the horizontal indirect effect of MiFID 
still has to follow some principles:  
‘(i) it is not constrained by conventional rules of construction; (ii) it does not 
																																																																																																																																																													
Staikouras, ‘A Novel Reasoning of the UK Supreme Court decision in Lehman Brothers: The MiFID 
Segregation Rule from the Angle of Financial Intermediation and Regulation Theory’ (2014) Journal of 
Business Law 97, at 97–120. 
130 Ibid, para. 4. 
131 Ibid, paras. 132–134. 
132 Ibid, para. 135. 
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require ambiguity in the legislative language; (iii) it is not an exercise in semantics 
or linguistics; (iv) it permits departure from the strict and literal application of the 
words which the legislature has elected to use; (v) it permits the implication of 
words necessary to comply with Community law; and (vi) the precise form of the 
words to be implied does not matter.’133 
 FCA’s COBS Handbook in Private Cases  4.1.3.
Given that MiFID’s investment conduct rules are transposed into the FCA’s 
COBS entirely, the next question is the impact of such regulatory rules in private law 
cases. This question should be answered by reference to the influence of FCA’s rules on 
contracts and on other common law duties respectively. First, in some cases, courts 
might be inclined to give these rules the status of contract terms, so contravention of 
these rules becomes actionable at common law as a breach of contract. For example, in 
Larussa-Chigi v CS First Boston Ltd, Thomas J. suggested that the Bank of England’s 
London Code of Conduct, even if the parties had not expressly incorporated the Code, 
have been incorporated as a matter of contract, comprising an implied term, because 
there is a clause mentioning that ‘the transactions will be governed by a Code of 
Conduct established by the Bank of England’.134 But, most cases reject this approach,135 
which means the FCA’s rules cannot become implied contractual terms. However, this 
is not to deny the influence of the FCA’s rules on contracts. Specifically, the FCA 
																																																								
133 Ibid, para. 131. 
134 [1998] C.L.C. 277, at 293–295; see also Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society 
(No.2) [1999] Lloyd’s Rep. P.N. 496, at 504. 
135 See, e.g., Redmayne Bentley Stockbrokers v Isaacs [2010] EWHC 1504 (Comm), para. 94; Wilson v MF 
Global UK Ltd [2011] EWHC 138 (QB), para. 14; Shelley Barnes, Darren Barnes v Black Horse Limited [2011] 
EWHC 1416 (QB); [2011] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 1130, para. 38; Clarion Limited and Others v National Provident 
Institution [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1888, at 1894–1898. 
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Handbook states that the duties imposed by regulatory rules may not be contractually 
overridden: ‘a firm must not, in any communication relating to designated investment 
business seek to: (i) exclude or restrict; or (ii) rely on any exclusion or restriction of; any 
duty or liability it may have to a client under the regulatory system.’136 It also requires 
that any duty or liability of an investment firm to a retail client, other than under the 
regulatory system, shall not be excluded or restricted in any communication, in order to 
comply with the client’s best interests rule.137 Through these provisions, FCA’s rules 
may affect contractual terms in the practice of financial markets. However, whilst the 
FCA’s rules announce that the obligation to act in the ‘best interest of clients’ may not 
be contractually overridden, courts have consistently held that such contractual clauses 
shall still be valid: this is not for unduly restricting or excluding liabilities, but for 
interpreting the parties’ duties to each other in line with the contractual terms.138 
Second, although some may argue that these regulatory rules could be seen as a 
legitimate expectation creating a fiduciary duty for investors,139 a clear point made by 
the Court of Appeal in Gorham v British Telecommunications is that common law duties and 
regulatory rules are not co-extensive.140 Lord Hodge in Grant Estates Ltd v Royal Bank of 
Scotland Plc (a Scottish case) also adopts an approach based on a clear separation 
																																																								
136 FCA Handbook, COBS 2.1.2R. 
137 FCA Handbook, COBS 2.1.3 G (1). 
138 See, e.g., IFE Fund v Goldman Sachs International [2006] EWHC 2887 (Comm); [2007] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 
264, para. 71 (affirmed by the Court of Appeal: see IFE Fund v Goldman Sachs International [2007] EWCA 
Civ 811; [2007] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 449); Springwell Navigation Corp v JP Morgan Chase Bank (formerly Chase 
Manhattan Bank) [2010] EWCA Civ 1221; [2010] 2 C.L.C. 705, para. 184. 
139 Christa Band and Karen Anderson, ‘Selling Complex Financial Products to Sophisticated Clients: JP 
Morgan Chase v Springwell: Part 2’ (2009) 24 Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 233, 242–
243; Adrian Fong, ‘Fiduciary Duty in the Context of Providing Investment Services’ (2013) Journal of 
International Banking Law and Regulation 390, at 391–393. 
140 Gorham & Others v British Telecommunications Limited plc, The Trustees of the BT Pension Scheme, Standard Life 
Assurance Company [2000] 1 W.L.R. 2129, at 2141.  
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between the domains of regulatory rules and common law duties and remedies:  
‘a common law duty can arise from the existence of a statutory duty as part of 
the background circumstances; and the existence of a statutory duty may show that 
a particular risk should have been foreseen. […] Looking to the policy of the 
FSMA one discovers that it provides protection to consumers of financial services 
through a self-contained regulatory code and statutory remedies for breach of its 
rules.’141  
‘[T]he mere existence of a regulatory duty of itself […] [does not bring] about the 
creation of a co-extensive common law duty’.142 However, it is admitted that FCA’s 
rules afford ‘strong evidence’ as to what is expected of a competent adviser in most 
situations.143 It is useful to start with the requirements of relevant regulatory regimes in 
determining the extent of a common law duty to act with the skill and care to be 
expected of a reasonably competent financial advisor,144 in particular the duty of care 
ordinarily includes compliance with the relevant regulatory rules.145 By means of this, 
abuses of common law duties in circumstances in which there would be no regulatory 
cause of action could be firmly prevented. 146  Thus, in the UK’s practice, the 
determination of common law duties is influenced by FCA’s rules to some extent. 
																																																								
141 Grant Estates Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland Plc [2012] CSOH 133; 2012 G.W.D. 29-588, para. 79. 
142 John Green and Paul Rowley v The Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2013] EWCA Civ 1197; [2014] Bus. L.R. 168, 
para. 29. 
143 Seymour v Ockwell [2005] EWHC 1137 (QB); [2005] P.N.L.R. 39, para. 77. 
144 Shore v Sedgwick Financial Services Ltd [2007] EWHC 2509 (Admin); [2008] P.N.L.R. 10, para. 161 
(affirmed by the Court of Appeal: see Shore v Sedgwick Financial Services Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 863; [2009] 
Bus. L.R. 42). 
145 Loosemore v Financial Concepts [2001] Lloyd’s Rep. P.N. 235, at 241–242. 
146 Lucy James and Lucy James, ‘Green and Rowley v RBS - A Case for A Concurrent Duty of Care?’ 
(2014) 29 Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 110, at 113. 
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4.2. Long-Standing National Private Law 
Given that MiFID’s rules undoubtedly have some influence on national private law 
in the UK, a question arises: whether national private law is not important any longer? 
In fact, national courts, in practice, have regard to a range of sources in cases: they will 
start by looking at contractual documents, then FCA’s rules and even MiFID’s rules, 
followed by consideration of other judge-made law.147 In most cases, contractual terms 
and the judge-made law are the key of judges to governing investment conduct and 
resolving disputes. The role of national private law, thus, is unshakable and irreplaceable 
whether before or after the introduction of MiFID’s rules. As Professor Goode 
observed:  
‘[…] most of our commercial law is judge-made; and what the judges have 
created they are free to change to reflect new social or economic considerations or 
to correct principles or rules that can now be seen to have been mistaken.’148  
It is important to emphasise that ‘the common law is not antipathetic to 
concurrent liability’,149 so, next to the aforementioned Section 138D of FSMA, there 
may be many different resources of judge-made law raising different types of 
remedies.150 The claimant is just required to choose which alternative he/she wants at 
the time when judgment is awarded in his favour.151 
																																																								
147 See many cases exemplified in above note 111. 
148 Roy Goode, Commercial Law in the Next Millennium (Sweet & Maxwell, 1998), at 15. 
149 Browne-Wilkinson LJ.: ‘My own belief is that, in the present context, the common law is not 
antipathetic to concurrent liability, and that there is no sound basis for a rule which automatically restricts 
the claimant to either a tortious or a contractual remedy.’Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd (No.1) [1995] 2 
A.C. 145, at 193–194.  
150 See further in R. Stewart and J. L. Powell, above note 110, Ch. 3. 
151 Tang Man Sit (Deceased) v Capacious Investments Ltd [1996] A.C. 514, at 525–526. See further in John 
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 Contractual Terms 4.2.1.
In spite of some rare cases, investment firms and their clients usually have written 
contracts in normal cases, so courts treat the contracts as the starting point and interpret 
the parties’ duties in line with the contractual terms.152 The scope of common law 
duties, thus, may be adjusted by the terms of the contracts. For example, unless the 
parties have agreed that a tortious remedy is to be limited or excluded, 153 the scope of 
tortious duties will be consistent with the applicable contract otherwise.154 Also, the 
scope of fiduciary duties can be defined by the contractual terms,155 whether they are 
express or implied terms.156 This is because fiduciary duties are not set to aid in 
enlarging the scope of contractual duties either.157 The dominant role of contractual 
terms even goes further to embrace the ‘contractual estoppel’ between investment firms 
and sophisticated, commercial investors:  
‘[t]here is no reason in principle why parties to a contract should not agree 
that a certain state of affairs should form the basis for the transaction, whether it 
be the case or not. […] The contract itself gives rise to an estoppel.’158  
However, this overly ‘documentary fundamentalism’ would need a suitable control 
in order to prevent it from intruding into all transactions, whatever the size or 
																																																																																																																																																													
Stevens, ‘Election Between Alternative Remedies’ [1995] Restitution Law Review 117, at 117–122. 
152 Alastair Hudson, The Law of Finance (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2013), para. 10-18. 
153 Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd (No. 1) [1995] 2 A.C. 145, at 194. 
154 South Australian Asset Management Corporation v York Montague [1997] A.C. 191, at 211. 
155 Kelly v Cooper [1993] A.C. 205, at 215; John Youngs Insurance Services Ltd v Aviva Insurance Service UK Ltd 
[2011] EWHC 1515 (TCC); [2012] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 1045, para. 94(1). 
156 Dick Frase, Law and Regulation of Investment Management (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), para. 8-069. 
157 Clark Boyce v Mouat [1994] 1 A.C. 428, at 437. 
158 Peekay Intermark Limited, Harish Pawani v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited [2006] EWCA 
Civ 386; [2006] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 511, para. 56; see also Springwell Navigation Corp v JP Morgan Chase Bank 
(formerly Chase Manhattan Bank) [2010] EWCA Civ 1221; [2010] 2 C.L.C. 705, para. 170. 
 Chapter V Optimum Private Law Governance of Investment Conduct in the CMU   
 224 
sophistication of the counterparty.159 Therefore, the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 
(‘UCTA’) dealing with unfair contract terms might provide major protection. The 
UCTA requires that contractual provisions or non-contractual notices, which seek to 
exclude or restrict liability, 160  must satisfy a ‘reasonable test’. 161  Furthermore, as 
mentioned by FCA’s rules,162 if the term is in a business-to-consumer contract, it would 
be subject to the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (‘UTCCR’)163 
or the Consumer Rights Act 2015164, depending on the contract entered into before 1 
October, 2015 or later. These two regimes (namely, the unfair terms and the consumer 
protection regimes) have different scopes and different effects of application, but, to 
some extent, they overlap.165 It is worth mentioning that the foregoing discussion is 
based on the cases of ‘saying too much’ in contractual terms. However, since (i) claims 
may arise in the negotiation phase; and (ii) investment firms, generally, do not define 
precisely the nature or standard of the investment services in contractual terms, disputes, 
in most cases, have to be resolved by reference to other default rules, such as duties of 
care and fiduciary duties.166 
  
																																																								
159 Gerard McMeel, ‘Documentary Fundamentalism in the Senior Courts: the Myth of Contractual 
Estoppel’ [2011] Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 185, at 201–207. 
160 In England and Wales and Northern Ireland, Sections 2–4 of UCTA; in Scotland, Section 16 of 
UCTA. 
161 In England and Wales and Northern Ireland, Section 11 of UCTA; in Scotland, Section 24 of UCTA. 
162 FCA Handbook COBS 2.1.3(2)G. 
163  SI 1999/2083, as amended by SI 2001/1186 and SI 2001/3649. This legislation is national 
implementation of UCTD in the UK. 
164 In particular, Part 2 of the Consumer Right Act 2015. For a comprehensive analysis of the Consumer 
Rights Act 2015: see Alec Samuels, ‘The Consumer Rights Act 2015’ (2016) Journal of Business Law 159, at 
159–185. 
165 Edwin Peel, The Law of Contract (13th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), paras. 7-096–7-099. 
166 Iain G. MacNeil, An Introduction to the Law on Financial Investment (2nd edn, Hart Publishing, 2012), at 
240–241. 
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 Judge-Made Law: Duty of Care 4.2.2.
Fundamentally, a duty of care is a ‘management duty’167 to act carefully in 
performing the tasks that have been undertaken, irrespective of whether the person is a 
fiduciary.168 It is very likely to owe a duty of care when investment firms are providing 
investment services to their clients, although, in the USA, the courts classify the duty of 
care as a category of fiduciary duties,169 but carelessness is not disloyalty.170 As the 
House of Lords noted in Hilton v Barker Booth & Eastwood:  
‘if a solicitor is careless in investigating a title or drafting a lease, he may be 
liable to pay damages for breach of his professional duty, but that is not a breach 
of a fiduciary duty of loyalty; it is simply the breach of a duty of care.’171 
To establish liability in negligence, the first requirement is to show that a duty of 
care exists.172 Normally, it is well-established that a person who contracts with another 
to provide a service must provide the service with reasonable care and skill, which is ‘the 
standard of the ordinary skilled man exercising and professing to have that special 
skill’.173 However, this does not usually imply a warranty that the service provider will 
																																																								
167 J. C. Shepherd, The Law of Fiduciaries (The Carswell Company Limited, 1981), at 48. 
168  Matthew Conaglen, Fiduciary Loyalty: Protecting the Due Performance of Non-Fiduciary Duties (Hart 
Publishing, 2010), at 36. 
169 Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law (Oxford University Press, 2011), at 169–177. For an opponent of this in 
the USA: see Larry E. Ribstein, ‘Are Partners Fiduciaries?’ (2005) University of Illinois Law Forum 209, at 
220. 
170 Parker Hood, Principles of Lender Liability (Oxford University Press, 2012), para. 5.26. 
171 Hilton v Barker Booth & Eastwood [2005] UKHL 8; [2005] 1 W.L.R. 567, para. 29. 
172 There are three conditions of establishing liability for negligence: (i) the defendant ‘failed to exercise 
due care’; (ii) the defendant ‘owed the injured man the duty to exercise due care’; and (iii) the defendant’s 
failure to do so was ‘the cause of the injury in the proper sense of the term’: see Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd 
v Morts Dock & Engineering Co (The Wagon Mound) [1961] A.C. 388, at 422. This thesis will discuss the first 
two elements only. 
173 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 W.L.R. 582, at 586. 
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achieve the desired result.174 This common law principle is embodied in Section 49 of 
the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982: ‘in a contract for the supply of a service 
where the supplier is acting in the course of a business, there is an implied term that the 
supplier will carry out the service with reasonable care and skill’. For those 
business-to-consumer contracts, the Section 49 of Consumer Rights Act 2015 will cover: 
‘[e]very contract to supply a service is to be treated as including a term that the trader 
must perform the service with reasonable care and skill.’ Furthermore, even where a 
contract is not in place, there could be ‘a special relationship between the parties which 
imposed a duty to give careful advice’. 175  Based on this, investment firms, as 
professionals, might be taken to have assumed responsibilities towards their clients and 
owe a duty of care in tort and in contractual obligations simultaneously.176 But, it should 
be noted that contractual and tortious duties have different origins and different 
functions.177 This difference can be important for investors since the limitation period 
within which a cause of action can be brought starts to run at different times.178 
Likewise, the duty of care on trustees is written in a statutory form in Section 1 of the 
																																																								
174 Greaves & Co. (Contractors) Ltd. v Baynham Meikle & Partners [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1095, at 1100; Nykredit 
Mortgage Bank Plc v Edward Erdman Group Ltd [1997] 1 W.L.R. 1627, at 1631. 
175 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] A.C. 465, at 523–524. 
176 Robinson v PE Jones (Contractors) Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 9; [2012] Q.B. 44, paras. 74–76. 
177 Ibid, paras. 77–79. 
178 Jonathan Fisher and Maclcolm Waters, The Law of Investor Protection (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003), 
para. 32-026. For more differences between tortious and contractual obligations: see Hugh Beale, Chitty on 
Contracts (31st edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2012), paras. 1-139–1-145. According to Sections 2 and 5 of the 
Limitation Act 1980, they both refer to ‘six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued’. But, 
in case of tort, this date is ‘not when the culpable conduct occurs, but when the plaintiff first sustains 
damage’: See Berney v Saul (t/a Thomas Saul & Co) [2013] EWCA Civ 640; [2013] P.N.L.R. 26, para. 52, 
quoting p. 1630 of Nykredit Mortgage Bank Plc v Edward Erdman Group Ltd [1997] 1 W.L.R. 1627. Therefore, 
the limitation periods of them should be examined respectively: see Aspect Contracts (Asbestos) Limited v 
Higgins Construction plc [2015] UKSC 38; [2015] 1 W.L.R. 2961, paras. 21–22. 
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Trustee Act 2000,179 although it may be limited by express provisions of the trust.180 It 
requires a trustee: 
‘must exercise such care and skill as is reasonable in the circumstances, having 
regard in particular—(a) to any special knowledge or experience that he has or 
holds himself out as having, and (b) if he acts as trustee in the course of a business 
or profession, to any special knowledge or experience that it is reasonable to 
expect of a person acting in the course of that kind of business or profession’.181  
This Article of the Trustee Act 2000 may also be easily applied to investment firms 
when they are providing portfolio management services. 
The standard associated with the duty of care is the second question. In order to 
underpin the well-established commercial life, 182  the standard of liability is 
‘commercially unacceptable conduct in the particular context’.183 ‘[W]here there is more 
than one accepted market practice, […] [an investment firm] will not be negligent if he 
follows one of them’.184 However, it should be noted that courts tend to protect retail 
clients more in cases of negligent investment advice. First, ‘if the bank does give an 
explanation or tender advice, then it owes a duty to give that explanation or tender that 
advice fully, accurately and properly’.185 Investment firms now have a ‘clear explanation’ 
																																																								
179 For a comprehensive analysis of the Trustee Act 2000: see Alastair Hudson, Equity and Trusts (7th edn, 
Routledge, 2013), Ch. 9.2. 
180 Schedule 1 of the Trustee Act 2000, para. 7. 
181 Section 1 of the Trustee Act 2000. 
182 Tony Dugdale, ‘Investment Advice: Duty of Care and Breach of Duty’ (2007) 23 Professional Negligence 
114, at 117. 
183 Cowan de Groot Properties v Eagle Trust [1992] 4 All E.R. 700, at 761; Heinl v Jyske Bank (Gibraltar) Ltd 
[1999] Lloyd’s Rep. Bank 511, at 535; Bank of Scotland v A Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 52; [2001] 1 W.L.R. 751, 
para. 29; Tayeb v HSBC Bank Plc [2004] EWHC 1529 (Comm); [2004] 4 All E.R. 1024, paras. 73 and 74. 
184 Riyad Bank v Ahli United Bank (UK) Plc [2006] EWCA Civ 780; [2006] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 777, para. 65. 
185 Crestsign Ltd v National Westminster Bank Plc [2014] EWHC 3043 (Ch); [2015] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 133, 
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duty to retail clients. Second, in a well-publicised case, Verity & Spindler v Lloyds Bank 
plc,186 the trial judge took into account: (i) a lack of sophistication of the client, and (ii) 
the client’s reliance on the service provider, in order to hold that there was an assumed 
duty of care regarding advice and there was a breach of duty.187 Third, if the duty is to 
advise whether or not a course of action should be taken, the adviser must take 
reasonable care to consider ‘all the potential consequences of that course of action’.188 
This broad range of considerations provides a wide safety net for advisees. Fourth, the 
Court of Appeal in Gorham v British Telecommunications said that the standard of care here 
is ‘a duty to the investment advisor not to give negligent advice to retail clients that 
adversely affected their interests as the clients intended them to be’. 189  The 
commercially acceptable standard now turns to be an expectation of their retail clients, 
which is higher than the former. By contrast, courts hold the standard of commercial 
activity in case of providing execution-only investment services to non-retail clients.190 
In the wake of the global financial crisis of 2007–09, courts have, generally, proved less 
sympathetic to non-retail investors.191 In many of the cases listed, the investment firms 
																																																																																																																																																													
para. 145 quoting p. 533 of Cornish v Midland Bank Plc [1985] 3 All E.R. 513. 
186 Verity & Anor v Lloyds Bank plc [1995] C.L.C. 1557. 
187 Ibid, at 1580–1581, 1587. 
188 South Australia Asset Management Corp v York Montague Ltd [1997] A.C. 191, at 214. 
189 Gorham & Others v British Telecommunications Limited plc, The Trustees of the BT Pension Scheme, Standard Life 
Assurance Company [2000] 1 W.L.R. 2129, at 2142. 
190 Titan Steel Wheels Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2010] EWHC 211 (Comm); [2010] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 92, 
para. 96. 
191 See, e.g., Peekay Intermark Ltd v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 386; 
[2006] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 511; Springwell Navigation Corp v JP Morgan Chase Bank (formerly Chase Manhattan Bank) 
[2010] EWCA Civ 1221; [2010] 2 C.L.C. 705; Titan Steel Wheels Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2010] 
EWHC 211 (Comm); [2010] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 92; Bank Leumi (UK) Plc v Wachner [2011] EWHC 656 (Comm); 
[2011] 1 C.L.C. 454; Wilson v MF Global UK Ltd [2011] EWHC 138 (QB); Winnetka Trading Corp v Julius 
Baer International Ltd [2011] EWHC 2030 (Ch); [2012] 1 B.C.L.C. 588; Camerata Property Inc v Credit Suisse 
Securities (Europe) Ltd [2012] EWHC 7 (Comm); [2012] 1 C.L.C. 234; Standard Chartered Bank v Ceylon 
Petroleum Corp [2012] EWCA Civ 1049; IG Markets Ltd v Crinion [2013] EWCA Civ 587; [2013] C.P. Rep. 
41; IG Index Ltd v Ehrentreu [2013] EWCA Civ 95; [2013] L.L.R. 366; Zaki v Credit Suisse (UK) Ltd, [2013] 
EWCA Civ 14; [2013] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 1159; and Al Sulaiman v Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Ltd, [2013] 
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had a ‘contractual estoppel’192 clause. Because there was no obligation accepted; there 
was no advice given; and, even there was advice given, there was no deemed reliance, 
the courts merely uphold the validity of such clauses and no liability to these investment 
firms. 
Nevertheless, the above non-retail cases do not necessarily mean that there is no 
duty to provide accurate information to non-retail clients. A duty to provide accurate 
information and the duty to give careful investment advice should be distinguished, 
even the dividing line is difficult to draw in some cases.193 In terms of the duty of care 
in providing accurate information, misrepresentation shall be mentioned here. In the 
context of investment services, pertinent questions may often arise as to whether 
advertising materials or the statements of salespersons can form the basis of an 
actionable representation.194 If the answer is positive, there are no fewer than three 
possible grounds to claim the recovery: first, the breach of duty of care in whether tort 
or contractual obligations; second, the breach of warranty for representations which are 
incorporated as terms of agreements; and third, under Section 2(1) of the 
Misrepresentation Act 1967.195 
																																																																																																																																																													
EWHC 400 (Comm); [2013] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 1105. 
192 See further in Section 4.2.1 above (p. 223). 
193 South Australia Asset Management Corp v York Montague Ltd [1997] A.C. 191, at 214; Walker v Inter-Alliance 
Group Plc (In Administration) [2007] EWHC 1858 (Ch); [2007] Pens. L.R. 347, para. 30; and Crestsign Ltd v 
National Westminster Bank Plc, above note 185, para. 115. 
194 Gerard McMeel and John Virgo, McMeel and Virgo on Financial Advice and Financial Products (3rd edn, 
Oxford University Press, 2014), paras. 6.06–6.17. 
195 According to Section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967: ‘where a person has entered into a 
contract after a misrepresentation has been made to him by another party thereto and as a result thereof 
he has suffered loss, then, if the person making the misrepresentation would be liable to damages in 
respect thereof had the misrepresentation been made fraudulently, that person shall be so liable 
notwithstanding that the misrepresentation was not made fraudulently, unless he proves that he had 
reasonable ground to believe and did believe up to the time the contract was made the facts represented 
were true.’ Since the burden of proof is reversed, this Article will almost always be more advantageous 
than others. However, it will not always be possible to sue under Section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation 
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 Judge-Made Law: Fiduciary Duty 4.2.3.
Since the fiduciary law is described as the ‘holy grail’ 196  to ‘facilitate 
situationally-appropriate justice in ways that the ordinary laws of civil law obligations 
cannot’,197 breaches of fiduciary duties can be actionable in the client/investment firm 
relationship. A well-known definition of a fiduciary ‘is someone who has undertaken to 
act for or on behalf of another in a particular matter in circumstances which give rise to 
a relationship of trust and confidence’. 198 Specifically, albeit this classification of 
fiduciary relationships is not without criticism,199 fiduciary relationships are said to arise 
in two circumstances: (i) status-based—where a relationship falls under recognised 
categories, and (ii) fact-based—where the particular facts and circumstances of a 
relationship drive it in a fiduciary character.200 With regard to the client/investment firm 
relationship, the most relevant categories of the status-based circumstance are (i) trustee 
and beneficiary,201 and (ii) principal and agent.202 As to the fact-based circumstance, it 
may depend on a variety of investment services offered by investment firms since there 
																																																																																																																																																													
Act 1967, because sometimes there is no contract but a special relationship (such as, fiduciary 
relationships). For a theoretical discussion about the relationships between these bases: see Ian Brown 
and Adrian Chandler, ‘Deceit, Damages and the Misrepresentation Act 1967, s.2(1)’ [1992] Lloyd's 
Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 40, at 40–72. 
196 Leonard I. Rotman, ‘Fiduciary Law's Holy Grail: Reconciling Theory and Practice in Fiduciary 
Jurisprudence’ (2011) 91 Boston University Law Review 921, at 923. 
197 Ibid, at 935. 
198 Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch. 1, at 18. 
199 For example, Professor Miller argues this approach of fiduciary relationships lacks consistency and 
predictability. Paul B. Miller, ‘A Theory of Fiduciary Liability’ (2011) 56 McGill Law Journal 235, at 247–
252 
200 Robert Flannigan, ‘The Fiduciary Obligation’ (1989) 9 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 285, at 286–287; P. 
D. Finn, ‘The Fiduciary Principle’ in T. G. Youdan (ed), Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (Carswell, 1989), at 
32–33; Law Commission, Fiduciary Duties and Regulatory Rules: A Consultation Paper (Consultation Paper No. 
124, 1992), paras. 2.4.3–2.4.8. 
201 Keech v Sandford (1726) 25 E.R. 223; Price v Blakemore (1843) 49 E.R. 922. 
202 Lamb v Evans [1893] 1 Ch. 218, at 229; English v Dedham Vale Properties Ltd [1978] 1 W.L.R. 93, at 110–
111. 
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is no settled test.203 Therefore, in practice, we need to examine the services provided by 
the investment firms in different situations in order to find out whether there is a 
fiduciary relationship. 
First, those who provide advisory investment services may owe fiduciary duties to 
their clients.204 Fiduciary duties may arise where a client is particularly dependent on 
that advice.205 Therefore, where advice is provided by an investment firm as a specialist 
skilled personal services to a client with the expectation that the client will rely on that 
advice, there will normally be a fiduciary relationship.206 For example, in Lloyd’s Bank v 
Bundy, a special fiduciary relationship existed as a result of the reliance placed by a retail 
client on the advice given by a bank.207 However, without such reliance, merely giving 
advice does not in itself give rise to a fiduciary relationship, because this is a general 
market transaction for selling advice.208 
Second, investment firms providing portfolio-management investment services 
may also owe fiduciary duties to their clients. Some have argued that there is ‘a 
particularly clear basis’ for investment managers to owe fiduciary duties to their 
clients.209 As Justice Moore-Bick said: 
‘it would be unusual for an investment manager acquiring and managing a 
portfolio of investments under a formal management agreement not to owe duties 
																																																								
203 Matthew Conaglen, ‘The Nature and Function of Fiduciary Loyalty’ (2005) 121 Law Quarterly Review 
452, at 455. 
204 See, e.g., Woods v Martins Bank [1959] 1 Q.B. 55, at 72. 
205 Tate v Williamson (1865-66) L.R. 1 Eq. 528, at 534. 
206 Dick Frase, ‘Conflicts of Interest’ (2012) 97 Compliance Officer Bulletin 1, at 3. 
207 Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy [1975] Q.B. 326, at 341–342. 
208 Barnes v Black Horse Limited [2011] EWHC 1416 (QB); [2011] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 1130, para. 17; see 
also Larry E. Ribstein, ‘Fencing Fiduciary’ (2011) 91 Boston University Law Review 837, at 912–913. 
209 D. Frase, above note 206, at 6. 
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of care and duties of a fiduciary nature to the other party to the agreement’.210  
It is suggested that investment firms will generally be acting as fiduciaries when 
they are managing portfolios of assets on behalf of their clients.211 This is because: (i) 
there is a custodial relationship between the manager and client, and (ii) there is the 
unilateral power conferred on the manager to take decisions.212 
Third, whether fiduciary duties will arise when investment firms providing 
execution-only investment services is still unclear. Generally, a fiduciary relation exists 
‘whenever the plaintiff entrusts to the defendant a job to be performed, for instance, the 
negotiation of a contract on his behalf or for his benefit, and relies on the defendant to 
procure for the plaintiff the best terms available.’213 Therefore, there is considerable 
authority holding that a broker who is engaged to buy or sell shares on behalf of his 
client may be subject to fiduciary duties when buying and selling.214 For example, 
delivering share certificates to a broker with instructions to sell was held to give rise to a 
fiduciary relationship.215 Some scholars also argue that an investment firm is obliged to 
seek ‘best execution’ for a client because that is a fiduciary activity.216 However, on the 
contrary, courts recently consider that, where regulatory rules permit a participant to sell 
financial instruments to a professional client or eligible counterparty on an execution 
																																																								
210 Diamantides v JP Morgan Chase Bank [2005] EWCA Civ 1612, para. 27. 
211 A. Hudson, above note 152, para. 5-18.  
212 Stuart Willey, ‘Investment Management and Fiduciary Duties’ in Dick Frase (ed), Law and Regulation of 
Investment Management (Sweet & Maxwell, 2004), para. 9-004. 
213 Reading v Attorney General [1949] 2 K.B. 232, at 236. 
214 Erskine, Oxenford & Co. v Sachs [1901] 2 K.B. 504, at 511–512, 516–518; Armstrong v Jackson [1917] 2 
K.B. 822, at 826–827; Christoforides v Terry [1924] A.C. 566, at 571. 
215 Hancock v Smith (1889) 41 Ch. D. 456, at 459–462. 
216 See, e.g., Alastair Hudson, Securities Law (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2013), para. 25-14. 
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only basis, there is no fiduciary duty.217 Due to the absence of reliance within these 
transactions, some scholars also describe such transactions between clients and 
investment firms as ‘arm’s length’ without fiduciary relationship.218 But, it is still unsure 
whether courts will differentiate this standard in case that investment firms provide 
execution-only services to retail clients. 
Since fiduciary relationships may exist between investment firms and their clients, 
the next question is about the content of fiduciary duties. Fiduciary duties are 
traditionally considered to proscribe conduct rather than prescribe it,219 which focus on 
what a fiduciary should not do instead of what the fiduciary should do.220 It is a 
mistaken assumption that all fiduciaries owe the same duties in all circumstances.221 
Fiduciary duties, in fact, are ‘a flexible set of principles’ to guide decision making,222 
whose scope depends on the nature of the relationship and the facts of the case.223 
There are two general principles for deciding this: (i) ‘no conflict of interest’ principle;224 
and (ii) ‘no secret profits’ principle.225 In combination of these two principles, the 
irreducible core of fiduciary duties is the duty of loyalty:  
																																																								
217 JP Morgan Bank (formerly Chase Manhattan Bank) v Springwell Navigation Corp [2008] EWHC 1186 (Comm), 
para. 573 (affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Springwell Navigation Corp v JP Morgan Chase Bank (formerly 
Chase Manhattan Bank) [2010] EWCA Civ 1221; [2010] 2 C.L.C. 705). 
218 See I. G. MacNeil, above note 166, at 237–238. 
219 John McGhee, Snell's Equity (33rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2014), para. 7-011. 
220 Attorney-General v Blake Jonathan Cape Ltd. [1998] Ch. 439, at 455; Item Software (UK) Ltd v Fassihi [2004] 
EWCA Civ 1244; [2004] B.C.C. 994, para. 41. 
221 Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd (No.1) [1995] 2 A.C. 145, at 206. 
222 James Hawley, Keith Johnson and Ed Waitzer, ‘Reclaiming Fiduciary Duty Balance’ (2011) 4 Rotman 
International Journal of Pension Management 4, at 7. 
223 Re Coomber [1911] 1 Ch. 723, at 729; Kelly v Cooper [1993] A.C. 205, at 214; Henderson v Merrett Syndicates 
Ltd (No.1) [1995] 2 A.C. 145, at 205.  
224 ‘It was a rule of universal application that trustees could not enter into contracts in which their own 
interests might be in conflict with those of their constituents’: see Aberdeen Railway Co. v Blaikie (1854) 17 
D. (H.L.) 20, at 21. 
225 ‘So decreed, that the lease should be assigned to the infant, and that the trustee should be indemnified 
from any covenants comprised in the lease, and an account of the profits made since the renewal’: Keech v 
Sandford 25 E.R. 223, at 223–224. 
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‘a fiduciary must act in good faith; he must not make a profit out of his trust; 
he must not place himself in a position where his duty and his interest may conflict; 
he may not act for his own benefit or the benefit of a third person without the 
informed consent of his principal’.226 
Furthermore, ‘not every breach of duty by a fiduciary is a breach of fiduciary 
duty’.227 Fiduciary duties sit alongside other statutory, equitable and common law duties 
that a fiduciary might owe, in order to guard against a fiduciary’s temptation to breach 
other duties.228 In particular, fiduciary duties are not a panacea for the complexity and 
professionalisation in commerce.229 Therefore, many scholars argue that other available 
doctrines are also of potential importance in the relationship of client/investment firm: 
such as, undue influence or good faith in commercial transactions,230 and an equitable 
concept of ‘fraud on a power’.231 These will be discussed in the next section. 
 Judge-Made Law: Other Doctrines 4.2.4.
In addition to the duty of care and the fiduciary duties mentioned above, there are 
other doctrines (such as, undue influence, unconscionability, good faith, fraud on a 
power and confidentiality). First of all, some argue that the undue influence could be 
found easily, when financial instruments are sold in an unsuitable fashion, or are 
intrinsically unsuitable.232 Although it was said to be indefinable,233 the law of undue 
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influence is clarified and explained by the House of Lords in Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v 
Etridge (No. 2): 
‘[i]f the intention was produced by an unacceptable mean, which is regarded 
as an exercise of improper or “undue” influence, and the law hence will not permit 
the transaction to stand, whenever the consent thus procured ought not fairly to be 
treated as the expression of a person’s free will’. 234  
Fiduciary duties and the doctrine of undue influence are commonly conflated,235 
but they are distinct.236 On the one hand, the doctrine of undue influence does not 
apply to all fiduciary relationships,237 and, on the other, not all relationships with undue 
influence are necessarily fiduciary relationships.238 In practice, despite the scepticism 
about the utility of this divide,239 the cases of undue influence might happen in two 
situations: one is the direct analogue of duress, called ‘actual’ undue influence; and 
another is called ‘presumed’ undue influence, where the parties are in a relationship in 
which related duties are imposed on one party towards the other.240  
Second, the principle of unconscionability may provide another possibility. In case 
of unconscionability, ‘the court has an undoubted jurisdiction to relieve against […] 
unequitable and unconscientious bargains’.241 Even if some argue that the undue 
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influence can be subsumed by the principle of unconscionability,242 they are different: 
the former is worse than the latter since the party under undue influence is subordinate 
and does not purport to act independently.243 These two doctrines, thus, are examined 
separately.244 Specifically, this principle has three elements:  
‘[f]irst, one party has been at a serious disadvantage to the other, whether 
through poverty, or ignorance, or lack of advice, or otherwise, so that 
circumstances existed of which unfair advantage could be taken; […] secondly, this 
weakness of the one party has been exploited by the other in some morally 
culpable manner; […] and thirdly, the resulting transaction has been, not merely 
hard or improvident, but overreaching and oppressive’.245 
In practice, although the burden of justifying such an unconscionable transaction is 
on the weak party246 (i.e. clients of investment services in this case), it is highly possible 
that this principle could be applied in some financial transactions. However, the 
application of this principle is narrowly conservative in the UK law247 and is only of 
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theoretical interest to scholars.248 
Third, although a duty to negotiate in good faith is unworkable,249 ‘a theme that 
runs through our law of contract is that the reasonable expectations of honest men must 
be protected’.250 The duty of good faith, thus, could provide another protection of the 
client/investment firm relationship in the UK. Even if there is no consistent conception 
of the contents of good faith,251 a possible synonym is ‘fair and open dealing’ that is 
used to clarify a same term ‘good faith’ of UTCCR (or of the Consumer Rights Act 
2015 if the contract entered into after 1 October, 2015).252 Duties of good faith are 
frequently recognised without any presence of a fiduciary relationship or on the basis of 
fiduciary principles.253 The duty of good faith does not exclusively belong to fiduciaries 
and should be classified as one duty other than a fiduciary duty, although this is not 
without opponent.254 A ‘seminal judgement’255 is Imperial Group Pension Trust Ltd v 
Imperial Tobacco Ltd.256 It was held that the employer, who does not owe any fiduciary 
duties with respect to the exercise of his power to give or withhold consent,257 may still 
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owe an obligation to exercise his discretion in good faith,258 since this obligation arises 
as an implied term in the contract,259 and also on the basis of an implied limitation on 
the power.260 Once some elements of bad faith exist (e.g., some dishonesty or improper 
motive), a breach of the duty of good faith is established.261 
Fourth, a ‘power’ can be used in good faith, but for an improper purpose.262 A 
person has a ‘power’ over property when he can dispose of property owned by others,263 
and a person having a ‘power’ must fairly and honestly execute it without having any 
ulterior object to be accomplished.264 Since investment firms have a discretion in 
choosing investment targets, this may easily happen in the practice of portfolio 
management services. Unlike the excessive execution, which is known as ‘going beyond 
the permitted bounds of a power’,265 where the purpose or intention goes beyond the 
scope of the power, it will constitute a ‘fraud on the power’266 (hence, an alternative 
label of this doctrine is ‘proper purposes doctrine’267). The ‘fraudulent appointment’268 
means that ‘the power has been exercised for a purpose, or with an intention, beyond 
the scope of or not justified by the instrument creating the power’.269 Indeed, clear 
distinctions between the duty of loyalty and the proper purposes doctrine are not always 
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easy to draw,270 and the proper purposes doctrine, in practice, is based on the very 
similar fact which explains and justifies the application of the duty of loyalty.271 
However, the proper purposes doctrine applies to ‘all powers’,272 whether fiduciary 
powers or personal (non-fiduciary) powers273, or even powers in public law.274 
Last but not least, an investment firm may use a ‘Chinese wall’, which is a 
contrivance within an organisation to ensure that some parts of that organisation do not 
allow a client’s confidential information to become known to other parts of that 
organisation.275 It is essential not to confuse the fiduciary duty with a separate duty to 
respect confidential information.276 The Court of Appeal, in Attorney General v Blake, 
indicates the differences between these two duties as follows:  
‘the two relationships are not mutually exclusive. They may co-exist between 
the same parties at the same time. But, they generate different obligations [a 
obligation of confidence and a fiduciary duty of loyalty], and their duration may be 
different.’277 
Obligations of confidentiality may arise outside of any fiduciary relationship,278 
and may endure after the relationship has ended.279 For example, a non-fiduciary can be 
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under a duty of confidentiality, and can still put his own interests first.280 Banks have a 
duty of confidentiality to customers,281 but do not normally come under a fiduciary duty 
to a customer.282 Furthermore, a duty of confidentiality can have a wider sphere to 
protect disclosure of government secrets and personal or private information, with the 
advent of the Human Right Act 1998.283 Therefore, confidence is best analysed as a 
separate head of liability from fiduciary duties,284 even the jurisdictional basis of the 
action for breach of confidence is still uncertainty and controversial.285 
4.3. Conflict of Laws in Cross-Border Transactions 
In the practice of providing investment services, terms of business or agreements 
with clients might typically be required to cover a clause regarding the conflict of laws.286 
The conflict of laws would decide whether the UK’s courts shall be the forum of 
disputes resolution (choice-of-forum rules) and whether the UK’s law shall be applied 
(choice-of-law rules).287 Therefore, in addition to the foregoing substantive private law 
in the UK, the conflict of laws might be a particularly important issue in cross-border 
transactions in the EU. Unlike substantive private law, Article 81.2(c) of the TFEU 
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provides a legal basis for unifying conflict of laws in the EU. The intra-European 
conflict of laws, thus, are laid down by Regulations,288 as another type of ‘regulatory 
tool’289 for allocating competences of private law systems between Member States 
within the EU.290 Since the UK opted in these Regulations,291 the role of UK’s national 
courts here is to interpret these EU statutes simply, and such interpretation shall be 
done in accordance with the guidance of the CJEU.292 However, a conflict may still 
emerge between the MiFID regime and the intra-European conflict of laws, because it 
may not be easy to find an adequate balance between industry and consumer legitimate 
interests.293 
 Choice-of-Forum Rules: 2012 Brussels Regulation294 4.3.1.
Since 10 January, 2015, the whole of the ‘recast’ Brussels Regulation295 has been 
applied. The sole object of this Regulation ‘is not to unify procedural rules but to 
determine which court has jurisdiction in disputes relating to civil and commercial 
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matters in intra-European relations and to facilitate the enforcement of judgments’.296 
According to this Regulation, clients and investment firms are free to choose the forum 
by an agreement, because ‘the autonomy of the parties’ shall be respected.297 In order to 
neutralise the effect of jurisdiction clauses that might pass unnoticed in contracts,298 
such agreements must be agreed by the parties and ‘clearly and precisely 
demonstrated’,299 and must be either in writing, in a form which accords with practices 
which the parties have established between themselves, or in a form which is widely 
known to any given international trading or commercial area.300 Generally, in the 
absence of such agreements, an investment firm whose headquarters are in the UK shall 
be sued in the courts of the UK.301 But, if disputes arising out of the operations of a 
branch, agency or other establishment, an investment firm may be sued in where the 
branch, agency or other establishment is situated;302 if in matters relating to a contract, 
an investment firm may be sued in the courts where the services were provided (or 
should have been provided);303 and if in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, a 
firm may be sued in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred or may 
occur.304 Given these varied choice-of-forum rules, an investment firm under the FCA’s 
investment conduct supervision may be sued by clients in national courts of different 
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Member States. 
Furthermore, weaker parties should be protected by the choice-of-forum rules 
more,305 regardless of the defendant’s domicile.306 For example, where an investment 
firm, whose headquarter is in the UK, provides investment services (or pursues any 
other commercial or professional activities) to a consumer307 domiciled in France 
through its French branch, the consumer shall claim his right at the French courts.308 In 
another example, if such commercial or professional activities could be proven as the 
investment firm directing them to France (through a website or other e-commerce 
methods), the consumer may claim his rights at courts in either the UK or France.309 As 
to the demonstration of whether the investment firm ‘directs such activities’ to France, 
it should consider relevant evidence in combination other than by only the domicile, 
such as, ‘the international nature of the activity at issue’, ‘mention of telephone numbers 
with the international code’, ‘use of a top-level domain name’ other than that of the 
Member State in which the investment firm is established, ‘the description of itineraries 
from one or more other Member States to the place where the service is provided’, 
‘mention of an international clientele composed of customers domiciled in various 
Member States’, and ‘the website permits consumers to use a different language or a 
different currency’.310 In fact, it is not easy to answer this question in practice, so the 
legal certainty for consumers’ choice is provided at the expense of legal uncertainty for 
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online businesses who bear significant costs of compliance with the complexity of the 
jurisdiction.311 It is important to note that the above allocation of jurisdiction for 
protecting consumers is not absolute, which may be departed from by an agreement in 
accordance with specific conditions.312 However, if a choice-of-forum clause is included, 
without being individually negotiated, in a contract between a consumer and an 
investment firm, with a conferral of exclusive jurisdiction on a court in the territorial 
jurisdiction of which the investment firm has ‘his principal place of business’, it must be 
regarded as ‘unfair’, as ‘it causes, contrary to the requirement of good faith, a significant 
imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the 
detriment of the consumer’.313 
 Choice-of-Law Rules: Rome I & II Regulations314 4.3.2.
Rome I Regulation forms common choice-of-law principles of contractual 
obligations in the EU. The meaning of ‘contractual obligations’ are defined by the CJEU 
as legal obligations freely consented by one person towards another.315 In terms of 
non-contractual obligations, they are governed by Rome II Regulation. The concept of 
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‘non-contractual obligations’ varies from one Member State to another, so it should be 
understood as ‘an autonomous concept’.316 Given the fact that concurrent claims might 
occur easily in the UK, the substantive scope and the provisions of Rome II Regulation 
should be consistent with Rome I Regulation.317 However, courts in the UK may 
encounter some difficulties in choosing applicable Regulations of the client/investment 
firm relationship,318 in particular, equity-based obligations (such as, fiduciary duties) 
may be caught by either Rome I or Rome II Regulation in the UK. For example, 
pursuant to Articles 11 and 12 of Rome II Regulation, liabilities for management of 
business (negotiorum gestio) and pre-contractual dealings (culpa in contrahendo) are placed 
within the framework of Rome II Regulation. However, by contrast, Articles 12.1(c), (d) 
and (e) of Rome I Regulation indicate that restitutionary claims between the parties 
following the termination of a contract for breach or frustration, or to fix the 
consequences of its nullity, would fall in the scope of Rome I Regulation.  
Notwithstanding the ambiguity of equity-based obligations, investment firms and 
their clients still can freely decide the applicable law in accordance with Rome 
Regulations.319 In the absence of an agreement on choice of law, a contract for the 
provision of services shall be governed by the law of the country where the investment 
firm has his habitual residence,320 where will be the branch, agency or any other 
establishment is located if the contract is concluded in the course of the operations of a 
																																																								
316 Recital 11 of Rome II Regulation. 
317 Recital 7 and Article 4.3 of Rome II Regulation. 
318 T. M. Yeo, Choice of Law for Equitable Doctrines (Oxford University Press, 2004), Chs. 7 and 8. 
319 Article 3 of Rome I Regulation and Article 14 of Rome II Regulation. 
320 Article 4.1(b) of Rome I Regulation. 
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branch, agency or any other establishment.321 In terms of non-contractual obligations 
arising out of a tort/delict, the law of the country in which the damage occurs shall be 
applied generally. 322  Furthermore, weaker parties are protected more in Rome I 
Regulation.323 For example, where an investment firm, whose headquarter is in the UK, 
pursues (or directs) commercial or professional activities to a consumer domiciled in 
France by a branch (or by e-commerce methods), the contractual obligations are 
governed by the law of France.324 Recital 24 of Rome I Regulation also makes clear that 
the concept of ‘direct activity’ should be interpreted harmoniously with the Brussels 
Regulation.325 By establishing this uniform choice-of-law rule between consumers and 
investment firms, it would provide ‘more legal certainty–and thus, confidence–for the 
consumer who will know that the rules he knows best will apply to the legal 
relationship’. 326  One limitation of the above protection of consumers shall be 
mentioned: in case that a contract for the supply of services where the services are to be 
supplied to the consumer exclusively in a country other than that in which the consumer 
has his habitual residence, Rome I Regulation’s consumer protection does not apply.327 
Therefore, if a consumer, who is resident in France, took a trip to the UK and bought 
investment services from an investment firm that are supplied in the UK exclusively, 
this contract is governed by the law of the UK. This is because, from the investment 
																																																								
321 Article 19.2 of Rome I Regulation. 
322 Article 4.1 of Rome II Regulation. 
323 Recital 23 of Rome I Regulation. 
324 Recitals 25, 26 and Article 6 of Rome I Regulation. 
325 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters, 2012 OJ L351/1. See further in Section 4.3.1 above (pp. 241–244). 
326 Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on Retail Financial Services in the Single 
Market, COM(2007) 226 final, April, 2007, para. 31, available at: 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52007DC0226&from=EN> 
(accessed June, 2017). 
327 Article 6.4(a) of Rome I Regulation. 
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firm’s perspective, he may not know that the particular consumer actually resides in 
France, so he would surely expect that this contract would be subject to the UK law; 
from the consumer’s perspective, he would assume that the law of the UK would be 
applied to the transaction when he bought services in the UK.328 Again, the parties may 
still choose the law applicable to the contract in accordance with Article 3’s freedom of 
choice in Rome I Regulation, but such a choice shall not have the result of depriving the 
protection of the consumer that he could have in the absence of the choice.329  
 Home Country Control versus Conflict of Laws 4.3.3.
The preceding discussion indicates a significant conflict between the Single 
Passport regime in the MiFID regime and the conflict of laws in private law systems in 
the EU. Specifically, within the competence allocation of the MiFID regime, investment 
conduct of an investment firm, whose headquarter is in the UK, shall be regulated by 
the UK’s regulatory rules and supervised by the FCA when it pursues (or directs) 
commercial or professional activities to consumers domiciled in other Member States 
through e-commerce methods.330 But this investment firm might be sued by the 
consumers in different national courts, and so be governed by different national private 
laws. Private law obligations between investment firms and their clients will ‘always 
provide a residual role’ for host Member States’ judicial authorities.331 Given this, 
compared to the home country control of administrative regulation, conflict of laws 
																																																								
328  Christian Twigg-Flesner, ‘‘Good-Bye Harmonisation by Directives, Hello Cross-Border only 
Regulation?’ – A way forward for EU Consumer Contract Law’ (2011) 7 European Review of Contract Law 
235, at 248. 
329 Article 6.2 of Rome I Regulation. 
330 See further in Section 2.1 of CHAPTER III (pp. 75–80). 
331 Emilios Avgouleas, The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse: A Legal and Economic Analysis (Oxford 
University Press, 2005), at 300. 
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might be more complicated for investment firms to act safely in cross-border markets 
and creates enormous costs.332  
In fact, many provisions of EU law imply this issue,333 but this conflict becomes 
more remarkable in the Directive on electronic commerce (‘ECD’).334 According to 
Article 3.1 of ECD, ‘each Member State shall ensure that the information society 
services provided by a service provider established on its territory comply with the 
national provisions applicable in the Member State in question which fall within the 
coordinated field.’ In terms of the ‘coordinated field’, Article 2(h)(i) broadly defines as 
all ‘requirements regarding the quality or content of the service including those 
applicable to advertising and contracts, or requirements concerning the liability of the 
service provider.’ Although the ECD’s internal market clause does not aim to establish 
additional conflict-of-law rules,335 and the Rome Regulations do not want to restrict the 
free movement of goods and services in the internal market,336 ambiguity regarding the 
definition of the ‘coordinated field’ raises a debate about the relationship between 
norms of private international law and the principles of the internal market.337 In order 
																																																								
332 Norbert Reich et al, European Consumer Law (2nd edn, Intersentia, 2014), at 200. 
333 See, e.g., Article 4.1(h) of Rome I Regulation; Recital 23 of KID Regulation; Recital 8 of Directive 
2002/65/EC concerning the distance marketing of consumer financial services, 2007 OJ L319/1 
(‘DMD’); and Article 3.7 of Directive 2005/29/EC concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial 
practices in the internal market, 2005 OJ L149/22. (‘UCPD’) 
334 Directive 2000/31/EC on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic 
commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce), 2000 OJ L178/1. (‘ECD’) 
335 Recital 23, Article 1.4 and Article 3.3 along with Annex of ECD. 
336 Recital 40 and Article 23 of Rome I Regulation; Recital 35 and Article 27 of Rome II Regulation. 
337 See, e.g., Norbert Reich and Axel Halfmeier, ‘Consumer Protection in the Global Village: Recent 
Developments in German and European Union Law’ (2001) 106 Dickinson Law Review 111, at 132–134; 
Michael Hellner, ‘The Country of Origin Principle in the E-commerce Directive: A Conflict with Conflict 
of Laws?’ (2004) 12 European Review of Private Law 193, at 194–213; Gert de Baere, ‘Is this a Conflict Rule 
which I see Before Me? Looking for a Hidden Conflict Rule in the Principle of Origin as Implemented in 
Primary European Community Law and in the Directive on Electronic Commerce’ (2004) 11 Maastricht 
Journal of European and Comparative Law 287, at 305–317; Ralf Michaels, EU Law as Private International Law? 
Re-Conceptualising the Country-Of-Origin Principle as Vested Rights Theory (ZERP Diskussionspapier 5/2006, 
2006), at 12–16. 
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to resolve this debate, the CJEU confirmed that the country-of-origin principle ‘does 
not establish additional rules on private international law relating to conflicts of laws’,338 
because (i) Article 3.1 of ECD only ‘leads to the application of the substantive law in 
force’ in Member States339; and (ii) from Article 1(4) and Recital 23 of ECD, ‘host 
Member States are in principle free to designate, pursuant to their private international 
law’ as ‘long as this does not result in a restriction of the freedom to provide electronic 
commerce services’.340 In relation to the term ‘coordinated field’ of the provision, it 
principally precludes the provider of an e-commerce service from being made subject, in 
other Member States, to stricter requirements than those provided for by the 
substantive law of the Member State in which that service provider is established.341 
Thanks to this case law, the outstanding issue342 between the internal market and the 
private international law is resolved partly. 
However, the answer to this case law may not be able to end the conflict between 
the Single Passport regime and the conflict of laws entirely. In accordance with the 
CJEU’s explanation in the eDate Advertising and Others case,343 if choice-of-law rules have 
determined the law of host Member States to be the applicable law, the internal market 
clause can have a role to play in a second stage in the way this law is applied or 
interpreted. In other words, the choice-of-law rules shall still be interpreted in 
																																																								
338  CJEU, Joined Cases C-509/09 and C-161/10, eDate Advertising GmbH v X and Olivier Martinez and 
Robert Martinez v MGN Limited, [2011] ECR I-10269, para. 61. 
339 Ibid, para. 62. 
340 Ibid, para. 63. 
341 Ibid, para. 68. 
342 In fact, this debate first appeared in 1990s. For a probably first analysis on this issue: see Jan Wouters, 
‘Conflict of Laws and the Single Market for Financial Services (Part I)’ (1997) 4 Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law 161, at 161–208; and Jan Wouters, ‘Conflict of Laws and the Single Market 
for Financial Services (Part II)’ (1997) 4 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 284, at 284–296. 
343 CJEU, Joined Cases C-509/09 and C-161/10, above note 338. 
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accordance with the EU Treaties, since the choice-of-law rules do not exempt from the 
normative effects of the internal market provisions.344 In the light of this, the Single 
Passport regime, which allocates competences to home Member States on the basis of 
the internal market, should be able to influence the European conflict of laws to some 
extent. Therefore, the interaction between the MiFID regime and European conflict of 
laws may remain controversial,345 the effective use of the possibilities offered by the 
European Passport regime may be impaired, and the uniformity of investor protection 
at the EU level may be deterred.346 
 Co-ordination System of Private Law Governance in the 5.
Capital Markets Union 
5.1. ESMA’s Direct Supervision? Single Supervisor? 
Given the aforementioned issues of the MiFID regime in private law systems, any 
approach to the implementation of EU policies has to secure the optimal interplay 
between administrative regulation and private law systems by appropriate coordination 
mechanisms.347 As Professor Stefan Grundmann said:  
‘if indeed a European Capital Market Union were established, with 
far-reaching reforms, the relationship between regulation (supervision or market 
regulation) and private law could even become one of the core themes of 
																																																								
344 A. Gkoutzinis, above note 18, at 146–159 
345 Jean-Pierre Casey and Karel Lannoo, The MiFID Revolution (Cambridge University Press, 2009), at 189. 
346 Michel Tison, The Civil Law Effects of MiFID in a Comparative Law Perspective (Ghent University Financial 
Law Institute Working Paper No WP 2010-05, 2010), at 13–17. 
347 Geoffrey P. Miller and Fabrizio Cafaggi, The Governance and Regulation of International Finance (Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2013), at 9–10; Olha O. Cherednychenko, ‘In Search of Coherence in the 
Implementation of EU Policies: The Case of Financial Service Contracts’ (5th Standing Group on 
Regulatory Governance (ECPR) Biennial Conference Regulatory Governance Between Global and Local, 
Barcelona, 25-27 June 2014), at 20. 
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discussion in the next decade’.348  
This not only indicates the hybrid governance of investment conduct in the EU, 
but also highlights that, if the EU wants to reform, improve or render more coherent 
the dispersed rules, it should have an aerial view at all rules of European capital markets 
law.349 Therefore, what we have to ask is whether centralised investment conduct 
supervision will be exactly the thing that the CMU needs, from the perspective of 
private law governance? 
In order to answer this question, it is necessary to start with an examination of 
ESMA’s influence on NCAs and national courts. There are two concerns. The first 
concern is ESMA’s rule-making powers. Indeed, delegated and implementing Directives, 
technical standards, guidelines and recommendations are all useful to the 
implementation and enforcement of MiFID’s rules, but these rule-making powers are 
limited to administrative regulation merely.350 As discussed above,351 national courts 
may take into account these regulatory rules as supportive evidence of private cases, but 
they have no obligation to follow these rules as NCAs. The second concern is ESMA’s 
supervisory powers. Unlike NCAs, national courts will not feel bound by ESMA.352 All 
ESMA’s supervisory powers (such as, monitoring the application of EU law and binding 
mediation) could only be relevant to NCAs, not to national courts.353 One special case, 
																																																								
348 Stefan Grundmann, ‘The Banking Union Translated into (Private Law) Duties: Infrastructure and 
Rulebook’ (2015) 16 European Business Organization Law Review 357, at 379. 
349 Brigitta Lurger, ‘Old and New insights for the Protection of Consumers in European Private Law in 
the Wake of the Global Economic Crisis’ in Roger Brownsword et al (eds), The Foundations of European 
Private Law (Hart Publishing, 2011), at 98–99. 
350 See further in Section 3 of CHAPTER II (pp. 23–61). 
351 See Section 4.1.3 above (pp. 219–221). 
352 R. Veil, above note 78, at 422. 
353 See further in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of CHAPTER III (pp. 88–105). 
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however, should be followed up in the future is the product’s restriction power newly 
conferred to ESMA by MiFIR.354 If ESMA adopts a retroactive measure of specific 
products, this banning power may influence the contracts directly.355 Notwithstanding 
this, ESMA is very unlikely to have such strong usage of this sensitive power in reality 
because of ESMA’s constitutionality issue.356 On the whole, ESMA provides very little 
help in co-ordinating private law governance of investment conduct. Therefore, it is 
highly doubtful that the establishment of a single supervisor will be able to reduce 
transactions costs of private law systems in the CMU more effectively. 
5.2. Cross-Border Extra-Judicial Mechanism 
In fact, such a multiplicity of jurisdictions and large variations of national private 
law across Member States may encourage the establishment of extra-judicial mechanism 
in cross-border transactions.357 FIN-NET, which is a voluntary network of out-of-court 
complaint schemes handling disputes about financial services in the EU, is established 
to assist clients in transferring complaints to the competent alternative dispute 
resolution (‘ADR’) scheme in the country of the financial services provider.358 However, 
the handling of complaints about financial services by this voluntary network may still 
be particularly problematic in a cross-border context.359 As acknowledged by the 
																																																								
354 Article 40 of MiFIR: see further in Section 3.3.8 of CHPATER II (pp. 58–60) and Section 3.3.1 of 
CHAPTER III (p. 102). 
355 For example, according to Article 6(b)(iv)(2) of the ISDA 2002 Master Agreement, there is a right to 
terminate swaps and derivatives transactions following termination events due to illegality. By referring 
the definition of ‘termination events’ in Article 5(b)(i) along with the definition of ‘law’ in Article 14, 
ESMA’s product restriction could possibly be seen as a transaction ‘becomes unlawful under any 
applicable law’ and classified as a termination event due to illegality. 
356 See further in Section 4.1 of CHAPTER III (pp. 105–117). 
357 N. Reich et al, above note 332, at 326–327.  
358 See more at the website of FIN-NET, available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/finance/fin-net/index_en.htm> (accessed June, 2017). 
359 For example, some Member States are still not FIN-NET members; ADR still does not exist in all 
Member States; and consumers are not aware of ADR schemes: see European Commission, Consultation 
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Commission,  
‘[i]n the long run and in the event cross-border integration increases 
significantly, it might become necessary to think of additional measures to improve 
the ADR system in retail financial services’.360 
Since ADR mechanisms could provide confidence of investors in buying 
cross-border investment services in the EU,361 it might be needed to develop an 
enhanced pan-EU out-of-court mechanism in the CMU, in particular with the field of 
cross-border capital market disputes settlement. In addition to Article 81.2(g), Article 
114 of the TFEU clearly has potential in developing cross-border dispute resolution and 
redress procedures.362 Article 169.2 of the TFEU may also provide a legal basis to do so 
without the restriction of fiscal provisions, albeit its legal limits have never been 
tested.363 In fact, the possibility of this is also confirmed by recent legislation. For 
example, according to MiFID II, Member States now have an obligation to 
‘ensure’—rather than merely ‘encourage’ or ‘promote’—that efficient and effective 
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<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/adr/adr_consultation_en.pdf>  
(accessed June, 2017). 
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Central and Eastern Europe Countries (CEECs): Preliminary Findings and Research Agenda (EUI Working Papers, 
Law 2013/07, European University Institute, Department of Law, 2013), at 76–78. 
362 Niamh Moloney, ‘Investor Protection and the Treaty: an Uneasy Relationship’ in Guido Ferrarini, 
Klaus J. Hopt and Eddy Wymeersch (eds), Capital Markets in the Age of the Euro: Cross-Border Transactions, 
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complaints and redress procedures in the resolution of cross-border consumer 
disputes,364 ‘with a view to protecting clients and without prejudice to the right of 
customers to bring their action before the courts’.365 The Consumer ADR Directive 
also requires appropriate ADRs in Member States to cover disputes arising from 
cross-border financial services.366 Overall, there is a trend in the EU law to involve 
administrative authorities in the settlement of compensation claims, as a visible sign of 
administrative measures of private law.367 The proposed ADR system of cross-border 
capital market disputes, thus, seems to be an area ripe for potential development 
through ESMA who could promote, advise on, and coordinate pan-EU movements 
towards.368 The impact of ESMA’s powers could be more incisive in such extra-judicial 
mechanisms, since arbitration is not bound by general private law and private 
international law.369 
It is important to note that this proposed ADR mechanism in the CMU is not 
flawless. First, its function may be limited by investors’ rational apathy, free riding and 
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lack of confidence in its fairness.370 Second, the current dispute resolution system in the 
EU law still lacks coherence and is fragmented.371 Third, this self-sufficient ADR 
mechanism may have particularly deleterious consequences in relation to diversity of 
public policy objectives in Member States (such as, divergent needs of domestic 
consumer protection).372 Therefore, national courts would still have to co-exist as 
complementary systems. Unless this proposed pan-EU ADR is a very attractive 
option,373 clients would rather sue investment firms in their local courts.374 By means of 
this double-track system, the relationship between administrative regulation and private 
law systems of investment conduct governance could be illustrated by Professor 
Micklitz’s metaphor:  
‘[t]he European rules governing the financial market are to be understood as a 
“silo” which contains public administrative rules on supervision and monitoring, 
on rule-making and rule enforcement, and last but not least on conflict resolution 
through ADR. European regulation, national implementing and enforcement rules 
are merging together in an amalgam of Europeanised national rules. The “silo” is 
closed and in principle self-standing. “Horizontally” applicable national private 
legal orders and national courts enter only when the “vertical” rules encapsulated 
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in the silo turn out to be deficient in substance, or when the conflict cannot be 
kept within the boundaries of administrative monitoring, surveillance management 
or ADR conflict resolution.’375 
 Concluding Remarks 6.
The function of private law systems in governing investment conduct in the EU 
has been examined comprehensively in this chapter. Due to its late development and 
Treaty limitations,376 European private law is normally nationalised in Member States 
and very divergent in national private law systems (for instance, Member States develop 
their own ways to explain the term ‘good faith’ in Article 3 of UCTD). Under this 
decentralised model, even the harmonisation of MiFID’s investment conduct rules is so 
dense and exhaustive, divergent national private laws and courts still have an important 
role to play in governing investment conduct. In the light of the UK’s practice, the 
influence of MiFID’s rules on private cases largely depends on the application of 
national courts. The UK’s common law system takes centre stage in most cases and the 
MiFID’s regime merely plays a supporting role. When tackling cross-border transactions 
relating to the UK, another complication with respect to the competence allocation is 
the interaction between the MiFID’s Single Passport regime and the intra-European 
private international law. For example, investment conduct of an investment firm, 
whose headquarter is in the UK, shall be regulated by the UK’s regulatory rules and 
supervised by the UK’s supervisor when it pursues (or directs) commercial or 
																																																								
375 Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, ‘The Public and the Private – European Regulatory Private Law and 
Financial Services’ (2014) 10 European Review of Contract Law 473, at 474. 
376 In particular, Article 81 of the TFEU lists the measures that can be adopted by the EU exhaustively: 
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professional activities to consumers domiciled in other Member States through 
e-commerce methods. However, this investment firm might be sued by the consumers 
in different national courts, and so be governed by different national private laws. On 
the whole, many issues of private law in governing investment conduct are still unclear 
and complex, and these shall be resolved in order to build a solid CMU. 
However, with regard to these issues, centralised supervision of investment 
conduct provides little help. National courts are not bound by ESMA (or even the 
proposed single supervisor), and the administrative authorities’ opinion may only 
provide some supporting evidence to national courts in private law cases. Therefore, 
from the perspective of private law governance, it is highly doubtful that the 
establishment of a single supervisor could reduce the transaction costs of capital 
markets in the EU.377 By comparison, a non-mandatory pan-EU ADR for cross-border 
capital market disputes is a more useful and feasible option in coordinating private law 
governance in the EU. Next to the judiciary, this ADR, as an important vehicle 
accelerating the Europeanisation in the CMU, could effectively ease the tension caused 








377 As the first step, the Commission is preparing a campaign to raise awareness of FIN-NET: see 
European Commission, The Consumer Financial Services Action Plan, COM(2017) 139 final, March, 
2017, at 4, available at: 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:055353bd-0fba-11e7-8a35-01aa75ed71a1.0003.02/D
OC_1&format=PDF> (accessed June, 2017). 






























OPTIMUM ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNANCE 
OF INVESTMENT CONDUCT 
IN THE CAPITAL MARKETS UNION 
‘The state is a two-edged sword: the existence of a state is 
essential for economic growth; the state, however, is the source of 
man-made decline.’1 
‘“Subsidiarity” is a two-edged sword. It can cut against 
Community action, but can also cut against state prerogatives.’2 
 Introduction 1.
Given that centralised investment conduct supervision provides little help in 
reducing transaction costs in the CMU, from the perspective of private law governance,3 
this chapter is going to examine whether the argument in favour of centralised 
investment conduct supervision in the CMU could stand, from the perspective of 
administrative governance. In fact, the plea for a single supervisor in European capital 
markets is not a new idea—it is as old as the free movement of capital. The idea of 
single supervisor first appeared in the Segré report, which considered the establishment 
of an agency at the EU level similar to the US SEC in 1966.4 The term, European 
																																																								
1 Douglass C. North, Structure and Change in Economic History (Norton, 1981), at 20. 
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3 See further in Section 5.1 of CHAPTER V (pp. 250–252). 
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Securities and Exchange Commission (‘ESEC’), emerged in 1976, 5  with some 
followers.6 The idea was appeared again in 1999 because of the commencement of the 
European Monetary Union (‘EMU’).7 It then raised a long-lasting debate after the 
Lamfalussy report8 published in 2001.9 In fact, the Lamfalussy report envisaged the 
creation of EU supervisors as a possible development after the basic harmonised rules 
are in place.10 This possibility was confirmed by the Prospectus Directive in 2003.11 
The de Larosière Report of 2009 also highlighted that an additional reform of ESFS 
might be considered: namely, moving towards a system that would rely on only two EU 
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or of Supplementing or Replacing It by Community Law’ (1976) 13 Common Market Law Review 231, at 
249–251. 
6 See, e.g., Ruben Lee, ‘Supervising EU Capital Markets: Do We Need A European SEC?’ in R. M. 
Buxbaum et al (eds), European Business and Economic Law (Walter de Gruyter, 1996), at 187. 
7 See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, ‘Case for a European Securities Commission’ (1999) 38 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 9, at 9–44.; Gilles Thieffry, ‘Towards a European Securities Commission’ (1999) 18 
International Financial Law Review 14, at 14–18; David Green and Karel Lannoo, Challenges to the Structure of 
Financial Supervision in the EU: Report of a CEPS Working Party (Centre for European Policy Studies, 2000), 
at 18–19. 
8 European Commission, Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European 
Securities Markets, February, 2001, available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/lamfalussy/wisemen/final-report-wise-men_en.p
df> (accessed June, 2017). (‘Lamfalussy report’) 
9 See, e.g., Gilles Thieffry, ‘The Case For a European Securities Commission (ESC)’ in Eilís Ferran and 
Charles A. E. Goodhart (eds), Regulating Financial Services and Markets in the 21st Century (Hart Publishing, 
2001), at 211–234; Jeroen Kremers, Dirk Schoenmaker and Peter Wierts, ‘Does Europe Need A 
Euro-Wide Supervisor?’ (2001) 6 The Financial Regulator 50, at 50–56; Yannis Avgerinos, ‘The Need and 
the Rationale for A European Securities Regulator’ in Mads Andenas and Yannis Avgerinos (eds), 
Financial Markets in Europe: Towards a Single Regulator? (Kluwer Law International, 2003), Ch. 6; Gilles 
Thieffry, ‘After the Lamfalussy Report: The First Step towards a European Securities Commission?’ in 
Mads Andenas and Yannis Avgerinos (eds), Financial Markets in Europe: Towards a Single Regulator? (Kluwer 
Law International, 2003), Ch. 7; Gregor Pozniak, ‘Towards a European Securities Commission: A View 
from the Securities Markets Industry’ in Mads Andenas and Yannis Avgerinos (eds), Financial Markets in 
Europe: Towards a Single Regulator? (Kluwer Law International, 2003), Ch. 9; Eric J. Pan, ‘The Case for a 
Single European Securities Regulator’ in Mads Andenas and Yannis Avgerinos (eds), Financial Markets in 
Europe: Towards a Single Regulator? (Kluwer Law International, 2003), Ch. 10; Gerard Hertig and Ruben Lee, 
‘Four Predictions about the Future of EU Securities Regulation’ (2003) 3 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 
359, at 370–377; Rosa M. Lastra, ‘The Governance Structure for Financial Regulation and Supervision in 
Europe’ (2003) 10 Columbia Journal of European Law 49, at 54–56; Eilís Ferran, Building an EU Securities 
Market (Cambridge University Press, 2004), at 119–122; Pierre-Marie Boury, ‘Does the European Union 
Need A Securities and Exchange Commission?’ (2006) 1 Capital Markets Law Journal 184, at 191–194; 
Dorothee Fischer-Appelt, ‘Does the EU Need A Single European Securities Regulator?’ in Herwig C. H. 
Hofmann and Alexander H. Turk (eds), EU Administrative Governance (Edward Elgar, 2006), at 270–278. 
10 Lamfalussy report, above note 8, at 95. 
11 Recital 47 of Directive 2003/71/EC on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to 
the public or admitted to trading and amending Directive 2001/34/EC, 2003 OJ L345/64. 
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authorities, which means the first authority would be responsible for banking and 
insurance prudential issues as well as for any other issue relevant for financial stability, 
and the second authority would be responsible for conduct-of-business and market 
issues.12 A similar debate comes out again after the launch of the Action Plan of CMU, 
although SSM and ESMA are both in place now.13 However, the preceding discussion 
does not differentiate investment conduct supervision from others, nor does it have a 
structured comparison of transaction costs. This is the task that this chapter aims to do.  
With an aim to conduct a comprehensive transaction cost analysis focusing on 
investment conduct supervision, the rest of this chapter is divided into four sections. 
Section 2 explores the legal bases of the administrative governance in the EU Treaties. 
Based on the Treaty principles in the EU, Sections 3 and 4 further compare the total 
transaction costs between the current supervisory system and the proposed 
centralisation of investment conduct supervision. This institutional comparison is 
formed by the transaction cost approach: 14  environmental factors 
(uncertainty/complexity and small numbers) and human factors (opportunism and 
bounded rationality) are compared respectively. At the end, Section 5 concludes the 
outcome of this comprehensive institutional comparison. 
  
																																																								
12 European Commission, Report of the High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, 
February, 2009, Rec. 24, available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf> (accessed June, 
2017). (‘De Larosière report’) 
13 See Footnotes 21 and 22 of CHAPTER I (p. 4). 
14 See further in Sections 2 (pp. 135–146) and Section 3.2 (pp. 153–161) of CHAPTER IV. 
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 Treaty Principles of European Administrative 2.
Governance 
2.1. Principles of Conferral, Subsidiarity and Proportionality 
As explored in the preceding chapters, the development of European capital 
markets regulation focuses on administrative measures largely.15 However, even though 
administrative regulation enjoys a larger flexibility compared to private law systems in 
the EU law,16 every action taken by the EU shall still be examined under the Treaties 
that have been approved voluntarily and democratically by all Member States. It is, thus, 
worthy to explore these Treaty bases before conducting a comparative institutional 
analysis. 
First of all, according to the principle of conferral, the EU is only entitled to act 
within the competences conferred by Member States for the objectives set out in the 
Treaties.17 This principle governs the ‘limits’ of the EU’s competences.18 In this sense, 
the EU enjoys no inherent sovereignty and is seen, for the most part, as a species of 
confederation.19 The TFEU further distinguishes exclusive, shared, and supporting 
competences of the EU.20 Policy areas that are not mentioned in Articles 3 and 6 of the 
TFEU would be classified into the type of shared competences.21 Within the shared 
competences, the EU may legislate and adopt legally binding acts, but the competences 
																																																								
15 See further in Sections 2 and 3 of CHAPTER II (pp. 17–61) and CHAPTER III (pp. 75–105). 
16 See further in Section 2.2 of CHAPTER V (pp. 197–199). 
17 Article 5.2 of the TEU. 
18 Article 5.1 of the TEU. 
19 David Edward and Robert Lane, Edward and Lane on European Union Law (Edward Elgar, 2013), para. 
2.26. 
20 Article 2 of the TFEU. 
21 Some explain this denial of exclusive competences was presumably because of the potential breadth of 
internal market measures: see Lorna Woods and Philippa Watson, Steiner and Woods EU Law (12th edn, 
Oxford University Press, 2014), at 58. 
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remain with Member States if the EU does not do so.22 On the basis of this, investment 
conduct regulation falls into the shared competence (whether through the provisions of 
either ‘internal market’, ‘consumer protection’ or ‘area of freedom’23) and the EU has 
legitimate powers to impose harmonised measures. But, the ‘use’ of the EU’s 
competences is still governed by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.24 If 
these two principles cannot be met, shared competences shall remain with Member 
States.25 
Second, whether the EU could intervene in a shared competence is subject to the 
principle of subsidiarity.26 Specifically, the test of this principle includes three steps: (i) 
to apply criteria chosen—this is the ‘reason of scale or effects’ test; (ii) to verify that 
credible co-operation between Member States is infeasible in the status quo—this is the 
‘cannot sufficiently achieved’ test; and (iii) to confirm the EU’s action can enforce this 
intervention better—the ‘better achieved’ test. 27  In order to clarify the ‘dynamic 
concept’ of the above three-stage test,28 a more detailed protocol on subsidiarity is 
annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam29, indicating the following conditions should be 
examined:  
‘(i) the issue under consideration has transnational aspects which cannot be 
satisfactorily regulated by action by Member States’; (ii) ‘actions by Member States 
																																																								
22 Article 4.1 of TEU. 
23 Articles 4(a), (f) and (j) of the TFEU. 
24 Article 5.1 of the TEU. 
25 Article 4.1 of the TEU. 
26 Article 5.3 of the TEU. 
27 Jacques Pelkmans, ‘An EU subsidiarity test is indispensable’ (2006) 41 Intereconomics 249, at 251. 
28 Treaty of Amsterdam: Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, 
1997 OJ C 340/105, para. 3. 
29 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the 
European Communities and related Acts, 1997 OJ C340/1. 
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alone or lack of EU’s action would conflict with the requirements of the Treaty or 
would otherwise significantly damage Member States’ interests’; and (iii) ‘action at 
the EU level would produce clear benefits by reason of its scale or effects 
compared with action at the level of the Member States’.30  
However, these criteria of the protocol, in fact, do no more that restate the 
problem, and they are not even clear whether these criteria are cumulative or 
alternative.31 What we can confirm is that the principle of subsidiarity is a test of 
‘comparative efficiency’ between different institutional arrangements of governance in 
the EU.32 
Third, in addition to the principles of conferral and subsidiarity, the content and 
form of EU’s action shall meet the principle of proportionality no matter in any kind of 
competences, in order to define the action assigned to the EU is not exceed what is 
‘necessary to achieve’ the object of the EU.33 As per the CJEU’s ruling case in Fedesa 
case,34 four stages are generally acknowledged to assure that the EU’s measures are 
commensurate with its objectives: (i) a measure is in pursuit of a legitimate objective; (ii) 
the measure must be suitable to achieve the objective (the suitability test); (iii) the 
measure must be necessary to achieve the objective, which means there cannot be any 
less onerous way of doing it (the necessity test); and (iv) the measure must be reasonable, 
																																																								
30 Treaty of Amsterdam: Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, 
above note 28, para. 5. 
31 L. Woods and P. Watson, above note 21, at 60. 
32 Commission Communication to the Council and Parliament, Bulletin EC 10-1992 (27, October 1992), 
at 116. See also Andreas Føllesdal, ‘Subsidiarity’ (1998) 6 Journal of Political Philosophy 190, at 193. 
33 Article 5.4 of the TEU. 
34 CJEU, Case C-331/88, The Queen v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and Secretary of State for Health, 
ex parte: Fedesa et al., [1990] ECR I-4023, para. 13. 
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considering competing interests and disadvantages (the proportionality stricto sensu test).35 
Furthermore, according to the protocol annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam, EU’s 
measures should provide Member States with alternative ways to achieve the objectives 
of the measures.36 Conceptually, the principle of subsidiarity is an assessment of the 
‘need’ for the EU’s action, and the principle of proportionality is a determination of the 
‘nature’ and ‘intensity’ of the EU’s action.37 However, this distinction is blurred in 
practice, since the objective of action and the means to pursue the objective cannot be 
separated clearly.38 As some commentators claim, the wording ‘in so far as’ within the 
principle of subsidiarity ‘embodies a specific application of the principle of 
proportionality’ for protecting national powers.39 Due to the blurring of the line 
between the two principles, the protocol on the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon no longer contains the 
concrete guidance and just ‘conflates’ these two principles:40  
‘the reasons for concluding that a EU objective can be better achieved at the 
																																																								
35 Tor-Inge Harbo, ‘The Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law’ (2010) 16 European Law 
Journal 158, at 165; Paul Craig and G. de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (Fifth edn, Oxford 
University Press, 2011), at 526; Wolf Sauter, ‘Proportionality in EU Law: A Balancing Act?’ (2013) 15 
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 439, at 448; HM Government, Review of the Balance of 
Competences between the United Kingdom and the European Union: Subsidiarity and Proportionality, 
December, 2014, at 35–36, available at: 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/388852/BoCSubAn
dPro_acc.pdf> (accessed June, 2017). 
36 Treaty of Amsterdam: Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, 
above note 28, para. 6. 
37 Koen Lenaerts, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Environment in the European Union: Keeping 
the Balance of Federalism’ (1994) 17 Fordham International Law Journal 846, Part II. 
38 Gráinne De Búrca, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Court of Justice as an Institutional Actor’ 
(1998) 36 Journal of Common Market Studies 217, at 220; Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, Constitutional Law of the 
European Union (Longman, 2002), at 185. 
39 Koen Lenaerts et al, European Union Law (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), para. 7-039; Takis 
Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Laws (2nd edn, Oxford University Press, 2007), at 176. 
40 Damian Chalmers, Gareth Davies and Giorgio Monti, European Union Law: Text and Materials (3rd edn, 
Cambridge University Press, 2014), at 393. 
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EU level shall be substantiated by qualitative and, wherever possible, quantitative 
indicators’; and (ii) ‘draft legislative acts shall take account of the need for any 
burden, whether financial or administrative, falling upon the EU, national 
governments, regional or local authorities, economic operators and citizens, to be 
minimised and commensurate with the objective to be achieved’.41  
Both of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality together amount to 
nothing more than an economic analysis of (de)centralisation.42 
In the light of this, the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality set in the EU 
Treaties43 are in line with the long-standing argument of federalism economists: first, 
the principle of subsidiarity is commonly considered to be rooted in the theory of 
federalism,44 which is concerned with understanding ‘which functions and instruments 
are best centralised and which are best placed in the sphere of decentralised levels of 
government’;45 and second, the principle of proportionality also embeds the theory of 
federalism into its assessment.46 Professor Van den Bergh, based on the federalism 
theory, establishes a consolidated analysis of competence allocation in relation to 
																																																								
41 Lisbon Treaty, Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, 2007 
OJ C306/150, Article 5. 
42 Jacques Pelkmans, Testing for Subsidiarity (Bruges European Economic Policy Briefings no 13, 2006), at 
2. 
43 Namely, the Treaty on European Union (‘TEU’) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (‘TFEU’). 
44 See, e.g., Paul D. Marquardt, ‘Subsidiary and Sovereignty in the European Union’ (1994) 18 Fordham 
International Law Journal 616, at 618–625; George A. Bermann, ‘Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in 
the European Community and the United States’ (1994) 94 Columbia Law Review 331, Part I; Koen 
Lenaerts, ‘Federalism: Essential Concepts in Evolution - The Case of European Union’ (1998) 21 Fordham 
International Law Journal 746, at 780–781. See further in Section 4 below (pp. 275–300). 
45 Wallace E. Oates, ‘An Easy on Fiscal Federalism’ (1999) 37 Journal of Economic Literature 1120, at 1120.  
46  Gabrielle Appleby, ‘Proportionality and Federalism: Can Australia Learn from the European 
Community, the US and Canada’ (2007) 26 University of Tasmania Law Review 1, at 20. 
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regulatory governance in the EU’s multi-level system.47 Regulation should be carried 
out by Member States, unless there is a justification for action to be taken at the EU 
level. 48  Thus, ‘[f]or an economist, … [o]nly indivisibilities, economies of scale, 
externalities, and strategic requirements are acceptable as efficiency arguments in favour 
of allocating powers to higher levels of government.’49 In other words, any institutional 
change towards higher level of Europeanisation shall be justified by comparatively lower 
total transaction costs, in order to pass the tests in the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality. 
2.2. Appropriate Level of Europeanisation 
Given that: (i) the principle of subsidiarity recognises the capacities of a variety of 
actors at different levels, and (ii) the principle of proportionality supports the search for 
less intrusive governance, the legal bases of EU Treaties provide potential for 
developing a wider range of institutional governance.50 This wide range of institutional 
governance can further be categorised on a scale ranging from the ‘lightest’ to the 
‘strongest’ levels of Europeanisation: namely, (i) NCAs, (ii) networks of NCAs, (iii) 
																																																								
47 See Roger Van den Bergh, ‘The Subsidiarity Principle in European Community Law: Some Insights 
from Law and Economics’ (1994) 1 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 337, at 337–366; 
Roger Van den Bergh, ‘Economic Criteria for Applying the Subsidiarity Principle in the European 
Community: The Case of Competition Policy’ (1996) 16 International Review of Law and Economics 363, at 
363–383; Roger Van den Bergh, ‘Subsidiary as an Economic Demarcation Principle and the Emergence 
of European Private Law’ (1998) 5 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 129, at 129–152; 
Roger Van den Bergh, ‘Towards an Institutional Legal Framework for Regulatory Competition in Europe’ 
(2000) 53 Kyklos 435, Appendix. 
48 Alex Mills, ‘Federalism in the European Union and the United States: Subsidiarity, Private Law, and 
the Conflict of Laws’ (2011) 32 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 369, at 377. 
49 Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, ‘Economic Federalism and the European Union’ in Sylvia Ostry et al (eds), 
Rethinking Federalism: Citizens, Markets, and Governments in a Changing World (University of British Columbia 
Press, 1995), at 155. 
50 Colin Scott, ‘The Governance of the European Union: The Potential for Multi-Level Control’ (2002) 8 
European Law Journal 59, at 64–66. 
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European agencies, and (iv) European institutions.51 An initial European response to 
the challenges of integration and subsidiarity is the model of transnational regulatory 
networks.52 On the one hand, the consistency in application of the EU law could be 
achieved by establishing networks of NCAs.53 On the other hand, by taking into 
account the principle of subsidiarity, networks of NCAs are a halfway solution between 
decentralisation and centralisation with a double delegation: one ‘upwards’ from NCAs 
and second ‘downwards’ from the Commission.54 These networks keep the benefits of 
decentralisation and offer safeguards to the problems of decentralisation 
simultaneously.55 Therefore, in order to maintain the institutional balance within the 
Treaties, EU networks remain their important roles for the function of EU financial 
markets. However, due to the perils of politicisation, the credibility of regulatory 
commitments as well as the institutional deficits and gaps of the pan-EU regulation, the 
need for European agencies is undisputed in some fields where networks cannot 
function well.56 The creation of independent European agencies and ‘Euro-regulators’ 
are two further options for stronger consistent supervision of EU law.57 ESMA and 
SSM, for example, are two major cases upwards higher level of Europeanisation in 
																																																								
51 Annetje Ottow, ‘Europeanization of the Supervision of Competitive Markets’ (2012) 18 European Public 
Law 191, at 193–194. 
52 Giandomenico Majone, ‘The Credibility Crisis of Community Regulation’ (2000) 38 Journal of Common 
Market Studies 273, at 295. 
53 Asen Lefterov, ‘How Feasible Is the Proposal for Establishing a New European System of Financial 
Supervisors?’ (2012) 38 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 33, at 55–57. 
54 David Coen and Mark Thatcher, ‘Network Governance and Multi-Level Delegation: European 
Networks of Regulatory Agencies’ (2008) 28 Journal of Public Policy 49, at 50. 
55  Pierre Schammo, ‘EU Day-to-Day Supervision or Intervention-Based Supervision: Which Way 
Forward for the European System of Financial Supervision?’ (2012) 32 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 771, 
at 791–793. 
56 Giandomenico Majone and Michelle Everson, ‘Institutional Reform: Independent Agencies, Oversight, 
Coordination and Procedural Control’ in Olivier De Schutter, Notis Lebessis and John Paterson (eds), 
Governance in the European Union (European Communities, 2001), at 130–140. 
57 Mark Thatcher and David Coen, ‘Reshaping European Regulatory Space: An Evolutionary Analysis’ 
(2008) 31 West European Politics 806, at 825–827. 
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European financial markets.58 Compared to EU networks, the constitutionality issue of 
these two types of institutional governance is more sensitive.59 They may face more 
challenges from the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. 
In practice, concrete steps towards the strongest Europeanisation of the 
Eurozone’s supervisor in financial markets are very recent, because the political 
consensus for the creation of SSM by Article 127.6 of the TFEU was agreed in 2012 
within the plan of EBU.60 Since November, 2014, the ECB has become a centralised 
supervisor for the Euro area’s large credit institutions, and the broader prudential 
supervision of Eurozone banks is centralised to ECB.61 SSM, which is restricted in the 
banking business and the Eurozone only, reflects a traditional and overly-narrow view 
of the sources of systemic risks,62 but it opens a new chapter of Europeanisation. There 
are three ways to make prudential supervisory powers more ‘centralised’ in SSM. First, 
the ECB can issue a binding instruction addressed to respective NCAs, and NCAs, in 
turn, follow the instruction by addressing decisions to private individuals or 
																																																								
58 Annetje Ottow, ‘The New European Superviosry Architecture of the Financial Markets’ in Michelle 
Everson, Cosimo Monda and Ellen Vos (eds), European Agencies in between Institutions and Member States 
(Kluwer Law International, 2014), at 138–142. 
59 For detailed discussion about the constitutionality issues of European agencies: see Section 4.1 of 
CHAPTER III (pp. 105–117). 
60 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank 
concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, 2013 OJ L287/63 (‘SSM 
Regulation’); Regulation (EU) No 1022/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking 
Authority) as regards the conferral of specific tasks on the European Central Bank pursuant to Council 
Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, 2013 OJ L287/5. 
61 Rosa M. Lastra, ‘Banking Union and Single Market: Conflict or Companionship’ (2013) 36 Fordham 
International Law Journal 1190, at 1192; see also Articles 5 and 6 of SSM Regulation.  
62 Eilís Ferran and Valia SG Babis, ‘The European Single Supervisory Mechanism’ (2013) 13 Journal of 
Corporate Law Studies 255, at 259; Danny Busch and Guido Ferrarini, ‘A Banking Union for a Divided 
Europe: An Introduction’ in Danny Busch and Guido Ferrarini (eds), European Banking Union (Oxford 
University Press, 2015), para. 1.02; Eilís Ferran, ‘European Banking Union: Imperfect, But It Can Work’ 
in Danny Busch and Guido Ferrarini (eds), European Banking Union (Oxford University Press, 2015), para. 
3.12. 
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corporations from the EU law.63 The ECB works as a ‘supervisors’ supervisor’ of the 
pan-EU market with intervention powers in this case.64 Second, the ECB has direct 
powers and could take legally binding measures vis-a ̀-vis private individuals or 
corporations from EU law,65 as a ‘direct supervisor’ of the pan-EU market. Third, there 
might be an unprecedented way established by Article 4.3 of SSM Regulation, i.e., an 
application of ‘national legislation’ (rather than the EU law) by the ECB to private 
individuals or corporations.66 This novelty may be a striking step for the European 
integration project,67 but its administrative and judicial reviews are still in question and 
need more clarification in the future practice.68 
Although the upward trend of centralised financial supervision in the EU is 
underway, a counter-trend (namely, decentralisation) in the field of competition policies 
cannot be ignored. Since 2004, the Directorate General for Competition embedded in 
the European Commission (‘DG COM’) has been exercising its supervisory power in 
the EU with the support of European Competition Network (‘ECN’) in Member 
States.69 In this model, the DG COM remains its centralised supervisory powers to 
ensure the application of the principles laid down in Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU, 
in conformity with the legal basis of Article 105.70 Yet, the EU’s antitrust governance 
																																																								
63 Articles 6.3 and 6.5(a) of SSM Regulation. 
64 Klaus Lackhoff, ‘How Will the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) Function? A Brief Overview’ 
(2013) 29 Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 13, at 21. 
65 CHAPTER III of SSM Regulation. 
66 Recital 34 of SSM Regulation. 
67 A. Witte, ‘The Application of National Banking Supervision Law by the ECB: Three Parallel Modes of 
Executing EU Law?’ (2014) 21 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 89, at 105–109. 
68 Tomas M. C. Arons, ‘Judicial Protection of Supervised Credit Institutions in the European Banking 
Union’ in Danny Busch and Guido Ferrarini (eds), European Banking Union (Oxford University Press, 
2015), paras. 13.30 and 13.25. 
69 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 OJ L1/1. 
70 Suzanne Kingston, ‘A "New Division of Responsibilities" in the Proposed Regulation to Modernise 
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apparatus relies on a decentralised structure of parallel enforcement of the law, and the 
DG COM only focuses on European significant cases and co-ordinates national 
authorities in the application of EU laws.71 By means of this, national supervisory 
structures, including their expertise and knowledge, would be fully incorporated into the 
supranational system, so the need for human and financial resources to manage the 
supervisory tasks of the EU could be minimised.72 Compared to the full centralisation, 
there would be a great benefit in adopting this complementarity model for supervision.  
In sum, given the above two examples in the EU, centralisation and 
decentralisation have their own strengths and weaknesses. This is not always the case 
for strongest centralisation in the EU. As some argue, ‘decentralisation is neither good 
nor bad for efficiency, equity, or macroeconomic stability; but rather that its effects 
depend on institution-specific design.’ 73  Therefore, the EU Treaties guarantee a 
comprehensive institutional comparison in order to prevent any undue movement of 
Europeanisation. 
 ‘Cannot be Sufficiently Achieved’ Test 3.
As discussed in CHAPTER III, in terms of investment conduct supervision of 
cross-border transactions, one of the major challenges in the current system is the 
																																																																																																																																																													
the Rules Implementing Articles 81 and 82 EC? A Warning Call’ (2001) 22 European Competition Law Review 
340, at 344; Rein Wesseling, ‘The Draft-Regulation Modernising the Competition Rules: the Commission 
is Married to One Idea’ (2001) 26 European Law Review 357, at 375. 
71 Alexander Türk, ‘Modernisation of EC Antitrust Enforcement’ in Herwig Hofmann and Alexander 
Türk (eds), EU Administrative Governance (Edward Elgar, 2006), at 215–243. 
72 Jacopo Carmassi, Carmine Di Noia and Stefano Micossi, Banking Union: A Federal Model for the European 
Union with Prompt Corrective Action (CEPS Policy Brief, No 282, 2012), at 5. 
73 Jennie Litvack, Junaid Ahmad and Richard Bird, Rethinking Decentralization in Developing Countries (The 
World Bank, 1998), at vii. 
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co-operation issue between NCAs.74 For example, on the one hand, NCAs of home 
Member States may ignore host Member States’ benefits if they can escape the costs of 
supervisory failures, and, on the other hand, NCAs of host Member States may have 
few incentives to invest in adequate supervision if NCAs of home Member States are 
given the leading role and are presumed to take it. Indeed, one candidate solution of this 
co-operation issue is to create a supranational supervisor to supervise investment firms 
in more than one country. However, this issue could alternatively be resolved by 
successful bargaining between the affected parties,75 without the need of centralisation.   
From the viewpoint of co-operative federalism, the primary function of the central 
government is to encourage and enforce inter-jurisdictional co-operation.76 This idea is 
embedded in the principle of sincere co-operation of the TEU, which requires ‘the 
Union and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying 
out tasks which flow from the Treaties,’77 as an expression of the EU’s solidarity.78 In 
accordance with this principle, Member States have: (i) a positive obligation to take all 
appropriate measures to fulfil the obligations of the EU law,79 and (ii) a negative 
obligation to refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the 
EU’s objectives.80 These obligations are ‘binding on all the authorities of Member 
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States’,81 including NCAs. Therefore, where the implementation of EU law raises 
special difficulties (such as, cross-border transaction of investment conduct supervision), 
Member States should submit them to the Commission and work together with it in 
good faith with a view to overcoming the difficulties.82 Based on the principle of 
sincere co-operation, MiFID I sets some obligations of co-operation between Member 
States.83 However, there is little definitive guidance of these obligations,84 and it also 
lacks an official mechanism to tackle disputes of co-operation. Therefore, rules of 
MiFID II guarantee the co-operation in cross-border situations between NCAs, 85 
along with the role played by ESMA as a mediator. 86 By means of this, the current 
system offers enough safeguards to tackle the co-operation issues that may arise from 
the network-based supervision between Member States.87 As some commentators said, 
‘[i]nstead of a single regulatory method for financial markets, successive coordinating 
layers have been established [in ESMA] that do what they can to fill in the gaps.’88  
Furthermore, two other logical cures have been discussed for the co-operation 
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issue without the establishment of a supranational supervisor: first, adding more 
accountability and powers to home Member States’ NCAs in order to stimulate them to 
take into account the interests of host Member States;89 and, second, equipping more 
powers to host Member States’ NCAs in order to protect their States’ interests.90 
Indeed, if incentives are sufficiently aligned or even the conflicts of incentives are small, 
decentralisation is the preferred method of governance than centralisation.91 In the light 
of the above discussion, any centralised supervision of investment conduct might find it 
hard to satisfy the test of ‘cannot be sufficiently achieved’ by the reason of tackling the 
co-operation issue solely between NCAs. In fact, even though the argument in favour of 
the centralised investment conduct supervision could pass the initial test of ‘cannot be 
sufficiently achieved’ within the principle of subsidiarity, it still should be further 
examined by a comparative institutional analysis for assessing the ‘better achieved’ and 
‘necessary to achieve’ tests within the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. 
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 ‘Better Achieved’ and ‘Necessary to Achieve’ Tests 4.
4.1. Comparison of Costs Incurred by Uncertainty/Complexity 
As Professor Takis Tridimas said, the evolution of EU capital market regulation 
has been ‘a journey towards federalisation’.92 The theory of federalism for the vertical 
allocation of competence in a multi-level system, thus, could provide a good starting 
point for the institutional comparison, albeit it is derived from the competence 
allocation between the federal and state governments in the USA.93 Its initial focus on 
public finance lays out a general normative framework for the assignment of 
competences to different levels of government.94 A centralised (or unitary) government 
would possess a far greater capability to tackle macroeconomic stabilisation problems, 
but a basic shortcoming of a centralised government is its insensitivity to varying 
preferences.95 Furthermore, economies of scale, as positive externalities and their 
limitations, might be another factor that should be considered in the decision regarding 
(de)centralisation.96 Therefore, within the standard approach of the federalism theory, 
the heterogeneity and spillovers are at the heart of the debate about the gains from 
centralisation,97 and a least-cost model of federalism is formed to find the optimum 
assignment of competences in a multi-level government.98 This is in line with the 
																																																								
92 Takis Tridimas, ‘EU Financial Regulation: Federalization, Crisis Management, and Law Reform’ in 
Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford University Press, 2011), at 783. 
93 W. Kip Viscusi, Joseph Emmett Harrington and John M. Vernon, Economics of Regulation and Antitrust 
(4th edn, The MIT Press, 2005), at 14–19. 
94 Richard A. Musgrave and Peggy B. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice (4th edn, McGraw-Hill, 
1984), PART FIVE. 
95 Wallace E. Oates, Fiscal Federalism (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972), at 4–13. 
96 Gordon Tullock, ‘Federalism: Problems of Scale’ (1969) 6 Public Choice 19, at 19–29.  
97 Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate, ‘Centralized versus Decentralized Provision of Local Public 
Goods: A Political Economy Approach’ (2003) 87 Journal of Public Economics 2611, at 2628. 
98 Albert Breton and Anthony Scott, The Economic Constitution of Federal States (University of Toronto Press, 
1978), Ch. 7. 
 Chapter VI Optimum Administrative Governance of Investment Conduct in the CMU   
 276 
standard of institutional selection applied by this thesis.99 However, since the arguments 
of the federalism theory are derived from the welfare economics, an implicit assumption 
of it is that government agencies, which are omniscient and benevolent, would seek to 
maximise social welfare.100 By comparison with the perspective of the transaction cost 
approach, these arguments hence could be used to tackle the issues in respect of the 
environmental factors merely.101 
 Centralisation: Negative Externalities 4.1.1.
In the wake of the global financial crisis followed by the Eurozone debt crisis, 
centralisation of supervision is supported by the reason of tackling cross-border 
problems,102 since the liberalisation process in the EU is not immunised from contagion 
effects. 103  First, Member States are unable to tackle pan-EU issues after the 
liberalisation, particularly limited policy options as a result of free movement.104 Second, 
the free movement of capital does not avoid inconsistent developments and can even 
hide them, exaggerating a more serious consequence.105 Mere harmonisation of legal 
frameworks through Regulations and Directives may not be enough to eliminate 
negative cross-border externalities caused by market integration, given the importance 
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of judgment in supervisory decisions.106 According to Article 3.3 of the TEU, the EU 
‘shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member 
States’, so how to make sure a structure of supervision does not lead to fragmentation 
of the single market is the real issue of the EU.107 
A financial trilemma is modelled to clarify this issue, stating that: (i) financial 
stability, (ii) financial integration, and (iii) national financial supervision are incompatible; 
and, if any two of these three objectives can be combined, one has to be given up 
thereafter. 108  Indeed, policymakers can solve the financial trilemma by breaking 
connections of the integrated market.109 But, if the trend of stable integration in the EU 
is irreversible, the establishment of pan-European supervisors is needed to tackle the 
issues caused by the integration.110 Supranational bodies can take supranational actions 
and exercise controls over national supervisors legitimately,111 so they have the ability to 
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address transnational issues in ways which are difficult for national supervisors.112 SSM 
was a clear example born out of the realisation of this ‘dark side’ of market 
integration.113 Without doubt, NCAs will lose part of their powers in favour of a 
supranational body and countries will renounce part of their sovereignty, but this is the 
price to pay for ‘stable’ market integration.114 
 Centralisation: Economies of Scale 4.1.2.
Thanks to the effect of economies of scale, the smaller number of supervisors, the 
lower monitoring costs: centralised supervision can allocate its resources in a more 
efficient way than multiple supervisors.115 This advantage can be found in many specific 
ways. First, centralised supervision is a solution to the overlapping competences of the 
current supervisory system, in which monitoring costs might be paid double by home 
and host Member States.116 Second, centralised supervision is a supranational cure to 
reduce costs for negotiation and co-operation between NCAs.117 Third, centralisation 
of supervision could potentially reduce the high costs of prosecuting EU law caused by 
different institutional capacities of Member States.118 Finally, for non-EU supervisors, 
facing a single market European supervisor would obviously facilitate discussion and 
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worldwide co-operation of supervision surrounding the international financial markets, 
because they can ‘speak with one voice’.119 The EU’s whole interest could be asserted at 
the global level by this single supervisor, especially as not all NCAs of Member States 
are members of international standard setters.120  
Besides the benefits to supervisors, supervisees and markets can also gain 
significant benefits from centralisation. This is because ‘when two nations unite, average 
trading costs are reduced since some international transactions now become domestic 
transactions’,121 centralised supervision could have beneficial effects for harmonisation 
and integration.122 Specifically, from the viewpoint of investment firms, after building a 
pan-European supervisor with overall responsibility of supervision, a ‘level playing field’ 
will be produced by uniform approaches for supervision.123 As a result of this legal 
certainty, regulated investment firms no longer need to comply with duplicated 
supervision of both home and host Member States, followed by a reduction of 
substantial compliance costs.124 From the viewpoint of capital markets, centralised 
supervision in charge of information system helps capital markets reducing information 
costs. This is because: first, the multiplicity of reporting systems on regulated 
investment firms restricts the markets’ ability to achieve efficiency in disclosure due to 
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the significant costs caused the multiplicity;125 and, second, if information is required to 
be disclosed by disparate means, information asymmetries of the markets may not be 
redressed because investors may find it is too inconvenient and difficult to retrieve the 
information.126 A recent study shows that it costs an average investor €430 per month 
to obtain a full real-time picture of equity prices in the EU, while the same service costs 
an American investor €58.127 Therefore, centralised supervision may reduce significant 
information costs, bringing further integration of the EU capital markets.128 
 Decentralisation: Heterogeneity of Preferences 4.1.3.
Nonetheless, the benefits of the economies of scale are not unlimited. As some 
said, ‘it [centralisation] must be carefully applied and must not be in any way interpreted 
as a possibility or a potential danger of “levelling” the Member-States of the Union, by 
excessively reducing or erasing national differences.’ 129  Extremely centralised 
supervision may cause considerably higher costs on the huge EU market than local 
supervision. A supervisory legwork may need to be performed ‘close to the ground’, in 
order to save NCAs’ knowledge of national, regional and local banking markets, their 
longstanding expertise and their advantages with regard to location and language 
skills.130 
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By contrast to centralisation supervision, decentralised supervision can 
accommodate supervisory proximity to the markets, in which risks reflect investment 
patterns, product features and distribution structures that relate to particular 
characteristics of domestic markets.131 As admitted by the European Court of Human 
Rights (‘ECtHR’): ‘[b]ecause of their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, the 
national authorities are in principle better placed than the international judge to 
appreciate what is “in the public interest”’.132 Due to their knowledge of the local 
markets, local supervision will remain the best solution in many places of supervision 
(such as, direct contact with the supervised entities).133 It is undeniable that NCAs are 
better placed than a European supervisor to monitor market developments,134 and they 
could take some good decisions on financial issues.135 Likewise, when citizens’ tastes 
vary with geography, there will often be efficiency gains from differentiating policies for 
matching citizens’ preferences. 136  Extreme centralisation might ‘penalise’ small 
operators and less developed Member States. 137  For example, small firms, some 
financial services providers and non-financial firms have been disproportionately 
affected by capital requirements, along with the dangers of a lack of proportionality.138 
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Given that NCAs have important and long-established expertise in the supervision 
within their territory and their economic, organisational and cultural specificities,139 it is 
doubtful that a Europe-wide regime is capable of addressing the vagaries of all of the 
EU national markets.140 
As F. A. Hayek, the 1974 Nobel Prize winner in Economic Sciences, said: ‘[w]e 
must solve it [the knowledge issue] by some form of decentralisation’.141 This argument 
is also support by the preamble and Article 1.2 of the TEU: the decisions should be 
made ‘as closely as possible to the citizen’ in order to create an ever closer union among 
the peoples of Europe. However, it should be admitted that decentralisation, inevitably, 
comes together with some additional costs for aligning the different interests of the EU 
and Member States. There is always a trade-off between centralisation and 
decentralisation. But, the potential gains of a decentralised system, such as, lesser 
collecting costs of local information and better understanding of local demands, always 
have some explanation in favour of the argument of decentralisation.142 
 Increased Costs after Centralised Investment Conduct Supervision 4.1.4.
As the decentralisation theorem under the federalism theory highlights:  
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‘in the absence of cost-savings from the centralised provision of a good and 
of interjurisdictional external effects, the level of welfare will always be as least as 
high (and typically higher) […] in each jurisdiction than […] any single, uniform 
level of […] maintained across all jurisdictions.’143  
This is the partial case of investment conduct supervision in the EU, because, at 
the present stage, investment conduct supervision has only limited cross-border 
activities 144 —‘EU investors’ do not exist, for the moment at least. 145  Even if 
cross-border problems happen, investment conduct supervision, which normally pays 
attention to the ‘micro’ issue regarding relationships between investment firms and their 
clients (namely, investor protection), would be lower in priority than other ‘macro’ 
issues (such as, financial stability).146 Thus, the argument for centralisation, based on 
negative externalities, would not be compelling here, and investment conduct 
supervision cannot be seen as a convincing case for centralisation at the EU level due to 
this reason.147 The decision as to (de)centralised investment conduct supervision, 
principally, needs to take account of the positive externalities and the heterogeneity of 
preferences. Given the optimum level of investment conduct supervision in the EU is 
formed by a trade-off between the economies of scale and the heterogeneity of 
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preferences, it would not be in the extreme extent of centralisation.148 
 
Figure VI-1: Comparison of Costs Incurred by Uncertainty/Complexity  
between Centralisation and Decentralisation in the EU 
In brief, based on the federalism theory, a comparison between the current system 
and the centralised supervision in the field of investment conduct could be explained by 
foregoing Figure VI-1. The X-axis and Y-axis represent the number of transaction costs 
and the level of Europeanisation respectively. First of all, the EC line shows external 
costs caused by the negative externalities, and it slopes trivially to the right and levels 
thereafter. Negative externalities, hence, are not decisive factors in the consideration of 
the terms of the centralised supervision of investment conduct. Second, organisational 
costs, as the OC line shows, decrease gradually due to the economies of scale, and this 
trend reverses after reaching the lowest point (‘LC’) due to the heterogeneity of 
preferences. Because the ‘preference asymmetries’ in investment conduct supervision, 
the same as in the field of justice and consumer protection, is still very large between 
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Member States,149 the level of LC point (namely, the level of Europeanisation) would 
not be high due to the high heterogeneity of preferences. Given the optimum level of 
governance is at the point of lowest total transaction costs, the TC line, which 
represents the sum of the external costs and organisational costs, reveals the optimum 
level of Europeanisation is at point LT. Any level of Europeanisation of investment 
conduct supervision higher than point LT would not have lower total transaction costs, 
so, at the current stage, the establishment of a single supervisor in charge of investment 
conduct supervision in the EU may not be supported. However, it is noteworthy that if 
either: (i) the slope of the EC line becomes significant (namely, higher negative 
externalities), or (ii) the lowest point of the OC line moves to the right (namely, higher 
economies of scale or lower heterogeneity of preferences), the optimum level of 
Europeanisation will get higher and point LT will be more ‘right’ towards centralisation. 
4.2. Comparison of Costs Incurred by Small Numbers 
Even the aforementioned ‘mainline’ federalism theory provides some strong 
arguments for the competence assignment in a multi-level government, it rules out the 
issue of inter-governmental competition.150 After answering the question of ‘why 
centralise’ in the previous section, it is the time to ask ‘why decentralise’ in turn? If there 
is no significant negative externalities here, Tiebout’s model,151 with respect to the 
theory of inter-governmental competition, could be applied in support of 
																																																								
149 Alberto Alesina, Ignazio Angeloni and Ludger Schuknecht, ‘What Does the European Union Do?’ 
(2005) 123 Public Choice 275, at 283–284 
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decentralisation: under certain circumstances, competition between jurisdictions 
supplying rival combinations of local public goods would lead to an efficient supply of 
such goods.152 Whilst this model has been highly criticised due to its restrictive 
conditions,153 it is a pioneering contribution to the theory of regulatory competition.154 
Tiebout’s model has found some support, asserting that competition between 
governments would produce optimal legal rules with respect to corporate charters.155 In 
fact, the regulatory competition theory is elaborated from the heterogeneity of 
preferences aforementioned,156 along with a more systematic and detailed analysis of 
decentralisation.157 Here, the issue of small numbers in regulation158 is taken into 
account in the theory of ‘supervisory’ competition. 
 Decentralisation: Competition to Efficiency 4.2.1.
Although rich literature of the regulatory competition exists in the field of 
rule-making process in the EU,159 there is a missing link of allocation of supervisory 
competences.160 It is, thus, needed to examine the force of supervisory competition by 
incorporating relative arguments. First, Tiebout’s model focuses on the mobility of 
																																																								
152 Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, ‘The Political Economy of Federalism’ in Dennis C. 
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153 See, e.g., Pierre Pestieau, ‘The Optimality Limits of the Tiebout Model’ in Wallace E. Oates (ed), The 
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Tiebout's Theory of Local Public Expenditures’ (1981) 49 Econometrica 713, at 713–736. 
154 See further in Section 2.2 of CHAPTER II (pp. 20–22). 
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156 See Section 4.1.3 above (pp. 280–282). 
157 W. E. Oates, ‘Toward A Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism’, above note 100, at 354. 
158 See Section 3.2.1 of CHAPTER IV (pp. 154–155). 
159 See further in Section 2.2 of CHAPTER II (pp. 20–22). 
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Working Paper, 2013), part II. 
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supervisees as a stimulation of intergovernmental competition.161 Given the implicit 
assumption is that supervisory authorities would seek to maximise social welfare of their 
own countries, countries below optimum size will seek to attract new supervisees, 
whereas those above optimum size will try to turn away extant supervisees.162 In this 
sense, divergent supervision of investment conduct in Member States is for the purpose 
of (dis)attracting investment firms. This supervisory competition would result in an 
efficient outcome of each Member State.  
Second, even in the absence of mobility of supervisees, supervisory competition 
can still take place across jurisdictions through the channel of capital mobility and this is 
often the case in capital markets. 163  Given this, NCAs of investment conduct 
supervision in Member States may (dis)attract foreign capitals by means of adjusting 
their standard of supervision until they achieve the maximised social welfare. Third, 
where there is no mobility of capitals between different Member States, the ‘yardstick 
competition’ may still happen: namely, supervisory competition takes place merely 
through the free flow of information.164 Based on this, if citizens of a jurisdiction use 
information in other jurisdictions as a benchmark to evaluate the performance of their 
supervisory authorities, the supervisory authorities will compete with others. 165 
Therefore, by means of these three types of supervisory competition, investors and 
																																																								
161 This is the first condition of the Tiebout’s model: see C. M. Tiebout, above note 151, at 419. 
162 This is the seventh condition of the Tiebout’s model: see ibid, at 419. 
163 Barbara Gabor, Regulatory Competition in the Internal Market Comparing Models for Corporate Law, Securities 
Law and Competition Law (Edward Elgar, 2013), at 15–16. 
164 Jeffrey L. Harrison, ‘Yardstick Competition: A Prematurely Discarded Form of Regulatory Relief’ 
(1979) 53 Tulane Law Review 465, at 467. 
165 Pierre Salmon, ‘Decentralisation as An Inventive Scheme’ (1987) 3 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 24, 
at 30–32; Timothy Besley and Anne Case, ‘Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and Yardstick 
Competition’ (1995) 85 The American Economic Review 25, at 25–45. 
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investment firms in each Member State may compare other Member States’ investment 
conduct supervision, and then enforce NCAs to meet the optimum outcome in their 
territories. 
 Increased Costs after Centralised Investment Conduct Supervision 4.2.2.
Based on the supervisory competition theory, centralised supervision of 
investment conduct in the EU will bring increased costs. This is because the distinction 
between Member States with regard to the supervisory preferences is significant: some 
are characterized by heavy public intervention in markets, but a more ‘laissez-faire’ 
attitude is featured in others.166 If we assume that Member State A and Member State B 
have their own TC lines respectively (i.e., TCA and TCB) in Figure VI-2 below, each 
Member State would seek to achieve the lowest costs responding to the optimum level 
of Europeanisation, as discussed above.167 Therefore, Member State A would like to 
stop at the level of LA with total transaction costs of CA1. If Member State A goes 
further to the level LB, its total transaction costs would increase again to CA2. By 
comparison, Member State B would like to continue centralising until it reaches the level 
of LB. This is because Member State B can reduce more transaction costs (CB1−CB2) by 
enhancing the level LA to LB. There is no need to require Member States to do so, 
because they would try to find their lowest-cost level of Europeanisation automatically. 
																																																								
166 Alberto Alesina and Roberto Perotti, ‘The European Union: A Politically Incorrect View’ (2004) 18 
The Journal of Economic Perspectives 27, at 33–34. 
167 See Section 4.1.4 above (pp. 284–285). 
 Chapter VI Optimum Administrative Governance of Investment Conduct in the CMU   
 289 
 
Figure VI-2: Comparison of Costs Incurred by Small Numbers  
between Centralisation and Decentralisation in the EU 
 Given the aforementioned assumption, in order to enhance the level of 
Europeanisation, Member State B would choose to convey some benefits from which it 
will gain by this enhancement to Member State A. Therefore, as a compromise resulting 
from supervisory competition, the co-operation between Member States A and B would 
only be possible to locate at the level between LA and LB.
168 Furthermore, if the 
discrepancy between the level LA and the level LB is huge, this compromise would be 
extremely difficult to reach. This is because it is hard to find a balanced point between: 
(i) the decreasing costs of Member State B, and (ii) the increasing costs of Member State 
A caused by higher Europeanisation. In this sense, from the normative viewpoint, a 
single supervisor in charge of investment conduct supervision, which obviously 
represents a higher level of Europeanisation than the levels LB, would not be a 
comparatively better governance choice than the status quo. The proposed single 
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supervisor, from the positive viewpoint, would also be unfeasibly achieved through 
negotiations between Member States. Nevertheless, it should be further highlighted that 
if either LA or LB moves to the right more, the compromised point would also move to 
the right more. This movement towards higher level of Europenisation may be caused 
by changes of the TC line, as discussed above.169 
In stark contrast to the benefits of supervisory competition, the ‘race to the 
bottom’ argument could not be ignored, and it indeed raises a heated debate in the EU. 
It provides a strong counter-argument: an efficient equilibrium of supervisory 
competition does not exist since this competition will also encounter the market’s 
malfunctions.170 Even if ‘there is a market for regulation or rules, there is no reason to 
assume that this will be as perfect market’. 171  This explains the necessity of 
harmonisation to set up a ‘bottom line’ of supervisory competition in the EU.172 
Furthermore, governmental failures highlight that the outcome of supervisory 
competition in the European capital markets has no uniform answer.173 The assumption 
of ‘omniscient and benevolent’ supervisors may not be held as pointed out by the 
transaction cost approach,174 so the foregoing analysis is not the full story of the 
examination of Treaty principles. Given that ‘[i]nstitutions are simultaneously both 
objective structures “out there” and subjective springs of human agency “in the human 
																																																								
169 See Section 4.1.4 above (p. 285). 
170 Hans-Werner Sinn, ‘The Selection Principle and Market Failure in Systems Competition’ (1997) 66 
Journal of Public Economics 247, at 247–274; Hans-Werner Sinn, The New Systems Competition (Blackwell, 2003), 
at 5–8. 
171 Stephen Woolcock, ‘Competition among Rules in the Single European Market’ in William Bratton et 
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United States (Clarendon Press, 1997), at 302. 
172 See further in Section 2.2 of CHAPTER II (pp. 20–22). 
173 Lars Hornuf, Regulatory Competition in European Corporate and Capital Market Law: An Empirical Aanalysis 
(Intersentia, 2012), at 3–5; B. Gabor, above note 163, at 4–5. 
174 See further in Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 of CHAPTER IV (pp. 155–159).  
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head”’,175 a subjective approach, which focuses on the human factors within the 
organisational failures framework in the TCE, can be a good complement for the 
objective approach in understanding transaction costs.176 
4.3. Comparison of Costs Incurred by Opportunism 
Based on the theory of public choice, the influence of governmental/third party 
opportunism can be confidently asserted.177 This challenges the efficiency of the theory 
of regulatory competition abovementioned. 178  After removing the assumption of 
benevolence, the self-interested pattern of regulators and interest groups are taken into 
consideration by the concept of federalism respectively 179—the so-called ‘second 
generation theory of federalism’.180 This political economy perspective can provide 
further understanding of ‘semi-benevolent’ or even ‘malevolent’ governments in the 
federalism theory, but no definitive conclusion can be drawn regarding opportunism 
and the centralisation-decentralisation nexus.181 The optimum level of supervision 
varies in different conditions. 
 Decentralisation/Centralisation: Public Choice Theory 4.3.1.
On the one hand, a large body of literature argues that decentralised government, 
along with the policy competition, can limit the capacities of a monopolist (in this case a 
‘Leviathan’) seeking its own aggrandisement through maximising the revenues it extracts 
																																																								
175 Geoffrey M. Hodgson, ‘What Are Institutions?’ (2006) 40 Journal of Economic Issues 1, at 8. 
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177 See further in Section 3.2.2 of CHAPTER IV (pp. 155–157). 
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from the economy.182 A model based on the principal/agent approach further indicates 
a trade-off between centralisation and local accountability. 183  This is because 
decentralisation can ‘force governments to represent citizen interests and to preserve 
markets’.184 Some empirical research also supports the view that an increase in the 
number of competing jurisdictions would lead to a lower level of corruption.185 In this 
sense, decentralisation can reduce the costs caused by opportunism.  
On the other hand, some empirical evidence indicates a possibility of ‘overgrazing’: 
namely, competition of governments may lead to more corruption since different 
governments can extract bribes from the same economic actors.186 The function of 
decentralisation for preventing corruption does not always work. Since corruption is 
often stimulated by the fact that officials and citizens live and work close to one another 
in local communities, decentralised governments in close contact with citizens may 
breed corruption.187 Local politicians and bureaucrats are more likely to be subject to 
pressing demands from local interest groups.188 Also, due to the greater cohesiveness of 
interest groups and higher levels of voter ignorance: the lower level of government is, 
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the greater probability of capture by local interest groups is. 189  By contrast, 
centralisation can result in the ‘preference dilution effect’, which means each lobby has 
smaller impact on decisions making given the increasing heterogeneity of preferences.190 
In this regard, the costs of opportunism would be reduced by centralisation. 
 Increased Costs after Centralised Investment Conduct Supervision 4.3.2.
Overall, the effect of centralisation on lobbying might be ambiguous,191 but it 
cannot be ignored in the EU. For example, as of December, 2016, there were about 
11,000 registered lobbyists in the Parliament.192 According to an unofficial study given 
by Corporate Europe Observatory (a non-profit organisation devoted to research and 
advocacy of transparent lobbying) in 2011, it was estimated that between 15,000 and 
30,000 lobbyists were targeting EU decision-makers in Brussels.193 With regard to 
financial market supervision in the EU, some argue that lobbying at the EU level is not 
as great a problem as at the national level.194 This is because, compared to the national 
level, the ‘capture’ at the EU level instead needs stronger leverage in the dealings with a 
single supervisor.195 In the contrast, some argue that concentrating supervisory powers 
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in the hands of a single supervisor may make that supervisor more prone to being 
‘captured’, and the threat of supervisory capture can be reduced by the allocation of 
supervisory powers between supervisors.196 In order to apply the anti-/pro- arguments 
of centralisation in the field of investment conduct supervision, the costs caused by 
opportunism can be viewed as two possibilities in Figure VI-3 below. 
 
 
Figure VI-3: Comparison of Costs Incurred by Opportunism  
between Centralisation and Decentralisation in the EU 
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As mentioned above,197 the TC line of supervision is initially set as the TC0 line, 
along with the optimum level of Europeanisation at point L0. However, since 
supervisors are self-interested, and supervision is influenced by interest groups, 
accountability costs, such as, monitoring behaviour and aligning interests, need to be 
added to achieve the optimum outcome. According to the second generation theory of 
federalism,198 these costs might either increase or decrease with higher Europeanisation. 
Trends of accountability costs, thus, might be drawn as either the AC1 or AC2 lines. The 
decreasing/increasing trend would adjust the TC0 line to be the TC1/TC2 line in order 
to maintain the benevolence of supervisors, followed by the new optimum point (L1/L2) 
towards higher/lower Europeanisation. 
Given the above two possibilities assumed (namely, the TC1 and TC2 lines), the 
next step is to examine the case of investment conduct supervision in the EU would be 
which possibility. A useful argument indicates that the impact of centralisation or 
decentralisation on the efficacy of lobbies depends on whether the objectives of 
domestic and foreign interest groups are aligned or not.199 When the interests of 
domestic lobbies are in conflict with foreign lobbies, centralisation is better than 
decentralisation, as the TC1 line reveals. And vice versa, if interests coincide, 
decentralisation is suggested since centralisation means that foreign lobbies obtain a 
single channel to influence domestic and central governments, as the TC2 line shows. 
This argument is supported by some empirical evidence and particularly in fields, such 
																																																								
197 See Section 4.1.4 above (pp. 284–285). 
198 See Section 4.3.1 above (pp. 291–293). 
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as, consumer protection and environmental protection, where foreign and domestic 
sellers would have the same interests to lobby the centralised government if these 
policies were decided at the EU level.200 Due to the fact that investment conduct 
supervision has a similar protected target as consumer protection, domestic and foreign 
investment firms may have aligned interests to lobby. Therefore, the AC2 and TC2 lines 
would be more like the reality in this case of investment conduct supervision, which 
means the higher level of Europeanisation would not be a better alternative in the EU 
for reducing the costs caused by opportunism. 
4.4. Comparison of Costs Incurred by Bounded Rationality 
In practice, aligning and channelling self-interested governments towards pursuing 
the public interest could not guarantee good policy outcomes, because the governmental 
failures may often be ‘the result of fallibility rather than culpability’.201 The public 
choice theory is incomplete to the story: the ‘omniscience’ assumption of regulators 
shall also be removed by the cognitive model.202 Supervisors are boundedly rational 
too.203 Process-based judicial review of agency decisions might play an important role in 
de-biasing,204 but judicial review would never prevent all biased decisions making by 
public agencies since judges also have their own cognitive biases.205 Given the bounded 
																																																								
200 Massimo Bordignon, Luca Colombo and Umberto Galmarini, ‘Fiscal Federalism and Lobbying’ (2008) 
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rationality of supervisors is difficult to be overcome, it might be better to have different 
supervisory systems that would reduce the harmful effect of behavioural biases among 
supervisors by positive learning effects.206 
 Decentralisation: Laboratory Federalism 4.4.1.
Based on the standard approach of the federalism theory, it is argued that ‘[e]ach 
city or town is a laboratory where experiments are tried. If successful, the experiment is 
copied by other town governments. If it fails, the experiment is soon abandoned.’207 
The concept of ‘laboratory federalism’ was coined by Professor Oates in 1999,208 with 
some followers209 claiming that decentralisation can lead to a process of experimentation 
for policy innovation and learning. Although these positive benefits of decentralisation 
(such as, mistake-ridden learning, flexibility and option discovery) are normally 
neglected,210 the findings of behavioural economics attract some new attention on this: 
decentralisation could be a mechanism to reduce cognitive errors.211 
The benefits of this ‘laboratory’ are supported strongly by the evolutionary 
economics of private enterprises,212 and provides a theoretical background for the 
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application of ‘Open Method of Co-ordination’ (‘OMC’) in the EU.213 This is a new 
mode of EU governance instruments towards a paradigm of collective learning.214 The 
OMC, although it is applied in social policies mainly, is an explicit case of promoting 
policy learning between Member States by a soft approach of benchmarking (namely, 
best practices).215 To some extent, the OMC may also link to the yardstick competition 
argument mentioned above,216 but, here, the OMC is viewed as an effort to solve a 
different problem—that is, supervisors are boundedly rational. 
 Increased Costs after Centralised Investment Conduct Supervision 4.4.2.
If supervisors would never know where is the optimum point of the 
Europeanisation’s level, the theory of supervisory competition could be understood 
from another perspective. As shown by Figure VI-4 below, competition between 
Member States A and B has to be examined as the composition of many-times 
interaction over time.217 Initially, at point Li, Member States A and B have their own 
costs, and they then try to enhance the level of Europeanisation to point Lii. After 
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Soft Economic Policy Co-ordination’ (2001) 39 Journal of Common Market Studies 719, at 728. 
215 For deeper discussion about the OMC: See, e.g., Caroline de la Porte, Philippe Pochet and Belgium 
Graham Room, ‘Social Benchmarking, Policy Making and New Governance in the EU’ (2001) 11 Journal 
of European Social Policy 291, at 291–307; Susana Borrás and Kerstin Jacobsson, ‘The Open Method of 
Co-ordination and New Governance Patterns in the EU’ (2004) 11 Journal of European Public Policy 185, at 
185–208; Mary Daly, ‘Whither EU Social Policy? An Account and Assessment of Developments in the 
Lisbon Social Inclusion Process’ (2008) 37 Journal of Social Policy 1, at 1–19. 
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University Press, 2006), at 61; Arthur Benz, ‘Multilevel Governance in the European Union: 
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2015), at 208. See further in Section 4.2.1 above (pp. 287–288). 
217 For a formal model of this: see Ana B. Ania and Andreas Wagener, ‘Laboratory Federalism: The 
Open Method of Coordination (OMC) as an Evolutionary Learning Process’ (2014) 16 Journal of Public 
Economic Theory 767, at 771–782.  
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Member States A and B realised that a higher level of Europeanisation may reduce their 
costs, they keep doing this as an on-going experiment. This experiment then would 
continue until point Liv, because, once over point Liii, Member State A would learn that 
any further Europeanisation is without benefit. In contrast, Member State B would 
insist further Europeanisation for saving more costs. In this sense, the supervisory 
competition turns to be a ‘laboratory’ for each Member State: they learn, innovate and 
evolve by the mechanism of decentralisation. The TC lines, namely TCA and TCB, are 
not clear in the mind of Member States A and B, but are draw later after many tries. 
 
Figure VI-4: Comparison of Costs Incurred by Bounded Rationality  
between Centralisation and Decentralisation in the EU 
By admitting the unreality of the omniscience assumption of supervisors, 
centralised supervision in a blind way will result in the risk of losing diversity,218 
followed by a reduction of the abilities to innovate and learn. ‘By opening up the space 
																																																								
218 Eilis Ferran, ‘Examining the United Kingdom's Experience in Adopting the Single Financial Regulator 
Model Symposium: Do Financial Supermarkets Need Super Regulators’ (2002) 28 Brooklyn Journal of 
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for some institutional experimentation, a different opportunity structure is, perhaps, 
offered to the participants to exploit.’ 219  In an even worse case, once financial 
institutions and supervisors all adopt similar business strategies, an error can result in 
heightened systemic risks. 220  Supervisory diversity provides a valuable, and little 
appreciated, hedge against systemic failures as a risk-sharing method.221 This benefit of 
risk diversification generated by decentralisation is also supported by some empirical 
evidence.222 Therefore, compared to the single supervisor, the network-based structure 
of ESMA, which essentially follows an OMC approach in the field of investment 
conduct supervision,223 may provide a better system in reducing the costs caused by 
bounded rationality. This directly deliberative poly-archy (‘DDP’) of Member States 
provides a machine for learning from diversity.224 As the official motto of the EU 
indicates, ‘United in diversity’.225  
 Concluding Remarks 5.
In this chapter, the current network-based system and the centralised supervision 
of investment conduct have been compared in detail from the perspective of 
																																																								
219 Helen Wallace, ‘Flexibility: A Tool of Integration or a Restraint on Disintegration?’ in Karlheinz 
Neunreither and Antje Wiener (eds), European Integration After Amsterdam: Institutional Dynamics and Prospects 
for Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2000), at 190. 
220 R. Herring and R.E. Litan, Financial Regulation in the Global Economy (Brookings Institution, 1995), at 8. 
221 Roberta Romano, Against Financial Regulation Harmonization: A Comment (Yale Law & Economics 
Research Paper No 414, 2010), at 18–21. 
222 Alessandra Arcuri and Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, ‘Centralization versus Decentralization as a Risk-
Return Trade-Off’ (2010) 53 Journal of Law and Economics 359, at 359–378. 
223 Elliot Posner, ‘The Lamfalussy Process: Polyarchic Origins of Networked Financial Rule-Making in 
the EU’ in Charles F Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin (eds), Experimentalist Governance in the European Union: 
Towards A New Architecture (Oxford University Press, 2010), at 54–57; Christian Schweiger, The EU and the 
Global Financial Crisis: New Varieties of Capitalism (Edward Elgar, 2014), at 50. 
224  Charles F. Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, ‘Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of 
Experimentalist Governance in the EU’ (2008) 14 European Law Journal 271, at 276.  
225 Article I-8 of Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 2004 OJ C310/01. 
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administrative regulation. Thanks to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, 
the EU Treaties guarantee a comprehensive institutional comparison to prevent any 
undue movement of Europeanisation. First of all, it was questioned whether the 
co-operation between Member States ‘cannot be sufficiently achieved’ in the current 
network-based supervision along with ESMA’s intervention, in particular the principle 
of sincere co-operation as set out in the TFEU. Furthermore, based on the transaction 
cost approach, the total transaction costs would not be reduced, but even increased, 
after the introduction of centralised supervision of investment conduct. Specifically, the 
transaction cost comparison between the current supervisory system and the centralised 
supervision of investment conduct could be summarised as at Table VI-1 below. Given 
the increased transaction costs after centralisation, it is highly doubtful that the 
proposed establishment of a single supervisor in charge of investment conduct 
supervision in the CMU could pass the ‘cannot be sufficiently achieved’ test and/or the 
‘better achieved’ and ‘necessary to achieve’ tests within the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality. 
Table VI-1: Transaction Cost Comparison between Current Supervisory 
System and Centralisation of Investment Conduct Supervision 




Small Numbers Increase 
Human Factors 
Opportunism Increase 
Bounded Rationality Increase 
Total Transaction Costs Increase 
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Therefore, as the negative answer from the perspective of private law governance, 
the argument in favour of the establishment of a single supervisor in charge of 
investment conduct supervision for reducing transaction costs in the European capital 
markets cannot be made from the perspective of administrative governance either. In 
fact, other than establishing a centralised supervisor in the CMU, we may have to pay 
more attention to ensuring ESMA plays its role in effectively coordinating and 
supporting NCAs’ investment conduct supervision,226 in particular, implementation and 




226 Professor Moloney holds a similar expectation regarding governance issues of CMU. However, unlike 
this study focusing on whether the investment conduct supervision should be supervised centralisedly in 
the EU, she analyses a question regarding whether the capital market will be supervised centralisedly in 
the EU. See Niamh Moloney, ‘Institutional Governance and Capital Markets Union: Incrementalism or A 
‘Big Bang’?’ (2016) 13 European Company and Financial Law Review 376 at 333–336; see also N. Moloney, 
‘Capital Markets Union: "Ever Closer Union" for the EU Financial System?’, above note 147, at 412–420. 
227 ESMA, ESMA Strategic Orientation 2016-2020, ESMA/2015/935, June, 2015, at 12–14, available at: 
<https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/2015-935_esma_strategic_orientatio
n_2016-2020.pdf> (accessed June, 2017). 
See also ESMA, 2017 Work Programme, ESMA/2016/1419, September, 2016, at 4, 8–15, available at: 
<https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/esma-2016-1419_-_esma_2017_work_progra




‘Governance is an organizing concept for many fields in all social 
sciences; it is not a field per se, and certainly not a field within 
economics. Case studies in law, political science, sociology, and 
anthropology, and game-theoretic modeling in economics, have 
all contributed to the advancement of our knowledge concerning 
governance institutions. This offers a unique opportunity for the 
social sciences to have a meeting point, if not for reunification, 
after their separation over a century ago.’1 
Since the financial markets in the EU were ‘shocked’ by the financial crisis of 
2007–09, policymakers has been initiating many reforms in the European internal 
market. The establishment of the EBU for supervision and resolution of the Eurozone’s 
major banks is a core reform to stabilise and strengthen the single currency.2 The CMU 
is complementary to the EBU in improving risk diversification and resilience to banking 
shocks.3 Notwithstanding having a similar name as to the term ‘Union’, the CMU is 
directed at achieving integration of markets across all Member States by removing 
barriers to capital flows and stimulating the development of European capital markets.4 
																																																								
1 Avinash Dixit, ‘Governance Institutions and Economic Activity’ (2009) 99 American Economic Review 5, 
at 6. 
2 For more information about the EBU, available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/finance/general-policy/banking-union/index_en.htm>  
(accessed June, 2017). 
3 European Commission, Green Paper: Building a Capital Markets Union, COM(2015) 63 final, February, 
2015, at 4, available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/finance/consultations/2015/capital-markets-union/docs/green-paper_en.pdf> 
(accessed June, 2017).  
4 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Action Plan 
on Building a Capital Markets Union, COM(2015) 468 final, September, 2015, at 4, available at: 
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Also, it is distinct from other unions in the EU, since the legislative framework to 
support cross-border investment conduct is already in place broadly (such as, MiFID 
II/MiFIR and ESMA).5 This legislative framework is formed by the fundamental 
freedoms of the Treaty of Rome initially, along with over fifty-year on-going reforms.6 
However, these efforts might not be enough to tackle the remaining obstacles in the 
CMU. This thesis is an attempt to analyse these obstacles, and whether these obstacles 
could be resolved by further centralisation of supervision at the EU level. It has 
attempted to explore the institutional governance of investment conduct in the EU and 
sought to address one primary research question: namely, ‘whether investment conduct 
should be supervised centralisedly at the EU level in the CMU (or not)’? 
Indeed, the current regulatory system of investment conduct faces many 
challenges,7 but this does not necessarily lead to a positive answer of having a single 
European supervisor.8 Based on the transaction cost approach,9 this thesis holds a 
negative answer instead. This is supported by the result of a two-fold institutional 
comparison. First, by taking into account the regulatory role and the Treaty limitations 
of European private law, private law governance of investment conduct is still 
decentralised and very divergent in Member States.10 Given the UK’s experience, this 
																																																																																																																																																													
<http://ec.europa.eu/finance/capital-markets-union/docs/building-cmu-action-plan_en.pdf> 
(accessed June, 2017).  
5 See further in Section 3.3 of CHAPTER II (pp. 32–60) and Section 3 of CHAPTER III (pp. 84–103). 
6 See further in Sections 2, 3.1 and 3.2 of CHAPTER II (pp. 17–32) and Section 2 of CHAPTER III (pp. 
73–83). 
7 See further in Section 4 of CHAPTER II (pp. 61–71) and Sections 4.1–4.3 of CHAPTER III (pp. 105–
128). 
8 See further in Section 4.4 of CHAPTER III (pp. 128–130). 
9 See further in CHAPTER IV (pp. 133–192). 
10 See further in Sections 2 and 3 of CHAPTER V (pp. 195–212). 
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may cause many complexities and problems in the European capital markets. 11 
However, the establishment of a single supervisor in charge of investment conduct 
provides very little help in resolving these.12 In contrast, an optional pan-EU ADR for 
capital market disputes, next to the national judicial systems, might be a better initiative 
in the CMU to reduce transaction costs.13 Second, even if focusing on administrative 
governance merely, transaction costs in the CMU may not decrease, but even increase, 
after the establishment of a single supervisor in charge of investment conduct 
supervision. 14  Therefore, the establishment of a single supervisor in charge of 
investment conduct supervision is hard to pass the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality.15 In fact, within the current network-based supervisory system, NCAs 
have an obligation to co-operate,16 and ESMA has enough powers for tackling relevant 
issues in cross-border transactions already. 17 We have to pay more attention on 
ensuring ESMA plays its role effectively in the CMU. 
In other words, through the lens of the transaction cost approach, the relationship 
between the current system, the proposed single supervisor and the optimum 
governance of investment conduct could be explained as following Figure VII-1.18 
																																																								
11 See further in Section 4 of CHAPTER V (pp. 212–250). 
12 See further in Section 5.1 of CHAPTER V (pp. 250–252). 
13 See further in Section 5.2 of CHAPTER V (pp. 252–255). 
14 See further in Section 4 of CHAPTER VI (pp. 275–300). 
15 See further in Section 2 of CHAPTER VI (pp. 262–271). 
16 See further in Section 3 of CHAPTER VI (pp. 271–274). 
17 ESMA now has not only many soft and hard powers to NCAs, but also some direct supervisory 
powers to financial institutions. See further in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of CHAPTER III (pp. 88–105).  
18 This line is the same as the line L3.3 in CHAPTER IV (p. 189). 
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Figure VII-1: Relationship between Current Status, Single Supervisor and 
Optimum Governance of Investment Conduct in the EU 
The current system ( ), as examined by this thesis, is not the perfect one, so it is 
not on the optimum point ( ) of governance. Furthermore, given that, either from the 
perspective of private law systems or administrative regulation, the establishment of a 
single supervisor will not lower (but even increase) the total transaction costs of the 
CMU, the proposed single supervisor (→) represents a ‘too much’ move towards 
administrative regulation. The CMU merely needs ‘a little’ move to reduce its 
transaction costs, so a pan-EU ADR might be a better option. In the light of this, it not 
only indicates that the capacity of private law for governing investment conduct is 
normally ignored by policymakers in the EU, but also highlights the importance of 
hybrid investment conduct governance between private law systems and administrative 
regulation. The EU should have a more comprehensive viewpoint of European capital 
markets law in relation to the trend of ‘Europeanisation’, in order to establish the 
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Doubtless, the present study will not put an end to the lively debate about the 
necessity of a single supervisor of investment conduct supervision in the CMU. 
Nonetheless, it is hoped that this thesis could shed new light on this sensitive and 
pressing issue. Since the UK triggered the Brexit process on 29th March, 2017,19 the 
UK, (a home country of many investment firms which uses a different currency and 
unjoins the plan of SSM) will not be able to participate the policymaking of CMU 
anymore. Will this make the UK turn to be a competitor of the CMU, leading to a single 
supervisor in charge of investment conduct supervision in the CMU?20 This question 
calls for follow-up research on the forthcoming changes in the CMU in the context of 





19 A letter from the British Prime Minister, Theresa May, notifying the United Kingdom's intention to 
leave the European Union (29th of March, 2017), available at: 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/pdf/070329_UK_letter_Tusk_Art
50_pdf/>  (accessed June, 2017). 
20 The EU also noticed this issue recently: see European Commission, Public Consultation on the 
Operations of the European Supervisory Authorities, March, 2017, at 4, 16 and 22, available at: 
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/2017-esas-operations-consultation-document_en.pdf> 
(accessed June, 2017). 
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